She just doesn't look like a philosopher…? Affective influences on the halo effect in impression formation

Can good or bad moods influence people's tendency to rely on irrelevant information when forming impressions (halo effects)? On the basis of recent work on affect and cognition, this experiment predicted and found that positive affect increased and negative affect eliminated the halo effect. After an autobiographical mood induction (recalling happy or sad past events), participants (N = 246) read a philosophical essay, with an image of the writer attached, showing either an older man or a young woman (halo manipulation). Judgements of the essay and the writer revealed clear mood and halo effects, as well as a significant mood by halo interaction. Positive affect increased halo effects consistent with the more assimilative, constructive processing style it recruits. Negative affect promoting more accommodative and systematic processing style eliminated halo effects. The relevance of these findings for impression formation in everyday situations is considered, and their implications for recent affect‐cognition theories are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do you see what I see? Affect and visual information processing

Individuals in sad moods process information in a less global and more local manner than do those in happier moods. This experiment investigates whether processing speed is associated with these mood effects, whether task ambiguity moderates these mood effects, and whether making feelings appear irrelevant to the task can eliminate these mood effects. Participants in happy, sad, and neutral moods were lead to experience their feelings as being either relevant or irrelevant to a global/local processing task. As predicted, sad moods decreased global processing relative to happier moods when feelings seemed relevant to the task and when the criteria for responding were ambiguous, but not when feelings seemed irrelevant or when the criteria were unambiguous. Consistent with the idea that mood guides processing, increases in affect intensity were associated with faster reaction times. Overall, the results suggest that mood and processing effects share some core similarities with mood and judgement effects.     

When necessity is the mother of invention: Mood and problem solving

Happy moods foster the ability to think about problems in new ways, but little is known about how sad moods affect this process. This paper investigates the hypothesis that individuals in sad moods adhere to the data and might not think about problems in new ways until they receive data indicating that it is appropriate to do so. To investigate this hypothesis, participants in happy, sad, and neutral moods completed a classic mental set task (Luchins, 1942). All mood groups were able to break the mental set and to think about the problems in a new way, but mood affected when they did so. Consistent with the idea that individuals in sad moods adhere to the data, they relied on the mental set until they received evidence that it may be problematic. In contrast, individuals in happier moods were more likely to abandon the mental set on their own, rather than wait for evidence of its inadequacy. In three follow-up experiments, when the information provided by participants’ sad feelings was rendered uninformative, the mood effect disappeared. These findings are consistent with the claim that affect influences processing only when it provides information about how to proceed.     

How Positive and Negative Feedback Motivate Goal Pursuit

This article explores the feedback individuals give, seek, and respond to in the course of pursuing their goals. We propose that positive feedback motivates goal pursuit when it signals an increase in goal commitment, whereas negative feedback motivates goal pursuit when it signals insufficient goal progress. We review research suggesting that whether individuals are drawn to evaluate their level of commitment versus rate of progress determines the type of feedback (positive or negative) that best motivates them to pursue their goals. We then review research suggesting that these effects of feedback operate by inducing positive and negative general moods as well as specific emotions.     

Affect influences false memories at encoding: evidence from recognition data

Memory is susceptible to illusions in the form of false memories. Prior research found, however, that sad moods reduce false memories. The current experiment had two goals: (1) to determine whether affect influences retrieval processes, and (2) to determine whether affect influences the strength and the persistence of false memories. Happy or sad moods were induced either before or after learning word lists designed to produce false memories. Control groups did not experience a mood induction. We found that sad moods reduced false memories only when induced before learning. Signal detection analyses confirmed that sad moods induced prior to learning reduced activation of nonpresented critical lures suggesting that they came to mind less often. Affective states, however, did not influence retrieval effects. We conclude that negative affective states promote item-specific processing, which reduces false memories in a similar way as using an explicitly guided cognitive control strategy.     

Mood, source characteristics, and message processing: A mood-congruent expectancies approach

Based on two lines of research, a model is proposed to explain when individuals in a positive mood as well as individuals in a negative mood invest more or less effort in message processing. First, research has shown that moods affect likelihood estimates. That is, positive (negative) mood leads to a mood-congruent increase regarding the occurrence of positively (negatively) valenced events. Second, research has shown that mood-unrelated expectancies affect message processing. Combining both lines of research, I argue that mood-congruent expectancies also affect message scrutiny, that is, more effortful processing given expectancy disconfirmation rather than expectancy confirmation. This prediction was tested in two experiments involving initial information regarding source honesty and likability, respectively. As predicted, individuals in both positive and negative moods evinced more effortful message processing when initial information disconfirmed rather than confirmed expectancies. Thus, these results are consistent with a quite flexible view of individuals in both positive and negative moods regarding the effort invested in information processing.     

Constructive controversy and creative process engagement: The roles of positive conflict value,cognitive flexibility,and psychological safety

This research explores how and when constructive controversy enhances creative process engagement. We identify positive conflict value and cognitive flexibility as two mediating processes that transmit the effect of constructive controversy on creative process engagement. We further theorize that psychological safety shows opposing moderating effects: It strengthens the positive conflict value–creative process engagement link, whereas weakens the cognitive flexibility–creative process engagement link. Moreover, we propose that psychological safety strengthens and weakens the two mediating pathways through positive conflict value and cognitive flexibility, respectively. Results based on a multiwave data involving 239 employees from the research and development division of a large high‐technology company provide support for our hypotheses. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Affective guidance of intelligent agents: How emotion controls cognition

How do emotions and moods color cognition? In this article, we examine how such reactions influence both judgments and cognitive performance. We argue that many affective influences are due, not to affective reactions themselves, but to the information they carry about value. The specific kind of influence that occurs depends on the focus of the agent at the time. When making evaluative judgments, for example, an agent’s positive affect may emerge as a positive attitude toward a person or object. But when an agent focuses on a cognitive task, positive affect may act like feedback about the value of one’s approach. As a result, positive affect tends to promote cognitive, relational processes, whereas negative affect tends to inhibit relational processing, resulting in more perceptual, stimulus-specific processing. As a consequence, many textbook phenomena from cognitive psychology occur readily in happy moods, but are inhibited or even absent in sad moods (149).     

Who am I? The relationship between self‐concept uncertainty and materialism

It is well accepted that materialism may result in a number of negative consequences, hence the importance of improving its understanding. In this paper, we propose that materialism negatively relates to self‐concept uncertainty. Uncertainty about oneself is aversive and those feeling uncertain may use the possession of material objects as a way to reduce the uncertainty. Inasmuch as material objects can serve as concrete signs of self‐worth, self‐concept uncertainty can therefore relate to more materialism. Over two studies, one in Australia and the other in the US, with a total of 390 participants, our research demonstrates that lower clarity about one's self‐concept associates with higher levels of materialism. While this result holds for both genders, this relationship is considerably stronger for women compared to men. We also find that lower self‐concept clarity relates to higher compulsive buying. We further demonstrate that materialism relates to higher positive moods during shopping, and also relates to higher negative moods after shopping, more notably negative moods towards what was purchased. This effect is significant even when controlling for general affective states.     

Remembering can cause forgetting--but not in negative moods

Repeated retrieval of a subset of previously observed events can cause forgetting of the non-retrieved events. We examined how affective states experienced during retrieval modulate such retrieval-induced forgetting by inducing positive, negative, and neutral moods in subjects immediately before they attempted to retrieve studied items. On the basis of recent work, we hypothesized that positive moods encourage relational processing, which should increase interference from related events and thus enhance retrieval-induced forgetting. By contrast, negative moods should encourage item-specific processing, which should reduce interference and thus reduce such forgetting. Our results are consistent with these predictions. When subjects were in negative moods, repeated retrieval did not cause forgetting of the non-retrieved material, whereas when subjects were in positive and neutral moods, they showed reliable retrieval-induced forgetting. Our findings suggest that the emotions involved during interrogation of a witness can affect the result of repeated interrogations.     

With sadness comes accuracy; with happiness, false memory: mood and the false memory effect

The Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm lures people to produce false memories. Two experiments examined whether induced positive or negative moods would influence this false memory effect. The affect-as-information hypothesis predicts that, on the one hand, positive affective cues experienced as task-relevant feedback encourage relational processing during encoding, which should enhance false memory effects. On the other hand, negative affective cues are hypothesized to encourage item-specific processing at encoding, which should discourage such effects. The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with these predictions: Individuals in negative moods were significantly less likely to show false memory effects than those in positive moods or those whose mood was not manipulated. Experiment 2 introduced inclusion instructions to investigate whether moods had their effects at encoding or retrieval. The results replicated the false memory finding of Experiment 1 and provide evidence that moods influence the accessibility of lures at encoding, rather than influencing monitoring at retrieval of whether lures were actually presented.     

Facial affect processing and depression susceptibility: cognitive biases and cognitive neuroscience

Facial affect processing is essential to social development and functioning and is particularly relevant to models of depression. Although cognitive and interpersonal theories have long described different pathways to depression, cognitive-interpersonal and evolutionary social risk models of depression focus on the interrelation of interpersonal experience, cognition, and social behavior. We therefore review the burgeoning depressive facial affect processing literature and examine its potential for integrating disciplines, theories, and research. In particular, we evaluate studies in which information processing or cognitive neuroscience paradigms were used to assess facial affect processing in depressed and depression-susceptible populations. Most studies have assessed and supported cognitive models. This research suggests that depressed and depression-vulnerable groups show abnormal facial affect interpretation, attention, and memory, although findings vary based on depression severity, comorbid anxiety, or length of time faces are viewed. Facial affect processing biases appear to correspond with distinct neural activity patterns and increased depressive emotion and thought. Biases typically emerge in depressed moods but are occasionally found in the absence of such moods. Indirect evidence suggests that childhood neglect might cultivate abnormal facial affect processing, which can impede social functioning in ways consistent with cognitive-interpersonal and interpersonal models. However, reviewed studies provide mixed support for the social risk model prediction that depressive states prompt cognitive hypervigilance to social threat information. We recommend prospective interdisciplinary research examining whether facial affect processing abnormalities promote-or are promoted by-depressogenic attachment experiences, negative thinking, and social dysfunction.     

On feeling good and getting your way: mood effects on negotiator cognition and bargaining strategies.

Are happy people more likely to be cooperative and successful negotiators? On the basis of the Affect Infusion Model (AIM; Forgas, 1995a). Experiment 1 predicted and found that both good and bad moods had a significant mood-congruent effect on people's thoughts and plans, and on their negotiation strategies and outcomes in both interpersonal and intergroup bargaining. Experiment 2 replicated these results and also showed that mood effects were reduced for persons more likely to adopt motivated processing strategies (scoring high on machiavellianism and need for approval). Experiment 3 confirmed these effects and demonstrated that the mood of the opposition also produced more mood-congruent bargaining strategies and outcomes. The results are discussed in terms of affect priming influences on interpersonal behaviors, and the implications of these findings for real-life cognitive tasks and bargaining encounters are considered.     

Mood-related self-schemata and mood-congruity effects in autobiographical memory: A study of women with premenstrual syndrome

Everyday autobiographical memory and mood interactions were explored in a small clinical sample of women with premenstrual syndrome (PMS) and a matched control group. Subjects kept daily records of memorable events for two consecutive menstrual cycles. Two recognition memory tests were given after a one-cycle delay. Mood, or affect, was self-assessed retrospectively over a week, at the end of each day during data collection and at testing, and when events occurred. Women with PMS were more depressed and more negative (angry) than positive (experiencing bursts of energy) in their daily moods than controls. Memory accuracy was poorer overall for PMS than control subjects, although no direct effects of menstrual cycle phase on memory were found. Instead, mood affected memory indirectly through moodrelated self-schemata which subsequently mediated mood-congruity effects. Memory accuracy for events experienced in negative mood states and associated with negative affective reactions was higher for PMS subjects when tested in negative mood states than for controls. No group differences were found on events associated with positive affect or positive daily moods when mood state at the time of testing was also positive. Women with PMS processed information selectively from negative events and events experienced in negative moods compared to controls. Negative events and negative moods appeared to interfere with remembering for control subjects. Women in the control group appeared to be biased towards selectively remembering positive events and events experienced on days when their mood states were relatively positive.     

On undesirable consequences of thinking: framing effects as a function of substantive processing

Three studies investigate the impact of effortful constructive processing on framing effects. The results replicated previous findings: Participants avoided the risky option when the scenario was framed in terms of gains, but preferred this option when the scenario was framed in terms of losses. Importantly, framing effects were most pronounced when conditions allowed for an effortful constructive processing style (i.e., substantive processing). This impact of decision frames varied when decision time served as an indicator for the elaboration extent (Study 1), and also when processing motivation (accountability; Study 2) and processing ability (decision time; Study 3) were manipulated. Moreover, effortful processing did not increase framing effects when contextual cues reduced the necessity for constructive thinking (Study 1). We suggest that decision frames may take on very different roles as a function of the ambiguity of the decision problem, and the degree and style of processing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of positive and negative moods on helping tasks having pleasant or unpleasant consequences

A field study investigated the effects of positive and negative moods on subjects' willingness to perform helping tasks having pleasant or unpleasant consequences. Results indicated that procedures designed to induce either positive or negative moods facilitate helping when the task has pleasant consequences, but tend to inhibit helping when the task is likely to be unpleasant. The findings are consistent with the notion that many everyday acts of kindness (altruism) are interpretable as a form of hedonism. The implications of these outcomes for an activation model of mood-induced altruism are discussed.     

Beyond Hedonism and Associationism: A Configural View of the Role of Affect in Evaluation,Processing, and Self-Regulation

Most existing models assume that negative moods are more likely than positive moods to (a) induce recall of negatively toned information, (b) lead to less favorable evaluations, (c) induce more systematic but less flexible processing, and (d) arouse a desire to change the mood. A series of studies is discussed in which each of these effects and its opposite are obtained. The consistent pattern of data in these studies supports a configural, as opposed to a simple hedonistic or associationistic, view of mood. From the configural perspective, people do not seek positive moods; they seek positive outcomes. And, in some contexts, these outcomes can be signaled by a negative mood.     

Sometimes happy people focus on the trees and sad people focus on the forest: context-dependent effects of mood in impression formation

Research indicates that affect influences whether people focus on categorical or behavioral information during impression formation. One explanation is that affect confers its value on whatever cognitive inclinations are most accessible in a given situation. Three studies tested this malleable mood effects hypothesis, predicting that happy moods should maintain and unhappy moods should inhibit situationally dominant thinking styles. Participants completed an impression formation task that included categorical and behavioral information. Consistent with the proposed hypothesis, no fixed relation between mood and processing emerged. Whether happy moods led to judgments reflecting category-level or behavior-level information depended on whether participants were led to focus on the their immediate psychological state (i.e., current affective experience; Studies 1 and 2) or physical environment (i.e., an unexpected odor; Study 3). Consistent with research on socially situated cognition, these results demonstrate that the same affective state can trigger entirely different thinking styles depending on the context.     

Mood and Emotions in Small Groups and Work Teams

Affective influences abound in groups. In this article we propose an organizing model for understanding these affective influences and their effects on group life. We begin with individual-level affective characteristics that members bring to their groups: moods, emotions, sentiments, and emotional intelligence. These affective characteristics then combine to form a group's affective composition. We discuss explicit and implicit processes through which this affective combination occurs by examining the research on emotional contagion, entrainment, modeling, and the manipulation of affect. We also explore how elements of the affective context, such as organizationwide emotion norms and the group's particular emotional history, may serve to constrain or amplify group members' emotions. The outcome, group emotion, results from the combination of the group's affective composition and the affective context in which the group is behaving. Last, we focus on the important interaction between nonaffective factors and affective factors in group life and suggest a possible agenda for future research.     

Anxious mood narrows attention in feature space

Spatial attention can operate like a spotlight whose scope can vary depending on task demands. Emotional states contribute to the spatial extent of attentional selection, with the spotlight focused more narrowly during anxious moods and more broadly during happy moods. In addition to visual space, attention can also operate over features, and we show here that mood states may also influence attentional scope in feature space. After anxious or happy mood inductions, participants focused their attention to identify a central target while ignoring flanking items. Flankers were sometimes coloured differently than targets, so focusing attention on target colour should lead to relatively less interference. Compared to happy and neutral moods, when anxious, participants showed reduced interference when colour isolated targets from flankers, but showed more interference when flankers and targets were the same colour. This pattern reveals that the anxious mood caused these individuals to attend to the irrelevant feature in both cases, regardless of its benefit or detriment. In contrast, participants showed no effect of colour on interference when happy, suggesting that positive mood did not influence attention in feature space. These mood effects on feature-based attention provide a theoretical bridge between previous findings concerning spatial and conceptual attention.