Psychological essentialism among Korean children and adults: A modified replication study

Developmental psychologists have shown interest in the development of psychological essentialism among children; that is, a belief that certain psychological characteristics (such as personality) are relatively stable and unchanging. Although previous studies have shown that children are essentialistic about human traits, and the coherence among various essentialism dimensions increases with age, moderating cultural factors in the development of essentialism, especially among Asian children, have received little attention. Using the methodologies of Gelman, Heyman, and Legare (2007), levels of psychological essentialism among Korean children and adults were measured, and compared with the original US data. Results demonstrated cross‐cultural similarity in the development of coherence in essentialistic thought, and difference in the level of essentialism among adult participants. The present findings imply that different cultural values between Asians and Westerners can play a role in the developmental trajectory of psychological essentialism.     

My Heart Made Me Do It: Children's Essentialist Beliefs About Heart Transplants

Psychological essentialism is a folk theory characterized by the belief that a causal internal essence or force gives rise to the common outward behaviors or attributes of a category's members. In two studies, we investigated whether 4‐ to 7‐year‐old children evidenced essentialist reasoning about heart transplants by asking them to predict whether trading hearts with an individual would cause them to take on the donor's attributes. Control conditions asked children to consider the effects of trading money with an individual. Results indicated that children reasoned according to essentialism, predicting more transfer of attributes in the transplant condition versus the non‐bodily money control. Children also endorsed essentialist transfer of attributes even when they did not believe that a transplant would change the recipient's category membership (e.g., endorsing the idea that a recipient of a pig's heart would act pig‐like, but denying that the recipient would become a pig). This finding runs counter to predictions from a strong interpretation of the “minimalist” position, an alternative to essentialism.     

儿童基于心理本质论的种族认知及其影响因素

心理本质论将类别成员视为由共同的本质所决定,且这些本质对应着一些表面的不可改变的属性。其中,种族本质论就是心理本质论的一种。研究种族本质论的发展对于了解儿童的种族认知具有重要意义。种族本质论者认为,种族具有遗传不变性、有较强的归纳强度和标签具有客观性等特征。但是,基于不同特征的种族本质论的发展存在差异。类属语言、社会文化背景和群体地位,均可能影响儿童种族本质论的发展。这些影响因素提示,可通过减少类属语言的描述和促进民族融合等方式改变儿童的种族本质论。比较儿童对种族本质论的建构与自然世界的建构之间的差异,方便我们探索类别学习跨领域的一致性问题。如何确保种族本质论的发展是适宜的,这需要未来开展一些干预性的研究。     

儿童基于心理本质论的种族认知及其影响因素

心理本质论将类别成员视为由共同的本质所决定,且这些本质对应着一些表面的不可改变的属性。其中,种族本质论就是心理本质论的一种。研究种族本质论的发展对于了解儿童的种族认知具有重要意义。种族本质论者认为,种族具有遗传不变性、有较强的归纳强度和标签具有客观性等特征。但是,基于不同特征的种族本质论的发展存在差异。类属语言、社会文化背景和群体地位,均可能影响儿童种族本质论的发展。这些影响因素提示,可通过减少类属语言的描述和促进民族融合等方式改变儿童的种族本质论。比较儿童对种族本质论的建构与自然世界的建构之间的差异,方便我们探索类别学习跨领域的一致性问题。如何确保种族本质论的发展是适宜的,这需要未来开展一些干预性的研究。     

Structural Essentialism and Determinism

The paper tries to develop Bartels’s modern essentialism as a structural-role theory of identity for spacetime points. I adopt Hoefer’s idea of denying primitive identity for this theory and apply it to GTR and prerelativistic physics to find different versions of essentialism and different definitions of determinism which are coherent with them. I also try to argue that modified essentialism helps us to refute objections raised against essentialism and offers us the best understanding of prerelativistic and relativistic theories.     

Children,Object Value,and Persuasion

We argue that, contrary to standard views of development, children understand the world in terms of hidden, nonobvious structure. We review research showing that early in childhood, items are not understood strictly in terms of the features that present themselves in the immediate “here‐and‐now,” but rather are thought to have a hidden reality. We illustrate with two related but distinct examples: category essentialism, and attention to object history. We discuss the implications of each of these capacities for how children determine object value. Across a broad range of object types (natural and artifactual, real and virtual, durable and consumable), an item is evaluated very differently, depending on inferred qualities and context. In this way, children's early‐emerging conceptual frameworks influence how objects attain both psychological and monetary value, and may have important implications for which messages children find most persuasive.     

民族接触减弱民族本质论：文化认同与文化相似性的中介作用

采用问卷法,以911名少数民族和汉族大学生为被试,探讨了民族接触减弱民族本质论及其机制问题。研究1检验了民族接触与民族本质论、民族交往态度的关系,结果表明,少数民族被试的民族接触与民族本质论存在显著负相关,汉族被试存在负相关但不显著;研究2检验了少数民族被试的本民族文化认同和与汉族文化的相似性感知在民族接触和民族本质论之间的中介作用。结果表明,文化认同和文化相似性完全中介了民族接触和民族本质论之间的负相关。文章认为民族接触可以通过增加民族之间文化相似性感知、降低内群体的文化认同而减弱民族本质论信念。最后讨论了本研究在理论和实践方面的贡献,以及存在的局限性。     

Essentialism goes social: belief in social determinism as a component of psychological essentialism

Individuals tend to explain the characteristics of others with reference to an underlying essence, a tendency that has been termed psychological essentialism. Drawing on current conceptualizations of essentialism as a fundamental mode of social thinking, and on prior studies investigating belief in genetic determinism (BGD) as a component of essentialism, we argue that BGD cannot constitute the sole basis of individuals' essentialist reasoning. Accordingly, we propose belief in social determinism (BSD) as a complementary component of essentialism, which relies on the belief that a person's essential character is shaped by social factors (e.g., upbringing, social background). We developed a scale to measure this social component of essentialism. Results of five correlational studies indicate that (a) BGD and BSD are largely independent, (b) BGD and BSD are related to important correlates of essentialist thinking (e.g., dispositionism, perceived group homogeneity), (c) BGD and BSD are associated with indicators of fundamental epistemic and ideological motives, and (d) the endorsement of each lay theory is associated with vital social-cognitive consequences (particularly stereotyping and prejudice). Two experimental studies examined the idea that the relationship between BSD and prejudice is bidirectional in nature. Study 6 reveals that rendering social-deterministic explanations salient results in increased levels of ingroup favoritism in individuals who chronically endorse BSD. Results of Study 7 show that priming of prejudice enhances endorsement of social-deterministic explanations particularly in persons habitually endorsing prejudiced attitudes.     

How does social essentialism affect the development of inter‐group relations?

Psychological essentialism is a pervasive conceptual bias to view categories as reflecting something deep, stable, and informative about their members. Scholars from diverse disciplines have long theorized that psychological essentialism has negative ramifications for inter‐group relations, yet little previous empirical work has experimentally tested the social implications of essentialist beliefs. Three studies (N = 127, ages 4.5–6) found that experimentally inducing essentialist beliefs about a novel social category led children to share fewer resources with category members, but did not lead to the out‐group dislike that defines social prejudice. These findings indicate that essentialism negatively influences some key components of inter‐group relations, but does not lead directly to the development of prejudice.     

Thomas Kuhn's Misunderstood Relation to Kripke-Putnam Essentialism

Kuhn's ‘taxonomic conception’ of natural kinds enables him to defend and re-specify the notion of incommensurability against the idea that it is reference, not meaning/use, that is overwhelmingly important. Kuhn's ghost still lacks any reason to believe that referentialist essentialism undercuts his central arguments in SSR – and indeed, any reason to believe that such essentialism is even coherent, considered as a doctrine about anything remotely resembling our actual science. The actual relation of Kuhn to Kripke-Putnam essentialism, is as follows: Kuhn decisively undermines it – drawing upon the inadequacies of such essentialism when faced with the failure of attempts to instantiate in history or contemporaneously its ‘thought-experiment’ – and leaves the field open instead for his own more ‘realistic’, deflationary way of thinking about the operation of ‘natural kinds’ in science. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Developmental changes in the understanding of generics

Generic sentences (such as "Birds lay eggs") are important in that they refer to kinds (e.g., birds as a group) rather than individuals (e.g., the birds in the henhouse). The present set of studies examined aspects of how generic nouns are understood by English speakers. Adults and children (4- and 5-year-olds) were presented with scenarios about novel animals and questioned about their properties, using generic and non-generic questions. Three primary findings emerged. First, both children and adults distinguished generic from non-generic reference, interpreting generics as referring to kinds. Thus, under certain contexts children and adults accepted that "Dobles have claws" even when all the dobles in the available context were clawless. Second, adults further distinguished properties that are inborn from those that are acquired. Inborn properties were judged to be predicated of a generic kind, even when all available instances have lost the property, but this was not the case for acquired properties. Third, children did not distinguish inborn from acquired properties. These data suggest the existence of developmental changes in conceptual or semantic understanding, and are interpreted in light of recent theories of psychological essentialism.     

Are apes essentialists? Scope and limits of psychological essentialism in great apes

Human reasoning is characterized by psychological essentialism (Gelman in The essential child: origins of essentialism in everyday thought. Oxford University Press, New York, 2003): when reasoning about objects, we distinguish between deep essential properties defining the object’s kind and identity, and merely superficial features that can be changed without altering the object’s identity. To date, it is unclear whether psychological essentialism is based on the acquisition of linguistic means (such as kind terms) and therefore uniquely human, or whether it is a more fundamental cognitive capacity which might be present also in the absence of language. In the present study, we addressed this question by testing whether, and if so, under which circumstances non-human apes also rely on psychological essentialism to identify objects. For this purpose, we adapted classical verbal transformation scenarios used in research on psychological essentialism (Keil in Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1989) and implemented them in two nonverbal tasks: first, a box task, typically used to test object individuation (Experiment 1), and second, an object choice task, typically used to test object discrimination, object preferences and logical inferences (Experiments 2–4). Taken together, the results of the four experiments suggest that under suitable circumstances (when memory and other task demands are minimized), great apes engage in basic forms of essentialist reasoning. Psychological essentialism is thus possible also in the absence of language.     

The intergenerational transmission of ethnic essentialism: how parents talk counts the most

The present study analyzed the role of parents as potential sources of children's essentialist beliefs about ethnicity. We tested 76 parent–child (5‐year‐olds) dyads of Jewish Israeli parents from three social groups, defined by the kindergartens children attended: national religious, secular, or Jewish‐Arab integrated. We assessed parents' and children's beliefs, and parents' usage of ethnic attitudinal and categorization markers in a book‐reading activity. Overall, national religious parents manifested the strongest ethnic essentialism and endorsement of anti‐negotiations with Palestinians, and were the most likely to express negative attitudes and mark ethnic categories in their conversations with their children. Moreover, regression analyses revealed that ethnic categorization in parents' speech was the most reliable predictor of children's ethnic essentialism. Ethnic essentialism is transmitted to children not via explicit communication of intergroup beliefs or attitudes, but rather via the sheer marking of categories in ways that resonate with children's own intuitive ways of conceptualizing the social world.     

The essentialist aspect of naive theories

Recent work on children's inferences concerning biological and chemical categories has suggested that children (and perhaps adults) are essentialists - a view known as psychological essentialism. I distinguish three varieties of psychological essentialism and investigate the ways in which essentialism explains the inferences for which it is supposed to account. Essentialism succeeds in explaining the inferences, I argue, because it attributes to the child belief in causal laws connecting category membership and the possession of certain characteristic appearances and behavior. This suggests that the data will be equally well explained by a non-essentialist hypothesis that attributes belief in the appropriate causal laws to the child, but makes no claim as to whether or not the child represents essences. I provide several reasons to think that this non-essentialist hypothesis is in fact superior to any version of the essentialist hypothesis.     

Measurement invariance of self-continuity strategies: Comparisons of early adolescents from Brazil,Canada and Colombia

Data from 655 early adolescents from three contexts (Curitiba, Brazil; Montreal, Canada and Barranquilla, Colombia) were used to test for measurement invariance in the constructs of essentialism and narrativism. These two different strategies have been proposed to explain the perceptions of stability of self-continuity over time. Essentialism predicates self-continuity on some fundamental, unchanging aspect of the self. In contrast, narrativism is an understanding of self-continuity as a result of one's cumulative experiences and decisions. Previous research using interview methods have found that these two strategies are mutually exclusive expressions of self-continuity. The current study sought to test this conceptualization using a questionnaire that assessed the underlying structural relation between essentialism and narrativism. The analyses supported a two factor model with measurement invariance across samples allowing for a comparison of mean differences across language and cultural barriers. As a whole, these findings highlight the need to examine developmental changes in warranting strategies for self-continuity.     

Humean nomic essentialism

Humeanism – the idea that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences – and Nomic Essentialism – the idea that properties essentially play the nomic roles that they do – are two of the most important and influential positions in the metaphysics of science. Traditionally, it has been thought that these positions were incompatible competitors. We disagree. We argue that there is an attractive version of Humeanism that captures the idea that, for example, mass essentially plays the role that it actually does in the laws of nature. In this paper we consider the arguments that have lead many to conclude that Humeanism cannot be combined with Nomic Essentialism; we identify the weaknesses in these arguments; and we argue in detail that a version of Humeanism based on a variant of the Best System account of laws captures the key intuitions behind nomic essentialism.     

Books Received

In Questioning Technology, Feenberg accuses Heidegger of an untenable 'technological essentialism'. Feenberg's criticisms are addressed not to technological essentialism as such, but rather to three particular kinds of technological essentialism: ahistoricism, substantivism, and one-dimensionalism. After these three forms of technological essentialism are explicated and Feenberg's reasons for finding them objectionable explained, the question whether Heidegger in fact subscribes to any of them is investigated. The conclusions are, first, that Heidegger's technological essentialism is not at all ahistoricist, but the opposite, an historical conception of the essence of technology which serves as the model for Feenberg's own view. Second, that while Heidegger does indeed advocate a substantivist technological essentialism, he offers a plausible, indirect response to Feenberg's voluntaristic, Marcusean objection. Third, that Heidegger's one-dimensional technological essentialism is of a non-objectionable variety, since it does not force Heidegger to reject technological devices in toto. These conclusions help vindicate Heidegger's ground-breaking ontological approach to the philosophy of technology.     

Précis of How children learn the meanings of words

Normal children learn tens of thousands of words, and do so quickly and efficiently, often in highly impoverished environments. In How Children Learn the Meanings of Words, I argue that word learning is the product of certain cognitive and linguistic abilities that include the ability to acquire concepts, an appreciation of syntactic cues to meaning, and a rich understanding of the mental states of other people. These capacities are powerful, early emerging, and to some extent uniquely human, but they are not special to word learning. This proposal is an alternative to the view that word learning is the result of simple associative learning mechanisms, and it rejects as well the notion that children possess constraints, either innate or learned, that are specifically earmarked for word learning. This theory is extended to account for how children learn names for objects, substances, and abstract entities, pronouns and proper names, verbs, determiners, prepositions, and number words. Several related topics are also discussed, including na?ve essentialism, children's understanding of representational art, the nature of numerical and spatial reasoning, and the role of words in the shaping of mental life.     

Genetic essentialism: on the deceptive determinism of DNA

This article introduces the notion of genetic essentialist biases: cognitive biases associated with essentialist thinking that are elicited when people encounter arguments that genes are relevant for a behavior, condition, or social group. Learning about genetic attributions for various human conditions leads to a particular set of thoughts regarding those conditions: they are more likely to be perceived as (a) immutable and determined, (b) having a specific etiology, (c) homogeneous and discrete, and (d) natural, which can lead to the naturalistic fallacy. There are rare cases of "strong genetic explanation" when such responses to genetic attributions may be appropriate; however, people tend to overweigh genetic attributions compared with competing attributions even in cases of "weak genetic explanation," which are far more common. The authors reviewed research on people's understanding of race, gender, sexual orientation, criminality, mental illness, and obesity through a genetic essentialism lens, highlighting attitudinal, cognitive, and behavioral changes that stem from consideration of genetic attributions as bases of these categories. Scientific and media portrayals of genetic discoveries are discussed with respect to genetic essentialism, as is the role that genetic essentialism has played (and continues to play) in various public policies, legislation, scientific endeavors, and ideological movements in recent history. Last, moderating factors and interventions to reduce the magnitude of genetic essentialism, which identify promising directions to explore in order to reduce these biases, are discussed.     

Artifact and Essence

An essential property is a property that an object possesses in every possible world in which that object exists. An individual essence is a property (or set of properties) that an object possesses in every world in which that object exists, and that no other object possesses in any possible world. Call the claim that some artifacts possess an individual essence ‘artifactual essentialism’. I will argue that artifactual essentialism is true. In doing so, I will be responding to two recent arguments by Penelope Mackie against artifactual essentialism (Mackie (2006), esp. ch. 3.). In “Individual Essence Properties”, I will rehearse the qualifications that any property must meet if it is to constitute an individual essence, and in “Artifacts and the Recycling Problem” and “Artifacts and the Tolerance Problem”, I will rehearse Mackie’s arguments against artifactual essentialism. In “Artifacts and Weak Unshareability?” and “Artifacts and Strong Unshareability?”, I will show why both of these arguments fail. In “Mona Lisa’s Essence”, I will defend the interesting claim that some artifacts possess an individual essence. In the final section I will entertain some objections to my proposal.