Church‐Based Social Relationships and Change in Self‐Esteem Over Time

This study has two goals. The first goal is to see if church‐based social relationships are associated with change in self‐esteem. Emotional support from fellow church members and having a close personal relationship with God serve as measures of church‐based social ties. The second goal is to see whether emotional support from fellow church members is more strongly associated with self‐esteem than emotional support from secular social network members. The data come from an ongoing nationwide survey of older adults. The findings reveal that having a close personal relationship with God is associated with a stronger sense of self‐esteem at the baseline and follow‐up interviews. In contrast, emotional support from fellow church members was not associated with self‐esteem at either point in time. However, emotional support from secular social network members is related to self‐esteem at the baseline but not the follow‐up interview.     

Dimensional and Cross‐Cutting Assessment in the DSM‐5

A significant proposed change to the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM‐5) that will significantly affect the way counselors diagnose mental disorders is the addition of dimensional assessments to the categorical diagnoses. The author reviews the current DSM's (4th ed., text rev.; American Psychiatric Association, 2000 ) categorical classification system, describes the proposed dimensional and cross‐cutting assessments, and provides implications about clinical utility and user acceptability of a dimensional diagnostic approach.     

From Melancholia to Meaning How to Live the Past in the Present

Freud's theory of melancholia has lately experienced a renaissance among those interested in the creative potentialities of the psyche. In this essay, I consider the ways in which melancholia can contribute to the actualization of these potentialities by preparing the ground in which inspiration can later take root. I also outline the circumstances in which the melancholy subject's refusal to abandon its lost objects represents an entirely valid response to loss. At the same time, I propose that if the subject is to develop an affirmative and imaginatively supple relationship to its psychic history, it must in the end move from melancholia to meaning production. Insofar as melancholia signals the psyche's inability or stubborn unwillingness to move forward, its powers by necessity remain dormant until the subject is able to exchange its sadness for the versatile meaning-making capacities of the signifier. I moreover argue that it is only when the subject is able to transcend its melancholia enough to begin to desire new objects that it can develop loving and responsible relationships with others—that it can begin to welcome others in their own terms rather than reducing them to its own narcissistic image.     

Time Past and Time Present: ;Linearities, Circularities and Life

In 1979 this journal published 'Psychodynamic and structural approaches to work with families', a paper reflecting my preoccupation at that time with the move from a psychodynamic model to a model that was not only systemic, but based on developmental principles of family life and family evolution. This paper considers some of the effects of social context, past and present, which relate to the social construction of myself as a woman therapist, and my relationship to changes in professional and gendered issues since 1979.     

How to do a meta‐analysis

Meta‐analysis is a statistical tool for estimating the mean and variance of underlying population effects from a collection of empirical studies addressing ostensibly the same research question. Meta‐analysis has become an increasing popular and valuable tool in psychological research, and major review articles typically employ these methods. This article describes the process of conducting meta‐analysis: selecting articles, developing inclusion criteria, calculating effect sizes, conducting the actual analysis (including information on how to do the analysis on popular computer packages such as IBM SPSS and R) and estimating the effects of publication bias. Guidance is also given on how to write up a meta‐analysis.     

A Note on the Power of Multiattribute One‐switch Utility Functions

One‐switch utility functions model situations in which the preference between two alternatives switches only once as the outcome of one attribute of both alternatives changes from low to high. Recent research cites evidence that the sum of exponential functions (sumex) is the most convincing type for modelling one‐switch utility functions. Sumex functions allow to model exactly one preferential switch and they are convenient for estimating one‐switch utility functions. However, it is unclear so far if sumex functions are suitable to model preferential switches that are perceivable by a decision maker. This paper first analyses how different the utility of two alternatives before and after a preferential can be modelled with sumex functions given that the preferential switch is caused by a particular attribute outcome improvement. It thereafter investigates how accurately decision makers perceive such utility differences. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

大圆满(Dzogchen)及海德格尔的四维时间

关于时间,我们有太多的疑问,比如过去的事情就不再有了吗?未来是不可预期的吗?现在存在吗?时光的流逝是不可逆转的吗?什么是永恒?它与时间的关系如何?本文以藏传佛教大圆满传统的龙清巴和西方现象学派的海德格尔为例讨论时间的经验。他们都没有去构想永恒的生命,而是深入到时间流逝的现象和经验之中,揭示了一个全新的时间维度,即所谓第四时间或时间的第四维度。本文首先介绍大圆满传统中处理时间经验的一种修行,然后分析龙清巴的四时概念及其在佛教史上的意义,接着讨论海德格尔的四维时间概念,以及其追随者对这一概念的进一步讨论。最后在结论中,我将简单说明四维时间在这两个传统中的同异点,并探讨其相似点后的可能原因。     

Relational Self‐Construal: Past and Future

Relational self‐construal is characterized as the extent to which a person defines the self in terms of close relationships. In this article, I distinguish relational self‐construal from collective‐interdependent self‐construal and from other similar‐sounding constructs. I review the history of the concept of relational self‐construal and how it is most frequently measured or manipulated. The remainder of the article focuses on research that examines the role of relational self‐construal in cognition, affect, motivation, and close interpersonal relationships.     

Time for Values: Responding Educationally to the Call from the Past

This paper rethinks the fostering task of the teacher in a time when it, paradoxically, has tended to become marginalized and privatized despite its public urgency. Following post-holocaust thinkers such as Hannah Arendt and Zygmunt Bauman, the position explored here is radical in the sense that it takes ‘the crisis of traditions’ and the erosion of a common moral ground or value basis seriously, and it is conservative in the sense that it insists on responding educationally to the call from the past by returning to (a) the moral character of our existence and (b) our own embeddedness in the incompleteness of living traditions. The argument is that there is a difference between educating for common values—which entails a belief in pre-existing commonalities—and making values common in and through education. The latter, we argue, entails an aspiration for continuously creating new commonalities and for cultivating the ability to act and judge as a thinking moral agent in specific, lived and worldly cases. In this sense, the fostering task of the teacher is to create commonality of what is not (yet) common, turning the liberal democratic values of the past into contested objects of study.     

Stability and Change in Domain‐specific Self‐esteem and Global Self‐esteem

A notable uptick of interest in the stability of self‐esteem has been observed over the past few years. Most researchers, however, have focused on unidimensional rather than multidimensional conceptualizations of self‐esteem. The paucity of empirical research is surprising given conflicting theoretical perspectives on the stability of self‐esteem. The goal of the present study was to thoroughly disentangle different conceptualizations of self‐esteem and test opposing classical theories on (i) the stability and (ii) the direction of mutual influence of these different forms of self‐esteem. We analysed two‐year longitudinal data from participants (N = 644 at T1, N = 241 at T2) with an average age of 47.0 years (SD = 12.4). Analyses using a latent variable approach revealed that the domains of self‐esteem were relatively stable in terms of rank order and mean levels. In fact, the size of the stability coefficients was comparable to that of other trait measures that have been reported in the literature and paralleled the stability observed for global self‐esteem. Results did not provide support for either top‐down or bottom‐up effects between domain‐specific and global self‐esteem. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications regarding the stability and development of self‐esteem in adulthood and advance the understanding of self‐esteem in personality theory. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge‐how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge‐that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge‐how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge‐that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that come apart.     

Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement

According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge‐how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge‐how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge‐how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti‐intellectualism. Unlike neo‐Rylean anti‐intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge‐how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge‐how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance.     

The Defeasibility of Knowledge‐How

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge‐how. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, against intellectualism, we will show that knowledge‐how is in fact resilient to being undermined by the very kinds of traditional (propositional) epistemic defeaters which clearly defeat the items of propositional knowledge which intellectualists identify with knowledge‐how. Second, we aim to fill an important lacuna in the contemporary debate, which is to develop an alternative way in which epistemic defeat for knowledge‐how could be modelled within an anti‐intellectualist framework.     

How Stimulus Variables Combine to Affect Change Blindness

Change blindness is the inability to detect changes that occur in a scene, when the scene is briefly obscured while the change happens. It has been found to occur during driving simulations and computer use for example. Scene-Complexity, stimulus On-Time and time for which a scene is obscured can all affect our ability to detect changes (or change blindness). In most studies parameters have been selected to induce change blindness with little consideration of the extent to which change blindness might be induced. There is however evidence that variables that describe the visual scene can affect likelihood of detecting changes (Rensink Visual Cognition 7:345?C376, 2000). These effects have in this paper been explored in combination. Increasing Scene-Complexity, decreasing stimulus On-Time and increasing the duration for which a scene is obscured all increase change blindness but they all interact to further increase the likelihood of changes being missed. In order to reduce change blindness in a changing scene, all the variables need to be considered.     

The Lingering Effects of Our Past Experiences: The Sunk‐Cost Fallacy and the Inaction‐Inertia Effect

The effect of past experiences and actions in shaping current perceptions, emotions, decisions and goals is widely recognized in the psychological literature. When it comes to economic decisions, however, these influences are sometimes seen as impediments to rational decision‐making. In an attempt to explore the enduring consequences of the past, we present, compare, and discuss two familiar behavioral phenomena: The sunk‐cost effect, which refers to situations where continued actions are fueled by past investments, and the inaction‐inertia effect, in which continued inaction is triggered by the shadows of missed opportunities. Although one process elicits continued action and the other continued inaction, we show that there is a great deal of similarity in the psychological underpinnings of these effects, and argue that respecting sunk costs and avoiding actions that are associated with forgone opportunities are not necessarily unreasonable, or maladaptive behaviors.