Age differences in moral judgment: Older adults are more deontological than younger adults

In 2 studies, an older and a younger age group morally evaluated dilemmas contrasting a deontological judgment (do not harm others) against a utilitarian judgment (do what is best for the majority). Previous research suggests that deontological moral judgments are often underpinned by affective reactions and utilitarian moral judgments by deliberative thinking. Separately, research on the psychology of aging has shown that affect plays a more prominent role in the judgments and decision making of older (vs. younger) adults. Yet age remains a largely overlooked factor in moral judgment research. Here, we therefore investigated whether older adults would make more deontological judgments on the basis of experiencing different affective reactions to moral dilemmas as compared with younger adults. Results from 2 experiments indicated that older adults made significantly more deontological moral judgments. Mediation analyses revealed that the relationship between age and making more deontological moral judgments is partly explained by older adults exhibiting significantly more negative affective reactions and having more morally idealistic beliefs as compared with younger adults.     

Good Moral Judgment and Decision‐Making Without Deliberation

It is widely accepted in psychology and cognitive science that there are two “systems” in the mind: one system (System 1) is characterized as quick, intuitive, perceptive, and perhaps more primitive, while the other (System 2) is described as slower, more deliberative, and responsible for our higher‐order cognition. I use the term “reflectivism” to capture the view that conscious reflection—in the “System 2” sense—is a necessary feature of good moral judgment and decision‐making. This is not to suggest that System 2 must operate alone in forming our moral decisions, but that it plays a normatively ineliminable role. In this paper, I discuss arguments that have been offered in defense of reflectivism. These arguments fit into two broad categories; let us think of them as two sides of a coin. On the first side are arguments about the efficaciousness of conscious reasoning—for example, without conscious deliberation we will make bad moral judgments and decisions. On the other side of the coin are arguments about the centrality of conscious deliberation to normative actions—for example, without conscious deliberation we are no more agential than animals or automatons. Despite their attractiveness, I argue that these arguments do not successfully establish that reflection is a necessary component of good moral judgment and decision‐making. If I am right, the idea that good moral judgment and decision‐making can result from entirely automatic and subconscious processes gains traction. My goal in this paper is to show that reflectivism fails to include the full range of cases of moral decision‐making and that a theory of automaticity may do a better job. I briefly discuss at the end of the paper how an account of successful automatic moral judgment and decision‐making might begin to take shape.     

Affect and the weight of idealistic versus pragmatic concerns in decision situations

Individuals consider abstract values and principles important aspects of their identities. Nonetheless, they often make judgments and decisions that contradict these values and principles for the sake of pragmatic benefits. Assuming that the process of weighting idealistic and pragmatic concerns is context sensitive, the present research argues that affect influences the relative weight of idealistic versus pragmatic concerns in decision situations owing to its influence on the level of abstraction at which individuals represent situations mentally. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that more positive affect increases the prominent weighting of idealistic over pragmatic concerns while less positive affect leads to less differentiation between the relevance of idealistic and pragmatic concerns. Studies 3 and 4 test the assumption that affective influences on mental abstraction are crucial for affect‐dependent shifts in the weighting of idealistic and pragmatic concerns. By bringing together theorizing on affect and cognition with recent theorizing on the role of mental abstraction for decision processes, this article highlights a mechanism through which decisions can be influenced by feelings that goes beyond the mechanisms that have typically been discussed in the affect and cognition literature so far.     

Numeracy and decision making

A series of four studies explored how the ability to comprehend and transform probability numbers relates to performance on judgment and decision tasks. On the surface, the tasks in the four studies appear to be widely different; at a conceptual level, however, they all involve processing numbers and the potential to show an influence of affect. Findings were consistent with highly numerate individuals being more likely to retrieve and use appropriate numerical principles, thus making themselves less susceptible to framing effects, compared with less numerate individuals. In addition, the highly numerate tended to draw different (generally stronger or more precise) affective meaning from numbers and numerical comparisons, and their affective responses were more precise. Although generally helpful, this tendency may sometimes lead to worse decisions. The less numerate were influenced more by competing, irrelevant affective considerations. Analyses showed that the effect of numeracy was not due to general intelligence. Numerical ability appears to matter to judgments and decisions in important ways.     

Adult Age Differences in Dual Information Processes: Implications for the Role of Affective and Deliberative Processes in Older Adults' Decision Making

ABSTRACT— Age differences in affective/experiential and deliberative processes have important theoretical implications for judgment and decision theory and important pragmatic implications for older-adult decision making. Age-related declines in the efficiency of deliberative processes predict poorer-quality decisions as we age. However, age-related adaptive processes, including motivated selectivity in the use of deliberative capacity, an increased focus on emotional goals, and greater experience, predict better or worse decisions for older adults depending on the situation. The aim of the current review is to examine adult age differences in affective and deliberative information processes in order to understand their potential impact on judgments and decisions. We review evidence for the role of these dual processes in judgment and decision making and then review two representative life-span perspectives (based on aging-related changes to cognitive or motivational processes) on the interplay between these processes. We present relevant predictions for older-adult decisions and make note of contradictions and gaps that currently exist in the literature. Finally, we review the sparse evidence about age differences in decision making and how theories and findings regarding dual processes could be applied to decision theory and decision aiding. In particular, we focus on prospect theory ( Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 ) and how prospect theory and theories regarding age differences in information processing can inform one another.     

Judgment and decision making: Behavioral approaches

The area of judgment and decision making has given rise to the study of many interesting phenomena, including reasoning fallacies, which are also of interest to behavior analysts. Indeed, techniques and principles of behavior analysis may be applied to study these fallacies. This article reviews research from a behavioral perspective that suggests that humans are not the information-seekers we sometimes suppose ourselves to be. Nor do we utilize information effectively when it is presented. This is shown from the results of research utilizing matching to sample and other behavioral tools (monetary reward, feedback, instructional control) to study phenomena such as the conjunction fallacy, base-rate neglect, and probability matching. Research from a behavioral perspective can complement research from other perspectives in furthering our understanding of judgment and decision making.     

Alexithymia tendencies and mere exposure alter social approachability judgments

ABSTRACT People have a fundamental motivation for social connection and social engagement, but how do they decide whom to approach in ambiguous social situations? Subjective feelings often influence such decisions, but people vary in awareness of their feelings. We evaluated two opposing hypotheses based on visual familiarity effects and emotional awareness on social approachability judgments. These hypotheses differ in their interpretation of the familiarity or mere exposure effect with either an affective or cognitive interpretation. The responses of our 128‐student sample supported the cognitive interpretation. Lower emotional awareness or higher alexithymia was associated with higher approachability judgments to familiarized faces and lower approachability judgments to novel faces. These findings were independent of the Big Five personality factors. The results indicate that individual differences in emotional awareness should be integrated into social decision‐making models. The results also suggest that cognitive‐perceptual alterations may underlie the poorer social outcomes associated with alexithymia.     

When thoughts don’t feel like they used to: Changing feelings of subjective ease in judgments of the past

Thinking about the past is critical to everyday experiences, but people are not unbiased when doing so. Feelings of subjective ease that accompany generating reasons for known or alternative outcomes influence hindsight bias. But people do not always make decisions immediately after thinking about issues. Three experiments demonstrated that generating versus reading earlier generated reasons has markedly different effects on judgments, with theoretical and practical implications. Inevitability judgments were consistent with feelings of ease when generating reasons, but with numbers of reasons (content) when later reading those reasons. Experiments 2 and 3 also found that feelings of ease can be reconstructed if people reconsider their feelings when initially generating reasons. Discussion centers on the operation of subjective ease and its role in understanding judgment and decision making.     

What a Feeling: The Role of Immediate and Anticipated Emotions in Risky Decisions

The risk‐as‐feelings hypothesis argues that many risky decisions are not only predicted by anticipated emotions, as most consequentialistic decision making theories would presume, but also by immediate emotions. Immediate emotions refer to the “hot” visceral feelings people feel as they contemplate a specific decision option at the cusp of making a decision, whereas anticipated emotions are those emotions that people forecast that they will feel once they experience possible consequences of that decision. Four studies focused on the role of both types of emotions in decisions under risk and uncertainty. Decisions were substantively predicted by immediate emotional states beyond anticipated emotions or the subjective probability attached to outcomes. Thus, risky choices may be prompted, in part, by how people feel about the “riskless” portion of the decision—specifically, the various decision options they are contemplating—rather than the potential outcomes those options may produce. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Automatic Optimism: Why People Assume Their Futures will be Bright

Why are people optimistic about their futures, continuously assuming that their futures will be full of the positive outcomes they desire and devoid of negative outcomes? This paper concerns the proposal that desire, represented as affective reactions to potential future events, causes optimism for the future. We propose that positive or negative affective reactions to future events innervate motivations to approach or avoid the events. These motivations can be satiated by judging that events that elicit positive affective reactions are likely to occur and events that elicit negative affective reactions are unlikely to occur. The tendency to be optimistic thus results from emotional processes that occur largely outside of conscious awareness. We discuss recent evidence that supports these propositions, the import of understanding optimism as the result of emotional processes for judgment and decision research as well as attempts to improve decision‐making, and remaining unresolved issues.     

Affective Arousal as Information: How Affective Arousal Influences Judgments,Learning, and Memory

The affect‐as‐information framework posits that affect is embodied information about value and importance. The valence dimension of affect provides evaluative information about stimulus objects, which plays a role in judgment and decision‐making. Affect can also provide evaluative information about one's own cognitions and response inclinations, information that guides thinking and reasoning. In particular, positive affect often promotes, and negative affect inhibits, accessible responses or dominant modes of thinking. Affect thus moderates many of the textbook phenomena in cognitive psychology. In the current review, we suggest additionally that the arousal dimension of affect amplifies reactions, leading to intensified evaluations, increased reliance on particular styles of learning, and enhanced long‐term memory for events. We conclude that whereas valenced affective cues serve as information about value, the arousal dimension provides information about urgency or importance.     

With or Without Empathy: Primary Psychopathy and Difficulty in Identifying Feelings Predict Utilitarian Judgment in Sacrificial Dilemmas

Drawing from research on moral judgment and affective dysfunction, we examined how trait psychopathy and alexithymia, which are characterized as empathic deficits, relate to utilitarian moral judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. As predicted, primary and secondary psychopathy traits and alexithymia were associated with reduced empathic concern. However, primary psychopathy and difficulty identifying feelings (one of three alexithymia traits), but not secondary psychopathy and other two alexithymia traits, were associated with utilitarian judgments. Moreover, hierarchical regression analysis showed that primary psychopathy, difficulty identifying feelings, and empathic concern made unique contributions to the prediction of direct harm on the victim, whereas alexithymia traits made weaker contributions. Although the lack of affective empathy is found in psychopathy and alexithymia, the process through which the two traits lead to utilitarian judgment in sacrificial dilemmas may be distinct. The present findings add to the growing literature, contributing to a fuller picture of the relationship between empathy, trait psychopathy, and alexithymia.     

Should I go with my gut? Investigating the benefits of emotion-focused decision making

Deliberative decision strategies have historically been considered the surest path to sound decisions; however, recent evidence and theory suggest that affective strategies may be equally as effective. In four experiments we examined conditions under which affective versus deliberative decision strategies might result in higher decision quality. While consciously focusing on feelings versus details, participants made choices that varied in complexity, in extent of subsequent conscious deliberation allowed, and in domain. Results indicate that focusing on feelings versus details led to superior objective and subjective decision quality for complex decisions. However, when using a feeling-focused approach, subsequent deliberation after encoding resulted in reduced choice quality. These results suggest that affective decision strategies may be more effective relative to deliberative strategies for certain complex decisions.     

Making Decisions in Foreign Languages: Weaker Senses of Ownership Attenuate the Endowment Effect

Although the number of bilingual consumers is expanding, research on the impact of language on consumer decision making is scarce. The current research examines the endowment effect, which is a fundamental consumer decision‐making regularity, under native versus foreign language processing. I show that the endowment effect, which refers to higher valuation of a given product by sellers than buyers, is attenuated when sellers and buyers process information in a foreign language due to a decrease in sellers’ valuation of the product. I further document empirical evidence for the underlying mechanism of this finding. Thinking in a foreign language diminishes the impact of affective reactions on sellers’ judgment, which results in lowered sense of psychological ownership. This lowered sense of psychological ownership significantly decreases sellers’ valuation to a level comparable to the valuation of buyers. The implications of these results for theory and practice, and avenues for future research are discussed.     

青少年情绪预测偏差与决策的关系研究

在决策过程中人们通常选择那些使其感到快乐的行为,决策结果与所预测的高兴或悲伤、满意或不满意紧密相连,以往研究发现这类预测即情绪预测存在偏差。本研究以188名中小学生为被试,采用自编情绪评定表和最后通牒游戏范式,对情绪预测偏差与决策的关系进行探索。结果表明青少年在预测对未来事件的情绪反应时存在强度偏差和持续时间偏差,情绪预测的强度偏差和持续时间偏差影响青少年回避或趋向决策。     

Alteration of affective Theory of Mind in amnestic mild cognitive impairment

The concept of amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) concerns a population of older individuals at high risk of developing probable Alzheimer's disease (AD). Impairments of the cognitive component of Theory of Mind (ToM), that is the inference about other people's beliefs, have been well documented in AD; on the contrary, controversial findings have been reported on the affective component of ToM (inference about other's feelings), a process mainly based on medial portions of the prefrontal cortex. The current study aimed at evaluating the affective component of ToM in aMCI subjects. Twenty aMCI subjects and 20 age‐matched healthy controls (HC) underwent a standard neuropsychological assessment and the assessment of affective ToM with the full 36‐item version of reading the mind in the eyes (RME). Although aMCI subjects had formal impaired performances only in memory tasks, HC outperformed aMCI subjects in several cognitive tasks, including also the RME (mean RME scores 21.7 ± 3.0 vs. 17.0 ± 3.8%; 60.3% of correct answers vs. 47.2%). The lower RME performance of aMCI patients provides the first empirical evidence that aMCI may be associated with difficulties in tasks of affective ToM, in accordance with recent findings of early difficulties of aMCI patients in other processes that are mainly dependent on the medial prefrontal cortex, such as reversal learning and decision making under ambiguity. Findings of the current study need further empirical confirmation in larger samples of aMCI patients and also the investigation of other MCI subtypes is needed.     

More Rational or More Emotional Than Others? Lay Beliefs About Decision-Making Strategies

Research demonstrates that people utilize both reasoning and feeling in decision making and that both strategies can be advantageous. However, little is known about how people perceive their decision-making relative to others. Despite research findings and popular appeals supporting the use of affective decision processes, across a series of studies, we find that individuals believe they rely more on reasoning, and less on feelings, than others. These effects are driven by the motivation to self-enhance where, in most contexts, individuals believe the use of reasoning is superior, and self-enhancing, compared to the use of feelings. Consistent with this mechanism, beliefs that one’s decisions are more rational than others’ are as follows: (a) stronger for those who exhibit greater beliefs in the superiority of reasoning (vs. feeling), (b) attenuated when the decision context precludes motivational thinking about the self or the self is affirmed, and (c) reversed when the use of feelings is perceived as more self-enhancing. We demonstrate downstream consequences (e.g., decision delegation), rule out alternative explanations, and discuss practical implications of these lay beliefs.     

Development and Validation of a New Measure of Intuition: The Types of Intuition Scale

The Types of Intuition Scale (TIntS) measures three types of intuition identified in a literature review by Pretz and Totz (2007): holistic, inferential, and affective. Holistic intuitions integrate diverse sources of information in a Gestalt‐like, non‐analytical manner; inferential intuitions are based on previously analytical processes that have become automatic; and affective intuitions are based on feelings. Current intuition measures inadequately assess these distinct types. We report four validity studies: Study 1 reports the reliability and factor structure of the TIntS and correlations with extant intuition and personality measures. Study 2 presents a confirmatory factor analysis. Studies 3 and 4 examine the predictive validity of the TIntS with respect to clinical decision making in occupational therapy and musical performance. Scales were internally consistent and stable over time, and factor analyses supported the predicted distinctions among them. Correlations with existing measures of intuition, personality, and behavior showed that the TIntS is unique in its assessment of all three types of intuition in one measure. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moving beyond categorization to understand affective influences on real world health decisions

This paper provides an overview of affect and health decision‐making research, with a focus on identifying gaps, opportunities, and challenges to guide future research. We begin by defining common categorical distinctions of affective processes that influence health decisions: integral (i.e., related to the decision) and incidental (i.e., normatively unrelated to the decision) influences, and current (experienced in the moment) and anticipated (“cognitive representations” of future affect) affect. We then summarize key discoveries within the most common categories of affective influences on health decision making: current integral affect, current incidental affect, and anticipated integral affect. Finally, we highlight research gaps, challenges, and opportunities for future directions for research aimed at translating affective and decision science theory to improve our understanding of, and ability to intervene upon, health decision making.