Self and Social Judgments of Ability: Beyond Distributional Information

ABSTRACT

In a given domain, low-skill individuals typically evaluate the ability level of other people more favorably than high-skill individuals. The current study tests whether this tendency continues to occur even when people have unambiguous distributional information available through which to judge others. Students received distributional information detailing their percentile rank in a statistics course and the percentile rank of another student in the course. Then, students were asked to evaluate their own and the other students' statistics ability. Students evaluated the other person's ability more favorably when their own rank in the course was low rather than high. Therefore, people may use themselves as a standard of comparison when they judge others even when more diagnostic sources of information are available.     

Knowing too much: using private knowledge to predict how one is viewed by others

People have more information about themselves than others do, and this fundamental asymmetry can help to explain why individuals have difficulty accurately intuiting how they appear to other people. Determining how one appears to observers requires one to utilize public information that is available to observers, but to disregard private information that they do not possess. We report a series of experiments, however, showing that people utilize privately known information about their own past performance (Experiments 1 and 2), the performance of other people (Experiment 3), and imaginary performance (Experiment 4) when intuiting how they are viewed by others. This tendency can help explain why people's beliefs about how they are judged by others often diverge from how they are actually judged.     

Altruistic behavior and cooperation: The role of intrinsic expectation when reputational information is incomplete

Altruistic behavior is known to be conditional on the level of altruism of others. However, people often have no information, or incomplete information, about the altruistic reputation of others, for example when the reputation was obtained in a different social or economic context. As a consequence, they have to estimate the other's altruistic intentions. Using an economic game, we showed that without reputational information people have intrinsic expectations about the altruistic behavior of others, which largely explained their own altruistic behavior. This implies that when no information is available, intrinsic expectations can be as powerful a driver of altruistic behavior as actual knowledge about other people's reputation. Two strategies appeared to co-exist in our study population: participants who expected others to be altruistic and acted even more altruistically themselves, while other participants had low expected altruism scores and acted even less altruistically than they expected others to do. We also found evidence that generosity in economic games translates into benefits for other social contexts: a reputation of financial generosity increased the attractiveness of partners in a social cooperative game. This result implies that in situations with incomplete information, the fitness effects of indirect reciprocity are cumulative across different social contexts.     

The role of egocentrism and focalism in the emotion intensity bias

People sometimes judge their emotions, preferences, and attitudes to be more intense than those of other people. Two experiments tested whether this emotion intensity bias in direct comparisons results from two non-motivated cognitive processes—egocentrism and focalism. In Study 1, the intensity bias was found even when comparing a friend’s preferences to peers. In Study 2, attention given to own versus other’s preferences, and the referent of the comparison (self or others) were manipulated. Results indicated that attention to others reduced the bias, presumably by reducing egocentrism. Consistent with focalism, the bias also emerged when a friend was the target of comparison, and the bias was eliminated when the self was the referent rather than the target of comparison. In the discussion, we evaluate these accounts in light of some alternative explanations for the intensity bias.     

Children's Critical Thinking When Learning From Others

A key component of critical thinking is the ability to evaluate the statements of other people. Because information that is obtained from others is not always accurate, it is important that children learn to reason about it critically. By as early as age 3, children understand that people sometimes communicate inaccurate information and that some individuals are more reliable sources than others. However, in many contexts, even older children fail to evaluate sources critically. Recent research points to the role of social experience in explaining why children often fail to engage in critical reasoning.     

Comparisons over time: Temporal trajectories,social comparison,and self‐evaluation

Social comparison information fluctuates over time. We examined how people evaluate their task performance and ability after receiving test feedback specifying not only that they ranked above or below average, but also that their social status was rising, falling, or remaining constant. Participants' self‐evaluations were more positive when their social standing was rising over time rather than remaining constant. On the other hand, participants whose status was falling did not evaluate themselves less favorably than those with a constant position in the performance distribution. These reactions to performance feedback were observed on self‐evaluations of ability, but not on more even‐handed assessments of performance. Implications for social comparison and self‐evaluation maintenance theories are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Assessing task difficulty for other people: when deeper evaluation means “it’s more about me!”

Empirical studies have revealed that teachers face problems when assessing task difficulty for their students. By drawing on research that focuses on how individuals assess what others know, we argue that these difficulties are a consequence of the imputation of one’s own knowledge to others (i.e., social projection). In particular, we tested the assumption that individuals impute more of their own knowledge to others, the more they elaborate what these others might know. In a first experiment, students were asked to judge task difficulty for their best friend. In the second experiment, teacher trainees were asked to assess task difficulty for 9th graders. Results revealed that individuals, who deeply elaborated when assessing task difficulty for another person, more closely relied on their own rating of task difficulty than individuals with a lower elaboration depth. These findings support the notion that social projection becomes stronger, the deeper individuals elaborate.     

Being all that you can be: the weighting of potential in assessments of self and others

An accurate assessment of an individual often requires taking their potential into account. Across six studies the authors found that people are more inclined to do so when evaluating themselves than when evaluating others, such that people credit themselves for their perceived potential more than they credit others for theirs. Participants rated potential as a more telling component of the self than of others, and the importance participants placed on their own potential led to attentional biases toward information about their own future potential that did not apply to information about the potential of others. Furthermore, when assessing themselves and other people, participants required more tangible proof that someone else has a given level of potential than they required of themselves, and they relied more on how they would ideally perform in self-assessment but more on how others actually performed in judging them.     

Solving the (Real) Other Minds Problem

People care about others’ thoughts, feelings, and intentions but can have considerable difficulty reading others’ minds accurately. Recent advances in understanding how people make such inferences provide significant insight into when people are likely to be reasonably accurate mind readers and when they are not. People tend to reason about others’ mental states by starting with their own and only subsequently adjusting that egocentric default to accommodate differences between themselves and others. Such adjustments tend to be insufficient, rendering final estimates egocentrically biased. When more information about others is available, people tend to rely on existing stereotypes or other expectations to intuit others’ mental states. Systematic errors resulting either from excessive egocentrism or inaccurate expectations can lead to miscommunication, misunderstanding, and social conflict, but these biases also suggest useful strategies for improving mind reading in everyday life.     

The norm of self-interest and its effects on social action

Four studies investigated whether people feel inhibited from engaging in social action incongruent with their apparent self-interest. Participants in Study 1 predicted that they would be evaluated negatively were they to take action on behalf of a cause in which they had no stake or in which they had a stake but held stake-incongruent attitudes. Participants in Study 2 reported both surprise and anger when a target person took action on behalf of a cause in which he or she had no stake or in which he or she held stake-incongruent attitudes. In Study 3, individuals felt more comfortable engaging in social action and expected others to respond more favorably toward their actions if the issue was described as more relevant to their own sex than to the opposite sex. In Study 4, the authors found that providing nonvested individuals with psychological standing rendered them as likely as vested individuals to undertake social action. The authors discuss the implications of these results for the relationship between vested interest, social action, and attitude-behavior consistency.     

Judging a Book by its Cover: The Influence of Implicit Self‐Theories on Brand User Perceptions

Do people judge others based on the brands they use? Prior research finds evidence to this effect, yet we argue this phenomenon is far from universal. Drawing on research on implicit self‐theories, we find that only entity (but not incremental) theorists are prone to judging people based on their brand use (Studies 1 and 2). We show that entity theorists infer that people use brands to signal who they are to others, thereby forming perceptions of these people based on the personality of the brands they use, but incremental theorists are reluctant to make inferences about brand users’ signaling motives (Studies 3, 4, and 5). When tendencies to make signaling inferences are reduced, entity theorists no longer judge people based on their brand use (Studies 3 and 4). Furthermore, even incremental theorists judge people based on their brand use when given the information that their brand use is not driven by situational forces, but is potentially driven by a signaling motivation (Study 5).     

Error and bias in comparative judgment: on being both better and worse than we think we are

People believe that they are better than others on easy tasks and worse than others on difficult tasks. In previous attempts to explain these better-than-average and worse-than-average effects, researchers have invoked bias and motivation as causes. In this article, the authors develop a more parsimonious account, the differential information explanation, in which it is assumed only that people typically have better information about themselves than they do about others. When one's own performance is exceptional (either good or bad), it is often reasonable to assume others' will be less so. Consequently, people estimate the performance of others as less extreme (more regressive) than their own. The result is that people believe they are above average on easy tasks and below average on difficult tasks. These effects are exacerbated when people have accurate information about their performances, increasing the natural discrepancy between knowledge of the self and knowledge of others. The effects are attenuated when people obtain accurate information about the performances of others.     

Use of absolute and comparative performance feedback in absolute and comparative judgments and decisions

Which matters more—beliefs about absolute ability or ability relative to others? This study set out to compare the effects of such beliefs on satisfaction with performance, self-evaluations, and bets on future performance. In Experiment 1, undergraduate participants were told they had answered 20% correct, 80% correct, or were not given their scores on a practice test. Orthogonal to this manipulation, participants learned that their performance placed them in the 23rd percentile or 77th percentile, or they did not receive comparative feedback. Participants were then given a chance to place bets on two games—one in which they needed to get more than 50% right to double their money (absolute bet), and one in which they needed to beat more than 50% of other test-takers (comparative bet). Absolute feedback influenced comparative betting, particularly when no comparative feedback was available. Comparative feedback exerted weaker and inconsistent effects on absolute bets. Absolute feedback also had stronger (and more consistent) effects on satisfaction with performance and state self-esteem. Experiment 2 replicated these effects in a different university sample, and demonstrated that the effects emerge even when bets are placed after participants rate their satisfaction with their performance (although these ratings do not mediate the effect of feedback on bets). These findings suggest that information about one’s absolute standing on a dimension may be more influential than information about comparative standing, partially supporting a key tenet of Festinger’s [Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.] theory of social comparison.     

视角采择的自动性

视角采择是个体表征他人或自己所看到世界的能力。个体在判断他人的视角时总是会自动激活自己的视角，但是当个体采取自己的视角时，并不总是会自动激活他人的视角。研究表明，当采取自己的视角时，成人和儿童可以自动做一级视觉视角采择，二级视觉视角采择的过程是非自动的，且成人可以自动做空间视角采择。未来研究需要继续探讨一级视觉视角采择自动性的影响因素，实验设置和个体因素是否会影响二级视觉视角采择的自动性，空间视角采择自动性的发展趋势和影响因素，视角采择的自动性是否与被试完成任务时所使用的策略有关，以及视角采择自动性的发展机制和脑神经机制。     

Sentencing,severity, and social norms: A rank-based model of contextual influence on judgments of crimes and punishments

Context effects have been shown to bias lay people's evaluations of the severity of crimes and punishments. To investigate the cognitive mechanisms behind these effects, we develop and apply a rank-based social norms approach to judgments of perceived crime seriousness and sentence appropriateness. In Study 1, we find that (a) people believe on average that 84% of people illegally download software more than they do themselves and (b) their judged severity of, and concern about, their own illegal software downloading is predicted not by its amount but by how this amount is believed (typically inaccurately) to rank within a social comparison distribution. Studies 2 and 3 find that the judged appropriateness of a given sentence length is highly dependent on the length of other sentences available in the decision-making context: The same objective sentence was judged as approximately four times stricter when it was the second longest sentence being considered than when it was the fifth longest. It is concluded that the same mechanisms that are used to judge the magnitude of psychophysical stimuli bias judgments about legal matters.     

Individual differences in judging deception: accuracy and bias

The authors report a meta-analysis of individual differences in detecting deception, confining attention to occasions when people judge strangers' veracity in real-time with no special aids. The authors have developed a statistical technique to correct nominal individual differences for differences introduced by random measurement error. Although researchers have suggested that people differ in the ability to detect lies, psychometric analyses of 247 samples reveal that these ability differences are minute. In terms of the percentage of lies detected, measurement-corrected standard deviations in judge ability are less than 1%. In accuracy, judges range no more widely than would be expected by chance, and the best judges are no more accurate than a stochastic mechanism would produce. When judging deception, people differ less in ability than in the inclination to regard others' statements as truthful. People also differ from one another as lie- and truth-tellers. They vary in the detectability of their lies. Moreover, some people are more credible than others whether lying or truth-telling. Results reveal that the outcome of a deception judgment depends more on the liar's credibility than any other individual difference.     

Need for power, collective identity, and political skill: an investigation in Taiwan

Research on power motivation and political skill suggests that high need for power individuals who are oriented toward others will be perceived by supervisors as being politically skilled. McClelland (1973) theorized that high need for power individuals who reflect an orientation towards others will be perceived more favorably than those who are geared toward their own self-interest. In an employee-supervisor matched sample of 149 employees in a Taiwanese financial services organization, need for power was found to interact with an orientation toward others (collective identity) to affect supervisor ratings of political skill such that high need for power individuals exhibited greater political skill when they had a strong collective identity. This finding provides empirical evidence for the importance of the socialized view of power (McClelland, 1973) and shows when need for power relates to political skill using supervisor ratings rather than a self-report measure.     

Positive illusion in close relationships

The literature regarding self-other comparisons suggests that self-enhancing perceptions are prevalent, including forms of “illusion” such as excessively positive self-evaluation, unrealistic optimism, and exaggerated perceptions of control. Concepts from optimal distinctiveness theory served as the basis for two experiments examining whether illusion functions similarly when the context of evaluation involves a relationship. In both experiments participants rated themselves, the best friend, and the average other—or their own romantic relationships, the best friend's relationship, and the relationship of the average other–using scales measuring positivity of evaluation, optimism regarding the future, and perceptions of control. In both experiments, participants exhibited centrality-based differentiation, rating targets more favorably to the degree that the target was more central to their social identity. Patterns of differentiation differed for the two contexts: In the individual context, participants differentiated themselves and their friends from the average other. In the relationship context, participants differentiated their own relationships from the relationships of friends and average others. Also, participants rated individuals as more controllable than relationships. Participants in Experiment 2 provided information regarding potential predictors of illusion. Analyses of these data suggest that favorable centrality-based differentiation may be partially accounted for by impression management, global self-esteem (particularly in the individual context), and commitment level (particularly in the relationship context).