On classifying abduction

We can witness the recent surge of interest in classifying different patterns or types of abduction. Many philosophers have suggested their own classifications emphasizing different aspects of abduction. Such a development is remarkable, in view of the fact that until quite recently the focus of the research on Peircean abduction was to identify its logical form. Another agenda in the recent attempts to classify abduction is whether to allow non-explanatory abductions. In order to resolve these two closely related issues, I propose to examine how Peirce would have responded to them. In particular, I suggest to do this in connection with Peirce's another life-long project, the classification of sciences. In this examination, it will be shown that Peirce struggled with the problem of conflating induction and abduction. I shall discuss how this problem influenced both Peirce's views on the interrelationship between abduction, deduction, and induction on the one hand, and his many classifications of sciences on the other. Also, the implication of the fundamental change in Peirce's views of abduction, deduction, and induction to the problem of the classification of sciences will be uncovered. Finally, I shall discuss whether inference to the best explanation is abduction. Insofar as this problem has bearing on the two controversial issues in classifying abduction, my negative answer will demonstrate that classifying abduction is yet to get off the ground.     

Patterns of abduction

This article describes abductions as special patterns of inference to the best explanation whose structure determines a particularly promising abductive conjecture (conclusion) and thus serves as an abductive search strategy (Sect. 1). A classification of different patterns of abduction is provided which intends to be as complete as possible (Sect. 2). An important distinction is that between selective abductions, which choose an optimal candidate from given multitude of possible explanations (Sects. 3–4), and creative abductions, which introduce new theoretical models or concepts (Sects. 5–7). While selective abduction has dominated the literature, creative abductions are rarely discussed, although they are essential in science. The article introduces several kinds of creative abductions, such as theoretical model abduction, common cause abduction and statistical factor analysis, and illustrates them by various real case examples. It is suggested to demarcate scientifically fruitful abductions from purely speculative abductions by the criterion of causal unification (Sect. 7.1).     

Perception as abduction: turning sensor data into meaningful representation

This article presents a formal theory of robot perception as a form of abduction. The theory pins down the process whereby low-level sensor data is transformed into a symbolic representation of the external world, drawing together aspects such as incompleteness, top-down information flow, active perception, attention, and sensor fusion in a unifying framework. In addition, a number of themes are identified that are common to both the engineer concerned with developing a rigorous theory of perception, such as the one on offer here, and the philosopher of mind who is exercised by questions relating to mental representation and intentionality.     

Nonmonotonic abductive inductive learning

Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) is concerned with the task of generalising sets of positive and negative examples with respect to background knowledge expressed as logic programs. Negation as Failure (NAF) is a key feature of logic programming which provides a means for nonmonotonic commonsense reasoning under incomplete information. But, so far, most ILP research has been aimed at Horn programs which exclude NAF, and has failed to exploit the full potential of normal programs that allow NAF. By contrast, Abductive Logic Programming (ALP), a related task concerned with explaining observations with respect to a prior theory, has been well studied and applied in the context of normal logic programs. This paper shows how ALP can be used to provide a semantics and proof procedure for nonmonotonic ILP that utilises practical methods of language and search bias to reduce the search space. This is done by lifting an existing method called Hybrid Abductive Inductive Learning (HAIL) from Horn clauses to normal logic programs. To demonstrate its potential benefits, the resulting system, called XHAIL, is applied to a process modelling case study involving a nonmonotonic temporal Event Calculus (EC).     

The fine-grained metaphysics of artifactual and biological functional kinds

In this paper we consider the emerging position in metaphysics that artifact functions characterize real kinds of artifacts. We analyze how it can circumvent an objection by David Wiggins (Sameness and substance renewed, 2001, 87) and then argue that this position, in comparison to expert judgments, amounts to an interesting fine-grained metaphysics: taking artifact functions as (part of the) essences of artifacts leads to distinctions between principles of activity of artifacts that experts in technology have not yet made. We show, moreover, that our argument holds not only in the artifactual realm but also in biology: taking biological functions as (part of the) essences of organs leads to distinctions between principles of activity of organs that biological experts have not yet made. We run our argument on the basis of analyses of artifact and biological functions as developed in philosophy of technology and of biology, thus importing results obtained outside of metaphysics into the debate on ontological realism. In return, our argument shows that a position in metaphysics provides experts reason for trying to detect differences between principles of activities of artifacts and organs that have not been detected so far.     

Feature centrality and property induction

A feature is central to a concept to the extent that other features depend on it. Four studies tested the hypothesis that people will project a feature from a base concept to a target concept to the extent that they believe the feature is central to the two concepts. This centrality hypothesis implies that feature projection is guided by a principle that aims to maximize the structural commonality between base and target concepts. Participants were told that a category has two or three novel features. One feature was the most central in that more properties depended on it. The extent to which the target shared the feature’s dependencies was manipulated by varying the similarity of category pairs. Participants’ ratings of the likelihood that each feature would hold in the target category support the centrality hypothesis with both natural kind and artifact categories and with both well-specified and vague dependency structures.     

Measuring Coping in Low-Income European American,African American,and Mexican American Adolescents: An Examination of Measurement Equivalence

We examined the cross-ethnic and cross-language equivalence of the Children's Coping Strategies Checklist (Ayers, T.S., Sandler, I.N., West, S.G. and Roosa, M.W. (1996). A dispositional and situational assessment of children's coping: Testing alternative models of coping. Journal of Personality , 64 (4), 923-958) by assessing item, functional, and scalar equivalence in a sample of 319 European American, African American, and Mexican American adolescents from low-income inner-city families. Depression, as measured by Children's Depression Inventory, was the criterion in the analyses of scalar equivalence. The results suggest considerable cross-ethnic and cross-language measurement equivalence of the Children's Coping Strategies Checklist. The findings also suggest some caution in using the Children's Depression Inventory in comparative studies of African American and Mexican American adolescents or in studies that treat these groups as homogeneous samples.     

The two faces of typicality in category-based induction

Studies of category-based induction using different methods have found somewhat contradictory results for whether typical items are a stronger basis for induction. Typical category items are generally more similar to other category items than are atypical ones, and they are also more likely to be categorized into the category in question. We propose that the first aspect (representativeness) influences induction, but the second (uncertainty about the correct category) does not. Two experiments using artificial categories found support for this prediction. Two further experiments manipulated pictures of objects and also found that representativeness in the category influenced the strength of induction, but uncertainty of classification did not. Thus, the two aspects of typicality have different effects on category-based induction.     

Executable specifications for hypothesis-based reasoning with Prolog and Constraint Handling Rules

Constraint Handling Rules (CHR) is an extension to Prolog which opens up a spectrum of hypothesis-based reasoning in logic programs without additional interpretation overhead. Abduction with integrity constraints is one example of hypothesis-based reasoning which can be implemented directly in Prolog and CHR with a straightforward use of available and efficiently implemented facilities.The present paper clarifies the semantic foundations for this way of doing abduction in CHR and Prolog as well as other examples of hypothesis-based reasoning that is possible, including assumptive logic programming, hypotheses with priority and scope, and nonmonotonic reasoning.Examples are presented as executable code so the paper may also serve the additional purpose of a practical guide for developing such programs, and it is demonstrated that the approach provides a seamless integration with existing constraint solvers.     

Explaining the Past in the Geosciences

Abductive reasoning is central to reconstructing the past in the geosciences. This paper outlines the nature of the abductive method and restates it in Bayesian terms. Evidence plays a key role in this working method and, in particular, traces of the past are important in this explanatory framework. Traces, whether singularly or as groups, are interpreted within the context of the event for which they have evidential claims. Traces are not considered as independent entities but rather as inter-related pieces of information concerning the likelihood of specific events. Exemplification of the use of such traces is provided by dissecting an example of their use in the environmental reconstruction of mountain climate.     

The role of within-category variability in category-based induction: a developmental study

The present studies tested the hypothesis that strong assumptions about within-category homogeneity impede children's recognition of the inductive value of diverse samples of evidence. In Study 1a, children (7-year-olds) and adults were randomly assigned to receive a prime emphasizing within-category variability, a prime emphasizing within-category similarities, or to not receive a prime. Only following the variability prime, children demonstrated a reliable preference for evaluating diverse over nondiverse samples to determine whether there is support for a category-wide generalization. Adults demonstrated a robust preference for diverse samples in all conditions. These effects extended beyond the specific categories included in the prime, as well as to multiple types of test questions. Study 1b demonstrated that priming variability leads children to select diverse samples only when doing so is informative for induction. Implications for conceptual development are discussed.     

Causal relations drive young children's induction, naming, and categorization

A number of recent models and experiments have suggested that evidence of early category-based induction is an artifact of perceptual cues provided by experimenters. We tested these accounts against the prediction that different relations (causal versus non-causal) determine the types of perceptual similarity by which children generalize. Young children were asked to label, to infer novel properties, and to project future appearances of a novel animal that varied in two opposite respects: (1) how much it looked like another animal whose name and properties were known, and (2) how much its parents looked like parents of another animal whose name and properties were known. When exemplar origins were known, children generalized to exemplars with similar origins rather than with similar appearances; when origins were unknown, children generalized to exemplars with similar appearances. Results indicate even young children possess the cognitive control to choose the similarities that best predict accurate generalizations.     

Conceptual influences on induction: A case for a late onset

This research examines the mechanism of early induction, the development of induction, and the ways attentional and conceptual factors contribute to induction across development. Different theoretical views offer different answers to these questions. Six experiments with 4- and 5-year-olds, 7-year-olds and adults (N = 208) test these competing theories by teaching categories for which category membership and perceptual similarity are in conflict, and varying orthogonally conceptual and attentional factors that may potentially affect inductive inference. The results suggest that early induction is similarity-based; conceptual information plays a negligible role in early induction, but its role increases gradually, with the 7-year-olds being a transitional group. And finally, there is substantial contribution of attention to the development of induction: only adults, but not children, could perform category-based induction without attentional support. Therefore, category-based induction exhibits protracted development, with attentional factors contributing early in development and conceptual factors contributing later in development. These results are discussed in relation to existing theories of development of inductive inference and broader theoretical views on cognitive development.     

Flight and abduction in witchcraft and UFO lore

The lore surrounding the mythical Witches' Sabbat and contemporary reports of UFO abductions share three main characteristics: the use of masks, the appearance of "Men in Black," and references to flight and abduction. We review these three commonalities with particular focus on the aspect of flight and abduction. We argue that narratives of the Witches' Sabbat and UFO abductions share the same basic structure, common symbolism, and serve the same psychological needs of providing a coherent explanation for anomalous (ambiguous) experiences while simultaneously giving the experient a sense of freedom, release, and escape from the self. This pattern of similarities suggests the possibility that UFO abductions are a modern version of tales of flight to the Sabbat.     

Three factors that promote positive induction when rats respond for 1% sucrose

Studies have demonstrated that rats will increase their operant rate of response for a low-valued reinforcer if a high-valued reinforcer will be available later in the session. Research on this positive induction effect suggests that at least three factors account for its appearance: premature responding for the yet unavailable high-valued reinforcer, an increase in the reinforcing value of the low-valued reinforcer, and responding controlled (e.g., elicited) by the response manipulandum. The present experiment tested whether the size of induction could be systematically altered by varying these factors. Twenty-four rats responded in sessions in which 1% sucrose or a food pellet served as the reinforcer in the first or second half of the session. In some sessions, the same operant response was required in both halves of the session. In others, different responses were required. Half of the rats received the different reinforcers in one food trough while the other half received reinforcers in the different halves of the session in different food troughs. Results demonstrated that a large positive induction effect was observed when all of the above factors were present to contribute to the effect (i.e., high-valued reinforcer upcoming, earned by making the same response, delivered to the same food trough). A small, but significant, induction effect remained when all three were absent (i.e., high-valued reinforcer delivered first, earned by making a different response, delivered to a different food trough). The results support the idea that these three factors are the main contributors to the appearance of this positive induction effect. However, at least one additional factor must also contribute.     

Use of current explanations in multicausal abductive reasoning

In multicausal abductive tasks a person must explain some findings by assembling a composite hypothesis that consists of one or more elementary hypotheses. If there are n elementary hypotheses, there can be up to 2ⁿ composite hypotheses. To constrain the search for hypotheses to explain a new observation, people sometimes use their current explanation—the previous evidence and their present composite hypothesis of that evidence; however, it is unclear when and how the current explanation is used. In addition, although a person's current explanation can narrow the search for a hypothesis, it can also blind the problem solver to alternative, possibly better, explanations. This paper describes a model of multicausal abductive reasoning that makes two predictions regarding the use of the current explanation. The first prediction is that the current explanation is not used to explain new evidence if there is a simple (i.e., nondisjunctive, concrete) hypothesis to account for that evidence. The second prediction is that the current explanation is used when attempting to discriminate among several alternative hypotheses for new evidence. These hypotheses were tested in three experiments. The results are consistent with the second prediction: the current explanation is used when discriminating among alternative hypotheses. However, the first prediction—that the current explanation is not used when a simple hypothesis can account for new data—received only limited support. Participants used the current explanation to constrain their interpretation of new data in 46.5% of all trials. This suggests that context-independent strategies compete with context-dependent ones—an interpretation that is consistent with recent work on strategy selection during problem solving.     

Chasing Our Tails: Psychological, Institutional and Societal Paradoxes in Natural Resource Management, Sustainability, and Climate Change in Australia

Natural Resource Management (NRM) and Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) have been guiding frameworks in Australia for a number of decades. Recently, NRM and ESD have become central to climate change mitigation. In this paper, we explore the psychological paradoxes that function within climate change settings, with particular attention devoted to the way that research and development reinforces these paradoxes by advocating for participatory forms of inquiry. Paradox emerges in NRM at psychological, institutional, and organisational levels. Paradoxes are also features of different forms of democracy such as neoliberal and participatory democracy. Although NRM, ESD and climate change are often conceptualised as distinct issue domains, these policy areas are fundamentally interconnected in both theory and in practice. This interconnection between these policy and research settings, reflections on paradox, and the experience of incorporating community psychology into the paradoxical settings of NRM and climate change are captured in this paper.     

Abductive inference in defeasible reasoning: a model for research programmes

Abduction is regarded as the inference process that goes from observations to explanations within a more general context or theoretical framework. There are good characterizations of abduction of surprising observations in monotonic theories. Also, in normal logic programs there are a tight relation among SLDNF and the abduction of negative literals. However, a problem that faces abduction is the explanation of anomalous observations, i.e., observations that are contradictory with respect to the current theory. For this reason, in this work we will consider the problem of embedding abduction of surprising and anomalous observations in defeasible (nonmonotonic) theories. We discuss some issues arising the pragmatic acceptance of abductive inferences in defeasible theories, and how to accommodate anomalous observations and characterize all the possible outcomes that a defeasible theory may face when confronted with new evidence. We explore the use of partial structures approach as a semantic foundation for our system. Finally, we discuss an application of our system as a formal device for representing the methodology of scientific research programmes. In this representation, a programme is regarded as a defeasible theory that draws predictions. When confronted with surprising or anomalous observations, the programme protects itself by means of heuristic procedures, which are represented in our system as abductive inference procedures.