Limitations of gaze transfer: Without visual context,eye movements do not to help to coordinate joint action,whereas mouse movements do

Remote cooperation can be improved by transferring the gaze of one participant to the other. However, based on a partner's gaze, an interpretation of his communicative intention can be difficult. Thus, gaze transfer has been inferior to mouse transfer in remote spatial referencing tasks where locations had to be pointed out explicitly. Given that eye movements serve as an indicator of visual attention, it remains to be investigated whether gaze and mouse transfer differentially affect the coordination of joint action when the situation demands an understanding of the partner's search strategies. In the present study, a gaze or mouse cursor was transferred from a searcher to an assistant in a hierarchical decision task. The assistant could use this cursor to guide his movement of a window which continuously opened up the display parts the searcher needed to find the right solution. In this context, we investigated how the ease of using gaze transfer depended on whether a link could be established between the partner's eye movements and the objects he was looking at. Therefore, in addition to the searcher's cursor, the assistant either saw the positions of these objects or only a grey background. When the objects were visible, performance and the number of spoken words were similar for gaze and mouse transfer. However, without them, gaze transfer resulted in longer solution times and more verbal effort as participants relied more strongly on speech to coordinate the window movement. Moreover, an analysis of the spatio-temporal coupling of the transmitted cursor and the window indicated that when no visual object information was available, assistants confidently followed the searcher's mouse but not his gaze cursor. Once again, the results highlight the importance of carefully considering task characteristics when applying gaze transfer in remote cooperation.     

What is Literature? Revisited: Sartre on the Language of Literature

This article argues that Sartre's distinction in What Is Literature? between prose and poetry should be understood in the light of his earlier distinction in The Imaginary between two kinds of meaning. Sartre argues against the “Cartesian picture” of consciousness in The Imaginary, specifically concerning our experience of images. Not only is a mental image not an “inner object” mediating between consciousness and the world, even a picture drawn on paper should not be understood as an object standing between the viewer and what this picture represents. Our experience, Sartre argues, is that of seeing things in a picture rather than seeing through it, such that the meaning of pictures and images in general is embodied in them and cannot be separated from them. He then goes on to contrast this kind of embodied meaning (which he calls “sense”) with a kind of meaning that can be completely grasped independently of its expression (which he calls “signification”) and identify the two with painting and language respectively. It is for this reason, this article argues, that Sartre later sees poetry as a deviation from language's proper function. This rigid distinction is maintained by Sartre until the end of his career, and the change that some commentators found in him are its outcome rather than a revolt against it. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty has demonstrated more convincingly that sense and signification are both essential aspects of linguistic meaning, and their relation is much more dynamic and complimentary than Sartre would have allowed.     

The role of gaze direction and mutual exclusivity in guiding 24‐month‐olds' word mappings

In these studies, we examined how a default assumption about word meaning, the mutual exclusivity assumption and an intentional cue, gaze direction, interacted to guide 24‐month‐olds' object‐word mappings. In Expt 1, when the experimenter's gaze was consistent with the mutual exclusivity assumption, novel word mappings were facilitated. When the experimenter's eye‐gaze was in conflict with the mutual exclusivity cue, children demonstrated a tendency to rely on the mutual exclusivity assumption rather than follow the experimenter's gaze to map the label to the object. In Expt 2, children relied on the experimenter's gaze direction to successfully map both a first label to a novel object and a second label to a familiar object. Moreover, infants mapped second labels to familiar objects to the same degree that they mapped first labels to novel objects. These findings are discussed with regard to children's use of convergent and divergent cues in indirect word mapping contexts.     

Impervious and intrusive: The impenetrable object in transference and countertransference

The author describes an internal object that he calls the ‘impenetrable object’ which has two characteristics: being impervious to the projections from the patient and being intrusive, i.e. projecting into the patient. It arises out of an early relationship with a mother who may be generally disturbed or traumatized so that she is unable to take in or tolerate the child's projections and may use the child as a receptacle for her own projections. He links the concept of an impenetrable object with other concepts such as Williams's ‘reversal of the container–contained relationship’ and Green's ‘dead mother’. If such an object dominates the patient's internal world, it can lead to severe difficulties in the analytic process. Interpretations may be experienced as violent projections from the analyst which the patient has to ward off and the analyst may enact an impervious or intrusive object in various ways. The author describes a case in which such dynamics played a significant role. He argues that intensive work in the countertransference is required to detect subtle enactments and allow a shift in the analyst, which in turn can enable change in the patient. He gives clinical material that demonstrates such work by the analyst and illustrates the shift from an impenetrable object to a more permeable one in the patient's internal world.     

Authenticity in Heidegger: A response to Dreyfus

In his book, Being‐in‐the‐World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I, Hubert Dreyfus argues that Heidegger's concept of authenticity is incomprehensible. He maintains that there are two conflicting accounts of inauthenticity in Being and Time. He elucidates what he calls the ‘structural account’ of inauthenticity and being‐in‐the‐world in the main body of his work, and then criticizes what he calls the ‘motivational account’ in an Appendix. Because he overlooks certain textual evidence and underemphasizes fleeing and the role of choice, his interpretation is neither complete nor compelling. I offer an alternative interpretation of authenticity. While Heidegger's notion of authenticity may still be weakened by other flaws, it is not incomprehensible in the sense that Dreyfus contends.     

On religious and cultural objects: Articulate and inarticulate bodies in Spinoza's philosophy of nature

Spinoza's philosophy is often overlooked when it comes to thinking about matters concerning art and culture. While recent work has done much to address this, his philosophy remains ambiguously related to the theorisation of things such as temples, poems, and paintings. This article argues that it is by turning to Spinoza's theorisation of the sacred in the Theological‐Political Treatise, that we can best derive his philosophical position on culture and its objects. I argue that Spinoza locates the sanctity of a religious object–what he calls its “articulateness”–in its particular use‐relation with a people. In a similar manner, Spinoza locates the “meaning” and articulateness of words in the use that people make of them, thereby secularising the sanctification process for cultural objects. I argue that this relation of “use” between cultural‐religious objects and human beings and their societies is the way in which we can best discern Spinoza's philosophical position regarding art and culture, as well as further develop his potential contribution to cultural and art theory.     

Infantile defences in parent‐infant psychotherapy: The example of gaze avoidance

Findings from parent‐infant observational research have stimulated the development of intersubjective models of psychotherapeutic action. These models have brought out the infant as an interactive partner with the parent. Conversely, interest in describing the individual psyche of the baby has decreased, especially the unconscious levels of his/her experiences and representations. In parallel, clinicians and researchers have been less prone to apply classical psychoanalytic concepts when describing the internal world of the infant. The author argues that this is inconsistent with the fact that psychoanalytic theory, from its inception, was founded on speculations of the infant's mind. He investigates one such concept from classical theory; the defence. Specifically, he investigates if selective gaze avoidance in young babies may be described as a defence or even a defence mechanism. The investigation links with Selma Fraiberg's discussion of the phenomenon and also with Freud's conception of defence. The author also compares his views on the baby as a subject with those suggested by infant researchers, for example, Stern and Beebe. The discussion is illustrated by vignettes from a psychoanalytic therapy with a 3 month‐old girl and her mother.     

A response to Metz's reply on the end of ubuntu

Thaddeus Metz argues against our position that ubuntu has reached its end. He rejects our recommendation that ubuntu both as a way of life and as an ethical theory must be jettisoned as it is no longer applicable to modern conditions. He thinks that both our recommendations are wrong. Hence he seeks to show that ubuntu is defensible both as an ethical theory and as a way of life. Further, he thinks there is a role to be played by ubuntu in how life could be lived in modern day (South) Africa. He also seeks to offer a defence of the relevance of ubuntu theorists. For these reasons he couches his responding title with the phrase ‘Just the beginning of ubuntu [?…?]’. In this paper I continue the debate by seeking to show that Metz's response poses no threat to our original position. I then endeavour to show that my assessment of his position puts him in an unenviable position of defending the indefensible. I further suggest that Metz's current defence of ubuntu is not philosophical but dogmatic.     

Say hello to the scream extractor: working with an autistic child with psychotic mechanisms

This paper describes the first two years of intensive psychotherapy with a six-year-old boy diagnosed with autism. I explore the many ways in which he retreated from reality, most frequently by taking refuge inside the maternal body or flying off into an imaginary space world. He fragmented his identity and that of his objects by using the discourse of fictional characters. Everything was externalised; there was little transmutation of material available for thought. I consider his dilemma – the wish to fuse with the object and the fear of being engulfed; the omnipotent denial of the need for an object and of the parental relationship, leading to an inability to make links. The paper discusses working with a child who experienced any ‘paternal’ firmness as persecuting and destructive. The softer, receptive maternal mind of the therapist was more easily tolerated. He gradually began to internalise a more benign combined object, as he became more able to bear separateness from the other.     

Feuerbach's theory of object‐relations and its legacy in 20th century post‐Hegelian philosophy

This paper focuses on the way in which Feuerbach's attempt to develop a naturalistic, realist remodeling of Hegel's relational ontology, which culminated in his own version of “sensualism”, led him to emphasize the vulnerability of the subject and the role of affectivity, thus making object‐dependence a constitutive feature of subjectivity. We find in Feuerbach the first lineaments of a philosophical theory of object‐relations, one that anticipates the well‐known psychological theory of the same name, but one that also offers a broader metaphysical basis in which all types of “essential objects” are shown to matter to subjectivity. This Feuerbachian theory of object‐relations, the paper then argues, foreshadows a number of important developments in 20th century post‐Hegelian philosophy. In it can be found an anticipation of Adorno's later theory of mimesis. Equally, this theory already emphasizes the “libidinal” nature of intentionality, in a way that announces Merleau‐Ponty's ontology of the flesh. Finally, the last section of the article proposes a model with which we might reconstruct the way in which object‐relations and self‐relations can be brought together consistently. In this instance, Feuerbach uses concepts that announce Freud's notion of “primary narcissism”. One contemporary philosopher who has proposed a sophisticated model of subjectivity, in which primary narcissism is shown to complement object‐dependence, is Axel Honneth. The last section argues that Feuerbach's full image of subjective identity as reciprocal scaffolding of self‐ and object‐relations reminds strongly of Honneth's core concept of “positive self‐relation”.     

Infants’ developing understanding of the link between looker and object

Three studies investigated infants’ understanding that gaze involves a relation between a person and the object of his or her gaze. Infants were habituated to an event in which an actor turned and looked at one of two toys. Then, infants saw test events in which (1) the actor turned to the same side as during habituation to look at a different toy, or (2) the actor turned to the other side to look at the same toy as during habituation. The first of these involved a change in the relation between actor and object. The second involved a new physical motion on the part of the actor but no change in the relation between actor and object. Seven‐ and 9‐month‐old infants did not respond to the change in relation between actor and object, although infants at both ages followed the actor's gaze to the toys. In contrast, 12‐month‐old infants responded to the change in the actor–object relation. Control conditions verified that the paradigm was a sensitive index of the younger infants’ representations of action: 7‐ and 9‐month‐olds responded to a change in the actor–object relation when the actor's gaze was accompanied by a grasp. Taken together, these findings indicate that gaze‐following does not initially go hand in hand with understanding the relation between a person who looks and the object of his or her gaze, and that infants begin to understand this relation between 9 and 12 months.     

How Not to Prove the Existence of ‘Atomless Gunk’

In his ‘Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts?: An Argument for “Atomless Gunk’’, Dean Zimmerman defends the claim that no physical object has a complete decomposition into simples but instead has among its parts a piece of ‘atomless gunk’ His argument for this claim rests in part upon a theory of the impenetrability of physical objects. In that theory, Zimmerman distinguishes ‘[t]he sort of impenetrability that is a part of the concept of’ a physical object from ‘a power to resist the pressure of other objects’. He says that impenetrability is but ‘an essential inability’ of two physical objects to occupy one and the same region of space, an essential inability that is not a power of one physical object to exert repulsive forces on others in its vicinity. I argue that this theory of impenetrability is false and that Zimmerman's argument for the existence of ‘atomless gunk’ fails.     

SEXUAL ABERRATION OR INSTINCTUAL VICISSITUDE? REVISITING FREUD'S “THE SEXUAL ABERRATIONS”

The author reconsiders Freud's “The Sexual Aberrations,” the first of his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), in light of contemporary psychoanalytic theory. Are the concepts of sexual aberration and norm still viable? The author argues that they are necessary but insufficient elements in current theory. He then presents a competing model in which sexuality can be reduced to a more elemental level of disturbance and wish, where it is an expression of a nonsexual wish—for example, to possess or control the object to eliminate separateness. The author presents clinical material to demonstrate this alternative model.     

Platonism and metaphor in the texts of mathematics: Gödel and Frege on mathematical knowledge

In this paper, I challenge those interpretations of Frege that reinforce the view that his talk of grasping thoughts about abstract objects is consistent with Russell's notion of acquaintance with universals and with Gödel's contention that we possess a faculty of mathematical perception capable of perceiving the objects of set theory. Here I argue the case that Frege is not an epistemological Platonist in the sense in which Gödel is one. The contention advanced is that Gödel bases his Platonism on a literal comparison between mathematical intuition and physical perception. He concludes that since we accept sense perception as a source of empirical knowledge, then we similarly should posit a faculty of mathematical intuition to serve as the source of mathematical knowledge. Unlike Gödel, Frege does not posit a faculty of mathematical intuition. Frege talks instead about grasping thoughts about abstract objects. However, despite his hostility to metaphor, he uses the notion of ‘grasping’ as a strategic metaphor to model his notion of thinking, i.e., to underscore that it is only by logically manipulating the cognitive content of mathematical propositions that we can obtain mathematical knowledge. Thus, he construes ‘grasping’ more as theoretical activity than as a kind of inner mental ‘seeing’.

     

The effects of adults' affective expression and direction of visual gaze on 12‐month‐olds' visual preferences for an object following a 5‐minute, 1‐day,or 1‐month delay

Between 12‐ and 14 months of age infants begin to use another's direction of gaze and affective expression in learning about various objects and events. What is not well understood is how long infants' behaviour towards a previously unfamiliar object continues to be influenced following their participation in circumstances of social referencing. In this experiment, we examined infants' sensitivity to an adult's direction of gaze and their visual preference for one of two objects following a 5‐min, 1‐day, or 1‐month delay. Ninety‐six 12‐month‐olds participated. For half of the infants during habituation (i.e., familiarization), the adults' direction of gaze was directed towards an unfamiliar object (look condition). For the remaining half of the infants during habituation, the adults' direction of gaze was directed away from the unfamiliar object (look‐away condition). All infants were habituated to two events. One event consisted of an adult looking towards (look condition) or away from (look‐away condition) an object while facially and vocally conveying a positive affective expression. The second event consisted of the same adult looking towards or away from a different object while conveying a disgusted affective expression. Following the habituation phase and a 5‐min, 1‐day, or 1‐month delay, infants' visual preference was assessed. During the visual preference phase, infants saw the two objects side by side where the adult conveying the affective expression was not visible. Results of the visual preference phase indicate that infants in the look condition showed a significant preference for object previously paired with the positive affect following a 5‐min and 1‐day delay. No significant visual preference was found in the look condition following a 1‐month delay. No significant preferences were found at any retention interval in the look‐away condition. Results are discussed in terms of early learning, social referencing, and early memory.     

The exclusion of psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psychotherapy from the publicly financed medical health sector in Sweden

Abstract

Schreber's fantasy of turning into a woman to be fertilized by God and produce a new race of mankind was a major motive for Superintendent of Sonnenstein, Dr Guido Weber, to maintain that Schreber was a case of chronic and incurable paranoia and unfit for life in society, failing to see the difference between the concrete and the metaphorical. Schreber not only proved Weber wrong, but prophetically anticipated a number of issues in current awareness of gender psychology and gender roles in society.

In Schreber's system the two principal elements of his delusions (his transformation into a woman and his favored relation to God) are linked by the assumption of a feminine attitude towarh God. It will be our task to show that there is an essential genetic relation between these two elements. Otherwise we shall be like a man holding a sieve under a he-goat while some one else milks it. Sigmung Freud     

Does how I look at what you're doing depend on what I'm doing?

Previous studies showed that people proactively gaze at the target of another's action by taking advantage of their own motor representation of that action. But just how selectively is one's own motor representation implicated in another's action processing? If people observe another's action while performing a compatible or an incompatible action themselves, will this impact on their gaze behaviour? We recorded proactive eye movements while participants observed an actor grasping small or large objects. The participants' right hand either freely rested on the table or held with a suitable grip a large or a small object, respectively. Proactivity of gaze behaviour significantly decreased when participants observed the actor reaching her target with a grip that was incompatible with respect to that used by them to hold the object in their own hand. This indicates that effective observation of action may depend on what one is actually doing, being actions observed best when the suitable motor representations may be readily recruited.     

Pre´cis of Heidegger,Language, and World-disclosure

It is argued that Heidegger should be seen as something of a Kantian Idealist. Like Kant, Heidegger distinguishes two standpoints (transcendental and empirical) which we can occupy when we ask the question whether natural things depend on us. He agrees with Kant that from the empirical or human standpoint we are justified in saying that natural things do not depend on us. But in contrast with Kant, Heidegger argues that from the transcendental standpoint we can say neither that natural things do depend on us, nor that they do not. His reasons for saying this, however, represent an attempt to rework both Kant's temporal idealism and his temporal interpretation of the concept of an object (which shows up in Heidegger as a temporal interpretation of being). Heidegger suggests that Kant was led astray into a transcendental idealism about natural entities, because he did not understand the implications of transcendental idealism about being.     

Battle of the dinosaurs: The impact of internalized bad paternal and maternal objects in a three-year-old boy

Abstract

This paper begins with a summary of W. Ronald D. Fairbairn's object relations theory, with particular focus on his ideas of how paternal objects are internalized alongside maternal objects. A case is then presented of a three-year-old boy who experienced deprivation and frustration from both his mother and father, thus initiating the internalization of bad paternal and maternal objects. Assessment and implications for treatment are then discussed using Fairbairn's model as an organizing framework for developing goals and interventions, and monitoring treatment progress.     

‘Though he slay me,yet will I trust in him’: a critical reconstruction of Winnicott's theory of value

This paper extrapolates an outline for a theory of value from Winnicott's reflections on war in ‘Discussion of war aims’ (1940). The author treats Winnicott's discussion as an occasion for a critical reconstruction of his theory of life‐values. He discerns an implicit set of distinctions in Winnicott's reflections on war, including different orders of value (existential, ethical, and psychosocial); a distinction between maturity and necessity; and a yet more fundamental distinction between violence and brutality. The paper argues, on the basis of these distinctions, that Winnicott allows for an understanding of one's encounter with the enemy as an ethical relation. The main argument of the paper is that the ethical attitude underpins recognition of the enemy's humanity. On a more critical note, the author argues that Winnicott doesn't adhere consistently to the ethical attitude he presupposes, that in certain passages he privileges the maturity of combatants over the humanity of the enemy.