The depoliticization of Karl Lashley: A response to Dewsbury

In this response to Donald Dewsbury's article, I address Dewsbury's criticisms of my interpretation of Karl Lashley by, first, disputing Dewsbury's characterization of my historiographic stance. I then go on to address Dewsbury's specific points, particularly regarding Lashley's racism and hereditarianism, which I argue are central to an understanding of the context of his science. I conclude by criticizing Dewsbury's proposed personality theory of Lashley on the grounds that it depoliticizes Lashley by psychologizing him.     

Lashley's shift from bacteriology to neuropsychology, 1910-1917, and the influence of Jennings, Watson, and Franz

From 1910 to 1917, Karl S. Lashley's research moved from bacteriology to neuropsychology through intermediate stages of zoology, comparative psychology, and the psychology of learning. This shift is examined with particular reference to Lashley's associations with John B. Watson, Shepherd I. Franz, and Herbert S. Jennings. Watson's impact was substantial, for he attracted Lashley to comparative psychology and was the source of many of his later research interests. The bridge to neuropsychological research was provided by Franz who trained Lashley in the lesion method of investigating the brain bases of learning. The influence of Jennings, Lashley's Ph.D. supervisor, was most evident in the divergence of the post-1915 interests of Lashley and Watson. Lashley's search for brain mechanisms of learning, as contrasted with Watson's concern with behavioral prediction and control, mirrored a similar earlier difference between Jennings and Jacques Loeb.     

Justification,Attachments and Regret

Abstract: In The View From Here, Jay Wallace emphasises that an agent's capacity to regret a past decision is conditioned by the attachments that she may have developed as a result. Those attachments shape the point of view from which she retrospectively deliberates. Wallace stresses, however, that not every normative aspect of her decision is affected by this change in perspective, because her decision will remain as unjustified as it was in the past. I will argue, however, that this approach to justification is inconsistent with the normative import that Wallace ascribes to the actual dynamics of our attachments in his defence of the rationale of regret. If I am right, Wallace's approach is caught in the following dilemma: Either he renounces a nonperspectival approach to justification or he revises his view about the normative import of the actual dynamics of our attachments.     

THE SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER OF PHILIP HEFNER'S “CREATED CO‐CREATOR”

Philip Hefner's understanding of humans as “created co‐creators” has played a key role in the science and religion field, particularly as scholars consider the implications of emerging technologies for the human future. Hefner articulates his “created co‐creator” framework in the form of scientifically testable hypotheses supporting his core understanding of human nature, adopting the structure of Imre Lakatos's scientific research programme. This article provides a brief exposition of Hefner's model, examines his hypotheses in order to assess their scientific character, and evaluates them against the relevant findings of contemporary science. While Hefner's model is largely commensurate with contemporary science, he at times makes claims that cannot be scientifically falsified or corroborated. Hefner's accomplishments in demonstrating the scientific compatibility of many theological notions is admirable; however, his overall position would be strengthened with a more tacit acknowledgment of the limitations of scientific knowledge. His anthropology draws also from extrascientific commitments and is all the richer for it.     

The role of evidence in interpretations of the scientific work of Karl Lashley

I discuss some of the issues underlying the different perspectives of Nadine Weidman and myself on the scientific oeuvre of Karl Lashley. I emphasize that our disagreements concern the kind of evidence needed to support specific claims more than any differences in our models of science. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Explanation and the Hard Problem

This paper argues that the form of explanation at issue in the hard problem of consciousness is scientifically irrelevant, despite appearances to the contrary. In particular, it is argued that the ‘sense of understanding’ that plays a critical role in the form of explanation implicated in the hard problem provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on satisfactory scientific explanation. Considerations of the actual tools and methods available to scientists are used to make the case against it being a necessary condition, and work by J.D. Trout that exploits psychological research on the hindsight and overconfidence biases is used to show that it is not a sufficient condition. It is argued, however, that certain intellectual and moral concerns give us good reason to still try to meet the hard problem’s explanatory challenge, despite its extrascientific nature.     

Personality Measurement in Cross-Cultural Perspective

I first provide an overview of general issues in personality measurement across cultures (e.g., measurement bias and equivalence, levels of test adaptation or indigenization). Then, in keeping with the organization of this special issue, I discuss personality measurement from alternative theoretical perspectives that have addressed, in varying degrees, personality and its measurement in cross-cultural perspective (i.e., trait perspectives, projective techniques, cultural psychology and constructivist perspectives, evolutionary perspectives). An integrated measurement approach is advocated, incorporating diverse aspects or levels of personality, while drawing on the complementary strengths of alternative approaches.     

Personality and psychopathology: working toward the bigger picture

There are systematic and meaningful links among normal and abnormal personality traits and Axis I and II constructs from the DSM. Nevertheless, much research in this area focuses on pairs of constructs (e.g., the link between personality traits and a specific Axis I disorder), rather than on the broader multivariate structure of the personality-psychopathology domain. We underscore the need for this broader perspective, a perspective that would transcend largely artificial boundaries between current constructs (e.g., normal and abnormal personality). We outline our approach to research from this perspective and we emphasize the internalizing (mood and anxiety) and externalizing (substance use and antisocial behavior) spectra as promising foci for initial research on the joint structure of personality and psychopathology.     

The validity and appropriateness of methods, analyses, and conclusions in Rind et al. (1998): A rebuttal of victimological critique from Ondersma et al. (2001) and Dallam et al. (2001).

The authors respond to 2 victimological critiques of their 1998 meta-analysis on child sexual abuse (CSA). S. J. Dallam et al. (2001) claimed that B. Rind, P. Tromovitch, and R. Bauserman (1998) committed numerous methodological and statistical errors, and often miscoded and misinterpreted data. The authors show all these claims to be invalid. To the contrary, they demonstrate frequent bias in Dallam et al.'s criticisms. S. J. Ondersma et al. (2001) claimed that Rind et al.'s study is part of a backlash against psychotherapists, that its suggestions regarding CSA definitions were extrascientific, and that the moral standard is needed to understand CSA scientifically. The authors show their suggestions to have been scientific and argue that it is Ondersma et al.'s issue-framing and moral standard that are extrascientific. This reply supports the original methods, analyses, recommendations, and conclusions of Rind et al.     

Reflections of an eclectic skeptic

Following primary and secondary education in Europe, I came to the United States for further education. After majoring in engineering, I shifted to liberal arts and social sciences. I minored in mathematics, philosophy, and education at the undergraduate level and physiology at the graduate level, ultimately obtaining a PhD in personality psychology. My interests were primarily academic, but I did not neglect the emerging field of clinical psychology. After working in hospitals for 9 years, I joined the faculty of Michigan State University where I established the psychological clinic and served as its director for 13 years. Subsequently, during 2 sabbaticals in Israel, I researched personality development in unconventional family settings (the kibbutz). I also studied such diverse issues as motivation for parenthood, time perception and time perspective, and cognition in psychopathology. After editing several textbooks on assessment techniques, I initiated the series of triennial Murray lectures that highlighted the dynamic approach to the study of personality.     

Cultural Complexities and Scientific Development

Methodological issues in psychology consist of a key aspect for the scientific development of the discipline. In this paper I elaborate on the reasons why I partially agree with Toomela's ideas, and why I also disagree with some of his arguments. The convergence refers to the need for a radical change concerning the widespread use of methodologies that has been typical of mainstream psychology, which still flavors too positivist and pseudo-quantitative, overlooking the central relevance of theory for scientific development. The divergence resides in Toomela's insistence to oppose what he designates as "the North American" to "the German-Austrian" scientific thinking: from my perspective, the misuse of cultural categories can only lead to misguided and unconstructive dichotomies that entails a naive concept of culture, and do not contribute to scientific development. From a contemporary systemic approach, complex issues deserve more sophisticated analysis.     

Iconic Representations and Representative Practices

I develop an account of scientific representations building on Charles S. Peirce's rich, and still underexplored, notion of iconicity. Iconic representations occupy a central place in Peirce's philosophy, in his innovative approach to logic and in his practice as a scientist. Starting from a discussion of Peirce's approach to diagrams, I claim that Peirce's own representations are in line with his formulation of iconicity, and that they are more broadly connected to the pragmatist philosophy he developed in parallel with his scientific work. I then defend the contemporary relevance of Peirce's approach to iconic representations, and specifically argue that Peirce offers a useful ‘third way’ between what Mauricio Suárez has recently described as the ‘analytical’ and ‘practical’ inquiries into the concept of representation. As a philosophically minded scientist and an experimentally inclined philosopher, Peirce never divorced the practice of representing from questions about what counts as a representation. I claim that his account of iconic representations shows that it is the very process of representing, construed as a practice which is coextensive with observing and experimenting, that casts light on the nature of representative relations.     

Personality and Health in the 1980s: Psychosomatic Medicine Revisited?

This special issue is a sign of a resurgence of interest in the role of personality in health not seen since the 1940s and early 1950s when the promises of the psychosomatic approach to health and illness appeared to be the greatest. This new look at personality and health represented by contributions to this special issue attempts to address the limitations of earlier work in psychosomatic medicine by making more explicit efforts to define personality variables precisely, to distinguish these variables from conceptually related psychological constructs, and to embed them in a body of theory and empirical research. This new work also attempts to remedy methodological limitations of earlier work by placing greater emphasis on prospective research and highlighting distinctions between symptom reports, illness behavior, and actual illness. However, the new work and earlier work in psychosomatic medicine share certain working assumptions, for example, a primary emphasis on the relatively direct impact of personality on disease onset, an assumption that personality variables operate in interaction with stressful events, and a frequent emphasis on general susceptibility to disease. Moreover, this new work frequently risks the same methodological pitfalls that limited scientific progress in psychosomatic medicine. We argue that the rapid rise and decline of psychosomatic medicine is most likely to be repeated in research on personality and health in the 1980s if reasonable criteria for considering personality variables a risk factor for disease are not precisely defined, disease endpoints (the dependent variable) are not assessed precisely, personality variables of interest (the independent variable) are not empirically distinguished from other related psychological variables, and complex relationships among risk factors are not taken into account. It is emphasized that models drawn from personality research cannot be transferred unchanged to the health arena without risking false inferences about the role of personality in health.     

The person as co-investigator in personality research

In this paper, arguments are presented for considering the subject as co-investigator in personality research. A review of current research methods suggests that personality psychology is well on its way to recognizing the individual as an expert on his or her own self and situation. This means that the subject should also be allowed to take a much more active role in psychological research. It is argued that the ideal methodology for accomplishing this integration of the individual into psychological research is to establish a dialogue between psychologist and subject, allowing each to contribute to the scientific process from his or her own perspective and on the basis of his or her own expertise. The present approach calls for greater emphasis on the organization and coherence of personality as a system, greater openness and sensitivity to the particular world of the individual, and an even more dynamic conception of individuality than is currently found in our field. An important implication of the open system approach advocated in this article, the reduced role of prediction in personality research, is discussed and, finally, a preliminary list of expected gains and losses is presented.     

How social was personality? The Allports' "connection" of social and personality psychology

This paper investigates three conflicting reconstructions of the historical relationship between personality and social psychology and addresses questions they raise regarding the subdisciplinary status of personality in the 1920s and the way in which the field gradually emerged as a separate area of psychology. Contesting claims that Floyd Allport first connected social psychology to a separate "branch" of personality psychology in the 1920s, I argue that he drew upon earlier work of psychologists and sociologists who treated personality as a central topic of social psychology. I compare Floyd Allport's views with those of Gordon Allport, who endeavored to establish personality as a separate subdiscipline.     

Building on Wachtel’s Points About Implications of Mitchell’s Ideas: Suggestions Based on the Participatory Philosophical Perspective for Locating the Person in the World of Practical Activities

In his paper “The Relationality of Everyday Life,” Wachtel (this issue) successfully moves us further along the path of the “unfinished journey” (p. 509) of Mitchell’s work. I begin my comments by pointing out how Wachtel identifies the importance for both theory and practice of focusing on everyday life in addition to early parent–child interactions and what transpires in psychoanalytic/psychotherapy sessions. His points about everyday life include rejecting one-person notions of internal processes that are “frozen” in time and offering a way to understand the vicious circles that are a prominent part of most clinical problems. My comments also include suggestions about how we can take another step along the path Wachtel has encouraged us to pursue—which he aptly describes as treating the person as a “self-in-context” (p. 507)—if we approach basic issues about the person’s relationship to others and the world at large along the lines of the participatory philosophical perspective (e.g., Westerman, 2005, 2013, 2014; Westerman & Steen, 2007). That perspective takes as its cornerstone idea the view that from the outset the person is a participant in practical activities. Guided by the participatory perspective, I add to Wachtel’s suggestions about how a focus on everyday life can enter into therapeutic work; present a different view of what are typically called “inner” processes and discuss some of the implications of that view for clinical work; and, most important, put forward an alternative account of vicious circles.     

Development of the Multi-Trait Personality Inventory (MTPI): comparison among four Chinese populations.

Anemic approach was adopted to develop a culture-specific instrument for the assessment of Chinese personality. The Multi-Trial Personality Inventory (MTPI) was administered to 1,673 men and 944 women in four major Chinese populations. It was found that Chinese in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States possess some common traits deeply rooted in the Chinese culture characterized by Confucian thoughts (e.g., self-discipline and moderation) and some additional traits nurtured by their respective environments. Consequently, findings of this study lent support to the hypothesis that, in spite of superficial discontinuities, there are basic continuities in the personality traits of mainland and overseas Chinese. The cross-cultural differences in personality were examined from a political-social perspective and also explained with a cultural-ecological model. In the development of the MTPI, a new methodology that relies on forming factor-consistent clusters was employed to deal successfully with the problem of complex factor space.     

Quel type d'approche scientifique pour la description de la personnalité ?

The purpose of the introduction to the special issue “scientific approaches of personality: challenges and controversies” is to present three different approaches to the scientific study of personality and personality judgment: the factorial approach, psychosocial approach, personality assessment at the level of the individual. The theoretical foundations of each field are exposed in the first part of the introduction. In the second part, we present the articles that compose this special issue.     

Development of the Multi-Trait Personality Inventory (MTPI): Comparison Among Four Chinese Populations

An emic approach was adopted to develop a culture-specific instrument for the assessment of Chinese personality. The Multi-Trait Personality Inventory (MTPI) was administered to 1,673 men and 944 women in four major Chinese populations. It was found that Chinese m mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States possess some common traits deeply rooted in the Chinese culture characterized by Confucian thoughts (e.g., self-discipline and moderation) and some additional traits nurtured by their respective environments. Consequently, findings of this study lent support to the hypothesis that, in spite of superficial discontinuities, there are basic continuities in the personality traits of mainland and overseas Chinese. The cross-cultural differences in personality were examined from a political-social perspective and also explained with a cultural-ecological model. In the development of the MTPI, a new methodology that relies on forming factor-consistent clusters was employed to deal successfully with the problem of complex factor space.     

Studies in intuitive personology from an idiothetic point of view: Implications for personality theory

Following Lamiell's (1981) critique of the individual differences approach to the scientific study of personality, questions have arisen concerning (a) the nature of the empirical research to which the “idiotheric” framework he proposed as an alternative has thus far led, and (b) the wider theoretical implications of that research. The present article seeks to address these questions within the medium of research on the nature of the reasoning process by which lay persons formulate and express subjective personality impressions. It is argued that the findings of this research offer strong empirical support for a conception of the intuitive personologist as a dialectician. Among other things, the discussion of these findings focuses on their implications for a humanistic conception of the relation between cognition and behavior, and thus of personality more broadly defined.