Domain familiarity as a cue for judgments of learning

Students differ in how much they already know about topics within and across their courses. Few studies, however, have examined the relationship between participants’ levels of knowledge across topics (i.e., their “domain familiarity”) and their learning of information from those topics, their study choices related to those topics, and their subjective self-assessments of their learning about the topics. As such, in two studies we had participants (Study 1, college students; Study 2, Mturk workers) rank their domain familiarity for several to-be-studied domains (e.g., chemistry, history), rate their efficacy and interest in those domains, study and make judgments of learning (JOLs) for facts from each domain, and finally complete a short-answer test over those facts. Participants’ efficacy and interest ratings for the topics were linearly related to their topic rankings, as were their recall of and JOLs for facts from those domains. Although the JOLs were consistently overconfident, they were more overconfident for better-known than for lesser-known topics. Participants’ study times were not related to their topic rankings (Studies 1 and 2), but participants did use domain familiarity to strategically decide which domains to restudy before the test (Study 2). Participants typically chose to restudy their least-familiar topics, but chose to restudy their best-known topic under extremely limited restudy conditions. As a whole, the results suggest that participants effectively use their domain familiarity as a basis for their JOLs and restudy choices, but to some extent overuse this factor to assess their learning, and underuse it to guide initial study.     

Encoding fluency is a cue used for judgments about learning

The authors used paired-associate learning to investigate the hypothesis that the speed of generating an interactive image (encoding fluency) influenced 2 metacognitive judgments: judgments of learning (JOLs) and quality of encoding ratings (QUEs). Results from Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that latency of a keypress indicating successful image formation was negatively related to both JOLs and QUEs even though latency was unrelated to recall. Experiment 3 demonstrated that when concrete and abstract items were mixed in a single list, latency was related to concreteness, judgments, and recall. However, item concreteness and fluency influenced judgments independently of one another. These outcomes suggest an important role of encoding fluency in the formation of metacognitive judgments about learning and future recall.     

The testing effect as a function of explicit testing instructions and judgments of learning

During study, people monitor their learning; the output of this monitoring is captured in so-called judgments of learning (JOLs). JOLs predict later recall better if they are made after a slight delay, instead of immediately after study (the delayed JOL effect). According to the self-fulfilling prophecy (SFP) hypothesis delayed JOLs are based on covert retrieval attempts from long-term memory, and successful retrieval attempts in themselves enhance learning (the testing effect). We compared memory for 40 Swahili-Swedish paired associates after a week as a function of three different learning conditions, namely study plus (i) explicitly instructed self-testing, (ii) delayed JOLs, or (iii) less self-testing. We showed that repeated delayed JOLs lead to a memory improvement that does not differ significantly from a comparable condition where the participants are explicitly testing memory, and both the latter groups performed reliably better than a group that self-tested less. The results suggest that delayed JOLs improve long-term retention as efficiently as explicit memory testing and lend support to the SFP hypothesis.     

Audience response as a heuristic cue in persuasion

Previous research on the persuasive impact of an overheard audience has yielded conflicting results. In this study, we attempted to understand such audience effects within the framework of the heuristic model of persuasion. Subjects listened to an audiotaped persuasive message that conveyed arguments of either high or low quality and that was responded to by either an enthusiastic or an unenthusiastic overheard audience. In addition, subject involvement (high vs. low) was varied. Consistent with predictions, the audience response cue influenced postmessage opinions only under low involvement; under high involvement, only argument quality affected persuasion. Analyses that took into account subjects' need for cognition supported the additional hypothesis that individuals lower in need for cognition would be more responsive to the audience manipulation under low involvement. Thought-listing data and regression analyses provided further support for the heuristic model.     

The ease-of-processing heuristic and the stability bias: dissociating memory, memory beliefs, and memory judgments

Judgments about memory are essential in promoting knowledge; they help identify trustworthy memories and predict what information will be retained in the future. In the three experiments reported here, we investigated the mechanisms underlying predictions about memory. In Experiments 1 and 2, single words were presented once or multiple times, in large or small type. There was a double dissociation between actual memory and predicted memory: Type size affected predicted but not actual memory, and future study opportunities affected actual memory but scarcely affected predicted memory. The results of Experiment 3 suggest that beliefs and judgments are largely independent, and neither consistently resembles actual memory. Participants' underestimation of future learning-a stability bias-stemmed from an overreliance on their current memory state in making predictions about future memory states. The overreliance on type size highlights the fundamental importance of the ease-of-processing heuristic: Information that is easy to process is judged to have been learned well.     

Importance of the kind of cue for judgments of learning (JOL) and the delayed-JOL effect

The delayed-JOL effect is the finding in which judgments of learning (JOLs) are more accurate at predicting eventual recall when they are made a short time after study rather than immediately after study. The present research replicated this effect and found that the kind of cue that is used for JOLs is critical. In particular, following the study of stimulus-response paired associates, there is an extremely robust delayed-JOL effect when the cue for JOLs is the stimulus alone (every one of 45 subjects showed the effect); however, there is little, if any, delayed-JOL effect when the cue for JOLs is the stimulus-response pair. This finding has important implications for education: To have the greatest accuracy at predicting eventual recall, a person should make JOLs not immediately after study but, instead, shortly after study (i.e., delayed JOLs) with the cue for JOLs being the stimulus alone. The theoretical mechanisms for the delayed-JOL effect are currently unknown, but some speculations are offered.     

Disturbance cues function as a background risk cue but not as an associative learning cue in tadpoles

Animal Cognition - Chemical information has an important role in the sensory ecology of aquatic species. For aquatic prey, chemical cues are a vital source of information related to predator...     

The memorizing effort heuristic in judgments of learning: A developmental perspective

Recent work on adult metacognition indicates that although metacognitive monitoring often guides control operations, sometimes it follows control operations and is based on the feedback from them. Consistent with this view, in self-paced learning, judgments of learning (JOLs) made at the end of each study trial decreased with the amount of time spent studying the item, suggesting that JOLs are based on the memorizing effort heuristic that easily learned items are more likely to be remembered. Study 1 extended investigation to primary school children. Whereas for third to sixth graders (9- to 12-year-olds) JOLs decreased with increasing study time (ST), no such relationship was found for first and second graders (7- and 8-year-olds). For both age groups, however, recall decreased with ST, supporting the validity of the memorizing effort heuristic. Self-reports (Study 2) disclosed the belief that recall should tend to increase with ST. The results bring to the fore the importance of mnemonic cues that shape metacognitive feelings even among primary school children. These cues lie in the very feedback that learners gain on-line from task performance rather than in metacognitive knowledge, and their use may also contribute to increased monitoring accuracy with age.     

Delaying judgments of learning affects memory,not metamemory

Judgments of learning (JOLs) for cue-target word pairs correlate particularly well with later target recall when made under conditions that permit delayed attempts to retrieve the targets--the delayed-JOL effect. Metamemory theories claim that memory monitoring improves under these conditions. However, another theory--the memory hypothesis--claims that the correlation increases because retrieved items receive a boost in recall from spaced study and are assigned high JOLs, whereas unretrieved items receive no spaced study and, therefore, no boost in recall and, consequently, are assigned low JOLs. When we eliminated differences in spaced study by reexposing word pairs following their JOLs, the delayed-JOL effect disappeared, supporting the memory hypothesis.     

Congruity influences memory and judgments of learning during survival processing

A recent line of research has suggested that memory systems evolved to encode fitness-relevant information more effectively than other types of information—a phenomenon known as the “survival processing effect” (Nairne, Thompson, & Pandeirada Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 33:263–273, 2007). However, the basis for the effect has been debated. In addition, it is unknown whether or not individuals will adjust their judgments of learning (JOLs) to reflect the survival processing effect. In three experiments, participants rated 16 words for their relevance to a survival scenario and another 16 words for their relevance to a bank robbery scenario. In Experiment 1A (with no JOLs), the survival processing effect emerged; in Experiment 1B (with JOLs), no survival processing effect emerged, but JOLs were higher in the survival condition. In both cases, these findings were confounded by higher relevance ratings in the survival condition. In Experiment 2, relevance was manipulated within each list, and the survival processing effect was eliminated. Instead, both recall and JOL magnitude were related to level of congruity between the words and type of processing. Together, these results provide further evidence for the role of congruity in the survival processing effect and JOLs.     

The proportion heuristic: problem set size as a basis for performance judgments

How do people evaluate their degree of mastery over a task? A series of four studies demonstrated that a potentially irrelevant cue can have a strong influence on such evaluations. In these studies, the total amount of work given to participants (the problem set size) influenced both (a) the amount of work participants completed before feeling that they had performed well and were adequately prepared for a related future task, and (b) participants' assessments of their performance and their feelings of preparedness for a related future task. These effects occurred even when a randomization procedure was used to emphasize the arbitrary nature of the problem set size. The effects vanished, however, when participants were given extra time to evaluate their progress after completing each problem. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A model for stochastic drift in memory strength to account for judgments of learning

Previous research has shown that judgments of learning (JOLs) made immediately after encoding have a low correlation with actual cued-recall performance, whereas the correlation is high for delayed judgments. In this article, the authors propose a formal theory describing the stochastic drift of memory strength over the retention interval to account for the delayed-JOL effect. This is done by first decomposing the aggregated memory strength into exponential functions with slow and fast memory traces. The mean aggregated memory strength shows power-function forgetting curves. The drift of the memory strength is large for immediate JOLs (causing a low predictability) and weak for delayed JOLs (causing a high predictability). Consistent with empirical data, the model makes a novel prediction of JOL asymmetry, or that immediate weak JOLs are more predictive of future performance than are immediate strong JOLs. The JOL distributions for immediate and delayed JOLs are also accounted for.     

Use of the familiarity difference cue in inferential judgments

The familiarity difference cue has been regarded as a general cue for making inferential judgments (Honda, Abe, Matsuks, & Yamagishi in Memory and Cognition, 39(5), 851–863, 2011; Schwikert & Curran in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(6), 2341–2365, 2014). The current study tests a model of inference based on familiarity differences that encompasses the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, Goldstein & Gigerenzer in Psychological Review, 109(1), 75–90, 2002). In two studies, using a large pool of stimuli, participants rated their familiarity of cities and made choices on a typical city-size task. The data were fitted with the r-s model (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl in, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 37(4), 827–839, 2011), which was adapted to include familiarity differences. The results indicated that people used the familiarity difference cue because the participants ignored further knowledge in a substantial number of cases when the familiarity difference cue was available. An analysis of reaction-time data further indicated that the response times were shorter for heuristic judgments than for knowledge-only-based judgments. Furthermore, when knowledge was available, the response times were shorter when knowledge was congruent with a heuristic cue than when it was in conflict with it. Differences between the familiarity difference cue and the fluency heuristic (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005, Psychological Review, 112, 610–628) are discussed.     

Age-related schema reliance of judgments of learning in predicting source memory

Source memory refers to mental processes of encoding and making attributions to the origin of information. We investigated schematic effects on source attributions of younger and older adults for different schema-based types of items, and their schema-utilization of judgments of learning (JOLs) in estimating source memory. Participants studied statements presented by two speakers either as a doctor or a lawyer: those in the schema-after-encoding condition were informed their occupation only before retrieving, while those of schema-before-encoding were presented the schematic information prior to study. Immediately after learning every item, they made judgments of the likelihood for it to be correctly attributed to the original source later. In the test, they fulfilled a task of source attributing. The results showed a two-edged effect of schemas: schema reliance improved source memory for schema-consistent items while impaired that for schema-inconsistent items, even with schematic information presented prior to encoding. Compared with younger adults, older adults benefited more from schema-based compensatory mechanisms. Both younger and older adults could make JOLs based on before-encoding schematic information, and the schema-based JOLs were more accurate in predicting source memory than JOLs made without schema support. However, even in the schema-after-encoding condition, older adults were able to make metacognitive judgments as accurately as younger adults did, though they did have great impairments in source memory itself.     

Predicting memory benefits in the production effect: the use and misuse of self-generated distinctive cues when making judgments of learning

The production effect occurs when reading a word aloud leads to better memory for the item, relative to words that are read silently. In the present study, we assessed the degree to which judgments of learning (JOLs) are sensitive to the production effect, to determine whether people are aware of how distinctive cues can enhance memory. If the act of saying a word aloud is used as a cue for later memorability, then JOLs should be sensitive to production. Experiment 1 demonstrated that this was the case, as participants provided higher JOLs for produced items than for those read silently. This pattern of JOLs was also evident when participants silently mouthed words (Exp. 2). In Experiment 3, participants instead made a nonunique response as the production component (saying “yes” instead of the word itself). JOLs were still higher under production, although memory performance did not differ from that in a silent condition. The results suggest that the presence of both specific and nonspecific self-generated cues is used to make metacognitive judgments, likely due to the high accessibility of this information, but that participants are not precisely aware of how distinctiveness enhances encoding and retrieval. Such findings have implications for how distinctiveness is perceived by learners and for what cues would appropriately be incorporated when predicting future memory performance.     

Memory accessibility and probability judgments: an experimental evaluation of the availability heuristic.

Consistent with Tversky and Kahneman's (1973, 1974) availability heuristic hypothesis, the current study found a negative correlation between recall latency for past events and the perceived future probability of similar events. Furthermore, when the relative accessibility of memories of positive and negative events was experimentally manipulated using the Velten mood-induction procedure, the perceived future probabilities of similar events also changed in a manner consistent with the availability heuristic account. Reductions in recall latencies resulting from the mood manipulations were, as predicted, related to increases in perceived probability, and vice versa. Partial correlations indicated that this association between the observed patterns of changes in recall latencies and probability judgments could not be accounted for by the existence of independent associations between each of these effects and the magnitude of mood change.     

The proximity heuristic in judgments of accident probabilities

In daily life, probabilities are often assessed informally through the perceived distance to a target event. Accident probabilities are believed to be high when a disastrous outcome appears to be close. This proximity heuristic can lead to exaggerated p(death) estimates in risky situations (Experiment 2), and sometimes higher probabilities for death after near‐accidents than after actual accidents (Experiment 3 and 4). Near‐accidents are also believed to be equally good, or better, predictors of future disasters than actual accidents, despite being less serious and more frequent (Experiment 5). The proximity heuristic influences the way people talk about their own and other people's chances (Experiment 1), and how they prepare to avoid (or, if necessary, to produce) a disastrous outcome (Experiment 6).     

Skill learning in the elderly: diminished implicit and explicit memory for a motor sequence.

Explicit and implicit memory for a cognitive-motor sequence was studied in elderly and young adults. Implicit memory was examined in a serial reaction-time paradigm in which sequences of hand postures repeated cyclically, then shifted to random sequences. Two control groups received random sequences throughout. Movement times (MTs) across the first 4 blocks did not improve more in the elderly-repeated than in the elderly-random group. In contrast, the young-repeated group showed greater improvement in MT across these blocks than the young-random group. MT was less affected in the elderly than in the young by shifts between repeated and random sequences, indicating impaired implicit memory. Explicit memory, which was assessed by free recall and cued recall, also was impaired in the elderly. Diminished implicit memory in the elderly could not be explained solely by the possible intrusion of conscious recollection strategies.     

Schematic knowledge changes what judgments of learning predict in a source memory task

Source monitoring can be influenced by information that is external to the study context, such as beliefs and general knowledge (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). We investigated the extent to which metamnemonic judgments predict memory for items and sources when schematic information about the sources is or is not provided at encoding. Participants made judgments of learning (JOLs) to statements presented by two speakers and were informed of the occupation of each speaker either before or after the encoding session. Replicating earlier work, prior knowledge decreased participants’ tendency to erroneously attribute statements to schematically consistent but episodically incorrect speakers. The origin of this effect can be understood by examining the relationship between JOLs and performance: JOLs were equally predictive of item and source memory in the absence of prior knowledge, but were exclusively predictive of source memory when participants knew of the relationship between speakers and statements during study. Background knowledge determines the information that people solicit in service of metamnemonic judgments, suggesting that these judgments reflect control processes during encoding that reduce schematic errors.