TELEOFUNCTIONALISM AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

Fred Dretske's teleofunctional theory of content aims to simultaneously solve two ground‐floor philosophical puzzles about mental content: the problem of naturalism and the problem of epiphenomenalism. It is argued here that his theory fails on the latter score. Indeed, the theory insures that content can have no place in the causal explanation of action at all. The argument for this conclusion depends upon only very weak premises about the nature of causal explanation. The difficulties Dretske's theory encounters indicate the severe challenges involved in arriving at a robust naturalistic understanding of content.     

FUNDAMENTALISM IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Drawing from social historical studies and critical feminist perspectives on psychological method and report writing, I analyze the content of the fourth edition of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (APA, 1994) as if it were a biblical text. I focus on the correspondence between the espoused intention of sensitivity toward participants and the codes of investigative conduct made explicit and implicit in the manual. Specifically, I examine definitions of research, research roles, ethical standards, writing style, and gender issues. I then discuss the manual's function as a fundamentalist bible in relation to psychologists' culture, including socialization of psychology students and the production of research articles. I conclude with recommendations for investigative and compositional alternatives.