Evidence coverage and argument skills: cognitive factors in a juror's verdict choice

Juror reasoning and verdict choice have been explored variously as functions of argument skill and the overall story representation of the evidence on which verdict choices are based. This study investigates the proportion of testimony covered in the justification of a verdict choice and its relationship with argument skill, narrative explanation or evidence‐based argument, and certainty about verdict choice. Each of these variables was also compared with the verdict choice. People serving jury duty justified verdict choices in two abridged jury trials. Individuals were consistent in the relative amount of evidence used in both trials. Argument skills, evidence evaluation type, and evidence synthesis type all accounted for variance in the amount of evidence covered. Evidence coverage, along with argument skills, predicted verdict choice. As expected, those most certain about verdict choice did not use the most evidence. Implications regarding mediating factors in story construction and juror decision making are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowledge-telling and knowledge-transforming arguments in mock jurors' verdict justifications

According to the “story model” a juror constructs an implicit mental model of a story telling what happened as the basis for the verdict choice. But the explicit justification of a verdict choice could take the form of a story (knowledge telling) or the form of a relational (knowledge-transforming) argument structure that brings together diverse, non-chronologically related pieces of evidence. The study investigates whether people tend towards knowledge telling or knowledge transforming, and whether use of these argument structure types are related to skilled argument and epistemic understanding. A sample of people on jury duty chose and justified verdicts in two abridged cases. Participants tended to display the same argument structure and argument skill across cases. Those using knowledge-transforming structures were more successful at the juror argument skills task and had a higher level of epistemic understanding. The discussion suggests that jurors approach their task with an epistemic orientation towards knowledge telling or knowledge transforming.     

Epistemological beliefs and thinking about everyday controversial issues

The authors investigated the relationship between individuals' beliefs about the nature of knowledge and the nature of learning (epistemological beliefs) and their thinking about everyday controversial issues. Adults (N = 174) ranging in age from 17 to 71 years old with a mean age of 38 completed the Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire (M. Schommer, 1990), which assessed their beliefs in the certainty and organization of knowledge and the speed and control of learning. After they had completed the questionnaire, they responded to a series of questions about two controversial issues that had been discussed in the local newspaper. Regression analyses indicated that the more the participants believed in complex and tentative knowledge, the more likely they were to take on multiple perspectives, be willing to modify their thinking, withhold ultimate decisions until all information was available, and acknowledge the complex, tentative nature of everyday issues. Epistemological beliefs that are heavily influenced by a higher level of education appear to relate to thinking beyond the classroom, and introducing controversial issues into the curriculum may reciprocally foster the development of epistemological beliefs.     

"Recipe for a Jury" Revisited: A Balance Theory Prediction

This study examined the relationship of three variables to verdict confidence in an experimental simulation of the jury deliberation process. The three variables were: sex of juror, verdict (guilty or innocent), and the similarity or dissimilarity between juror and confederate verdicts (congruence or incongruence). The subjects were 35 male and 37 female college students. They deliberated in groups containing a male confederate who role-played an obnoxious anti-White or anti-Black juror. Results indicated that before deliberation, male and guilt verdict jurors were more confident than females and innocent verdict jurors. After deliberation, however, sex differences in verdict confidence were absent while innocent verdicts jurors were more confident than guilt verdict jurors. Most important, as predicted from Heider's Balance Theory, males who deliberated with a confederate whose verdict was congruent with theirs' became less confident in their verdicts. Unexpectedly, females became more confident. The study's major hypothesis, then, that it may be advantageous for the defense to accept a juror who zealously advocates a guilty verdict, was only supported for males.     

Predicting global and topic‐specific certainty beliefs: Domain‐specificity and the role of the academic environment

Background. Epistemological beliefs are subjective theories of the structure and acquisition of knowledge. The instruments used to measure epistemological beliefs in educational psychology (see Duell & Schommer‐Aikins, 2001 ) typically consist of questionnaires tapping general, decontextualized beliefs about knowledge or knowledge acquisition in a specific field or in general. Aims. Using specific theories as stimuli, we determine the degree of topic‐specificity of certainty beliefs as well as the association between certainty beliefs and the learning environment. Sample. Participants were 662 upper secondary school students (Study 1) and 211 college students (Study 2). Method. A global instrument and a topic‐specific instrument were used to collect responses to up to 10 stimulus theories. Factor analysis, multiple regression analysis and multi‐level modelling were carried out. Results. Students' topic‐specific certainty beliefs varied markedly across the stimulus theories. Furthermore, students in different academic environments differed more strongly on global certainty beliefs than on topic‐specific certainty beliefs, and global certainty beliefs were only loosely connected to topic‐specific certainty beliefs. Conclusion. Researchers should critically assess the validity of decontextualized global questionnaires for assessing certainty beliefs. If possible, global measures should be complemented by topic‐specific measures.     

HOW WELL DO JURORS REASON?

Significant individual variation IS observed m how people reason as jurors At the saUsficing end of a continuum we identify, the juror draws on evi-dence selectively to construct a single story of what happened, with no acknowledgment of discrepant evidence or alternative possibilities A contrasting theory-evidence coordination mode of processing entails construction of multiple theories (story-verdict constellations)that are evaluated against the evidence and against alternatives Individual differences Influence task outcome, the satisficing mode being associated with more extreme verdict choices and very high certainty     

Beliefs about factors affecting the Reliability of eyewitness testimony: A Comparison of judges,jurors and the general public

We surveyed 164 members of the juror pool of the Court of Appeal and a representative sample of 1000 adult Norwegians without juror experience, about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of Norwegian judges. Although the judges were somewhat more knowledgeable than jurors and the general public, all groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony. Juror experience, in terms of number of times serving as juror, did not correlate with eyewitness knowledge. Consistent with this finding, the knowledge scores of the jurors were similar to the scores of the general public, tested with an abridged seven‐item version of the questionnaire. Comparisons with the results of surveys conducted in the US, indicate similar levels of knowledge among law professionals and jurors in the two countries. Increasing the knowledge of eyewitness testimony among the principal participants in the judiciary system may be an important component of the solution to eyewitness error. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Epistemological Development and Judgments and Reasoning About Teaching Methods

Children's, adolescents’, and adults’ (N = 96 7–8, 10–11, and 13–14-year-olds and university students) epistemological development and its relation to judgments and reasoning about teaching methods was examined. The domain (scientific or moral), nature of the topic (controversial or noncontroversial), and teaching method (direct instruction by lectures versus class discussions) were systematically varied. Epistemological development was assessed in the aesthetics, values, and physical truth domains. All participants took the domain, nature of the topic, and teaching method into consideration in ways that showed age-related variations. Epistemological development in the value domain alone was predictive of preferences for class discussions and a critical perspective on teacher-centered direct instruction, even when age was controlled in the analysis.     

Factual and Affective/Evaluative Recall of Pretrial Publicity: Their Relative Influence on Juror Reasoning and Verdict in a Simulated Fraud Trial1

This study investigated the relationship between recall of real‐life pretrial publicity (PTP) in a high‐profile fraud case and subsequent reasoning about the trial evidence and verdict decisions. Tracking the reasoning and verdict judgments of 50 mock jurors during a video simulation of the trial material, the effect of factual recall of PTP was compared with recall indicating an affective or evaluative response from the PTP. Affective/evaluative recall, but not factual recall, was significantly associated with anti‐defendant reasoning and confidence in guilt. This effect was partially mediated by reasoning developed during the course of evidence presentation. The potentially prejudicial effect of affective/evaluative recall of PTP is discussed in terms of it activating an explanatory structure that frames evidence interpretation.     

Mock Juror Attribution of Criminal Responsibility: Effects of Race and the Guilty But Mentally III (GBMI) Verdict Option1

The present study examined three questions relevant to the insanity defense: Does the availability of the alternative verdict “Guilty But Mentally III” affect juror assessment of criminal responsibility? Does race of defendant significantly affect juror decision-making about who should be acquitted under the insanity defense? And does race of victim significantly influence how jurors decide their final insanity defense verdicts? Race of defendant (black or white), race of victim (black or white), and verdict choice set [(Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI), Guilty, and Not Guilty) vs. (Guilty but Mentally III (GBMI), NGRI, Guilty, and Not Guilty)] were systematically varied. The mock-trial was presented to 197 college student subjects by means of an audiotape and slide show. Following the re-enacted trial, subjects answered a series of questions regarding the case. The main dependent variable was the rendered verdict. Both χ²loglinear analyses revealed a significant relationship between race of defendant and verdict such that the defendant, when presented as black, was acquitted NGRI significantly more often than when the defendant was presented as white. No significant effects were found for race of victim. The availability of the GBMI verdict option resulted in a twofold effect: There was a two-thirds reduction in both NGRI and straight guilty verdicts when the GBMI verdict option was made available. The implications for legal policy and future research are discussed.     

The variable influence of confession inconsistencies: How factual errors (but not contradictions) reduce belief in suspect guilt

Wrongful conviction statistics suggest that jurors pay little heed to the quality of confession evidence when making verdict decisions. However, recent research indicates that confession inconsistencies may sometimes reduce perception of suspect guilt. Drawing on theoretical frameworks of attribution theory, correspondence bias, and the story model of juror decision‐making, we investigated how judgments about likely guilt are affected by different types of inconsistencies: self‐contradictions (Experiment 1) and factual errors (Experiment 2). Crucially, judgments of likely guilt of the suspect were reduced by factual errors in confession evidence, but not by contradictions. Mediation analyses suggest that this effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt is underpinned by the extent to which mock‐jurors generated a plausible, alternative explanation for why the suspect confessed. These results indicate that not all confession inconsistencies are treated equally; factual errors might cause suspicion about the veracity of the confession, but contradictions do not.     

How type of excuse defense, mock juror age, and defendant age affect mock jurors' decisions

The authors investigated the effects of mock juror age (younger vs. older), defendant age (22 vs. 65), and type of excuse defense used by defendants (a highly self-inflicted condition, Cocaine Dependency Disorder, vs. a less self-inflicted condition, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder) on mock juror decisions. Ninety-six younger and 96 older adults read a scenario and answered a questionnaire. Results indicated that the defendant using the highly self-inflicted excuse was more likely to receive a guilty verdict and a longer sentence than was the defendant using the less self-inflicted excuse. Older jurors were more certain of their verdicts and saw the defendant as more responsible for his condition than did younger jurors. Defendant age did not affect juror decisions. In addition, excuse type and juror age affected the jurors' perceptions of the victim's responsibility for the attack. The authors discuss the potential influence of juror age on perceptions of defendant responsibility.     

Practical reasoning and practical knowledge

The judgement that provides the content of intention and coincides with the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative judgement about what to do, and not, as Anscombe and McDowell argue, a factual judgement about what one is doing. Treating the conclusion of practical reasoning as expressing a recommendation rather than a verdict undermines McDowell’s argument; the special nature of practical reasoning does not preclude its conclusions being normative. Anscombe’s and McDowell’s claim that practical self-knowledge is productive of action may be accommodated by identifying the content of practical knowledge not with the conclusion but with a premise of practical reasoning – a kind of practical reasoning that occurs within rather than before action.     

Juror Preference for Curative Alternative Verdicts for Veterans With PTSD

Two studies examined mock juror verdicts for veterans with PTSD in the criminal justice system. Mock jurors demonstrated a leniency toward treatment bias for veterans with PTSD who committed a violent crime, compared to a nonviolent crime. This leniency toward treatment bias occurred only when alternative verdict options, beyond guilty or not guilty, were available. In fact, a guilt bias was demonstrated by mock jurors when the only verdict options were guilty or not guilty, and a bias toward treatment was demonstrated when curative alternative verdicts were available. Implications for efforts to address the growing national problem of veterans with PTSD in the criminal justice system are discussed.     

Decision‐making in civil litigation: Effects of attorney credibility,evidence strength,and juror cognitive processing

The current study examined the relationship between juror cognitive processing (measured by need for cognition [NFC]), attorney credibility, evidence strength, and civil litigation verdicts (liability, likelihood of causation, and compensatory damages). Participants (N = 446) viewed a videotaped mock civil trial in which the credibility of the attorneys and the strength of the plaintiff's evidence were manipulated. Plaintiff attorney credibility, defense attorney credibility, and strength of evidence interacted with one another for liability verdicts. In the strong evidence condition, the likelihood of a liable verdict was higher for a credible plaintiff attorney than a non‐credible plaintiff attorney when facing a non‐credible defense attorney. In the ambiguous evidence condition, the likelihood of a liable verdict was higher for a credible plaintiff attorney than a non‐credible plaintiff attorney when facing a credible defense attorney. Plaintiff attorney credibility, however, was found to be more influential on jurors’ decision‐making than case evidence for likelihood of causation and compensatory damage award decisions. Participants’ NFC also interacted with plaintiff attorney credibility. High NFC jurors were more influenced by a credible plaintiff attorney than low NFC jurors. Although these findings are counter to common findings in the NFC literature, they conform to a body of literature that supports the notion that jurors view attorney credibility as a piece of case evidence and not a peripheral cue as is often assumed. Thus, the findings indicate that attorneys do matter to the outcomes of cases. Policy and practice implications for attorneys and the courts are discussed.     

Biased interpretation of evidence by mock jurors

Predecisional distortion is jurors' biased interpretation of new evidence to support whichever verdict is tentatively favored as a trial progresses. In 2 experiments, students and prospective jurors distorted evidence from a mock trial. Further, the magnitude of prospective jurors' distortion was twice that of students. Consistent with previous research, distortion increased with juror confidence in whichever verdict was currently leading. In spite of clear instructions to ignore prior beliefs, general proplaintiff or prodefendant attitudes influenced the verdicts of prospective jurors, but not of students. These findings suggest that jury instructions should warn against not only premature decisions but also any tentative judgments, lest such opinions influence jurors' evaluations of subsequent evidence. Predecisional distortion in jury trials may lead to biased outcomes resulting from evidence order effects.     

The relationship between epistemological beliefs,implicit theories of intelligence,and self‐regulated learning among Norwegian postsecondary students

Background. More empirical work is needed to examine the dimensionality of personal epistemology and relations between those dimensions and motivational and strategic components of self‐regulated learning. In particular, there is great need to investigate personal epistemology and its relation to self‐regulated learning across cultures and academic contexts. Because the demarcation between personal epistemology and implicit theories of intelligence has been questioned, dimensions of personal epistemology should also be studied in relation to implicit theories of intelligence. Aims. The primary aim was to examine the dimensionality of personal epistemology and the relation between those dimensions and implicit theories of intelligence in the cultural context of Norwegian postsecondary education. A secondary aim was to examine the relative contribution of epistemological beliefs and theories of intelligence to motivational and strategic components of self‐regulated learning in different academic contexts within that culture. Samples. The first sample included 178 business administration students in a traditional transmission‐oriented instructional context; the second, 108 student teachers in an innovative pedagogical context. Methods. The dimensionality of the Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire was examined through factor analyses, and the resulting dimensions were examined in relation to implicit theories of intelligence. We performed multiple regression analyses, separately for the two academic contexts, to try to predict motivational (i.e. self‐efficacy beliefs, mastery goal orientation, and interest) and strategic (i.e. self‐regulatory strategy use) components of self‐regulated learning with epistemological beliefs and implicit theories of intelligence. Results. Considerable cross‐cultural generalizability was found for the dimensionality of personal epistemology. Moreover, the dimensions of personal epistemology seemed to represent constructs separate from the construct of implicit theories of intelligence. Differences in the predictability of the epistemological dimensions were found for the two samples. For the student teachers, belief about knowledge construction and modification was a better predictor of self‐regulated learning. For the business administration students, belief about the certainty of knowledge played a more important role in self‐regulated learning. Conclusions. Epistemological beliefs predict self‐regulated learning among Norwegian postsecondary students and play more important roles than implicit theories of intelligence. Relations between epistemological beliefs and self‐regulated learning may vary with academic context.     

Repressed memory lawsuits: Potential verdict predictors

This research examined the relationship between verdict and juror sex, ethnicity, religiosity and authoritarianism, and case type in lawsuits involving repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. Subjects (N = 251) read excerpts from one of two hypothetical lawsuits (one involving claims of incest or one involving accusations of satanic ritual abuse; SRA), rendered an individual verdict, and responded to demographic questionnaires and measures of religiosity and authoritarianism. It was predicted that jurors who were female, highly religious, high authoritarian, or Mexican-American would be most likely to sympathize with the plaintiff, and that the SRA version would be less successful. Logit analysis yielded a main effect of sex on verdict and an interaction between sex, authoritarianism, and religiosity on verdict, both findings consistent with predictions. Hypotheses predicting main effects of ethnicity on verdict and case type on verdict did not find statistical support.     

The Impact of Regulatory Fit on Performance in an Inattentional Blindness Paradigm

The influence of timing and frequency of instructions on the reasoning of jurors in a simulated grand larceny trial was investigated. Mock jurors were given definitions of grand larceny before and after the testimony, only before, only after, or not at all. Although timing of instructions was not significantly related to reasoning or to verdicts, frequency of instructions influenced the aspects of testimony deemed relevant and increased juror use of legal rules in making verdicts. Selective encoding of testimony could not account for the instruction effect.