The inaction effect in the psychology of regret

Previous research showed that decisions to act (i.e., actions) produce more regret than decisions not to act (i.e., inactions). This previous research focused on decisions made in isolation and ignored that decisions are often made in response to earlier outcomes. The authors show in 4 experiments that these prior outcomes may promote action and hence make inaction more abnormal. They manipulated information about a prior outcome. As hypothesized, when prior outcomes were positive or absent, people attributed more regret to action than to inaction. However, as predicted and counter to previous research, following negative prior outcomes, more regret was attributed to inaction, a finding that the authors label the inaction effect. Experiment 4, showing differential effects for regret and disappointment, demonstrates the need for emotion-specific predictions.     

Coping with non‐purchase: Managing the stress of inaction regret

This research presents a framework based on coping theory to explain the different ways of managing the stress of regret for inaction. We theorize that primary appraisals of goal-relevance and secondary appraisals of reversibility affect how consumers cope with the stress of inaction regret resulting in different behavioral outcomes. Prior research has focused on two outcomes of regret for inaction—inaction inertia and dissonance reduction—that result in the decreased intent to avail of a similar future opportunity. This research proposes that these are not inevitable outcomes, but rather coping responses. Further, if the forgone opportunity is appraised to be goal-relevant and reversible, consumers engage in active coping that results in increased behavioral intent.     

Positive mood + action = negative mood + inaction: effects of general action and inaction concepts on decisions and performance as a function of affect

General action and inaction concepts have been shown to produce broad, goal-mediated effects on cognitive and motor activity irrespective of the type of activity. The current research tested a model in which action and inaction goals interact with the valence of incidental moods to guide behavior. Over four experiments, participants' moods were manipulated to be positive (happy), neutral, or negative (angry or sad), and then general action, inaction, and neutral concepts were primed. In Experiment 1, action primes increased intellectual performance when participants experienced a positive (happy) or neutral mood, whereas inaction primes increased performance when participants experienced a negative (angry) mood. Including a control-prime condition, Experiments 2 and 3 replicated these results measuring the number of general interest articles participants were willing to read and participants' memory for pictures of celebrities. Experiment 4 replicated the results comparing happiness with sadness and suggested that the effect of the prime's adoption was automatic. Overall, the findings supported an interactive model by which action concepts and positive affect produce the same increases in active behavior as inaction concepts and negative affect.     

Adolescent self-perception as a function of vision loss.

The potential effect of vision loss on adolescents' self-perception has been the subject of limited research. Several previous studies have failed to shed much light on this relationship. This study, utilizing a sample of adolescents with visual problems and a comparison sample with normal vision, found significant differences in dimensions of perceived self-concept between these groups. Some possible interpretations of these results are offered. The need for new research in this field of inquiry is emphasized.     

Action versus inaction: anticipated affect in the theory of planned behavior

Theory of planned behavior (TPB) variables and anticipated affect were assessed in relation to drinking and avoiding alcohol and in relation to eating and avoiding fast food. It was shown that previously reported residual effects of anticipated affect in the prediction of intentions are obtained only when the TPB variables are assessed with respect to one behavior (action or inaction) and anticipated affect is measured in relation to the alternative behavior. When all variables were assessed with respect to the same behavior, anticipated affect made no independent contribution to the prediction of intentions, nor did anticipated affect retain a residual effect when the TPB constructs in relation to the alternative action were included in the prediction equation.     

Differential patterns of post-shelter placement as a function of problem type and severity

Changes in placement restrictiveness, as a function of problem type and severity, were examined in a sample of 154 children departing a shelter for runaway and homeless youth. Six problem types were identified using a principal components analysis of youth-reported personal and family problems. Four of the six factors obtained represented youth problem types interpreted as reflecting antisocial/conduct problems, victimization by abuse, risk of suicide, and rebellious youth behaviors. The two remaining problem types were interpreted as a chaotic/aggressive family type and a mixed pattern of youth aggression and parental skill deficiency. An analysis of the problem types indicated that youth at higher risk for suicide, and those who came from more dysfunctional families, departed to living environments that were more restrictive than their placements at entry.     

Understanding a Desireless Action as a Benevolent Action

Scholars have questioned the doctrine of desireless action in the Bhagavadgita and questioned whether Krishna’s advice is to be taken literally on the basis that the Humean account of motivation is more plausible (or not) than the anti-Humean account. In this paper, I will avoid the Humean principle debate by proposing a new way of examining the term ‘desireless action’. I aim to show that Krishna’s advice can be rendered coherent on the basis that we understand a desireless action as an action motivated by a benevolent desire. I will be referring to the notion of benevolence as constructed by Francis Hutcheson because there is a parallel between the Hutchesonian experience of benevolence and purusha, or pure consciousness. Benevolent desire results in a desireless action since to act benevolently is to act ‘disinterestedly’ and thereby accepting purusha as one’s true nature.     

Post-decision consolidation over time as a function of gain or loss of an alternative

Post-decision consolidation processes were studied in a two-stage lottery design. School children (1) rated the attractiveness of audiotape head sets, (2) decided for which of two head sets they would like to get a lottery ticket, (3) threw a dice to determine if they got a lottery ticket in the preferred lottery or not, and (4)drew a ticket in the final lottery. Before and after each of these stages ratings were obtained of the attractiveness of the alternatives on four attributes. The results were interpreted in terms of Differentiation and Consolidation Theory. Post-decision consolidation appeared immediately after the outcome of the dice throw. Subjects who won a lottery ticket consolidated their prior decision to a greater degree than those who lost. The effect was so strong for the former group that a pre-decision attractiveness disadvantage was restructured to a post-decision advantage. Folowing the decision, consolidation remained at approximately the level reached immediately after the dice throw for losers and winners, respectively, but with an increasing trend over time for winners. Even following a final loss of an audiotape headset the level of consolidation was maintained.     

反事实思维与后悔的关系：调节模式的调节作用

已有研究表明反事实思维越多则后悔越强烈。本研究试图通过两项实验分别探讨特质性、情境性调节模式是否影响反事实思维与后悔之间的关系。结果表明：特质性调节模式及情境性调节模式均对反事实思维与后悔之间的关系具有调节作用,具体来说,针对情境性调节模式而言,运动模式下加法式思维越多则后悔越轻微,评估模式下加法式思维越多则后悔越强烈;针对特质性调节模式而言,运动模式下加法式思维越多则后悔越轻微。     

The influence of social comparison on career decision-making: Vocational identity as a moderator and regret as a mediator

This study investigated the influence of social comparison on career choice certainty and its potential mechanisms: regret as a mediator and vocational identity as a moderator. Before the formal experiment, 30 pairs of vocational values representing typical conflicts in career decision-making for Chinese university students were obtained. The formal experiment adopted a single-factor (social comparison VS no comparison) between-subject design with vocational identity as an independent covariate. Ninety-eight junior and senior undergraduate students and graduate students in a university in China were invited to participate in the computer-controlled experiment, which involved vocational identity assessment, social comparison manipulation, and analogue career-choice scenario tests. Path analysis showed that: (a) Social comparison significantly and negatively predicted career choice certainty; (b) Regret partially mediated the effect of social comparison on career choice certainty; and (c) Vocational identity did not moderate the path between social comparison and regret, but significantly moderated the negative effect of regret on career choice certainty. These results indicated that in the collectivistic Chinese culture, individuals' career development trajectories may not be totally independent and are subject to influences by other people's choices, while emotion of regret and vocational identity development all play significant roles in this intricate process.     

Evaluation of a victim as a function of fate similarity/dissimilarity

Upon observing a peer (victim) receive painful electric shocks as punishment for making errors in a serial learning task, subjects who anticipated a similar fate (n = 21) were significantly less likely to devalue the victim than those who did not anticipate a similar fate (n = 22). This finding supports the contention that an observer's devaluation of a suffering victim may vary as a function of anticipated fate similarity rather than perceived attitude or attribute similarity per se. Further, the data in conjunction with an additional, albeit marginally significant finding, suggest that derogation of the victim was more likely to be motivated by defensive attribution than a need to believe in a just world.     

The loss of repetition priming and automaticity over time as a function of degree of initial learning

Two experiments were performed to investigate the buildup of repetition priming in a lexical decision task with repeated presentations and its decline over the course of 2 months. Priming was found to accumulate as a power function of presentations and to decline as a power function of time. Accuracy measures indicated that the loss rate of priming was unaffected by the amount of initial priming. Response time measures indicated the same result when the experiments were analyzed separately; however, when the data were combined, increased initial priming was associated with greater losses in priming over time. The data were interpreted in terms of automaticity, and the power function decline in priming was taken as support for memory-based models of automaticity. Possible ways to incorporate forgetting into memory-based theories of automaticity are discussed.     

Action,interaction and inaction: post-Kantian accounts of thinking,willing, and doing in Fichte and Schopenhauer

This article features the contributions of Fichte and Schopenhauer to a philosophical account of action against the background of Kant's earlier and influential treatment of the topic. The article first presents Kant's pertinent contributions in the areas of general epistemology and metaphysics (“transcendental philosophy”), general practical philosophy (“moral philosophy”), the philosophy of law (“doctrine of right”) and ethic (“doctrine of virtues”). Then the focus is on Fichte's further original work on the issue of action in those same areas. Finally, the article turns to Schopenhauer's radical revision of the Kantian and Fichtean affirmative accounts of acting and willing through the correlated introduction of the irrational will, the self-negated will and ethical inaction.     

Examining symptom expression as a function of symptom severity: item performance on the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression

Despite widespread use of the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; M. Hamilton, 1960), questions have been raised concerning its psychometric properties. A nonparametric item response model was used to examine how the probability of observing a specific symptom of depression changes with increases in depressive severity in a sample of depressed adults. Results showed that options from a number of items on the HRSD did not vary as a function of severity and therefore should not be viewed as indicators of depressive severity. The extent to which symptoms are expressed as a function of depressive severity carries important implications for the use of the HRSD as a measure of severity and for the debate concerning construction of depression as a continuum. Results argue against viewing depression as a simple continuum.     

Executive function as a function of sub-clinical psychopathy

Some aspects of executive function are thought to be dysfunctional in psychopathic individuals. We administered a small battery of neuropsychological tests (spatial alternation task, object alternation task, and Porteus Maze) to two samples of college students and obtained a measure of psychopathy via a self-report questionnaire. Psychopathic traits were related to the tests of object alternation and Porteus Maze but not to the spatial alternation task. Our results support the hypothesis of orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) dysfunction with sparing of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in psychopathy and provide a downward extension of this theory to sub-clinical levels of psychopathy.