Estimating one's own and one's relatives' multiple intelligence: a study from Argentina

Participants from Argentina (N = 217) estimated their own, their partner's, their parents' and their grandparents' overall and multiple intelligences. The Argentinean data showed that men gave higher overall estimates than women (M = 110.4 vs. 105.1) as well as higher estimates on mathematical and spatial intelligence. Participants thought themselves slightly less bright than their fathers (2 IQ points) but brighter than their mothers (6 points), their grandfathers (8 points), but especially their grandmothers (11 points). Regressions showed that participants thought verbal and mathematical IQ to be the best predictors of overall IQ. Results were broadly in agreement with other studies in the area. A comparison was also made with British data using the same questionnaire. British participants tended to give significantly higher self-estimates than for relatives, though the pattern was generally similar. Results are discussed in terms of the studies in the field.     

Self-monitoring and the prediction of one's own and others' personality test scores

This study had two aims. Firstly, it examined the similarity between subjects' ratings of themselves and others and their scores on various personality tests. A group of 264 undergraduates in psychology completed Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale and the Neuroticism and Extraversion Scales from the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975; 1986). Then, they estimated both their own score and that of a peer on those questionnaires. The results showed that subjects (i) were fairly good at estimating their own and others' extraversion and neuroticism scores, (ii) were less accurate at estimating self-monitoring scores, (iii) were better at predicting their own scores than those of others, and (iv) erroneously believed themselves to be significantly similar to the chosen peer. Secondly, individual differences in the accuracy of personality estimation were studied. According to Synder's (1974) self-monitoring construct, people high in self-monitoring would be especially adept at reading others' expressive behaviours; therefore, any differences in the accuracy of perceiving the personality of others might be associated with differences in self-monitoring. High self-monitors were more accurate than low self-monitors at estimating neuroticism scores for others. Another implication of the self-monitoring theory is that, taking high and low self-monitors as targets of others' estimations, there should be greater discrepancy between actual scores and peer estimations for high self-monitors. The results here supported this prediction, but only in self-monitoring estimation.     

Recognizing one's own face

We report two studies of facial self-perception using individually tailored, standardized facial photographs of a group of volunteers and their partners. A computerized morphing procedure was used to merge each target face with an unknown control face. In the first set of experiments, a discrimination task revealed a delayed response time for the more extensively morphed self-face stimuli. In a second set of experiments, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to measure brain activation while subjects viewed morphed versions of either their own or their partner's face, alternating in blocks with presentation of an unknown face. When subjects viewed themselves (minus activation for viewing an unknown face), increased blood oxygenation was detected in right limbic (hippocampal formation, insula, anterior cingulate), left prefrontal cortex and superior temporal cortex. In the partner (versus unknown) experiment, only the right insula was activated. We suggest that a neural network involving the right hemisphere in conjunction with left-sided associative and executive regions underlies the process of visual self-recognition. Together, this combination produces the unique experience of self-awareness.     

Care for one's own future experiences

We care for our own future experiences. Most of us, trivially, would rather have them pleasurable than painful. When we care for our own future experiences we do so in a way that is different from the way we care for those of others (which is not to say that we necessarily care more about our own experience). Prereflectively, one would think this is because these experiences will be ours and no one else's. But then, of course, we need to explain what it means to say that a future experience will be mine and how knowledge of this fact renders it rational for me to care for this experience in a special way. Indeed most philosophers take this route. But in doing so, they quickly stumble on insuperable problems. I shall argue that the problem of egocentric care, as it is sometimes called, can be solved by turning things upside down: it is much more fruitful to think that the special kind of care we feel for some future experiences (and not others) is part of what makes them ours should they occur. This requires an explanation of egocentric care for future experiences that does not draw in a theory of personal identity, but rather contributes to one. I will attempt to provide this explanation by making use of the idea of a diachronic mental holism.     

Agency and observation in knowledge of one's own thinking

This essay addresses the question how we know our conscious thinking. Conscious thinking typically takes the form of a series of discrete episodes that constitute a complex cognitive activity. We must distinguish the discrete episodes of thinking in which a particular content is represented in phenomenal consciousness and is present “before the mind's eye” from the extended activities of which these episodes form a part. The extended activities are themselves contentful and we have first‐person access to them. But because their content is not represented in phenomenal consciousness, this access cannot be broadly observational. Instead, I argue, it is agential. Furthermore, that extended activities are intentional explains the possibility of a nonobservational form of introspective access to the discrete episodes in consciousness.     

Autoscopic phenomena and one's own body representation in dreams

Autoscopic phenomena (AP) are complex experiences that include the visual illusory reduplication of one’s own body. From a phenomenological point of view, we can distinguish three conditions: autoscopic hallucinations, heautoscopy, and out-of-body experiences. The dysfunctional pattern involves multisensory disintegration of personal and extrapersonal space perception. The etiology, generally either neurological or psychiatric, is different. Also, the hallucination of Self and own body image is present during dreams and differs according to sleep stage. Specifically, the representation of the Self in REM dreams is frequently similar to the perception of Self in wakefulness, whereas in NREM dreams, a greater polymorphism of Self and own body representation is observed. The parallels between autoscopic phenomena in pathological cases and the Self-hallucination in dreams will be discussed to further the understanding of the particular states of self awareness, especially the complex integration of different memory sources in Self and body representation.     

Monitoring one's own forgetting in younger and older adults

The present study examined whether there are age-related differences in the ability to accurately monitor forgetting. Young and older adults studied a mixed list of categorized words, and later recalled items when cued with each category. They then estimated the number of additional items that they did not recall-a form of monitoring one's forgetting. Older adults exhibited impaired memory performance compared with young adults, but also accurately estimated they forgot more information than young adults. Both age groups were fairly accurate in predicting forgetting in terms of resolution, indicating that aging does not impair the ability to monitor forgetting.     

Improvisational therapy: Evolving one's own clinical style

This article offers an invitation to develop one's own unique clinical style, relying less on institutionalized schools of therapy and more on the therapist's own natural resources. An emphasis is placed upon understanding therapy as art, trusting one's imagination, and maintaining a healthy irreverence for professional politics.     

Taking care of one's own: justice and family caregiving

This paper asks whether adult children have aduty of justice to act as caregivers for theirfrail, elderly parents. I begin (Sections I.and II.) by locating the historical reasons whyrelationships within families were not thoughtto raise issues of justice. I argue that thesereasons are misguided. The paper next presentsspecific examples showing the relevance ofjustice to family relationships. I point outthat in the United States today, the burden ofcaregiving for dependent parents fallsdisproportionately on women (Sections III. andIV.). The paper goes on to use Rawls'theoretical tool of the veil of ignorance toargue that caring for parents should not belinked to a person's sex and more generally,that there is no duty of justice to assume therole of caregiver for dependent parents(Sections V.). Although justice does notprovide the moral foundations for parent care,I show that it nonetheless places importantlimits on the instinct to care. I concludethat the voice of justice should be audible,and is intrinsically present, withinfamilies.     

The relationship between marital interaction behaviors and affective reactions to one's own and one's spouse's self-evaluation needs

A recent extension (Beach, & Tesser, 1993) of Tesser's self-evaluation maintenance model (SEM: Tesser, 1988) proposed that a person's motivation to feel good about the self, and his or her concern for the partner's need to feel good about the self, can affect the couple's interaction behavior. In the present study, individual differences in the motivation to maintain one's own and one's partner's SEM needs are used to predict the couple's problem-solving discussion behaviors. Fifty-three married couples were videotaped for 20 minutes while discussing an important relationship issue on which there was disagreement. From these video records, husbands' and wives' favorable and unfavorable discussion behaviors were coded. During a subsequent session, couples reported their affective reactions to a number of SEM scenarios recalled from memory, which were used to create an individual difference measure representing the strength in motivation to maintain one's own and one's partner's self-evaluation needs. In general, husbands' and wives' responsiveness to their partners' SEM needs was associated with favorable interaction behavior, whereas responsiveness to one's own SEM needs was associated with unfavorable interaction behavior. The results of this study suggest that the extended SEM model provides an experimental framework that incorporates research directed at both the elucidation of individual differences and the examination of the couple as a unit.     

Short article one's own face is hard to ignore

One's own face possesses two properties that make it prone to grab attention: It is a face, and, in addition, it is a self-referential stimulus. The question of whether the self-face is actually an especially attention-grabbing stimulus was addressed by using a face-name interference paradigm. We investigated whether interference from a flanking self-face on the processing of a target classmate's name was stronger than interference from a classmate's flanking face on the processing of one's own name as the target. In a control condition a third familiar face served as the flanker for both decisions from the participant's own name and from the classmate's name. The presentation of the self-face as a flanker produced significantly more interference on the identification of a classmate's name than the presentation of that classmate's face did on the identification of one's own name. This result was due to the interfering power of the self-face and not to a particular resistance of one's name to interfering facial stimuli. We argue that the emotional value or the high familiarity of one's own face may explain its attention-grabbing property.     

Short article one's own face is hard to ignore

One's own face possesses two properties that make it prone to grab attention: It is a face, and, in addition, it is a self-referential stimulus. The question of whether the self-face is actually an especially attention-grabbing stimulus was addressed by using a face–name interference paradigm. We investigated whether interference from a flanking self-face on the processing of a target classmate's name was stronger than interference from a classmate's flanking face on the processing of one's own name as the target. In a control condition a third familiar face served as the flanker for both decisions from the participant's own name and from the classmate's name. The presentation of the self-face as a flanker produced significantly more interference on the identification of a classmate's name than the presentation of that classmate's face did on the identification of one's own name. This result was due to the interfering power of the self-face and not to a particular resistance of one's name to interfering facial stimuli. We argue that the emotional value or the high familiarity of one's own face may explain its attention-grabbing property.     

Predicting one's own forgetting: the role of experience-based and theory-based processes

The authors examined the hypothesis that judgments of learning (JOL), if governed by processing fluency during encoding, should be insensitive to the anticipated retention interval. Indeed, neither item-by-item nor aggregate JOLs exhibited "forgetting" unless participants were asked to estimate recall rates for several different retention intervals, in which case their estimates mimicked closely actual recall rates. These results and others reported suggest that participants can access their knowledge about forgetting but only when theory-based predictions are made, and then only when the notion of forgetting is accentuated either by manipulating retention interval within individuals or by framing recall predictions in terms of forgetting rather than remembering. The authors interpret their findings in terms of the distinction between experience-based and theory-based JOLs.     

On-line questionnaire completion time and personality test scores

Participants completed two well established questionnaires on line (HPI: Hogan Personality Inventory; and the HDS: Hogan Developmental Survey). Time taken to complete each study was correlated with scale scores from both questionnaires including the occupational scales derived from the HPI. Those who scored higher on Adjustment (Stability), and Prudence (Conscientiousness) but lower on Learning Approach took longer to complete the test. Those who scored higher on Stress Tolerance and Reliability took significantly longer than those with low scores on these measures. With only the exception of Diligent and Dutiful all correlations between Dark Side variables and time taken were negative, particularly Leisurely, Excitable and Imaginative. Regression showed that up to 6% of the time taken variance could be accounted for. Implications for measurement were considered.