Hyperstriatal function in the pigeon: response inhibition or response shift?

Experiment 1 showed that pigeons with lesions of the anterior or posterior hyperstriatum were impaired relative to unoperated controls and to control operates having neostriatal lesions on both acquisition and reversal of a simultaneous position discrimination. The observation that hyperstriatal birds showed more tendency than controls to halt responding altogether in this situation cast doubt on the notion that the reversal deficit was due to a loss of response inhibition. A second experiment supported an alternative hypothesis, that hyperstriatal birds have a deficit in the ability to shift responding to an alternative stimulus as a consequence of nonreinforcement.     

Phase-oscillator computations as neural models of stimulus–response conditioning and response selection

The activity of collections of synchronizing neurons can be represented by weakly coupled nonlinear phase oscillators satisfying Kuramoto’s equations. In this article, we build such neural-oscillator models, partly based on neurophysiological evidence, to represent approximately the learning behavior predicted and confirmed in three experiments by well-known stochastic learning models of behavioral stimulus–response theory. We use three Kuramoto oscillators to model a continuum of responses, and we provide detailed numerical simulations and analysis of the three-oscillator Kuramoto problem, including an analysis of the stability points for different coupling conditions. We show that the oscillator simulation data are well-matched to the behavioral data of the three experiments.     

Joint response–effect compatibility

When performing jointly on a task, human agents are assumed to represent their coactor’s share of this task, and research in various joint action paradigms has focused on representing the coactor’s stimulus–response assignments. Here we show that the response–effect (R–E) contingencies exploited by a coactor also affect performance, and thus might be represented as if they were used by oneself. Participants performed an R–E compatibility task, with keypresses producing spatially compatible or incompatible action effects. We did not observe any R–E compatibility effects when the task was performed in isolation (individual go–no-go). By contrast, small but reliable R–E compatibility effects emerged when the same task was performed in a joint setting. These results indicate that the knowledge of a coactor’s R–E contingencies can influence whether self-produced action effects are used for one’s own motor control.     

Influences of multiple spatial stimulus and response codes on orthogonal stimulus—response compatibility

When up-down stimuli are mapped to left-right responses, an up-right/down-left mapping advantage is found that is modified by response eccentricity and hand posture. These effects can be attributed to correspondence of asymmetric stimulus and response codes formed relative to multiple reference frames. We examined the influence of stimulus-set location on these orthogonal stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) effects. In Experiment 1, the stimulus set appeared in the upper or lower display positions. A spatial code for stimulus-set location was formed, producing Simon-type response eccentricity and hand posture effects, but this code had no influence on the coding of the relevant stimuli. In Experiment 2, the stimulus set appeared in the left, center, or right positions relative to the response location, which also varied, to dissociate the effects of response location, relative to the stimulus display and body midline. The former factor influenced the orthogonal SRC effect for both unimanual switch movements and bimanual keypresses, and the latter factor influenced the effect for only unimanual switch movements. Stimulus-set location causes orthogonal Simon-type effects when varied along the stimulus dimension and provides a referent for response coding when varied along the response dimension.     

Unlearning a stimulus–response association

After a response has been associated with a particular stimulus, would this association be “unlearned” when the circumstances call for a new response to be made to that stimulus? This question was investigated in the present study with a negative priming (NP) paradigm developed by Shiu and Kornblum (1996). In the study, participants first practiced with a particular pairing of stimuli and responses in a four-choice reaction time (RT) task. Then, in the transfer phase, they switched to a different pairing of the same set of stimuli and responses. The results showed that a transfer response was slow if this response and the stimulus in the preceding trial had been paired in the training phase. Such NP effects persisted even after extended practice with the new pairing, suggesting that the “old” stimulus–response (SR) associations remain despite acquisition of some “new” associations.     

Is handedness just response bias?

Although most people prefer to use the right hand for unimanual tasks, it is unknown whether handedness arises from response bias. Whether it does is a question inspired by signal detection theory. We drew on the framework of signal detection theory to assess bias and sensitivity in hand choice by asking right-handers to choose between two tasks—one performed with the left hand, and one performed with the right. For some participants, the left-hand task stayed constant while the right-hand task was varied. For other participants, the right-hand stayed constant while the left-hand task was varied. We reasoned that if hand preference only reflected bias, participants would choose the generally preferred hand to the same degree, regardless of whether its task was constant or varied. Our participants followed this strategy only to some extent, suggesting that bias and sensitivity both contribute to hand preference.     

Effects of visual cue and response assignment on spatial stimulus coding in stimulus–response compatibility

Tlauka and McKenna (2000 Tlauka, M. and McKenna, F. P. 2000. Hierarchical knowledge influences stimulus–response compatibility effects. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 53A: 85–103.  [Google Scholar]) reported a reversal of the traditional stimulus–response compatibility (SRC) effect (faster responding to a stimulus presented on the same side than to one on the opposite side) when the stimulus appearing on one side of a display is a member of a superordinate unit that is largely on the opposite side. We investigated the effects of a visual cue that explicitly shows a superordinate unit, and of assignment of multiple stimuli within each superordinate unit to one response, on the SRC effect based on superordinate unit position. Three experiments revealed that stimulus–response assignment is critical, while the visual cue plays a minor role, in eliciting the SRC effect based on the superordinate unit position. Findings suggest bidirectional interaction between perception and action and simultaneous spatial stimulus coding according to multiple frames of reference, with contribution of each coding to the SRC effect flexibly varying with task situations.     

Does subliminal priming of free response choices depend on task set or automatic response activation?

In a task requiring speeded bidirectional responses to arrow symbols (?,?), "free choice" responses to interspersed bidirectional stimuli (<>) are influenced by masked directional primes (e.g., Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). By varying stimulus-response (S-R) compatibility, we tested whether this priming effect is mediated by the conscious instructional set, or instead by pre-existing directional associations to the symbols. In two experiments, one group of participants was instructed to respond with the hand consistent with the implied direction of the arrow symbols, while another group was instructed to make the spatially opposite responses. Both groups showed priming of "free choice" responses. However, such priming was always biased according to the instructional set rather than pre-existing associations. Subliminal priming of "free choice" responses therefore depends on conscious task goals.     

Gnosisssss ‐ A response to Wouter Hanegraaff

Researchers in psychology of religion in America and Britain have inherited the theoretical and research traditions established by W. James, S. Freud and J. Dittes. New nomothetic or theoretical frameworks have been called for in order to organize a plethora of idiographic data. A response to the call has been slow, but Paul Pruyser designated at least six areas in which the development of psychology of religion might most fruitfully occur; and the suggestion has been that altered states of consciousness research is perhaps the most important item of all six to consider for research methodology. This particular item, it was broadly suggested, may possibly serve as a bridge between East and West, thereby bringing psychologists of religion out of the darkness of Western methodological ethnocentrism, and into the light of cross-cultural, universally-applicable concerns sought in the spirit of the scientific study of religion. Psychologists of religion must rely on the tradition of Religion-swissenschaft for much of the ‘non-reducible’ data they study. Although the preponderence of general activity in the field is occurring in America, little attention along these lines is evident there. In Britain, the discipline is floundering. Yet, in spite of its quandaries, recognition of the need to encounter Eastern psychologies and religions, perhaps by means of the ‘bridge’ of altered states of consciousness research, appears to be more clearly stated in Britain (though infrequent, often obscure) than it has been elsewhere.     

A response to Penrose’s “Sandel on enhancement: A response to Van Niekerk”

In this article the author responds to Brian Penrose’s critical response to his (Van Niekerk’s) article “Biomedical enhancement and the pursuit of mastery and perfection: a critique of the views of Michael Sandel” that appeared in the PSSA conference edition of the SAJP 33(2), 2014. While Van Niekerk is appreciative of the opportunity for spirited dialogue that Penrose’s response provides, he nevertheless takes issue with several charges Penrose raises. He responds to Penrose’s claims that Van Niekerk does not fully understand “the Sandel project” and thus that Van Niekerk creates and shoots down a straw man in his argument against Sandel. Van Niekerk argues that Penrose’s claims are indicative of significant methodological differences between their respective approaches. Penrose acknowledges the “fuzziness” of Sandel’s arguments with regards to biomedical enhancement. He then develops an interpretation of Sandel’s views that claims to have “filled in the complete picture” of what Sandel attempts to do, and then reproaches Van Niekerk for not responding to that “completed picture”, i.e. the “Sandel project”. Van Niekerk finds this to be an unreasonable and methodologically highly problematic demand on him. Van Niekerk responds to a number of Penrose’s arguments, and then concludes that while there are, of course, good reasons to exercise caution at the prospect of biomedical enhancement with regard to its risks, the possibilities offered by enhancement need not elicit a prima facie reaction of pessimism. Rather, such prospects can also be regarded in a positive light as an exciting opportunity to take our own evolution in hand.     

Do young and old preschoolers exhibit response bias due to different mechanisms? Investigating children's response time

Previous studies have suggested that younger preschoolers exhibit a yes bias due to underdeveloped cognitive abilities, whereas older preschoolers exhibit a response bias due to other factors. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the response latency to yes-no questions pertaining to familiar and unfamiliar objects in 3- to 6-year-olds. The 3-year-olds exhibited a strong yes bias for both objects, and their response latency was significantly shorter than that of the 6-year-olds. The 4- and 5-year-olds did not exhibit any response bias, whereas the 6-year-olds exhibited a nay-saying bias (a response bias to say “no”) for unfamiliar objects. Overall, children’s response bias scores were stronger for familiar objects than for unfamiliar objects. The results suggest that 3-year-olds exhibit a yes bias automatically, but 5- and 6-year-olds are sensitive to question context.     

Refining the dual-stage account of intertrial feature priming: Does motor response or response feature matter?

Numerous studies have shown that repetition of search-relevant attributes facilitates visual search performance. For example, Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994) showed that when observers search for a target defined by its color and report its shape, repetition of the target color speeds search, an effect known as priming of pop-out. While intertrial feature priming in search was initially thought to affect perceptual processes, the idea that it also affects postselection stages of processing is increasingly acknowledged. However, because in previous studies repetition of the motor response has typically been confounded with repetition of the response feature, it is not clear what mechanisms underlie the postselection effect of intertrial priming. In the present study, we dissociated the two repetition types. The results showed that repetition of the target-defining attribute from the previous trial affects selection of the motor response but not discrimination of the response attribute. The implications for current accounts of intertrial priming are discussed.     

Inhibition of irrelevant category–response mappings

When switching tasks, performance tends to be worse for n – 2 repetitions than with n – 2 switches. This n – 2 repetition cost has been hypothesized to reflect task-set inhibition: specifically, inhibition of irrelevant category–response mappings involved in response selection. This hypothesis leads to divergent predictions for situations in which all tasks involve the same stimulus categories: An n – 2 repetition cost is predicted when response sets differ across tasks, but not when the response set stays the same. The authors tested these predictions by having subjects perform relative judgements with different reference points. In Experiment 1, the stimulus categories were the same across reference points, but the response set either differed or stayed the same (the multiple- and single-mapping conditions, respectively). An n – 2 repetition cost was found in the multiple-mapping condition but not in the single-mapping condition. Experiment 2 provided evidence against the possibility that these divergent effects reflected differences in memory load. These findings confirm predictions that link n – 2 repetition costs to inhibition of irrelevant category–response mappings.     

Does motor programming necessitate response execution?

The complexity of a movement is known to affect the time it takes to initiate the movement. This effect is thought to reflect changes in the duration of processes that operate on a motor program. This question addressed here is whether programming a movement compels the start of its overt execution. If it does, then the programming processes may be said to occur after the "point of no return." We report results from an empirical procedure and a theoretical analysis designed to study processes before and after this point separately. According to our results, changes in the complexity of a movement affect only the prior set of processes. From this we argue that motor programming does not necessitate response execution and that the point of no return occurs very late in the information-processing system.     

Does placebo response mediate runner's high?

It is proposed that runner's high is mediated by increased endorphin release as induced by placebo responses arising from subjective expectancies and setting.     

The“response” in behavior theory

The term“response” is a basic one in behavior theory, particularly reflex theory, but its definition is not clear. The origin of the term in the common vocabulary has affected its later extensions in the analysis of behavior. Some contemporary theorists accept the existence of two“types” of response, coordinating one with the Pavlovian conditioning procedure, the other with the operant conditioning procedure of the so-called“contingent” variety. Reservations are expressed here about such distinctions between response classes and conditioning paradigms, emphasizing the difficulties that arise from certain conventions and inadequacies in current definitions and conceptions of“response.” The critical nature of the problem for behavior theory is illustrated once again by the recent laboratory finding that a familiar and accepted conditional reflex, that of the“conditioned cardiac CR,” can be fractionated into“parts” and is therefore perhaps no longer to be treated as a single unitary“response.”     

Response–response binding across effector-set switches

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - A single encounter of a response together with a stimulus results in short-lived binding between the stimulus and the response. A repetition of any part of such...