Making judgments about ability: the role of implicit theories of ability in moderating inferences from temporal and social comparison information

Two studies examined the novel proposal that implicit theories of intelligence (C. S. Dweck & E. L. Leggett, 1988) moderate both the effects of performance trends on ability inferences and the perceived diagnosticity of temporal versus normative feedback. Results from 613 adolescents and 42 teachers confirmed that entity theorists perceived initial outcome as more diagnostic and inferred higher ability in another (Study 1) and in the self (Study 2) in a declining outcome condition; incremental theorists perceived last outcome as more diagnostic and inferred higher ability in an ascending condition. Experimental induction of beliefs about ability had similar effects. As predicted, self-appraisal was affected more by temporal feedback among incremental theorists and by normative feedback among entity theorists. Results help resolve prior mixed findings regarding order effects and responses to temporal and normative evaluation.     

Team effectiveness: beyond skills and cognitive ability.

On the basis of job analysis results, the validity of using measures of general cognitive ability, job-specific skills, and personality traits jointly at both the individual level and the group level to predict the performance of 79 four-person, human resource work teams was evaluated. Team member trait and job skill scores were aggregated with a conjunctive model of task performance. At the individual level of analysis, measures of personality (i.e., Agreeableness and Conscientiousness) predicted peer ratings of team member performance beyond measures of job-specific skills and general cognitive ability. Similarly, at the group level of analysis, both Agreeableness and Conscientiousness predicted supervisor ratings of work team performance, objective measures of work team accuracy, and work completed. At both the individual and group levels, the trait of Agreeableness predicted Interpersonal Skills.     

Victim sensitivity and the accuracy of social judgments

Recent theorizing on the relation between victim sensitivity and unethical behavior predicts that victim sensitivity is related to an asymmetrical focus on cues associated with untrustworthiness compared to cues associated with trustworthiness. This hypothesis and its consequences for the accuracy of social predictions are investigated in this article. In Study 1, participants rated the trustworthiness of 35 computer-animated faces that differed in their emotional expression. People high in victim sensitivity rated neutral and hostile faces more untrustworthy than people low in victim sensitivity, whereas no such effect was found for friendly faces. In Study 2, participants predicted the cooperativeness of 56 targets on the basis of minimal information. The accuracy of predictions was negatively related to victim sensitivity, and people high in victim sensitivity systematically underestimated targets' cooperativeness. Thus, the asymmetrical focus on untrustworthiness cues among victim-sensitive individuals seems to impair rather than improve their social judgments.     

Children's social competence, academic competence, and aggressiveness as related to ability to make judgments of fairness.

The relationship of 102 fifth and sixth graders' judgments of fairness with their academic and social competence and aggressiveness was studied. Children were given self-report and peer-nomination inventories measuring academic competence, social competence, and aggressiveness at a single point in time at the public school they attended. These measures were related to children's prediction of fairness on a distributive justice measure. Children who saw themselves as academically and socially competent scored higher on the distributive justice measure. Children whose peers saw them as less academically competent and more aggressive scored lower on the distributive justice measure. Analyses showed an association between children's academic competence, social competence, and aggressiveness scores and their scores on judgments of fairness.     

Reconfiguring Dis/ability: Multiple and Narrative Constructions of Self

Postmodern claims of multiple, narrative, and constructed identities contribute greater complexity to the social perceptions of persons with dis/abilities in part because they challenge the concept of a unitary self, which when applied to disabled people is not only inadequate and inaccurate but also dangerous. Theories of multiple identities, disrupted self-narratives, and dominant discourses about dis/ability are placed in dialogue with first-hand accounts of persons living with dis/abilities—and living fully. To be inclusive of people with dis/abilities, communities of faith are tasked with challenging the concept of a “normative” (unitary acceptable) body and constructing a revised narrative of the connection between divine activity and dis/ability.     

On the subjective quality of social justice: the role of affect as information in the psychology of justice judgments

This article argues that it is not uncommon for people forming justice judgments to lack information that is most relevant in the particular situation. In information-uncertain conditions, people may therefore construct justice judgments by relying on how they feel about the events they have encountered, and justice judgments may hence be strongly influenced by affect information. Findings show that in information-uncertain conditions, the affective states that people had been in prior and unrelated to the justice event indeed strongly influenced their justice judgments. These findings thus reveal that in situations of information uncertainty, people's judgments of justice can be very subjective, susceptible to affective states that have no logical relationship with the justice judgments they are constructing. Implications for the social psychology of justice and the literature on social cognition and affect are discussed.     

Interpretations and judgments regarding positive and negative social scenarios in childhood social anxiety

The present study extended our understanding of cognitive biases in childhood social anxiety. A non-clinical sample of 11-13-year olds completed social anxiety and depression scales and were presented with scenarios depicting positive and mildly negative social events. Social anxiety was associated with tendencies to interpret positive social events in a discounting fashion, to catastrophize in response to mildly negative social events, and to anticipate more negative emotional reactions to the negative events. Implications for understanding and treating social anxiety are discussed.     

Self,social identity and psychological well-being

Self and social identity are key elements in the understanding of a person’s strivings for health and well-being. This review (i) examines the concepts of self, social identity, and psychological well-being; (ii) integrates empirical evidence that relates various self-aspects or social identities to psychological well-being; (iii) analyzes within a stress and coping framework the well-being consequences of socially devalued self or threatened identities, perceived discriminations, challenges of acculturation and identity management; and (iv) delineates the role of self, social identity and related psycho-social variables as moderators and mediators in pathways leading to psychological well-being. Besides listing some methodological issues and empirical deficits, major concerns for future research are also identified. An explicit self and social identity perspective of this research synthesis brings personal and social aspects together, and this interface offers exciting opportunities for research advancement.     

The Deep Self Model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentional action

Recent studies by experimental philosophers demonstrate puzzling asymmetries in people’s judgments about intentional action, leading many philosophers to propose that normative factors are inappropriately influencing intentionality judgments. In this paper, I present and defend the Deep Self Model of judgments about intentional action that provides a quite different explanation for these judgment asymmetries. The Deep Self Model is based on the idea that people make an intuitive distinction between two parts of an agent’s psychology, an Acting Self that contains the desires, means-end beliefs, and intentions that are the immediate causal source of an agent’s actions, and a Deep Self, which contains an agent’s stable and central psychological attitudes, including the agent’s values, principles, life goals, and other more fundamental attitudes. The Deep Self Model proposes that when people are asked to make judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally, in addition to standard criteria proposed in traditional models, people also assess an additional ‘Concordance Criterion’: Does the outcome concord with the psychological attitudes of the agent’s Deep Self? I show that the Deep Self Model can explain a very complex pattern of judgment asymmetries documented in the experimental philosophy literature, and does so in a way that has significant advantages over competing models.     

Self and social functions: individual autobiographical memory and collective narrative

The personal functions of autobiographical memory build on the basic biological functions of memory common to most mammals that, however, do not have the kind of episodic memories that compose human autobiographical memory according to present theory. The thesis here is that personal autobiographical memory is functionally and structurally related to the use of cultural myths and social narratives, and that the relative emphasis put on the self in different cultural and social contexts influences the form and function of autobiographical memory and the need for developing a uniquely personal life narrative in those contexts. Historical and cross-cultural trends revealed in psychological and literary research are invoked to support this thesis.     

The informational basis of social judgments: Memory for informative and uninformative arguments

This study investigates the encoding and retrieval of arguments in an opinion formation task. It is based on a model of opinion formation that partitions the latter process into initial encoding, elaborative encoding, integration, and decision. According to this model elaborative encoding depends on two factors: (i) the informativeness of the arguments and (ii) their thematic relatedness. Since it is reasonably well established that the likelihood of retrieving an argument is an increasing function of the amount of elaboration performed on it, the first hypothesis is straightforward, namely, that the memory for an argument will increase with its informativeness and with its thematic relatedness to other arguments. The second hypothesis assumes that by dint of their closer association with the decision, informative arguments occupy a more central position in the representation of an opinion than uninformative ones. This implies that an informative argument should be accessed and reported prior to an uninformative argument, even when differences in retrievability (i.e., probabilities of recall) are controlled. The findings were consistent with such an analysis.     

Effects of social value orientations on fairness judgments

The authors assessed the impact that social value orientations--prosocial (i.e., concerned about outcomes for both oneself and others) versus proself (i.e., concerned about one's own outcome only)--had on fairness judgments in a non-negotiation setting. The results indicated that prosocials generally formed fairness judgments in a manner suggested by equity theory: Given the same input as a comparison other, they saw an equal outcome as fairer than a favorable or unfavorable outcome. The fairness determinations of proselfs, however, tended to follow the tenets of self-interest theory: Given the same input as a comparison other, they saw a favorable outcome as fairer than an unfavorable outcome. Contrary to self-interest theory, proselfs did not find a favorable outcome fairer than an equal outcome. These findings indicate that social value orientations differentially affect the evaluation of outcome information in the formation of fairness judgments.     

Rating ability in performance judgments: The joint influence of implicit theories and intelligence

The purpose of this study was to approach the issue of rating ability by examining the influence of rater implicit theories and rater intelligence on rating outcomes. Using the inferential accuracy model (Jackson, 1972), raters were identified as either possessing a normative or idiosyncratic implicit theory of the occupation of college instructor. In a laboratory setting, 50 normative and 50 idiosyncratic raters judged the videotaped performance of either a good or poor lecturer. Results showed that (a) intelligence was positively related to rating accuracy and to possessing a normative implicit theory, (b) rater type moderated the relationship between intelligence and rating accuracy, and (c) controlling for intelligence, normative raters committed stronger halo effects than idiosyncratic raters. These results were discussed in relation to furthering the understanding of rating ability.     

Alexithymia tendencies and mere exposure alter social approachability judgments

ABSTRACT People have a fundamental motivation for social connection and social engagement, but how do they decide whom to approach in ambiguous social situations? Subjective feelings often influence such decisions, but people vary in awareness of their feelings. We evaluated two opposing hypotheses based on visual familiarity effects and emotional awareness on social approachability judgments. These hypotheses differ in their interpretation of the familiarity or mere exposure effect with either an affective or cognitive interpretation. The responses of our 128‐student sample supported the cognitive interpretation. Lower emotional awareness or higher alexithymia was associated with higher approachability judgments to familiarized faces and lower approachability judgments to novel faces. These findings were independent of the Big Five personality factors. The results indicate that individual differences in emotional awareness should be integrated into social decision‐making models. The results also suggest that cognitive‐perceptual alterations may underlie the poorer social outcomes associated with alexithymia.     

Mood, memory, and social judgments in children

The influence of positive and negative moods on children's recall and recognition memory and impression-formation judgments was investigated in a two-list experimental design. A total of 161 schoolchildren, 8 to 10 years old, were presented with audiovisual information containing positive and negative details about 2 target children. Each presentation was preceded by happy or sad mood manipulations. One day later, the children were again placed in a happy or sad mood, and their recall and recognition memory and impression-formation judgments were assessed. Results showed that memory was better when (a) the children felt happy during encoding, retrieval, or both; (b) the material was incongruent with learning mood; (c) the 2 target characters were encountered in contrasting rather than in matching mood states; and (d) recall mood matched encoding mood. A happy mood increased the extremity of both positive and negative impression-formation judgments. Results are contrasted with experimental data obtained with normal or depressed adults, and implications are considered for contemporary theories of mood effects on cognition and for social-developmental research.