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1.
The paper explicates a politicized conception of reality with the help of Michel Foucault’s critical project. I contend that
Foucault’s genealogies of power problematize the relationship between ontology and politics. His idea of productive power
incorporates a radical, ontological claim about the nature of reality: Reality as we know it is the result of social practices
and struggles over truth and objectivity. Rather than translating the true ontology into the right politics, he reverses the
argument. The radicality of his method lies in showing how the ontological order of things is in itself the outcome of a political
struggle: Ontology is politics that has forgotten itself. I argue that Foucault’s thought accomplishes the politicization
of ontology with two key theoretical moves. The first is the contestation and provocation of all given and necessary ontological
foundations. He affirms the ontological view that there is a discontinuity between reality and all ontological schemas that
order it, and a subsequent indeterminacy of reason in establishing ultimate truths or foundations. After this initial step
whereby ontology is denaturalized—made arbitrary or at least historically contingent—the way is open for explanations that
treat the alternative and competing ontological frameworks as resulting from historical, linguistic and social practices of
power. The second key move is thus the exposure of power relations and their constitutive role in our conception of reality.
I conclude by considering the implications of Foucault’s politicization of ontology for our understanding of politics. 相似文献
2.
Contrary to Karl Leonhard Reinhold's theoretical critique of Kant's philosophy, his practical critique has been almost unknown. In my paper, I shall reconstruct Reinhold's practical philosophy after Kant. I will concentrate on the so‐called Reinhold's dilemma, which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of immoral actions in Kant. Also, I shall explain how Reinhold tried to escape this dilemma by introducing a new action theory and by sharply distinguishing between reason and will. Finally, I shall evaluate Reinhold's practical significance by relating his conception of individual freedom to recent theories of volitional self‐determination. 相似文献
3.
This article discusses the question whether or not Cassirer’s philosophical critique of technological use of myth in The Myth of the State implies a revision of his earlier conception and theory of myth as provided by The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. In the first part, Cassirer’s early theory of myth is compared with other approaches of his time. It is claimed that Cassirer’s
early approach to myth has to be understood in terms of a transcendental philosophical approach. In consequence, myth is conceived
as a form of cultural consciousness which is constituted by specific symbolic processes. In the second part, the theoretical
assumptions underlying Cassirer’s criticism of myth are discussed and compared with his earlier theory. It is argued that
there is a strong conceptual and theoretical continuity between Cassirer’s early views on myth as a symbolic form and his
later critique of technological use of myth. 相似文献
4.
Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge
requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt
the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral
constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as
sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception
of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a
protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness
of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics. 相似文献
5.
This article focuses on Michel Foucault’s concepts of authorship and power. Jacques Derrida has often been accused of being
more of a literary author than a philosopher or political theorist. Richard Rorty complains that Derrida’s views on politics
are not pragmatic enough; he sees Derrida’s later work, including his political work, more as a “private self-fashioning”
than concrete political thinking aimed at devising short-term solutions to problems here and now. Employing Foucault’s work
around authorship and the origins of power, I show that Derrida is indeed fashioning himself. This self-fashioning is not
merely private or fanciful. Rather, I argue that Derrida can be read as employing what Foucault would call “technologies of
the self” to not only show the play of possibility and impossibility at work in all politics and thought, but also to use
his savoir to create two important and potentially constructive power structures. First, there is the power of deconstruction itself
as a “militant critique” that calls for a forceful and irreducible justice. Second, there is the power of Derrida himself,
understood as leaving behind a legacy of himself as the “originator” of deconstruction and as a public intellectual.
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6.
This article aims at showing that in spite of Michel Foucault’s violent rejection of phenomenology, this discipline never
ceased to bear a crucial significance for his archaeological and genealogical analyses, in that it can be construed as a symptom
indicating the most serious challenge that the contemporary philosophy has to meet: thinking together Experience and Knowledge.
The author intends to prove, by resorting to the Marxian concept of ‘objectively necessary appearance’, that Foucault’s main
opposition to phenomenology stems from his original conception of the theory as a sort of experiment made by the philosopher
on himself and on his own historical a priori.
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7.
This article critically examines some of the theological and Neo-Orthodox readings of Foucault. An exploration of some key
texts reveals limitations in, e.g., Milbank’s account, and is developed further through an examination of Sharon Welch’s discussion
of feminist liberation theology. A deeper engagement with Foucault’s work emerges, clarifying issues of power, disclosure,
truth and ‘agonism’. The paper proposes that Foucault’s work is not an expression of ‘nihilism’ but rather is important for
the self-critique and integrity of theology. 相似文献
8.
In his later writings on ethics Foucault argues that rapport à soi – the relationship to oneself – is what gives meaning to
our commitment to ‘moral behaviour’. In the absence of rapport à soi, Foucault believes, ethical adherence collapses into
obedience to rules (‘an authoritarian structure’). I make a case, in broadly Levinasian terms, for saying that the call of
‘the other’ is fundamental to ethics. This prompts the question whether rapport à soi fashions an ethical subject who is unduly
self-concerned. Here we confront two apparently irreconcilable pictures of the source of moral demands. I describe one way
of trying to reconcile them from a Foucaultian perspective, and I note the limitations in the attempt. I also try to clear
away what I think to be a misunderstanding on Foucault’s part about what is at stake in the choice between these pictures.
To clarify my critique of Foucault, I also relate it to a similar recent critique of virtue ethics by Thomas Hurka.
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9.
This paper argues that Michel Foucault explicitly rejected the model of critique by which he is often understood—by both his
defenders and detractors. Rather than justifying norms that could be said to represent “the people;” judging institutions,
norms, and practices accordingly; and creating programs for others to enact, he theorized and practiced an experimental social
criticism in which specific intellectuals help people work through “intolerable” situations by multiplying the ways they can
think about and act upon them. As Foucault’s work with the prisons in France shows, one way intellectuals can be part of the
experimental transformations social bodies carry out upon themselves is through genealogical work describing the ways problems
have come to be identified—and can thus be transformed. This account of criticism undercuts the problem of justifying a standpoint
of critique that has plagued philosophers and suggests a few concrete means of better aligning theory and practice. 相似文献
10.
本文试图从康德Transzendental概念的三处基本定义,即"导论定义"、"系统定义"与"界限定义"的分析和梳理出发,将之分别解释为对康德Transzendental philosophie的起点、进程与界限的表述,并将后康德哲学的三个主要发展和"传承",即德国观念论、新康德主义与超越论现象学对康德transzendental概念的解释,视为主要是在这三个方向上的创造性批判、发掘和拓展延伸。在这一新的解释框架下,作者强调,理解现象学哲学的康德批判的关键就不仅在于施行或者限制在某种经验认知客体和绝对主体之间的"返转"或超越,而是在更高层次上来说明这样的"返转"或"超越"活动本身是如何可能和发生的。借助这一澄清,论文最后对康德transzendental概念在汉语语境中历时已久的译名之争提出看法。 相似文献
11.
In this essay I seek to show that a philosophy of modesty informs core aspects of both Nietzsche’s critique of morality and
what he intends to replace morality with, namely, an ethics of self-cultivation. To demonstrate this I focus on Dawn: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, a largely neglected text in his corpus where Nietzsche carries out a quite wide-ranging critique of morality, including
Mitleid. It is one of Nietzsche’s most experimental works and is best read, I claim, as an Epicurean-inspired critique of the present
and an exercise in moral therapy. In the opening sections I draw attention to the wider social dimension of the text and its
concern with a morality of compassion, which is rarely done in the literature. I then turn to highlighting Nietzsche’s “Epicurean
moment,” followed by two sections on Nietzsche on the self in which I aim to bring to light his ethics of self-cultivation
and show in what ways his revaluation makes central to ethics a modest egoism and care of self. In the conclusion to the essay
I provide a contrast between Nietzsche and Kant and deal with reservations readers might have about his ethics. Overall, the
essay seeks to make a contribution to an appreciation of Dawn as a work of moral therapy. 相似文献
12.
This paper explores the significance of authority for Kant’s understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation.
Beginning with the separation of the faculties of Theology and Philosophy in Conflict, it will be shown that Kant sees a clear distinction between the authority of reason and that of revelation. However, when
one turns to Religion, it is also clear that Kant sees an important, perhaps necessary, relationship between the two. Drawing on a variety of texts,
in particular those concerning the public and private use of reason, this paper then explores the relationship between the
authority of reason and that of revelation. From this discussion, several conclusions will be drawn regarding Kant’s understanding
of the relationship between reason and revelation, namely that while distinct, the two are not necessarily in conflict and
that, ultimately, the proper functioning of public reason must include some reference to revelation. 相似文献
13.
Abstract: In this paper I argue that Adorno's metacritique of freedom in Negative Dialectics and related texts remains fruitful today. I begin with some background on Adorno's conception of ‘metacritique’ and on Kant's conception of freedom, as I understand it. Next, I discuss Adorno's analysis of the experiential content of Kantian freedom, according to which Kant has reified the particular social experience of the early modern bourgeoisie in his conception of unconditioned freedom. Adorno argues against this conception of freedom and suggests that freedom is always conditioned by our embodiment and by our social and historical situation. Finally, I turn to Adorno's criticism of Kant's discussion of freedom and determinism in the Critique of Pure Reason and argue that while his philosophical argument against Kant fails, his metacritical argument remains suggestive. Scepticism about freedom arises when the standpoint of theoretical reason encroaches upon the standpoint of practical reason and assimilates persons to things. 相似文献
15.
Kant typically is not identified with the tradition of virtue epistemology. Although he may not be a virtue epistemologist in a strict sense, I suggest that intellectual virtues and vices play a key role in his epistemology. Specifically, Kant identifies a serious intellectual vice that threatens to undermine reason, namely enthusiasm ( Schwärmerei). Enthusiasts become so enamored with their own thinking that they refuse to subject reason to self‐critique. The particular danger of enthusiasm is that reason colludes in its own destruction: Enthusiasm occurs when self‐conceit and reason's desire to transcend its boundaries mutually reinforce each other. I conclude by sketching an account of Kantian intellectual virtue that is consistent with Kantian moral virtue. 相似文献
16.
This paper explores the Rousseauian background to Kant’s critique of metaphysics and philosophical theology. The core idea
is that the rejection of metaphysics and philosophical theology is part of a turn from theoretical to practical reason influential
on European philosophy of religion, a turn we associate with Kant but that is prefigured by Rousseau. Rousseau is not, however,
a thinker normally associated with the notion of metaphysical criticism, nor the notion of the primacy of practical reason.
The paper draws out this dimension of Rousseau’s thinking and its importance for Kantian thought. It will proceed by discussing
the Kant-Rousseau connection; demonstrate the importance of practical philosophy for Kant and the critical project generally;
overview Kant’s critique of metaphysics; and turn to a consideration of Rousseau, particularly from the text émile. Given the indisputable influence of Rousseau on Kant, the purpose of this paper is to explore the ways that Rousseau’s own
rejection of philosophical theology might be suggestive to those interested in Kant and the way in which it throws new light
on Kant’s philosophy of religion. As well as drawing out the Kant-Rousseau connection, it also, implicitly, defends the general
orientation of these philosophers as one that is important, perhaps vital, to philosophy of religion.
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17.
In this paper, I take Philip Rossi’s robust interpretation of critique as an interpretive guide for thinking generally about how to interpret Kant’s texts. I reflect first upon what might appear to be a minor technical issue: how best to translate the term Fähigheit when Kant utilizes it in reference to the human experience of pleasure and displeasure. Reflection upon this technical issue will, however, end up being a case study in how important it is when we are interpreting Kant’s texts to have Rossi’s focus on human finitude in the background. The terrain for these reflections on human finitude will be the realm of feelings of pleasure and displeasure. And the result will be that, counter to recent interpreters, like Elizondo (2014), who have suggested that Kant could welcome a thoroughly active conception of rational feeling, we must instead, as guided by Kant’s commitment to human finitude (and really his commitment to Transcendental Idealism itself), remember that every feeling for Kant—even the most rational of feelings, like the moral feeling of respect, or the pleasure he notes that we take in the proper functioning of one’s virtuous rational self—must be understood within the purview and constraints of the finite and sensibly-affected human being. I hope, then, that this brief reflection can be taken as one small piece of that larger story Rossi so aptly describes in his book, the story which answers the question of “What is critique?” in a way that insists upon but also simultaneously celebrates the centrality of finitude in human existence. 相似文献
18.
In this paper I give considerable attention to Richard Rorty's attempt to make plausible a conception of non-rational semantic and cultural change - change which Rorty insists on describing as identical with progress - in order to show the extent to which this attempt is compromised from the start by an unjustifiably narrow and inconsistent view of reason. The point of this immanent critique is not just to make Rorty's view of non-rational change look bad. It is meant to do more justice to his claim that intellectual and moral progress is inseparable from speaking and acting differently by incorporating this claim into a philosophically enlarged picture of reason. So the value of taking Rorty's claims about change seriously lies less in showing the shortcomings of his conception of reason than it does in bringing a sense of urgency to the need to renew the project begun by Kant, Hegel, and German Idealism - the project of conceiving reason as an agency of change by reinterpreting reason in terms of self-determining freedom. 相似文献
19.
This article focuses on the account of disrespect found in Honneth’s theory of recognition. In it, I am particularly interested
in the form of misrecognition or disrespect which is the negation of respect, and which is clearly represented by statelessness. Respect, for Honneth, is closely connected to legal recognition. Guided
by Honneth’s view of critical theory as ‘not entirely without a foundation in social reality’, the article puts together an
analysis of the political dynamics of his model of disrespect. This analysis is used to challenge certain aspects of Honneth’s
political theory and in particular the implications of his conception of the state. The article argues that the way in which
the state is used has the effect of obscuring significant political obstacles to recognition, and in particular, the way in
which the state limits respect. 相似文献
20.
AbstractThis article explores the historical and philosophical backgrounds that inform the appropriation of the term “public reason” in liberal theory. Particularly, it studies the differing nuances attached to public reason by Kant and Rawls. The article suggests that, while Kant viewed the public use of reason as a conditio sine qua non for Enlightenment to take place within the Prussian society, Rawls’s notion of public reason in Political Liberalism serves a different purpose in our contemporary world. Rawls sees public reason as a tool, which would enable citizens of the pluralistic liberal state to unearth tolerable bases for coexistence, despite their trenchant and often conflicting ideological, cultural and religious differences. Moreover, Rawls’s notion of public reason aims at liberal legitimacy: the normative and political justification of the legal power of the state in liberal democracy. 相似文献
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