Winnicott's invitation to ‘further games of Jung‐analysis’

Winnicott signs off his celebrated review of Jung's (1963) autobiography Memories, Dreams, Reflections with the warning that translation of ‘erreichten’ as ‘attained’ (implying assimilation) rather than as ‘reached to’, could ‘queer the pitch for further games of Jung‐analysis’. This subtly underscores his view that Jung—who he described earlier as ‘mentally split’ and lacking ‘a self with which to know’—remained essentially dissociated. However, Winnicott, whilst immersed in this work on Jung, wrote a letter to Michael Fordham describing himself as suffering ‘a lifelong malady’ of ‘dissociation’. But this he now reported repaired through a ‘splitting headache’ dream of destruction, dreamt ‘for Jung, and for some of my patients, as well as for myself’ (Winnicott 1989, p. 228). Winnicott's recurrent concern during his last decade was with ‘reaching to’—that quintessential Winnicottian term—some reparative experience that could address such difficulties in constellating a ‘unit self’. This is correlated with his engagement with Jung and tracked through his contemporaneous clinical work, particularly ‘Fear of Breakdown’ (1963). Themes first introduced by Sedgwick (2008) and developed by the author's earlier ‘Winnicott on Jung; destruction, creativity and the unrepressed unconscious’ (2011) are given further consideration.     

Outside‐In: Jung's myth of interiority ambiguated. Or ‐ Knowing me,Knowing Jung – ahah!

Given his lifelong battle against one‐sidedness Jung's persistent prioritising of the ‘inner life’ over the ‘outer’ can seem problematic. The question is raised as to whether an approach that seems to verge uncomfortably close to solipsism can sometimes render Jung blind to the intuition that psychic life is constituted by an on‐going interplay between inner and outer, self and other (an intuition that he himself sometimes articulated so brilliantly). The ‘ambiguation’ of Jung's work offers an opportunity to confront this problem by utilising a critical dynamic that is consistent with Jung's psychological insights.     

Transcending the caesura: Reverie,dreaming and counter‐dreaming

The author reflects about our capacity to get in touch with primitive, irrepresentable, seemingly unreachable parts of the Self and with the unrepressed unconscious. It is suggested that when the patient's dreaming comes to a halt, or encounters a caesura, the analyst dreams that which the patient cannot. Getting in touch with such primitive mental states and with the origin of the Self is aspired to, not so much for discovering historical truth or recovering unconscious content, as for generating motion between different parts of the psyche. The movement itself is what expands the mind and facilitates psychic growth. Bion's brave and daring notion of ‘caesura’, suggesting a link between mature emotions and thinking and intra‐uterine life, serves as a model for bridging seemingly unbridgeable states of mind. Bion inspires us to ‘dream’ creatively, to let our minds roam freely, stressing the analyst's speculative imagination and intuition often bordering on hallucination. However, being on the seam between conscious and unconscious, dreaming subverts the psychic equilibrium and poses a threat of catastrophe as a result of the confusion it affords between the psychotic and the non‐psychotic parts of the personality. Hence there is a tendency to try and evade it through a more saturated mode of thinking, often relying on external reality. The analyst's dreaming and intuition, perhaps a remnant of intra‐uterine life, is elaborated as means of penetrating and transcending the caesura, thus facilitating patient and analyst to bear unbearable states of mind and the painful awareness of the unknowability of the emotional experience. This is illustrated clinically.     

The seventh servant: The implications of a truth drive in Bions theory of 'O'

Drawing upon Bion's published works on the subjects of truth, dreaming, alpha‐function and transformations in ‘O’, the author independently postulates that there exists a ‘truth instinctual drive’ that subserves a truth principle, the latter of which is associated with the reality principle. Further, he suggests, following Bion's postulation, that ‘alpha‐function’ and dreaming/phantasying constitute unconscious thinking processes and that they mediate the activity of this ‘truth drive’ (quest, pulsion), which the author hypothesizes constitutes another aspect of a larger entity that also includes the epistemophilic component drive. It purportedly seeks and transmits as well as includes what Bion (1965, pp. 147‐9) calls ‘O’, the ‘Absolute Truth, Ultimate Reality, O’ (also associated with infi nity, noumena or things‐in‐themselves, and ‘godhead’) (1970, p. 26). It is further hypothesized that the truth drive functions in collaboration with an ‘unconscious consciousness’ that is associated with the faculty of ‘attention’, which is also known as ‘intuition’. It is responsive to internal psychical reality and constitutes Bion's ‘seventh servant’. O, the ultimate landscape of psychoanalysis, has many dimensions, but the one that seems to interest Bion is that of the emotional experience of the analysand's and the analyst's ‘evolving O’ respectively (1970, p. 52) during the analytic session. The author thus hypothesizes that a sense of truth presents itself to the subject as a quest for truth which has the quality and force of an instinctual drive and constitutes the counterpart to the epistemophilic drive. This ‘truth quest’ or ‘drive’ is hypothesized to be the source of the generation of the emotional truth of one's ongoing experiences, both conscious and unconscious. It is proposed that emotions are beacons of truth in regard to the acceptance of reality. The concepts of an emotional truth drive and a truth principle would help us understand why analysands are able to accept analysts’ interpretations that favor the operation of the reality principle over the pleasure principle—because of what is postulated as their overriding adaptive need for truth. Ultimately, it would seem that Bion's legacy of truth aims at integrating fi nite man with infi nite man.     

The so‐called death drive,an indispensable force for any subjective life

The psychoanalytic movement has difficulty in overcoming the malaise bequeathed by what Freud wanted to call the ‘death drive’. This term remains doubly problematic: first because the indispensable antagonist of Eros‐binding cannot be reduced to a particular drive; and secondly because this Anteros plays a vital role in subjectivization. The Freudian idea of the ‘death drive’ has in addition the drawback of confusing dissociative thrust (unbinding) with the aggressive component of libidinal cathexis. Now it is precisely the lack of articulation between them that leads to deconstructing it. For it is constantly observed that in the psychic register aggression is much more fixing than unbinding. The essential role of Anteros/unbinding in the process of subjectivization can be illustrated through several key operations in subjective development: sublimatory activity and its renunciation of pleasure‐discharge, the work of mourning opposed to melancholic fixation, the intricating‐unbinding parental function, and finally the psychoanalytic treatment and its work of analysis. This means we should cease to anathematize the dynamic component of unbinding as ‘of death’ and seek to explain the concept of subjectivization better.     

Attitudes to suffering: Parfit and Nietzsche

Abstract

In On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that Nietzsche does not disagree with central normative beliefs that ‘we’ hold. Such disagreement would threaten Parfit’s claim that normative beliefs are known by intuition. However, Nietzsche defends a conception of well-being that challenges Parfit’s normative claim that suffering is bad in itself for the sufferer. Nietzsche recognizes the phenomenon of ‘growth through suffering’ as essential to well-being. Hence, removal of all suffering would lead to diminished well-being. Parfit claims that if Nietzsche understood normative concepts in Parfit’s objectivist sense, he would not disagree with the claim that suffering is bad in itself – that intrinsic facts about suffering count in favour of our not wanting it. I argue that Nietzsche would disagree. Suffering for Nietzsche is not merely instrumentally necessary for psychological growth, nor is it easy to construe it as something bad in itself that contributes value as part of a good whole. Suffering that can be given meaning through growth is something we have reason to want. Suffering that remains brute and uninterpreted is something we have reason not to want. But for Nietzsche, suffering as such has no invariant value across all contexts.     

BECOMING RELATED: THE EDUCATION OF A PSYCHOANALYST

The author uses a “professional memoir,” a story about his first experiences in clinical work, to illustrate what he believes to be certain fundamental aspects of an analytic attitude. Taking place in a psychiatric hospital, it is meant to highlight the central place of intuition, emotional receptivity, empathy, relatedness—and their inherent dangers—in engaging therapeutically with patients' emotional disturbances. The author postulates that these and related aspects of clinical psychoanalysis are not sufficiently emphasized in psychoanalytic training and are often eclipsed by idealizations of psychoanalytic theories and their derivative techniques, third‐party demands for evidence‐based data, preoccupations with neurobiological correlates of experience, etc. Despite the clinical fact that psychoanalysis can be extraordinarily helpful to patients, he questions whether clinical psychoanalysis is rightly regarded as a “treatment.”     

Nonidentity,Negative Experience and the Pre‐Reflective Cogito

This paper contributes to the current academic debate on the nature of embodied, intentional consciousness, specifically the attempt to inaugurate a rapprochement between phenomenological existentialism and critical theory. This is accomplished through a critical comparison of the concepts of negative experience and nonidentity in Theodor Adorno's negative dialectics and Jean‐Paul Sartre's early phenomenology. By comparing how each engages with Hegel, I suggest that Sartre offers a broad, anthropological account of negative experience and nonidentity helpful to critical theorists but that there remains a critical deficit which Adorno's more restricted—and political—sense of nonidentity remedies. Sartre's anthropological portrayal of ‘persistent negation’ worries Adorno but I suggest that it can be understood as a pragmatic presupposition for problem‐solving rather than as a transcendental condition of experience.     

‘Caesura’ as Bion’s discourse on method1

The author contends that Caesura, one of Bion’s last works, can be read as the equivalent of Descartes’s Discourse on Method. In this compact and complex text, the dictate of ‘methodical’ and ‘hyperbolic doubt’– so called because it is taken to the extreme form of application to the faculty of thought itself – which, for Descartes, represents the fundamental principle of philosophical and scientific research, is reflected in the formula of ‘transcending the caesura’. Bion directs his attention successively to the pairs of opposing concepts that structure psychoanalytic discourse and demonstrates their paradoxical and non‐separative logic. The binary system of producing meaning is deconstructed through the systematic use of non‐pathological – i.e. not static but dynamic – reversible perspective. A viewpoint that appears natural, self‐evident and primary is plunged into crisis and proves to be founded on what the punctuation mark of the slash excludes. Yet the new point of view does not supplant its predecessor, but supplements it. The conceptual opposition is not overturned, but merely destabilized in such a way as to maintain a creative tension that generates new thoughts. By this technique of wrong‐footing the reader, Bion achieves what is tantamount to a Kuhnian revolution: the transition from Freud’s semiotic or evidential paradigm to an aesthetic one, centred on emotional experience – to a ‘science of at‐one‐ment’. Working with the antithetical concepts of censorship and caesura, the author illustrates some clinical implications of this radical shift.     

The latency complex: the dead hand of anti‐development

It is common knowledge that the same phenomena can be viewed in a variety of ways. This paper considers the implications of a constellation observed in some adult patients who have increasingly reminded the author of some of the children of latency age with whom he has also worked. In the literature these patients may also have been thought about in terms of ‘defences of the self’ (Fordham), patients who are ‘difficult to reach’ (Joseph), ‘psychic retreats’ (Steiner), and those who make ‘attacks on linking’ (Bion). They may equally be considered in terms of schizoid, narcissistic or borderline personalities, or as showing features on the autistic spectrum, such as mindlessness and extreme obsessionality. Writers such as Helene Deutsch with her concept of an ‘as‐if personality’, Winnicott with his ‘false self’, and Rosenfeld, discussing the split‐off parts of the personality in narcissistic patients, have also offered much to think about in their consideration of some of these phenomena. This paper proposes yet another vertex – the author's own imaginative conjecture – that is by no means mutually exclusive of any of these others.     

Trauma and the transference‐countertransference: working with the bad object and the wounded self

This paper focuses on the transference‐countertransference dynamics that manifest in work with those individuals who experienced severe early relational trauma and, in particular, childhood sexual abuse. The literature is surveyed from Davies and Frawley's (1992a) seminal paper through to more current trauma‐related and sensorimotor approaches, which deepen our understanding greatly. The rapidly shifting, powerful, conflicting and kaleidoscopic transference‐countertransference dynamics are explored in the light of these views and in relation to a lengthy clinical example. The author elucidates the dual‐aspect of the traumatic complex, whereby the abuser figure, which is disavowed by the patient, becomes manifest in prosecuting the analyst for the ‘wounds’ that the analysis evokes. The paper also explores the particular nature of the splitting processes, whereby pressure is put on the analyst to adopt an idealized role, in particular to act as a self‐object, in order to enable the patient to safely express and ‘be’ themselves in an attempt to make up for what was not possible in childhood; the analyst will necessarily fail in this task. In the context of powerful masochisto‐sadistic dynamics, the analyst's masochism is likely to be called up in the spirit of caring ‘humanity’ (another inevitable enactment), which can impede the progress of the analysis if not addressed. The extreme woundedness, intense affect and moral outrage associated with these dynamics are characteristic and compelling. Issues relating to disclosure, enactment and analytic attitude are also discussed.     

SEMANTIC EXTERNALISM AND A PRIORI SELF‐KNOWLEDGE

The argument known as the ‘McKinsey Recipe’ tries to establish the incompatibility of semantic externalism (about natural kind concepts in particular) and a priori self‐knowledge about thoughts and concepts by deriving from the conjunction of these theses an absurd conclusion, such as that we could know a priori that water exists. One reply to this argument is to distinguish two different readings of ‘natural kind concept’: (i) a concept which in fact denotes a natural kind, and (ii) a concept which aims to denote a natural kind. Paul Boghossian has argued, using a Dry Earth scenario, that this response fails, claiming that the externalist cannot make sense of a concept aiming, but failing, to denote a natural kind. In this paper I argue that Boghossian’s argument is flawed. Borrowing machinery from two‐dimensional semantics, using the notion of ‘considering a possible world as actual’, I claim that we can give a determinate answer to Boghossian’s question: which concept would ‘water’ express on Dry Earth?¹     

Differences in multiple‐target visual search performance between non‐professional and professional searchers due to decision‐making criteria

Professional visual searches, such as those conducted by airport security personnel, often demand highly accurate performance. As many factors can hinder accuracy, it is critical to understand the potential influences. Here, we examined how explicit decision‐making criteria might affect multiple‐target search performance. Non‐professional searchers (college undergraduates) and professional searchers (airport security officers) classified trials as ‘safe’ or ‘dangerous’, in one of two conditions. Those in the ‘one = dangerous’ condition classified trials as dangerous if they found one or two targets, and those in the ‘one = safe’ condition only classified trials as dangerous if they found two targets. The data suggest an important role of context that may be mediated by experience; non‐professional searchers were more likely to miss a second target in the one = dangerous condition (i.e., when finding a second found target did not change the classification), whereas professional searchers were more likely to miss a second in the one = safe condition.     

Accessing the multitude within: A psychoanalytic perspective on the transformation of masculinity at mid‐life1

This paper reflects upon the essential components of male identity that commonly are reworked in middle age. The author argues that healthy masculine gender identity involves an ongoing, plastic process of destabilization and reconstruction at various pivotal developmental stages, particularly during middle adulthood. In essence, a man's mature transformation of his sense of masculinity results when finite concepts of gender identity are superseded by an awareness of the complexity of one's multiple, early and diverse gender identifications. A clinical case provides insight into how psychoanalytic treatment can contribute to a new experience of masculinity. The case illustrates how a maturing man, meeting an altered sense of identity in mid‐life, relies less on gender splitting and more on reuniting previously antithetical intrapsychic elements. Why this more pluralistic, polythreaded masculinity frequently must wait until mid‐life is further clarified. Specific importance is attached to the early development of male gender identity as it is founded on the boy's unique struggles in separating from his mother. The foundation for male gender identity formation is reconsidered as the author questions the ‘dis‐identification’ model while explicating how the boy's striving for narcissistic completion shapes the gendered masculine ego ideal. Classically termed ‘phallicism’ is understood both to facilitate and obstruct a man's adult development, while the concept of ‘genitality’ is augmented by the postclassical notion of ‘interiority’. At mid‐life, ‘phallic’ ego ideals (resting on omnipotence, desires for narcissistic completion and gender splitting) are transformed into more realistic, ‘genital’ ego ideals (synthesizing autonomy and connection). The achievement of a mature, less sharply gendered ‘masculine’ ego ideal (revitalizing the foreclosed dimensions of both the early maternal and paternal imagos) occurs as the balance of forces shifts in the direction of true genitality rather than defensive phallicism.     

‘Telepathic’ phenomena and separation anxiety

By discussing a treatment characterized by its difficult ending, the author strives to show the dynamic impact of separation on phenomena that can be seen as ‘telepathic’. Led to develop some inalienable attachment to her analyst in the primary transference, the analysand found herself caught up in the contradiction of her visceral dread of dependency, which compelled her to interrupt the work in progress. She then began to work out her analyst's comings and goings and to run into him in public places, as if to be assured of his immovability. This phenomenon arose with high frequency as the effect of some idealization of the maternal object aiming to deny the spatiotemporal gap. The chance that the experience of rejection via indifference may be repeated also entailed the transferential unfurling of a fantasy involving a double, undifferentiation counterbalancing the lived experience of separation. Furthermore, a ‘telepathic’ dream occurred as confirmation of this twin relationship which illustrates the analysand's refusal to renounce her narcissistic object. Projective identifications, agglutinated ego nuclei along with primitive cross‐identifications could, among other concepts, account for such phenomena which are projective in nature yet real all the same. Such mechanisms could have the power to relay thoughts the moment undifferentiated parts of the ego – if not unborn parts of the self – were activated in a potentially symbiotic zone. Marked by a feeling of dispossession, the analyst's countertransference not only seemed to underscore this hypothesis, it also gave a partial explanation for it. Until the analyst could recognize his own nostalgia for a symbiotic relationship, he had to encourage the occurrence of those unexpected meetings which stemmed from a convergence between the transference and the countertransference.     

PERSPECTIVE‐NEUTRAL INTRINSIC VALUE

Is it possible to do a good thing, or to make the world a better place? Some argue that it is not possible, because perspective‐neutral value does not exist. Some argue that ‘good’ does not play the right grammatical role; or that all good things are good ‘in a way’; or that goodness is inherently perspective‐dependent. I argue that the logical and semantic properties of ‘good’ are what we should expect of an evaluative predicate; that the many ways of being good don't threaten the thesis that some ways are perspective‐independent; and that there are clear examples of perspective‐independent goodness.     

What is the function of faith and trust in psychoanalysis?1

Unlike other concepts such as ‘illusion’, ‘capacity to tolerate frustration’ and ‘libidinal investment’, the concept of faith has not yet found a well‐defined position in psychoanalytic theory. Bion focused on faith and placed it in an unusual context: scientific work. Through the Act of Faith a researcher can give some consistency to certain ideas, hunches or intuitions that may appear during observation, though he cannot represent them by existing theory. Through the Act of Faith an analyst can ‘see’, ‘hear’ and ‘feel’ those mental phenomena, the reality of which leaves no practising psychoanalysts in doubt, even if they cannot represent them by current formulations. In this paper, the author aims to expand Bion's proposals into the clinical and therapeutic fields. In the first part, the author examines how faith and trust overlap, and how they depart from each other, and he gives an example. Faith possesses an igniting and driving force which trust doesn't possess to the same extent. In the second part, the author looks at F as a psychic function of the analyst, which aids him in supporting a depressed and hopeless patient while waiting for the return of the patient's desire to live. In the final part, he focuses on F from the patient's point of view and studies the transformations of F that may occur during an analysis.     

From Experience to Metaphysics: On Experience‐based Intuitions and their Role in Metaphysics

Metaphysical theories are often counter‐intuitive. But they also often are strongly supported and motivated by intuitions. One way or another, the link between intuitions and metaphysics is a strong and important one, and there is hardly any metaphysical discussion where intuitions do not play a crucial role. In this article, I will be interested in a particular kind of such intuitions, namely those that come, at least partly, from experience. There seems to be a route from experience to metaphysics, and this is the core of my interest here. In order to better understand such ‘arguments from experience’ and the kind of relationship there is between this type of intuitions and metaphysical theories, I shall examine four particular cases where a kind of experience‐based intuition seems to motivate or support a metaphysical theory. At the end of the day, I shall argue that this route is a treacherous one, and that in all of the four cases I shall concentrate on, phenomenological considerations are in fact orthogonal to the allegedly ‘corresponding’ metaphysical claims. An anti‐realist view of metaphysics will emerge.     

Positive Self‐regard and Claim to Leadership: Two Fundamental Forms of Self‐evaluation

The present article examines the common factor structure of various self‐evaluative personality constructs. Consistent with previous research, we found considerable redundancy between constructs. Two basic forms of self‐evaluation could be distinguished: Positive Self‐regard (PSR) reflects people's contentedness with themselves in comparison with their own standards. Constructs such as depression, self‐esteem and neuroticism have very high loadings on this factor. In contrast, Claim to Leadership (CTL) reflects the subjective conviction that one is called to take charge and lead others. This conviction is often called ‘narcissism’. PSR mainly reflects an intra‐personal kind of self‐evaluation, whereas CTL reflects an inter‐personal kind. Both forms of self‐evaluation independently predict intellectual self‐enhancement, but only one of them (PSR) also predicts self‐reported mental health. Moreover, the two forms of self‐evaluation are differentially associated with self‐reported and peer‐reported inter‐personal traits (Dominance and Affiliation). Finally, the concepts of ‘Grandiosity’ and ‘Vulnerability’ from narcissism research may easily be reframed in terms of CTL and PSR. The two‐dimensional framework may help overcome the conceptual confusion that exists around different forms of self‐evaluation and streamline the field for future research. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology