Explaining False Uniqueness: Why We are Both Better and Worse Than Others

People see themselves as unique from others – as having better personalities and abilities, more desirable opinions, and brighter futures than almost everyone else. In the past, researchers attributed these ‘false uniqueness perceptions’ primarily to a need or desire to see oneself in the most charitable light possible (i.e., self‐enhancement). More recent findings – that oftentimes people claim to be worse off than others – call this view into question and raise the need to find explanations that can account for both positive and negative forms of uniqueness perceptions. This review describes several of the leading non‐motivated (cognitive) explanations for false uniqueness perceptions and discusses recent empirical findings that establish their role in these phenomena. The rationality of false uniqueness perceptions and the status of motivated reasoning are also briefly considered.     

Once upon a Time: Explaining Cultural Differences in Episodic Specificity

Research has generated converging evidence of cross‐cultural differences in episodic specificity, whereby Western children and adults exhibit greater abilities to recall specific past events and event‐specific details than their Asian counterparts. Are the cultural differences a result of methodological artifacts or the true work of ‘culture?’ This article addresses this question by critically evaluating recent cross‐cultural data. The analysis based on extant work suggests that culture shapes episodic remembering through two intrapersonal variables – self‐construal and emotion knowledge – and one interpersonal variable – parent–child reminiscing. The role of culture is discussed in a larger theoretical context pertaining to human memory and cognition and future directions are suggested.      

论时间洞察力

时间洞察力既是能力特质也是动力特质,是个体对时间的认知、体验和行动(或行动倾向)的人格特质,它可以区分为过去时间洞察力、现在时间洞察力、未来时间洞察力,也可以区分为特质时间洞察力和状态时间洞察力。时间洞察力是决定个人事业与人生成功的关键因素。我们已开始用多维度-多方法对时间洞察力开展深入的研究。     

Explaining Normativity: On Rationality and the Justification of Reason

Aspects of the world are normative in as much as they or their existence constitute reasons for persons, i.e. grounds which make certain beliefs, moods, emotions, intentions or actions appropriate or inappropriate. Our capacities to perceive and understand how things are, and what response is appropriate to them, and our ability to respond appropriately, make us into persons, i.e. creatures with the ability to direct their own life in accordance with their appreciation of themselves and their environment, and of the reasons with which, given how they are, the world presents them.
An explanation of normativity would explain the various puzzling aspects of this complex phenomenon. In particular it would explain how it is that aspects of the world can constitute reasons for cognitive, emotive, and volitional responses; how it is that we can come to realise that certain cognitive, emotional or volitional responses are appropriate in various circumstances, and inappropriate in others; and how it is that we can respond appropriately. This paper explores an aspect of the last of these questions.     

Explaining prompts children to privilege inductively rich properties

Four experiments with preschool-aged children test the hypothesis that engaging in explanation promotes inductive reasoning on the basis of shared causal properties as opposed to salient (but superficial) perceptual properties. In Experiments 1a and 1b, 3- to 5-year-old children prompted to explain during a causal learning task were more likely to override a tendency to generalize according to perceptual similarity and instead extend an internal feature to an object that shared a causal property. Experiment 2 replicated this effect of explanation in a case of label extension (i.e., categorization). Experiment 3 demonstrated that explanation improves memory for clusters of causally relevant (non-perceptual) features, but impairs memory for superficial (perceptual) features, providing evidence that effects of explanation are selective in scope and apply to memory as well as inference. In sum, our data support the proposal that engaging in explanation influences children’s reasoning by privileging inductively rich, causal properties.     

On Why There is a Problem of Supererogation

How can it be that some acts of very high moral value are not morally required? This is the problem of supererogation. I do not argue in favor of a particular answer. Instead, I analyze two opposing moral intuitions the problem involves. First, that one should always do one’s best. Second, that sometimes we are morally allowed not to do our best. To think that one always has to do one’s best is less plausible, as it makes every morally best act obligatory. I argue that, despite its implausibility, this is the main ingredient in a traditional outlook I call ‘morality of law,’ which conceives of morality as impartial, impersonal, rule-based and obligation-based. My main point is that supererogation will always be seen as problematic if the background theory is a morality of law. This is because supererogation encapsulates a view of morality-outside-obligation, whereas morality of law centers upon obligation as its main instrument of curbing a supposedly natural human selfishness.

     

论个人的时间管理倾向

时间管理倾向是一种具有动力性的人格特征,它由时间价值感、时间监控观和时间效能感构成。善于管理时间者的生活质量是高的。时间管理技能可以通过训练得到提高。     

论黑格尔的现代性时间意识

黑格尔的现代性、时间意识与精神辩证法是密切相连的。具体包含以下几点(1)现代性只有在线性的、不可逆的历史性时间意识中,才是可能的;(2)人的精神具有历史性,是在历史中自我中介、自我扬弃、自我提升的过程;(3)现代性属于精神的“自知”或“反思”阶段,表现出过渡、危机和意识分裂的特征。它具有三个原则,即理性主义、内在的主体性和自我意识的反思性。自由精神的实现是现代性的终极目的,在这个意义上,精神与现实的“和解”是精神辩证法的必然。在后黑格尔时代,黑格尔思想是否定和批判的源泉。     

Why neuroscience matters to cognitive neuropsychology

The broad issue in this paper is the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience. That issue arises particularly sharply for cognitive neurospsychology, some of whose practitioners claim a methodological autonomy for their discipline. They hold that behavioural data from neuropsychological impairments are sufficient to justify assumptions about the underlying modular structure of human cognitive architecture, as well as to make inferences about its various components. But this claim to methodological autonomy can be challenged on both philosophical and empirical grounds. A priori considerations about (cognitive) multiple realisability challenge the thesis on philosophical grounds, and neuroscientific findings from developmental disorders substantiate that challenge empirically. The conclusion is that behavioural evidence alone is inadequate for scientific progress since appearances of modularity can be thoroughly deceptive, obscuring both the dynamic processes of neural development and the endstate network architecture of real cognitive systems.     

Explaining brain size variation: from social to cultural brain

Although the social brain hypothesis has found near-universal acceptance as the best explanation for the evolution of extensive variation in brain size among mammals, it faces two problems. First, it cannot account for grade shifts, where species or complete lineages have a very different brain size than expected based on their social organization. Second, it cannot account for the observation that species with high socio-cognitive abilities also excel in general cognition. These problems may be related. For birds and mammals, we propose to integrate the social brain hypothesis into a broader framework we call cultural intelligence, which stresses the importance of the high costs of brain tissue, general behavioral flexibility and the role of social learning in acquiring cognitive skills.     

Using Class Pass Intervention to Decrease Disruptive Behavior in Young Children

Previous research has shown that disruptive behavior can impair students’ academic success (Pierce et al. in Remedial Spec Educ 25:175–188, 2004, https://doi.org/10.1177/07419325040250030501), as well as increase teacher’s stress level (Westling in Remedial Spec Educ 31:48–63, 2010, https://doi.org/10.1177/0741932508327466). The Class Pass Intervention (CPI) is a Tier 2 intervention designed to decrease disruptive behavior and increase academic engagement; however, few studies have evaluated the efficacy of CPI. The purpose of this study was to assess the effects of CPI on disruptive behavior and academic engagement of young students who engage in disruptive behavior. This study used a non-concurrent multiple baseline design to assess experimental control. In the current study, CPI led to a decrease in disruptive behavior and an increase in academic engagement for all three participants and these levels persisted throughout schedule thinning. In addition, results of teacher and student social validity assessments indicated that the intervention was effective and easy to implement and that students preferred the intervention.

     

Why Everyone Acts Altruistically All the Time: What Parodying Psychological Egoism Can Teach Us

Psychological Altruism (PA) is the view that everyone, ultimately, acts altruistically all the time. I defend PA by showing strong prima facie support, and show how a reinterpretive strategy against supposed counterexamples is successful. I go on to show how PA can be argued for in ways which exactly mirror the arguments for an opposing view, Psychological Egoism. This shows that the case for PA is at least as plausible as PE. Since the case for PA is not plausible, neither is that for PE.     

自古迄1949年浙江医药发展概论

自古迄1840年,浙江医药从无到有,起源绵延.北宋开始逐渐跃居全国前列,尤其楔入南宋,进入辉煌时期,位居全国榜首.明清时期,成为中国中医药最发达的省份.1840年前,浙江医药的起源与发展,则是一部浙江中医药发展史;1840年～1949年,浙江医药的发展,则是一部浙江中、西医药互相抗衡,却又交融的历史.     

为什么要假想一个稻草人

人人皆知科学是个或被认为是个好东西,就像一个名牌优质产品,也就容易出现冒牌货,把非科学的东西愣是说成科学,也就成了伪科学。伪科学的危害性在现在已引起了足够的重视。值得注意的是,当前在人文学界中出现的名为反伪科学实为反