Proclaiming and cultivating ‘childlikeness’: a subversive thread in Christian anthropology

If contemporary public discourse struggles with truncated notions of what it means to be human, nowhere is this more obvious than in our discussion and treatment of children. By and large, in our public discourse, we treat children as ‘little adults’ – as consumers, objects of beauty and fashion, career aspirants and sometimes even as sexual beings. By contrast, Jesus put children – as children – at the centre of his project in proclaiming the kingdom of God. He preserved a special place for children in his ministry, and in all three synoptics, he called his followers to ‘childlikeness’. This paper examines a subversive thread in historic theological anthropology. The nature of ‘childlikeness’ is explored and possible ways to cultivate childlikeness for adults are discussed. The notion of childlikeness has been rediscovered in recent times by the ‘Child Theology Movement’, but, in this paper, I wish to examine three linked authors who wrote on ‘childlikeness’ in the 19th and 20th centuries, predating the Child Theology Movement by some decades: George MacDonald, Baron Friedrich von Hügel and Gwendolen Greene.     

John Milton's Magisterial Reformation

In the English prose he published over a period of two decades, John Milton frequently uses the term ‘reformation’ to identify the age in which he was living and the causes for which he was fighting. In so doing, he reveals his support for the magisterial Reformation and his rejection of the radical Reformation. He expresses his desire not for religious diversity but for union with the Scottish and Continental Reformed Churches. He constructs a complex discourse that is self-serving, misleading in some ways, prophetic, and calculated to win a range of polemical contests. In supporting the magisterial Reformation, he also displays his support for theologians who participate in government, and magistrates who participate in determining religious belief and conduct. Milton thus repudiates many aspects of modernity and is, as he insists, a man who lived during, and promoted what he called, ‘times of reformation’.     

Nietzsche and the Empirical: through the eyes of the term ‘Empfindung’

Abstract

This paper examines Nietzsche’s attitude to the empirical by concentrating on his concept of Empfindung (sensation, perception, feeling). In Section 1, five distinctive features of his use of ‘Empfmdung’ are described in relation to the philosophical tradition and some of his sources in 19^th Century physiology. All five features, I argue, point to Nietzsche’s philosophical concern to stake out the limits of ‘Empfmdung’ as an aspect of human finitude. In Section 2, my attention turns from the term ‘Empfmdung’ to Nietzsche’s actual argumentation. The bewildering variety of perspectives and arguments concerning ‘Empfmdung’ in his writings are broken down into three basic types of argument or discourse with radically different, incompatible presuppositions: a critical, epistemological discourse serving anti-metaphysical ends; a quasi-scientific discourse serving critical-epistemological ends; and a quasi-ontological discourse of life that looks to explain the results of Nietzsche’s critical epistemology. The value of this ‘contradictory’ practice, I contend, is twofold: Nietzsche makes epistemology fruitful for the philosophical problem of life; at the same time he offers a performative critique of epistemology by the manner in which he exceeds it.     

On the motivations for Merleau-Ponty’s ontological research

This paper attempts to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s later work by tracing a hitherto overlooked set of concerns that were of key consequence for the formulation of his ontological research. I argue that his ontology can be understood as a response to a set of problems originating in reflections on the intersubjective use of language in dialogue, undertaken in the early 1950s. His study of dialogue disclosed a structure of meaning-formation and pointed towards a theory of truth (both recurring ontological topics) that post-Phenomenology premises could not account for. A study of dialogue shows that speakers’ positions are interchangeable, that speaking subjects are active and passive in varying degrees, and that the intentional roles of subjects and objects are liable to shift or ‘transgress’ themselves. These observations anticipate the concepts of ‘reversibility’ and ‘narcissism’, his later view of activity and passivity, and his later view of intentionality, and sharpened the need to adopt an intersubjective focus in ontological research.     

Gadamer and the Fusion of Horizons

Abstract

Hans‐Georg Gadamer is often criticized for his account of the fusions of horizons as the ideal resolution of dialogue. I argue that in fact it is an excellent account of the successful resolution of dialogue, but only in light of a proper understanding of what Gadamer means by ‘horizon’ and how then horizons are fused. I do this by showing how Gadamer is drawing on the technical sense of ‘horizon’ found in Edmund Husserl’s and Martin Heidegger’s phenomenologies. In the process I show why a prominent criticism of Gadamer’s account of the fusion of horizons, a criticism presented most forcefully by E. D. Hirsch, is mistaken.     

Variations on the concept of traumatism: Traumatism,traumatic, trauma1

In this paper, the author outlines Freud's fundamental hypotheses concerning the concept of traumatism, then goes on to differentiate three notions (French being a particularly apposite language for such a venture): ‘traumatism’, ‘traumatic’ (in a substantive sense) and ‘trauma’. These three terms correspond to the three turning points in Freud's theory with respect to the concept of traumatism (1895‐97, 1920, 1938). The author evokes also the developments that are due to Ferenczi, particularly in his later writings (1928‐33), where he defi ned and discussed the question of ‘trauma’ in contemporary clinical practice; the author goes on to explore the different variations on this theme as regards mental functioning. He then defi nes, from a metapsychological point of view, the differences between ‘traumatisms’ that have been ‘worked over by secondary processes’, organised and governed by the pleasure‐unpleasure principle (‘traumatism’) and ‘early’ or ‘primary traumatisms’, which interfere with the process of binding the instinctual drives (‘trauma’); states of mind infl uenced by a traumatic imprint (‘traumatic’) are looked upon as belonging to both categories of the above mentioned traumatisms. The author illustrates his hypotheses with a clinical example.     

Reading Derrida with Daya Krishna: Postmodern Trends in Contemporary Indian Philosophy

In his published lectures Civilizations: Nostalgia and Utopia (2012), Daya Krishna criticizes postmodern thought and especially the writings of Jacques Derrida. By outlining similarities between the two, I would claim that, indeed, it was Daya Krishna’s unexpected proximity to Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’ project that triggered his scathing critique of the latter. Moreover, Daya Krishna’s response to Derrida reveals an ongoing inner conflict in his own thinking. On the one hand, he provides us with a harsh critique of Derrida the ‘postmodern’; on the other hand, he concedes that the ‘modern’ notion of knowledge has been totally transformed, and the ‘deconstruction’ of its old formulations was the major catalyst that provoked and directed his own philosophical enterprise in the last years of his life, reformulating knowledges (in the plural). Reconstructing in this way, the dialogue which never happened might prove beneficial, not only for understanding the distinctive works of its participants, but also for carrying their writings and us one step further towards a productive, ‘relevant’ philosophical discourse in the twenty-first century.     

Between the confusion of tongues and the gift of tongues Or working as a psychoanalyst in a foreign language1

The author worked as a psychoanalyst for 5 years in Germany. In this paper, he attempts to answer the question ‘How was it possible that, in spite of his imperfect knowledge of German, notwithstanding a deepening understanding of the language during his residence in the country, he was able to successfully treat so many patients?’ He starts by putting forward some distinctions between the activity of interpretation as translation of the unconscious with the patient in session and the activity of translation of texts. After a brief exegetic review of the myths of Babel and Pentecost, he suggests that the analyst working in a foreign language moves between ‘the confusion of tongues’ and the ‘gift of tongues’, that is, between Babel and Pentecost. He presents some vignettes to illustrate typical situations he encountered in his practice. Finally, he draws some conclusions from this experience of psychoanalytic polyglotism, mainly on the basis of the communicative function that modern infant research assigns to affect attunement and verbal language.     

Harry Silverstein’s Four‐Dimensionalism and the Purported Evil of Death

Abstract

Amongst those views sometimes attributed to the later Wittgenstein are included both a deflationary theory of truth, as well as a non-factualism about certain regions of discourse. Evidence in favor of the former attribution, it is thought, can be found in Wittgenstein’s apparent affirmation of the basic definitional equivalence of ‘p’ is true and p in §136 of his Philosophical Investigations. Evidence in favor of the latter attribution, it might then be presumed, can be found in the context of the so-called ‘private language argument’, wherein Wittgenstein provides an expressivist treatment of first-person present tense sensation utterances. In this paper, by contrast, I will argue that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is best understood as endorsing neither a non-factualism about sensation utterances, nor a deflationism about truth. Wittgenstein should instead be understood as offering a ‘mixed’ view of sensation utterances according to which some while not others are apt for expressivist treatment. Moreover, he should be thought of as identifying truth-conditions with semantic ‘correctness-conditions’, and thus truth with semantic ‘assertibility’.     

Richard Hooker’s ‘labour’ on behalf of the puritan conscience

Abstract

Although Hooker’s Lawes contains no discussion of conscience, the text is concerned with effecting the puritan conscience in leading nonconformists to understand and obey the ordinances of the Elizabethan Church of England. Through close reading of Hooker’s textual performance, the essay demonstrates how his argumentation strategy defines the conscience to satisfy his polemical goals. In his exploration of the potential of reason to resolve doubts, Hooker designs his discourse to persuade the puritan of how unwise it is to plead conscience as the basis for disobedience. The text’s purpose is to convince puritans to ‘better frame them selves’ and surrender to the guide. Hooker also indicates ways the conscience, standing before public exposure, can know it is following God’s will. This essay suggests how Hooker manipulates his opponents so that if they are reasonable there is no ‘necessitie’ of disobedience. He exposes nonconformity as hardness of heart and weakness of brain. Importantly, however, Hooker’s text, suspicious of conscience as an inner voice, circumscribes the work of conscience in terms of civil obedience. Thus he argues that his ‘labour’ has produced a public exposition that should persuade puritans to embrace their public responsibilities as citizens.     

David Liberman's legacy

This article presents, in the author's own vision, his attempt to consider (and update) the work of an original thinker of contemporary psychoanalysis (in the present). Following a short overview of his biographical data and distinctive traits as maestro and man, it then tries to capture the implications and panoramic vision of Liberman's work, the prevailing questions and problems of psychoanalysis to which it responds. In the author's opinion this involves a serious attempt to systematize clinical psychoanalysis on the basis of singularity and of tolerance to human diversity, with the greatest precision and scientific rigour admitted by the psychoanalytic discipline – avoiding cliché on the one hand and what we might call the mystification of the Oracle on the other. The successive stages of Liberman's production are indicated in terms of the auxiliary disciplines (communication theory, semiotics and linguistics) which he used for his ever more precise systematization of clinical psychoanalysis finally leading to his proposals on ‘style’ and his vision of the psychopathology of over‐adaptation and psychosomatic instances. Other concepts which this paper highlights are: Liberman's conception of analytic dialogue as framed by human interaction; his theorization which stems from this particular empirical base making use of ‘operational definitions’ and ‘intermediary formulations’; his operational definition of transference; and the inclusion of setting inside the ‘analytic situation’.     

Taha Jabir Al-‘Alwani: A Study of His Views on Ethics of Disagreement in Islam

This paper is an attempt to provide its readers/listeners the views of Taha Jabir Al-‘Alwani on Ethics of Disagreement in Islam. Taha Jabir Al-‘Alwani is one of the renowned scholars and reformists of the contemporary Muslim world. He presented in terms of views on the ethics of disagreement in Islam, an explanation of the etiquette envisioned by Islam for all those engaged in discourse and intellectual dialogue, and he also exposes a higher number of principles and purposes of the Shariah which provide Muslims with perspectives far vaster than those afforded by pedantic debate over points of law and procedure or fine distinctions between conflicting theological arguments. Above all, he analyzes that what today is going in the world is totally a contrast trend to the teachings of Qur’an and Sunnah. After stressing the paramount duty of affirming the oneness of Allah (Tawhid), both the Qur’an and the Sunnah stress on one thing above all: the unity of Muslim Ummah.     

THE REBIRTH OF THE IDOLS: THE FREUDIAN UNCONSCIOUS AND THE NIETZSCHEAN UNCONSCIOUS3

The author explores how psychoanalysis mutates in its passing from the privacies of the session to the public spaces of academia, shifting away from enquiry into unfolding unconscious psychic processes guided by its method, and from the clinically based notions Freud and his diverse followers constructed, here called the ‘Freudian unconscious’. In postmodern intellectual contexts Freud's work fuels a ‘Nietzschean unconscious’, issuing from public lecterns in the protagonistic, self‐creating feats of a ‘psychoanalytic discourse’. The ideology of such mutation ishere traced from Nietzsche on to Heidegger and Kojave, and then to Lacan and Laplanche. It reflects the might of the ‘death of evidences’ and the Romantic penchant for the limit‐experience and the primacy accorded to the creative imagination. Discourse as revelation rests on a ‘paradox of the enunciation’ whereby the subject (author) of the statement is taken to be identical to the subject (matter) of the statement. Banishing the boundaries of illusion and evidence, and of self‐overcoming and insight, academic ‘psychoanalytic discourse’creates a ‘return of the idols’ in ‘theoretical’ narcissistic identification.     

Book received

In his recent article, titled ‘Royaumont Revisited’, Overgaard challenges Dummett's view that one needs to go as far back as the late nineteenth century in order to discover examples of genuine dialogue between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy. Instead, Overgaard argues that in the 1958 Royaumont colloquium, generally judged as a failed attempt at communication between the two camps, one can find some elements which may be utilized towards re-establishing a dialogue between these two sides. Yet, emphasising this image of Royaumont as a kind of battleground between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy obscures the plurality of philosophical approaches involved. Royaumont was the meeting point of more than two philosophical traditions, as can be shown by the divergent interests of its participants. Thus, though the potential for rapprochement between Oxford ‘linguistic philosophy’ and a certain strand of phenomenological thought may indeed be found among the discussions that took place during the colloquium, one should keep in mind that such rapprochement took place in the context of a meeting between, among others: continental ‘analytics’, Anglophone non-‘analytics’, French historians of philosophy, ‘analytic’ opponents of Oxford philosophy, Franciscan phenomenologists, and Oxonians who called their work ‘phenomenology’.     

Wrestling the Serpent: Gandhi,Amritsar and the British Empire

Throughout the period of the non‐co‐operation movement in India in the early 1920s, Gandhi surprised and sometimes bewildered the British in India with his incessant labelling of the Government as ‘satanic’. It is argued in this paper that Gandhi deliberately employed the word ‘satanic’ with a keen awareness of its power on both his opponents and supporters. He used it to give religious justification to the non‐co‐operation movement. He used it to apportion guilt and spread disaffection with the British Government. He used it to exhort his followers to greater self‐purification, especially against the ‘weaknesses’ of violence and untouchability.     

Say hello to the scream extractor: working with an autistic child with psychotic mechanisms

This paper describes the first two years of intensive psychotherapy with a six-year-old boy diagnosed with autism. I explore the many ways in which he retreated from reality, most frequently by taking refuge inside the maternal body or flying off into an imaginary space world. He fragmented his identity and that of his objects by using the discourse of fictional characters. Everything was externalised; there was little transmutation of material available for thought. I consider his dilemma – the wish to fuse with the object and the fear of being engulfed; the omnipotent denial of the need for an object and of the parental relationship, leading to an inability to make links. The paper discusses working with a child who experienced any ‘paternal’ firmness as persecuting and destructive. The softer, receptive maternal mind of the therapist was more easily tolerated. He gradually began to internalise a more benign combined object, as he became more able to bear separateness from the other.     

Remarks on Wittgenstein's über Gewissheit and a Norwegian discussion

In the late forties and in the fifties, what was then known as the Oslo School of Philosophy, that is, Arne Naess and his students, received some fame, or notoriety, for its empirical investigations of lay uses of various epistemological terms, such as ‘true’, ‘certain’, ‘probable’. It is less known that Arne Naess, in 1953, opened up a series of investigations into conceptual frameworks, the comparability of conceptual frameworks, and the senses, if any, in which a conceptual framework can be said to represent knowledge. In the course of these investigations Arne Naess, together with some of his students, developed views that are strikingly close to those of Ludwig Wittgenstein in Über Gewissheit. This paper examines some of those similarities and a few dissimilarities.     

On the difficulty interpreting He Yan’s ‘emotionless sage’

This paper examines the debate surrounding He Shao’s account that ‘He Yan thinks the sage is without pleasure, anger, sorrow and grief.’ The point of controversy surrounds squaring a perspective on the sage as emotionless with a thinker who otherwise largely expounds values and political views found in the Lunyu and the Laozi. Since proper management of emotions is important in both texts, it is difficult to imagine how He Yan could hold such a radical view. Dealing with this difficulty scholars have either simply found He Yan ‘unreasonable’ and ‘contradictory’ or otherwise sought to explain away his emotionless sage through complex ontological or political arguments. When He Yan’s work is contextualized in terms of philosophical religious views at the time, we find additional problems with how He Yan’s work has been interpreted. This paper considers a new way to view He Yan, one that respects his multifarious views.