Is mental rotation controlled or automatic?

A task requiring the mental rotation of letters was performed either alone or during the retention interval of two short-term memory tasks. The retention of eight digits or random configurations of eight dots slowed overall reaction time on the mental-rotation task, but did not significantly alter the estimated rate of mental rotation. Conversely, performance on the memory tasks did not vary with the angle of mental rotation. These results support the view that attentional control is required to set up the mental structures required in mental rotation, but that the actual execution of the mental-rotation component can be relegated to subordinate systems that do not compete for attentional resources.     

Do automatic mental associations detect a flashbulb memory?

Flashbulb memories (FBMs) are defined as detailed memories for the reception context in which people first heard of a public and emotionally relevant event. For many years researchers have been debating whether FBMs can be considered a special class of emotional memories, or whether they suffer the same fate as ordinary autobiographical formations. The debate on the real existence of this special class of memories reflects the difficulty of establishing their accuracy. Three indices have been defined as proxies for FBM accuracy: specificity of recalled details, individuals’ confidence in their memory, and memory consistency over time. However, all approaches to FBM assessment have been based on explicit self-report measures. In two studies we aimed to detect FBMs for two emotional public events, by simultaneously employing explicit traditional FBM measures and implicit measures based on the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT). Jointly considered, the results from the two studies showed that the implicit measures were able to discriminate a FBM, and appeared significantly associated with explicit traditional measures of FBM Specificity, Confidence, and Consistency. Both explicit and implicit assessments concurred to correctly estimate a FBM. Implications for the FBM debate are discussed.     

Do speakers have access to a mental syllabary?

The first, theoretical part of this paper sketches a framework for phonological encoding in which the speaker successively generates phonological syllables in connected speech. The final stage of this process, phonetic encoding, consists of accessing articulatory gestural scores for each of these syllables in a “mental syllabary”. The second, experimental part studies various predictions derived from this theory. The main finding is a syllable frequency effect: words ending in a high-frequent syllable are named faster than words ending in a low-frequent syllable. As predicted, this syllable frequency effect is independent of and additive to the effect of word frequency on naming latency. The effect, moreover, is not due to the complexity of the word-final syllable. In the General Discussion, the syllabary model is further elaborated with respect to phonological underspecification and activation spreading. Alternative accounts of the empirical findings in terms of core syllables and demisyllables are considered.     

Do haphazard reviews provide sound directions for dissemination efforts?

Comments on The dissemination and implementation of evidence-based psychological treatments: A review of current efforts (see record 2010-02208-010) by Kathryn R. McHugh and David H. Barlow. The lead article in the February–March issue by McHugh and Barlow (2010) emphasized the need for “dissemination and implementation of evidence-based psychological treatments.” The authors identified a number of intervention programs as evidence based and in need of dissemination. One is multisystemic therapy (MST). They claimed that this program is among “the most successful dissemination efforts...pursued by treatment developers” (p. 79). McHugh and Barlow’s (2010) discussion of the implementation of MST in Hawaii is troubling, because it neglected to mention concerns about the perceived lack of cultural sensitivity of the MST program in that state.     

Do McCollough effects provide evidence for global pattern processing?

Contingent color aftereffects (CAEs, or McCollough effects) were induced using two pairs of orthogonally related patterns (horizontal/vertical and concentric/radial) to determine whether the CAEs of the four patterns are independent. Tests using composite test patterns (like those employed by Emerson, Humphrey, & Dodwell, 1985) suggested independent aftereffects. However, tests using unitary patterns indicated additive or competing effects of the four patterns in regions where line orientations were similar, and tests isolating such regions showed clear interactions between the pattern aftereffects. The results fail to support the claim that global (rather than local) features of the patterns control these CAEs.     

Can mental rotation begin before perception finishes?

We conducted six experiments to determine if mental rotation can begin before perception finishes, as allowed by continuous flow models but not discrete stage models of information processing. The results of Experiments 1–3 showed that the effect of shape discriminability on RT was underadditive with the effect of stimulus orientation, suggesting that mental rotation began before shape discrimination had finished and that the two processes overlapped in time. The results of Experiments 4–6 indicated that mental rotation can overlap with color discriminations as well. In both sets of experiments, however, the amount of underadditivity tended to be much less than predicted by models allowing interference-free overlap. This suggests that mental rotation can overlap with perceptual analysis, contrary to fully discrete models, but that little rotation is carried out during this overlap due to interference between simultaneous discrimination and rotation processes.     

What’s up in mental rotation?

We report two experiments on the influence of head tilt on mental rotation. In Experiment I, subjects decided whether dot patterns were or were not repeated about a line. Their reaction times (RTs) were consistent with the interpretation that they mentally rotated the patterns so that the line was subjectively vertical before making their decisions. When the subjects tilted their heads, the RT functions shifted in the direction of the tilt, indicating that the subjective vertical lay closer to the retinal than to the gravitational vertical. In Experiment II, subjects decided whether singly presented alphanumeric characters in various orientations were standard or backward (mirror-reversed). Again, analysis of their RTs suggested mental rotation to the standard upright, but the function was unaffected by head tilt; in this case, the subjects operated in subjective gravitational rather than retinal coordinates. The choice of retinal or gravitational coordinates may depend on whether the stimuli are interpreted egocentrically or as part of the external world.     

Does mental rotation ability depend on sensory-specific experience?

No study has investigated the link between vision and touch with respect to spatial abilities using a within-subjects design. With this design, we compared participants’ tactile and visual mental rotation abilities, as measured by the Mental Rotations Test (Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978). Participants in four groups completed two consecutive sessions under no-switch (visual-visual or tactile-tactile) or switch conditions (visual-tactile or tactile-visual) to determine whether mental rotation abilities assessed in Session 2 depend on previous sensory-specific experiences (Session 1). Analysis of response accuracy revealed that all groups improved their performance in Session 2. Analysis of response time showed an improvement in visual and tactile performance during Session 2 for participants who first performed the task with the same modality. No effect of task repetition appeared for participants who performed in two different sensory conditions. These results reveal that mental rotation ability partly depends on sensory-specific conditions and that ability developed in a sensory-specific condition does not necessarily transfer to another sensory condition.     

Do We Need a Theory for the Religious Development of Women?

J. W. Fowler (1993) suggested that psychological theories of religious development need to be modified to take into account women's ways of knowing and acting. After recalling results of research on gender differences of religiousness and insights by Carol Gilligan (1982f1993) and Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule (1986), that contention is examined. The parallelisms posited by Fowler between women's epistemological orientations and his developmental stages are analyzed, and a different interpretation is proposed. Whereas the insights under discussion may be helpful when interviewing women and scoring the results, the conclusion is that at present theories of religious development need not be modified on that account. As regards gender- sensitive research on the religiousness of adults, it may be more fruitful to use feminine and masculine "orientations" as variables rather than being female or male.     

Cognitive subprocesses of mental rotation: why is a good rotator better than a poor one?

The Vanderberg-Kuse Mental Rotation Test is a standard test of mental rotation ability. Recent experiments have demonstrated that mental rotation is a complex cognitive process wherein different subprocesses (focused attention, visual scanning, perceptual decision, visual memory) play important roles in performance. We classified the population as good and poor rotators by performance of mental rotation (ns = 47: 22 men and 25 women, respectively; mean age: 20.7 yr.). To examine differences cognitive subprocesses of mental rotation of these two groups were compared. There were significant differences between poor and good rotators in performance on Raven's test and the Pieron Focused Attention test scores. The good rotators scored better because their perceptual decision-analytical intelligence (Raven) and focused attention scores were higher.     

Are implicit affective evaluations related to mental rotation performance?

Conscious and unconscious emotions are related to mental rotation. In this study, we investigated if also unconscious emotional evaluations of the stimuli are related to mental rotation performance. 114 students (39 men, 75 women) solved implicit and explicit affective evaluations and a psychometric mental rotation test with cube and pellet figures. Furthermore, the use of spatial toys, the stereotyping of spatial abilities, and the self-rating in spatial abilities were registered. The mental rotation test with pellet figures was more difficult than the one with cube figures. Mental rotation performance was predicted by the self-rating of spatial abilities. For the cube figures, it was additionally predicted by the implicit affective evaluation of those figures. The results did not differ between men and women. The study provides evidence for a relation between affective emotional evaluations and mental imagery processes, although this does not hold true for all stimulus types.     

The neural substrate for dreaming: is it a subsystem of the default network?

Building on the content, developmental, and neurological evidence that there are numerous parallels between waking cognition and dreaming, this article argues that the likely neural substrate that supports dreaming, which was discovered through converging lesion and neuroimaging studies, may be a subsystem of the waking default network, which is active during mind wandering, daydreaming, and simulation. Support for this hypothesis would strengthen the case for a more general neurocognitive theory of dreaming that starts with established findings and concepts derived from studies of waking cognition and neurocognition. If this theory is correct, then dreaming may be the quintessential cognitive simulation because it is often highly complex, often includes a vivid sensory environment, unfolds over a duration of a few minutes to a half hour, and is usually experienced as real while it is happening.     

What is improved if a mental rotation task is repeated – the efficiency of memory access, or the speed of a transformation routine?

The present study contrasts 3 theories which provide explanations for performance improvement in mental rotation tasks. Wallace and Hofelich conjectured that the process as such may be executed more rapidly after training, while Bethell-Fox and Shepard attributed practice effects to the fact that images may be transformed first elementwise, but later as a Gestalt. In contrast, Tarr and Pinker assumed that a transformation of an image will no longer be computed after training but simply be retrieved from memory. Thirty-seven subjects participated in 3 test sessions in which they had to decide on the parity of 3-D block figures presented from different perspectives. Experimental group subjects underwent 4 additional practice sessions in which a subset of the figures and a subset of perspective views were used. Tests adapted to the predictions of the 3 theories revealed specific learning effects but no transfer, neither to old objects presented in new perspectives nor to new objects. This supports an instance-based explanation of practice effects which states that objects are represented in multiple perspective views. Received: 7 May 1997 / Accepted: 6 August 1997     

D. photographs of facial displays provide a sound basis for classifying the primary emotions?

Izard (1971) and Tomkins (1963) argue that facial displays can be used to classify the primary emotions, and they include shame as such an emotion. An investigation of responses to photographs of facial expressions showed that shame had low identification rates and that subjects had little confidence in their judgements about photographs intended to express shame. The implications of these findings for such classification schemes are discussed.     

How apparent motion affects mental rotation: Push or pull?

Subjects were timed as they judged whether a small bar perpendicular to one side of a clockhand would point left or right if the hand was pointing upward (i.e., at the 12:00 position). The clockhand was shown in two successive orientations 30°apart, so that it was perceived to jump from one to the other, but the bar was included at only one of the two orientations. Analysis of reaction times as a function of angular orientation showed that the subjects “mentally rotated” the clockhand to the upright position before making their decisions. When the bar appeared on the second presentation, the jump had no significant influence on mental rotation but when it appeared on the first presentation, the estimated orientation from which the clockhand was mentally rotated was “dragged” in the direction of the jump.     

Distinguishing clockwise from counterclockwise: Does it require mental rotation?

In three experiments, subjects were timed as they judged whether stimuli, presented in different angular orientations, represented clockwise or counterclockwise directions. In each experiment, there was also a control condition in which the subjects were required to make mirror image judgments relative to some canonical orientation. Analysis of reaction times suggested that, in the control tasks, the subjects generally rotated the stimuli mentally to the canonical orientation before making their decision. Mental rotation was invoked less frequently in the case of the experimental tasks, suggesting at least limited access to an orientation-free code representing the difference between clockwise and counterclockwise. This was most evident in Experiment 1, where the stimuli represented 1-h jumps of a hand on a clock face. It was less so in Experiment 2, where direction of motion was indicated in a static display. In Experiment 3, only a few subjects proved able to use an orientation-free, clockwise versus counterclockwise rubric in order to discriminate normal from backward letters.