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1.
Campbell brown Yujin Nagasawa 《Synthese》2005,143(3):309-320
The Argument from Inferiority holds that our world cannot be the creation of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being; for if it were, it would be the best of all possible worlds, which evidently it is not. We argue that this argument rests on an implausible principle concerning which worlds it is permissible for an omnipotent being to create: roughly, the principle that such a being ought not to create a non-best world. More specifically, we argue that this principle is plausible only if we assume that there is a best element in the set of all possible worlds. However, as we show, there are conceivable scenarios in which that assumption does not hold. 相似文献
2.
Charles G. Morgan 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(1-4):280-289
The intuitive notion behind the usual semantics of most systems of modal logic is that of ‘possible worlds’. Loosely speaking, an expression is necessary if and only if it holds in all possible worlds; it is possible if and only if it holds in some possible world. Of course, contradictory expressions turn out to hold in no possible worlds, and logically true expressions turn out to hold in every possible world. A method is presented for transforming standard modal systems into systems of modal logic for impossible worlds. To each possible world there corresponds an impossible world such that an expression holds in the impossible world if and only if it does not hold in the possible world. One can then talk about such worlds quite consistently, and there seems to be no logical reason for excluding them from consideration. 相似文献
3.
Klaas J. Kraay 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(3):355-368
God is traditionally taken to be a perfect being, and the creator and sustainer of all that is. So, if theism is true, what sort of world should we expect? To answer this question, we need an account of the array of possible worlds from which God is said to choose. It seems that either there is (a) exactly one best possible world; or (b) more than one unsurpassable world; or (c) an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. Influential arguments for atheism have been advanced on each hierarchy, and these jointly comprise a daunting trilemma for theism. In this paper, I argue that if theism is true, we should expect the actual world to be a multiverse comprised of all and only those universes which are worthy of creation and sustenance. I further argue that this multiverse is the unique best of all possible worlds. Finally, I explain how his unconventional view bears on the trilemma for theism. 相似文献
4.
Each fictional world that adults create has its own distinct properties, separating it from other fictional worlds. Here we explore whether this separation also exists for young children's pretend game worlds. Studies 1 and 1A set up two simultaneous games and encouraged children to create appropriate pretend identities for coloured blocks. When prompted with a situation that required the use of a Game 1 object in Game 2, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds were reluctant to move pretend objects between games, even when the alternative‐world object was explicitly highlighted as a possible choice. Study 2 found the same effect when the two game worlds were presented sequentially. This suggests that, even for young children, multiple pretend game worlds are kept psychologically separate. 相似文献
5.
Edward N. Zalta 《Philosophical Studies》1987,51(2):213-239
In the debate about the nature and identity of possible worlds, philosophers have neglected the parallel questions about the nature and identity of moments of time. These are not questions about the structure of time in general, but rather about the internal structure of each individual time. Times and worlds share the following structural similarities: both are maximal with respect to propositions (at every world and time, either p or ~p is true, for every p); both are consistent; both are closed (every modal consequence of a proposition true at a world is also true at that world, and every tense-theoretic consequence of a proposition true at a time is also true at that time); just as there is a unique actual world, there is a unique present moment; and just as a proposition is necessarily true iff true at all worlds, a proposition is eternally true iff true at all times. In this paper, I show that a simple extension of my theory of worlds yields a theory of times in which the above structural similarities between the two are consequences. 相似文献
6.
Daniel Nolan 《Philosophical Studies》1996,84(2-3):239-262
Conclusion The realisation that Forrest/Armstrong style cardinality arguments are not successful allowsus to have a simpler and more intuitive principle of recombination, and dispenses with the need to postulate mysterious necessities in order to guarantee a maximum size of worlds. As we have seen, examining the options for possibilia to form a proper class also raises new issues to do with the connection of possible worlds and classes, and may provide the motivation for various theoretical commitments that seemed previously to have no application outside pure mathematics (Should any proper classes have singletons? Should the individuals form a set?). While this essay has proceeded as a discussion primarily of Lewis' theory, it can be more generally applied — any theory of possible worlds that would wish to endorse something like the unrestricted principle of recombination and wishes to be able to talk about possibilia from more than one world simultaneously will need a modal class theory where the possibilia form a proper class rather than a set, for example. Nearly every theory of possible worlds can, and in my opinion should, take advantage of the unrestricted principle of recombination rather than limit the size of possible worlds. 相似文献
7.
Dale Jacquette 《Studia Logica》2006,82(3):337-343
If we agree with Michael Jubien that propositions do not exist, while accepting the existence of abstract sets in a realist
mathematical ontology, then the combined effect of these ontological commitments has surprising implications for the metaphysics
of modal logic, the ontology of logically possible worlds, and the controversy over modal realism versus actualism. Logically
possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets exist if sets generally exist, but are equivalently expressed as
maximally consistent conjunctions of the same propositions in corresponding sets. A conjunction of propositions, even if infinite
in extent, is nevertheless itself a proposition. If sets and hence proposition sets exist but propositions do not exist, then
whether or not modal realism is true depends on which of two apparently equivalent methods of identifying, representing, or
characterizing logically possible worlds we choose to adopt. I consider a number of reactions to the problem, concluding that
the best solution may be to reject the conventional model set theoretical concept of logically possible worlds as maximally
consistent proposition sets, and distinguishing between the actual world alone as maximally consistent and interpreting all
nonactual merely logically possible worlds as submaximal.
I am grateful to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), for supporting this among related research projects in philosophical logic and philosophy
of mathematics during my Resident Research Fellowship in 2005-2006. 相似文献
8.
Dilip Ninan 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2018,47(1):1-16
The standard account of modal expressions in natural language analyzes them as quantifiers over a set of possible worlds determined by the evaluation world and an accessibility relation. A number of authors have recently argued for an alternative account according to which modals are analyzed as quantifying over a domain of possible worlds that is specified directly in the points of evaluation. But the new approach only handles the data motivating it if it is supplemented with a non-standard account of attitude verbs and conditionals. It can be shown the the relational account handles the same data equally well if it too is supplemented with a non-standard account of such expressions. 相似文献
9.
Carl David Mildenberger 《Philosophical Studies》2017,174(1):185-203
Debates that revolve around the topic of morality and fiction rarely explicitly treat virtual worlds like, for example, Second Life. The reason for this disregard cannot be that all users of virtual worlds only do the right thing while online—for they sometimes even virtually kill each other. Is it wrong to kill other people in a virtual world? It depends. This essay analyzes on what it depends, why it is that killing people in a virtual world sometimes is wrong, and how different virtual killings are wrong in different ways. I argue that killing people online is wrong if it is an instance of deliberately and non-consensually evoking disagreeable emotions in others. Establishing this conclusion requires substantial conceptual work, as virtual worlds feature new kinds of fictional agency, particular emotional responses to fiction, and unique ways in which the fiction of the virtual world relates to the wrongness of the killing. 相似文献
10.
《Basic and applied social psychology》2013,35(3):311-327
It is clear that we all have beliefs about the social world and how it works that we rely on as we make sense of and negotiate within that world. Although the importance of assumptions about ourselves and the world has been demonstrated in relation to crisis and trauma, their relevance to more proactive activities such as goal striving has not yet been established. To do this, I first present a conceptual framework and then offer (a) a profile of women's vulnerability-related assumptive worlds, (b) correlations of these assumptive worlds and identification with four societal reference groups (political orientation, religion, gender, cultural identity), and (c) regression data concerning the combined and unique ability of social referents and assumptive worlds to explain goal striving. I conclude by discussing implications for empowerment goals in work with women as well as future research. 相似文献
11.
Leo Luks 《Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology》2017,48(4):275-286
This paper provides an analysis of the paradoxical definition of art as the silence of the world, as presented in Maurice Blanchot’s The Space of Literature. The definition is analysed phenomenologically, by treating the world as the universal horizon of all experiences. The paper presents two possible interpretations of Blanchot’s statement. First, a possibility is considered that, according to Blanchot, in genuine artistic experience the mundane everyday life falls silent, and an autonomous fictional world opens up. The paper argues that while Blanchot does oppose art to everyday life, this interpretation is insufficient. Firstly, because on the basis of the phenomenological premise, all possible worlds fall within the universal world-horizon, and secondly, the function Blanchot attributes to art is considerably more radical, as when he speaks about the directedness of art outside of all possible worlds. While such an aim may seem impossible from the viewpoint of the phenomenological premise, the second part of the paper demonstrates that it can indeed be meaningfully interpreted on the basis of Martin Heidegger’s transcendent approach to the world. According to this interpretation, while the phenomenological premise prevents all discussion of places and experiences outside the world, a liminal experience can nevertheless be discussed. If this is true, it is not an entity within the world which opens up, but rather the world-horizon itself in the form of an anxious silence. 相似文献
12.
Christian List 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2023,57(2):316-340
This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness. 相似文献
13.
Michel Ghins 《国际科学哲学研究》2003,17(3):265-279
This article argues that Thomas Kuhn's views on the existence of the world have undergone significant change in the course of his philosophical career. In Structure, Kuhn appears to be committed to the existence of the ordinary empirical world as well as the existence of an independent metaphysical world, but realism about the empirical world is abandoned in his later writings. Whereas in Structure the only relative worlds are the scientific worlds inhabited by the practitioners of various paradigms, the later Kuhn puts the non-scientific worlds of particular groups or cultures on the same footing as the paradigm-related scientific worlds. The article shows that, on what Ian Hacking called the “new-world problem”, the later Kuhn has moved to a more radical antirealist position. It is also argued that the earlier and later solutions to the “new-world problem” face insuperable difficulties, which render Kuhn's account of scientific change implausible. 相似文献
14.
15.
Maxwell J. Cresswell 《Studia Logica》2006,82(3):307-327
The possible-worlds semantics for modality says that a sentence is possibly true if it is true in some possible world. Given
classical prepositional logic, one can easily prove that every consistent set of propositions can be embedded in a ‘maximal
consistent set’, which in a sense represents a possible world. However the construction depends on the fact that standard
modal logics are finitary, and it seems false that an infinite collection of sets of sentences each finite subset of which
is intuitively ‘possible’ in natural language has the property that the whole set is possible. The argument of the paper is
that the principles needed to shew that natural language possibility sentences involve quantification over worlds are analogous
to those used in infinitary modal logic. 相似文献
16.
Robert W. Jenson 《International Journal of Systematic Theology》2004,6(1):69-76
Abstract: Art can be understood as experimenting with possible worlds. There is, however, a real world underlying the possible worlds – the world created by God. We do not have unmediated access to this world, and so must, and can, continue to be artists, and a loss of faith in the existence of the real world leads to a loss of the possibility of art. If Christ is to be understood as art, then the Father is the artist who experiments with a possible world, which is thus defined as the real world, through his Son, the Logos. 相似文献
17.
Joshua Allen Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(1):55-71
There are a number of relevant alternatives accounts of knowledge in the literature, including those by contextualists (like
Lewis and Cohen), and invariantists (like Dretske). Despite widespread discussion of such views, an explication of the notion
of relevance is conspicuously absent from the literature. Without a careful explication of that notion, relevant alternatives
accounts resist evaluation. This paper attempts to aid in the evaluation of those accounts, by providing an account of relevance.
The account rejects two common presuppositions about the notion of relevance. The account holds that worlds, rather than alternatives,
are relevant, and that distant worlds can be relevant. Relevant worlds turn out to be those worlds at which an alternative
to one’s belief obtains, and is such that one’s epistemic position (with respect to what one believes at the actual world)
is worse than it is at the actual world. 相似文献
18.
C.J.K. Gibilisco 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2016,59(3):295-317
According to David Lewis’s Modal Realism, other possible worlds really exist as concrete, spatiotemporal systems, and every way that a world could be is a way that some world is. To establish this plenitude of concrete possible worlds, Lewis presents his ‘principle of recombination,’ which is meant to guarantee that there exists a possible world, or part of a possible world, for every possibility. Jessica Wilson has recently argued that Lewis’s principle of recombination fails to generate enough worlds to account for the plenitude of possibilities. Namely, Wilson argues that the principle of recombination cannot account for the possibility of spatially overlapping but distinct fundamental entities, as well as certain macroscopic entities. In this paper, I will defend Lewis’s principle of recombination against these charges, arguing that Wilson’s objections overlook features of Lewisian metaphysics that can solve the problems at hand. 相似文献
19.
Paulo De Jesus 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2018,17(5):861-887
According to enactivism all living systems, from single cell organisms to human beings, are ontologically endowed with some form of teleological and sense-making agency. Furthermore, enactivists maintain that: (i) there is no fixed pregiven world and as a consequence (ii) all organisms “bring forth” their own unique “worlds” through processes of sense-making. The first half of the paper takes these two ontological claims as its central focus and aims to clarify and make explicit the arguments and motivations underlying them. Our analysis here highlights three distinct but connected problems for enactivism: (i) these arguments do not and cannot guarantee that there is no pregiven world, instead, they (ii) end up generating a contradiction whereby a pregiven world seems to in fact be tacitly presupposed by virtue of (iii) a reliance on a tacit epistemic perspectivalism which is also inherently representationalist and as a consequence makes it difficult to satisfactorily account for the ontological plurality of worlds. Taking these considerations on board, the second half of the paper then aims to develop a more robust ontologically grounded enactivism. Drawing from biosemiotic enactivism, science and technology studies and anthropology, the paper aims to present an account which both rejects a pregiven world and coherently accounts for how organisms bring forth ontologically multiple worlds. 相似文献
20.
Robert Francescotti 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(2):241-254
Perhaps all concrete phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. Even so, it seems that the world could have been otherwise. It seems that physicalism, if true, is contingently true. In fact, many believe that the actual truth of physicalism allows metaphysically possible worlds duplicating the actual world in all physical respects while containing immaterial extras, e.g. ghosts, spirits, or Cartesian souls, that no physicalist would believe actually exist. Here I focus on physicalism regarding mentality and argue that the doctrine does not allow possible worlds that physically duplicate the actual world while differing mentally. By revealing what physicalism (regarding the mind) does not allow, this essay helps us get clear on what the view really amounts to and why it is contingent. 相似文献