科学与信仰--从爱因斯坦的宗教观谈起

爱因斯坦自少年时代起一直不信宗教,但他始终非常重视宗教问题,对宗教文化,对科学与信仰的关系有深刻而独到的认识和理解。但是他关于宗教的一些论述经常被人们所误解,一些别有用心的人经常利用伟大科学家的感召力来鼓动宗教狂热,例如邪教教首李洪志曾多次讲到:“爱因斯坦不是一般人,他发现了宗教甚至神学所讲的东西是对     

Text Belief Consistency Effects in the Comprehension of Multiple Texts With Conflicting Information

When reading multiple texts about controversial scientific issues, learners must construct a coherent mental representation of the issue based on conflicting information that can be more or less belief-consistent. The present experiment investigated the effects of text–belief consistency on the situation model and memory for text. Students read four texts about a scientific controversy. Learners' situation model was biased towards their beliefs when belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent texts were presented block-by-block. When the texts were presented alternatingly, situation models for belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent texts were equally strong. Moreover, the text base was better for belief-inconsistent texts. These results support the idea that prior beliefs influence the processing of conflicting information in multiple texts differently on the level of the situation model and on the propositional text base. A more balanced situation model of scientific controversies can be promoted by presenting belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent texts in an alternating sequence.     

信念修正的AGM理论

信念修正问题是一个富有活力的,正在发展的研究主题。这个主题包括了一大批背景不同、形态各异的理论。阿尔罗若(C．E．Alchourron)、加德福斯(P．Gardenfors)和梅金森(D．Markinson)共同建立的信念修正理论(简称AGM理论)是其中形成比较早的、影响最大的理论。本文说明信念修正的基本概念,并且对AGM理论进行述评.     

The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions

The paper provides an argument for the thesis that an agent’s degrees of disbelief should obey the ranking calculus. This Consistency Argument is based on the Consistency Theorem. The latter says that an agent’s belief set is and will always be consistent and deductively closed iff her degrees of entrenchment satisfy the ranking axioms and are updated according to the ranktheoretic update rules. Special Issue Formal Epistemology I. Edited by Branden Fitelson     

信念的组合性与信念的形而上学

20世纪以来,关于信念的形而上学研究,主要有表征主义和倾向论两条基本路径。基于对信念的组合性特征的阐明,一方面,组合性是信念的构成性条件;另一方面,组合性不是信念的构成性条件,因为典型的物理倾向和心理倾向都不具有组合性,而且,一个组合性的倾向谓词不必然谓述一个组合的倾向。因此,在形而上学上,信念不是倾向。进而,考虑到表征主义能够为信念的组合性提供最佳解释,论文主张,信念的组合性特征是支持信念表征主义的有力理由。     

The Representation of Belief

I derive a sufficient condition for a belief set to be representable by a probability function: if at least one comparative confidence ordering of a certain type satisfies Scott’s axiom, then the belief set used to induce that ordering is representable. This provides support for Kenny Easwaran’s project of analyzing doxastic states in terms of belief sets rather than credences.     

信念的目标

人们通常把信念的目标看成是指向真理,把它看成是信念的本质的和构成的特点.信念不只是被相信的命题,而且是一个人在特定环境下的一种心理状态.正确的、合理的信念意味该心理状态能够正确地认识事物,能够在实践中起调节的作用.     

The Wretchedness of Belief

In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks that the truly “religious man” thinks himself to be, not merely “imperfect” or “ill,” but wholly “wretched.” While such sentiments are of obvious biographical interest, in this paper I show why they are also worthy of serious philosophical attention. Although the influence of Wittgenstein's thinking on the philosophy of religion is often judged negatively (as, for example, leading to quietist and/or fideist‐relativist conclusions) I argue that the distinctly ethical conception of religion (specifically Christianity) that Wittgenstein presents should lead us to a quite different assessment. In particular, his preoccupation with the categorical nature of religion suggests a conception of “genuine” religious belief which disrupts both the economics of eschatological‐salvationist hope, and the traditional ethical precept that “ought implies can.” In short, what Wittgenstein presents is a sketch of a religion without recompense.     

Reasons for Belief

Davidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is presupposed in Davidson's claim. While 1 focus on McDowell's view, the argument generalizes to other views which take experiences as reasons for belief.     

The Notion of Merit in Indian Religions

There are uses of the term merit in Indian religions which also appear in secular contexts, but in addition there are other uses that are not encountered outside religion. Transfer of merit is a specific doctrine in whose connection the term merit is used with an intention which is not the same as that found in nonreligious contexts. Two main types of transfer of merit can be distinguished. First, the transfer of merit has been associated with certain ritual practices in Hinduism and in Buddhism. Another main type of transfer of merit is connected with Mahāyāna belief in bodhisattvas' loving-kindness towards other beings. In the orthodox Hindu schools, in Hīnayāna Buddhism and in Jainism, transfer of merit has been rejected on account of the doctrine of karma according to which the person can acquire karmic outcomes for only those actions he or she has performed by himself.     

The Paradox of Belief Instability and a Revision Theory of Belief

The epistemic paradox of 'belief instability' has recently received notable attention from many philosophers. In this paper I offer a new proposal, which I call a 'revision theory of belief'. This theory is in many respects an application of Gupta's and Belnap's revision theory of truth. They argue that the Liar paradox arises because our notion of truth is circular. I offer a similar proposal for handling the paradox of belief instability. In particular, I argue that our notion involved in the paradox of belief instability is circular, and this circularity of belief is the source of the paradox.