THE CREATIVE IMPERATIVE: Religious Ethics and the Formation of Life in Common

Challenging a long‐standing assumption of the separation of ethical from poetic activity, this essay develops the basis for a theory of moral life as inherently and radically creative. A range of contemporary post‐Kantian ethicists—including Ricoeur, Nussbaum, Kearney, and Gutiérrez—are employed to make the argument that moral practice requires a fundamental capability for creative transformation, imagination, and social renewal. In addition, this poetic moral capability can finally be understood only from the primordial religious point of view of the mystery of Creation as such. Humanity as an image of its Creator is called to the endless impossible possibility of the re‐creation of its own complex, plural, and fallen social world. Such a perspective is opposed to views of moral life as the application of law‐like principles or the recovery of past moral histories. Without a better understanding of moral life's radically creative imperative, we miss a vital element of social relations' distinctive humanity.     

Hegel,modal logic,and the social nature of mind

ABSTRACT

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit provides a fascinating picture of individual minds caught up in “recognitive” relations so as to constitute a realm—“spirit”—which, while necessarily embedded in nature, is not reducible to it. In this essay I suggest a contemporary path for developing Hegel's suggestive ideas in a way that broadly conforms to the demands of his own system, such that one moves from logic to a philosophy of mind. Hence I draw on Hegel's “subjective logic”, understood in the light of modern modal logic, in an attempt to model the way minds might be thought as connected by way of shared intentional contents. Here, we should not be surprised at some of the parallels that emerge between the approaches of Hegel and the modal logician Arthur Prior, as Prior had testified to the influence of his teacher, John N. Findlay, who himself had strong Hegelian leanings. In the final section, Robert Stalnaker's version of possible-world semantics is suggested as a framework within which Hegel's recognitive account of the mind might be understood.     

The Temporality of Life: Merleau‐Ponty,Bergson, and the Immemorial Past

Borrowing conceptual tools from Bergson, this essay asks after the shift in the temporality of life from Merleau‐Ponty's Phénoménologie de la perception to his later works. Although the Phénoménologie conceives life in terms of the field of presence of bodily action, later texts point to a life of invisible and immemorial dimensionality. By reconsidering Bergson, but also thereby revising his reading of Husserl, Merleau‐Ponty develops a nonserial theory of time in the later works, one that acknowledges the verticality and irreducibility of the past. Life in the flesh relies on unconsciousness or forgetting, on an invisibility that structures its passage.     

Rewriting the flesh of the world for the new human: Merleau-Ponty,Fanon, and Wynter on the ethics of futurity

This article reads Maurice Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the “flesh of the world” alongside the ontology that seems to undergird Frantz Fanon's sociodiagnostics as well as his theory of sociogeny. It argues that reading Fanonian sociogeny in terms of the ambiguity and intercorporeality of the flesh of the world renders the ethical and political imperatives of Fanon's decolonial project all the more pressing, since the “new human” is prefigured—if not totally determined—in the national consciousness obtained by “les damnés” through the decolonization process. It then examines how Sylvia Wynter's Fanonian call to (re)fashion the future of humanness through (re)conceptualizing “being human as praxis,” also seems to rely on this ontology of the flesh of the world. Bringing these arguments together, the article suggests that the conceptual content of the new human can be found in the liberation struggles of les damnés across what Wynter calls the “poverty archipelagos” wrought by colonial humanism. Hence, the “new skin” for which Fanon calls is fashioned through forming international solidarity with les damnés, with the conceptual content of the new humanism emerging sociogenically—and autopoetically—from those struggles themselves.     

John Colet,Preaching and Reform at St Paul's Cathedral, 1505-19

Abstract

As a Christian humanist, Colet attempted clerical reform partly by means of preaching. Evidence from Colet's ecclesiastical life as dean of St Paul's suggests that his success was limited by the inappropriate expression of his idealistic ecclesiology, which demanded perfection. Although Colet's passion for preaching was shared and admired by humanist colleagues, his sermons received negative reactions from his cathedral clergy, the Bishop of London and Henry VIII.

The intellectual basis for Colet's ecclesiology was a combination of Pauline theology and Dionysian spirituality, which created a vision of Church perfection by means of purification and illumination. However, Colet sought a spiritual and moral revival, not a fundamental change to the structure of the Catholic Church. Colet's humanist success was achieved mainly outside the ecclesiastical world.     

Nietzsche,intention, action

Nietzsche sometimes writes as if we are not in control—at least not in conscious control—of our actions. He seems to suggest that what we actually do is independent of our intentions. It turns out, though, that his understanding of both intention and action differs radically from most contemporary treatments of the issue. In particular, he denies that our actions are caused by their intentions, whose role is hermeneutical in a sense that this essay develops. How then is responsibility to be assigned, since its moral variety, at least, depends, on several views, on the intention with which an action is performed? Nietzsche, of course, is not interested in making attributions of moral responsibility. Still, his views on the relationship between an individual action, its intention, other actions by its agent, and the agent's character, as this essay presents them, provide a reasonable account of action generally and a different, broader account of responsibility for oneself.     

Of exile and Halakhah: Fourteenth-century Spanish Halakhic literature and the works of the French exiles Aaron ha-Kohen and Jeruham b. Meshulam

This article discusses the halakhic works of two authors who shared the experience of exile and displacement. Both authors, R. Aaron ha-Kohen of Lunel and R. Jeruham b. Meshulam, wrote halakhic compendia after leaving their homes in Southern France and settling in Spanish territory after the expulsion of 1306. The article suggests that there is a connection between a scholar's experience of being displaced and his desire to devote his time to assembling, restructuring and giving order to the law. R. Aaron ha-Kohen authored a work that was a collection of opinions, a compilation to consult regularly, one that can best be described as a portable library for the wanderer and the homebound person alike. Aaron in his introduction explicitly links his motivation for composing such a work to his personal experience of exile. R. Jeruham b. Meshulam composed a handbook or guide for the practicing judge of Castile. His primary motivation was to correct a situation he found in his new home – the lack of qualified judges in issuing legal decisions. Jeruham, as well, describes at length his exile experience in his introduction and indicates that his motivation to write such a work emerges from it. One can suggest that behind the émigré's diligence in ordering the law lay an attempt to recapture a lost world and to recreate on paper or parchment what was forever lost.     

The empiricist as rebel: Jung,Freud, and the burdens of discipleship

However little they share in common, both Freudian and Jungian commentators have long agreed that Jung's theoretical development in the years following his psychoanalytic affiliation prompted an open “split” with Freud and the psychoanalytic movement. Careful examination of Jung's principal “rebel” works does not sustain this thesis, however, but rather indicates Jung's honest belief that his limited appropriation of certain psychoanalytic mechanisms and attendant theoretical modifications constituted full-fledged loyalty to psychoanalysis as he understood it. This perception receives significant support from the Freud-Jung correspondence which reveals Jung openly articulating the ground rules defining his loyalty to psychoanalysis as early as 1906, and Freud accepting, and even approving, his protégé's empirical reservations over the course of the next five years.     

Durkheim,Sellars, and the Origins of Collective Intentionality

Wilfrid Sellars read and annotated Celestine Bouglé’s Evolution of Values, translated by his mother with an introduction by his father (1926). The book expounded Émile Durkheim's account of morality and elaborated his account of origins of value in collective social life. Sellars replaced elements of this account in constructing his own conception of the relationship between the normative and community, but preserved a central one: the idea that conflicting collective and individual intentions could be found in the same person. These notoriously opaque arguments, which seek to save an element of rationalism from social explanation while granting the claims of behavioural science, are illuminated by comparing them to their original Durkheimian form.     

A THEORY OF SOCIAL ACTION: WHY PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY NEEDS A SUPERPATTERN COROLLARY

Kelly's Commonality and Sociality corollaries deal with shared meanings. In this article, the authors revisit Kelly's early work on superpatterns to demonstrate the relationship between superpatterns and the concept of corporate construing (Balnaves & Caputi, 1993) as a way of extending the Commonality and Sociality corollaries. The authors argue that corporate construing is joint action. Constructs in such an action originate from corporate, not personal, agents. Corporate agency entails anticipation in joint action of the mode of representation of everyone else (sensus communis), justification of the joint action (reasons as good reasons), recognition that a personal action is corporate (the same) within a style of reasoning (a system of specialized techniques or corporate constructs). It is not the individual patterns of personal constructs, or an individual's interpretations of his or her own actions, that is relevant in an explanation of personal actions. It is an understanding of the genre, the overall template, the superpattern.     

Identity,Incentives, and Religious Defense of Human Rights: Marshall Meyer and the DAIA in Argentina's Dirty War

Whether religious groups advance or limit human rights has been a topic of recent debate among human rights scholars. This article studies the conditions under which religious leaders advance human rights in the context of Argentina's Jewish community during the country's 1976–1983 military dictatorship. Three major influences on religious support for human rights—autonomy from a religious community's establishment, a missionary-reformer identity, and congregational mobilization—are highlighted. Original archival research from the papers of U.S.-born rabbi Marshall T. Meyer illustrates his defense of human rights in Argentina, contrasting his work with the inaction of a major established Jewish organization. Quantitative cross-national analysis extends the case study findings by showing a relationship between religious institutions’ autonomy from the state and defense of human rights.     

Corpus Meum: Disintegrating Bodies and the Ideal of Integrity

This essay shows that Jean‐Luc Nancy's reconceptualization of corporeality in such texts as L'Intrus and Corpus can be an important ally to feminist theories of body. I introduce Nancy's ontology and argue that his rejection of the unified, integrated body of humanist discourses in favor of dis‐integrated bodies constituted by multiple alterities and his consequent reinterpretation of body as a “being‐exscribed” begin the task of thinking bodies beyond traditional dualisms and their ahistorical and rationalist frameworks. I then address three potential criticisms of Nancy's work and suggest that though there may be reasons to move cautiously in adopting the framework he provides, his work harbors resources directly beneficial to critiques of prevailing forms of gender normativity. Quel étrange moi! —Jean‐Luc Nancy, Corpus     

Theorising from the Global Standpoint: Kant and Grotius on Original Common Possession of the Earth

The paper contrasts Kant's conception of original common possession of the earth with Hugo Grotius's superficially similar notion. The aim is not only to elucidate how much Kant departs from his natural law predecessors—given that Grotius's needs‐based framework very much lines in with contemporary theorists’ tendency to reduce issues of global concern to questions of how to divide the world up, it also seeks to advocate Kant's global thinking as an alternative for current debates. Crucially, it is Kant's radical shift in perspective—from an Archimedean ’view from nowhere‘, to a first‐personal standpoint through which agents reflexively recognise their systematic interdependence in a world of limited space—that provides him with the more thorough and ultimately convincing global standpoint. This standpoint does not come with ready‐made solutions to shared global problems, but provides a promising perspective from which to theorise them.     

Dora's Gift; Or,Lacan's Homage to Dora

Lacan reopened Dora's case in 1957. In his 1951 talk (published in 1952), transference was the key; in the 1957 seminar, he focused on hysteria. Dora loved by proxy and refused to be an object of heterosexual desire. Her object was homosexual because Mrs. K embodied Dora's essential question, femininity—a question that cannot be divorced from that of the lack of the phallus and her father's gift of nothing, which is the gift of love. There is no greater gift than the gift of what one does not have. Drawing from Mauss and Lévi-Strauss, Lacan concluded with an analysis of the cultural meaning of the gift.     

The Theological Foundation of Hobbesian Physics: A Defence of Corporeal God

In 1668, the octogenarian Hobbes finally affirmed openly a doctrine that was unavoidable given his longstanding embrace of both theism and materialism: God is corporeal. However, this doctrine has generally been downplayed or dismissed by scholars, who have alleged that Hobbes's corporeal theism is irreconcilable with his more orthodox theological pronouncements or with his fundamental metaphysical principles. This paper defends the coherence of Hobbes's corporeal God against particularly vigorous criticisms of Douglas Jesseph and others. The aim of the paper is not, however, to situate Hobbes's deity safely within the boundaries of seventeenth century protestant theology, as defenders of Hobbesian theism have often wanted to do. Rather, the paper places the corporeal God at the metaphysical foundations of Hobbes's natural philosophy. Despite his early reticence about theological speculation, Hobbes eventually relied on God to provide a continuous, resistance-free source of motion or conatus to a material plenum whose parts would otherwise quickly slow to an infinitesimal crawl. Hobbes's late theology, while certainly heterodox in content, is not so different in function from that of contemporaries like René Descartes and Henry More, whose religious sincerity is rarely questioned. Hobbes' corporeal deity deserves a place in the seventeenth century pantheon.     

Albert le Grand: De ce qui vient avant la logique

Le premier tractatus du commentaire d'Albert le Grand à l'Isagoge de Porphyre consiste en une manière de proème ou d'introduction à l'ensemble de la logique. Comme la plupart des textes d'Albert le Grand, ce traité est d'une très grande richesse, qu'atténuent toutefois son manque d'ordre et son obscurité d'expression. Étant donné que les aspects fondamentaux de la logique y sont touchés—son statut scientifique et philosophique, son utilité, son sujet, sa division, sa relation aux sciences du langage, etc.—, ce petit ouvrage est du plus haut intérêt pour quiconque cherche à mieux comprendre la logique et la philosophie de la logique du XIII^e siècle. L'auteur présente ici une traduction annotée et expliquée de ce texte difficile, faite d'après la version provisoire de la nouvelle édition de Cologne. Le relevé des sources principales de l'ouvrage révèle, sur un fond aristotélicien permanent, une forte influence des traités logiques arabes nouvellement arrivés en Occident.

The first tractatus of Albert the Great's commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge consists of a kind of proem or introduction to the whole of logic. As most of Albert the Great's texts, this tract is of great richness, though it lacks order and is sometimes obscure. Since the fundamental themes of logic are addressed therein—its scientific and philosophical status, its utility, its subject, its division, its relation to the linguistic arts, etc.—, this small work is of high interest for anyone trying to better understand thirteenth-century logic and philosophy of logic. The author presents a translation of this difficult text, made after a preliminary version of the new critical edition and enriched with an introduction and explanatory notes. The survey of the main sources of the tract reveals, apart from a permanent artistotelian background, the strong influence of the Arabic logical treatises which were then coming in the Western world.     

Voluntarism,Atonement, and Duns Scotus

The two most important concepts in Duns Scotus's (1265/6‐1308) theology of the Atonement are satisfaction and merit. Just what these amount to and how they function in his theory are heavily conditioned by two more general commitments: Scotus's voluntarism, which includes the claim that nearly all of God's relations with the created order are contingent; and his formulation of the Franciscan Thesis, which holds that fixing the sin problem is not the primary purpose of God's Incarnation in Christ and that if Adam hadn't sinned God would have become incarnate anyway. In this essay I will discuss the theoretical background of Scotus's atonement theology—his voluntarism and his version of the Franciscan Thesis—before moving on to discuss his understanding of merit and satisfaction, how these are related, and how they relate to the theoretical background. I will engage some important recent scholarly attempts to position Scotus's Atonement theology as not quite as anti‐Anselmian as history has characterized it, arguing that one of these attributes to Scotus an understanding of merit which cannot be Scotus's in fact, since it entails a restriction on divine freedom that Scotus certainly would reject.     

How Lloyd Morgan's canon backfired

Lloyd Morgan's Canon is usually represented as a brave step towards mechanistic behaviourism. Morgan himself, however, was convinced that the behaviour of animals and humans could only be treated in intentionalist terms. In fact, not only the spirit but the details of his Canon have been consistently misunderstood. It was turned around by Neo-Cartesians within psychology and evolutionary biology to attack the very ground that Morgan shared with Darwin—the assumption that organisms are “no mere puppets in the hand of circumstances.” Morgan did not formulate his Canon in “revolt” against Romanes's anthropomorphic approach to comparative psychology. An examination of Morgan's early views reveals that his Canon represented a move towards, not against, Romanes's idea of an animal psychology. Before the Canon, Morgan had denied the very possibility of a comparative psychology.