Non-empirical theoretical virtues and the argument from underdetermination

The antirealist argument from the underdetermination of theories by data relies on the premise that the empirical content of a theory is the only determinant of its belief-worthiness (premise NN). Several authors have claimed that the antirealist cannot endorse NN, on pain of internal inconsistency. I concede this point. Nevertheless, this refutation of the underdetermination argument fails because there are weaker substitutes for NN that will serve just as well as a premise to the argument. On the other hand, antirealists have not made a convincing casefor NN (or its weaker substitutes) either. In particular, I criticize van Fraassen's recent claim that all ampliative rules in epistemology must be rejected on the grounds that they lead to incoherence. The status of the underdetermination argument remains unsettled.     

Gender sceptics and feminist politics

Some feminist gender sceptics hold that the conditions for satisfying the concept woman cannot be discerned. This has been taken to suggest that (i) the efforts to fix feminism’s scope are undermined because of confusion about the extension of the term ‘woman’, and (ii) this confusion suggests that feminism cannot be organised around women because it is unclear who satisfies woman. Further, this supposedly threatens the effectiveness of feminist politics: feminist goals are said to become unachievable, if feminist politics lacks a clear subject matter. In this paper, I argue that such serious consequences do not follow from the gender sceptic position. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the ‘Stirling Political Philosophy Group’ meeting and am grateful to those present for their constructive criticisms. I am also grateful to Alan Millar, the anonymous referees for this journal and Jenny Saul (who has read more than one version of this paper!) for their detailed and extremely helpful comments and suggestions.     

Gender identity,interactionism, and politics: A reply to Rogers and Walsh

This article is a reply to a recent article by Rogers and Walsh (Sex Roles, 1982, 8, 269–281). We disagree with some of their interpretations and criticisms of the psychomedical research on the development of sex differences. Thus, there is a discussion of the reasoning and strategies of the biological approach in this research area. However, we also support and extend some of their suggestions relevant to gender and sex.     

Abnormality, cognitive virtues, and knowledge

Causal analyses of one’s knowing that p have recently emphasized the involvement of cognitive virtues in coming to believe that p. John Greco suggests that in order to deal with Gettier-type cases, a virtue analysis of knowing should include a requirement that one’s knowing does not in a certain way involve abnormality. Yet Greco’s emphasis on statistical abnormality either renders his analysis subject to a generality problem or to objections regarding certain Gettier-type cases. When we instead consider abnormality in the sense of a causally differentiating factor in relation to a causal contrast situation, the account remains unclear concerning its application to an interesting non-Gettier-type case concerning chance. The exploration of these shortcomings casts doubt on the epistemological usefulness of the schema, ‘If you know, then there is no abnormality in your being right.’     

Constitutivism and the virtues

In Self-Constitution, I argue that the principles governing action are “constitutive standards” of agency, standards that arise from the nature of agency itself. To be an agent is to be autonomously efficacious, and the categorical and hypothetical imperatives arise from those two attributes. These principles are also “constitutive” of agency in two more specific ways. First, they meet the “constitution requirement”: the object must meet the standard in question, at least to some extent, in order to be the kind of object that it is. Second, they meet the “self-constitution requirement”: the object makes itself into the kind of object that it is by conforming to the standard. That is, the agent makes herself into an agent, and into the particular agent who she is, by conforming to those standards. Some neo-Aristotelians believe that Aristotelian virtues are constitutive standards. In this paper, I first ask why moral philosophers should focus on the virtues at all, considering the views of David Hume, Philippa Foot, and Aristotle. I then ask whether Aristotelian virtues meet the constitution requirement, and suggest that there are grounds for this view in the Nicomachean Ethics. But Aristotelian virtues do not meet the self-constitution requirement, which leaves Aristotle unable to explain moral responsibility. I end by examining the role that Aristotelian virtues could play in a Kantian ethic.     

Age rationing,the virtues,and wanting more life

The goal of this paper is to show that Callahan's reasons for withholding life extending care cannot be made out exclusively in terms of contemporary notions of distributive justice and fair allocation. I argue that by relying on a notion of justice which links the merit of the individual with the fairness of a social pattern of shares, Callahan imputes vice to the elderly as he denies them eligibility for life-prolonging care. Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is a useful tool for character evaluation. One can speak meaningfully of a proper disposition of a person of a certain type (an elderly person) with respect to the good of continued life. I claim that the mean of one's disposition with respect to the good of continued life would be relative to one's age group, and would be determined by that principle by which an elderly person of practical wisdom would determine it. This leads to very different conclusions than those drawn by Callahan.     

Gender constancy: A methodological and theoretical analysis

Two widely used tests of gender constancy, one verbal and one perceptual, were given to 26 4-to-6-year-old children. Children were classified at different levels of gender constancy, depending on which test was used. These discrepant results were not accounted for by the differences in the way the tests presented (verbally or visually), nor by the tests' differing definitions of gender constancy. The majority of the children answered gender constancy questions as though they were referring to a “pretend,” as opposed to a “real,” situation; such responses decreased scores of gender constancy on both tests. The theoretical and methodological implications of children spontaneously adopting a pretend mode of responding are discussed.     

Sin, suffering, and the need for the theological virtues.

This article examines the account of the relationship between sin and suffering provided by J. L. A. Garcia in "Sin and Suffering in a Catholic Understanding of Medical Ethics," in this issue. Garcia draws on the (Roman) Catholic tradition and particularly on the thought of Thomas Aquinas, who remains an important resource for Catholic theology. Nevertheless, his interpretation of Thomas is open to criticism, both in terms of omissions and in terms of positive claims. Garcia includes those elements of Thomas that are purely philosophical, such as natural law and acquired virtue, but neglects the theological and infused virtues, the gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit, and the beatitudes. These omissions distort his account of the Christian life so that he underplays both the radical problem posed by sin (and suffering), and the radical character of the ultimate solution: redemption in Christ through the grace of the Holy Spirit.     

Inference to the best explanation, coherence and other explanatory virtues

This article generalizes the explanationist account of inference to the best explanation (IBE). It draws a clear distinction between IBE and abduction and presents abduction as the first step of IBE. The second step amounts to the evaluation of explanatory power, which consist in the degree of explanatory virtues that a hypothesis exhibits. Moreover, even though coherence is the most often cited explanatory virtue, on pain of circularity, it should not be treated as one of the explanatory virtues. Rather, coherence should be equated with explanatory power and considered to be derivable from the other explanatory virtues: unification, explanatory depth and simplicity.     

Construct polysemy and the virtues of acquaintances

Empirical evidence and theoretical arguments seem to support the hypothesis that, on average, people assign aquaintances to the positive poles of constructs 62% of the time; these studies have focused on the mean proportion of positive judgments when collapsed across acquaintances and constructs. The present study examined the distribution of these virtues among acquaintances and constructs. Results indicated that: (a) closer acquaintances were assigned to the positive poles of constructs more frequently than comparatively distant acquaintances; (b) subjects assigned positive qualities to closer acquaintances more frequently on constructs with fewer alternative meanings, whereas the opposite relation was observed for distant acquaintances. These findings suggest that people are oriented toward formulating an unambiguous construction of the virtuous disposition of their closer acquaintances.     

Theoretical virtues and theological construction

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Aristotle on virtues and emotions

Conclusion Aristotle is certainly right to suggest that a philosophical psychology of the virtues will importantly involve tracing the connections between virtues and emotions. But while he is admirably diligent about scouting some kinds of differences between virtues, (notably what virtues are about — dangers, bodily pleasures, spending and getting money, distributions of honor or money, etc.), he does not seem prepared to admit that their logical/psychological structure can differ in respect of their general relations with emotions. Instead, he wishes to see them as homogeneous in this respect. But the main two connections he discovers — the propriety of affect relation and the index relation — are not general. They are true at best only of some virtues, and then only in improved formulations. Our brief investigation of his claims has shown, I think, that the virtues do display variety that is in part a function of their relations to emotion-types. We await a psychology of the virtues in which the connections of particular virtues to emotions, and the connections between the virtues that would become visible in the light of this structural variety, are fully traced.