Why Does Time Seem to Pass?

According to the B‐theory, the passage of time is an illusion. The B‐theory therefore requires an explanation of this illusion before it can be regarded as fully satisfactory; yet very few B‐theorists have taken up the challenge of trying to provide one. In this paper I take some first steps toward such an explanation by first making a methodological proposal, then a hypothesis about a key element in the phenomenology of temporal passage. The methodological proposal focuses on the representational content of the element of experience by virtue of which time seems to pass. The hypothesis involves the claim that the experience of change involves the representation of something enduring, rather than perduring, through any change.     

FINE'S MCTAGGART,TEMPORAL PASSAGE,AND THE A VERSUS B‐DEBATE

I offer an interpretation and a partial defense of Kit Fine's ‘Argument from Passage’, which is situated within his reconstruction of McTaggart's paradox. Fine argues that existing A‐theoretic approaches to passage are no more dynamic, i.e. capture passage no better, than the B‐theory. I argue that this comparative claim is correct. Our intuitive picture of passage, which inclines us towards A‐theories, suggests more than coherent A‐theories can deliver. In Finean terms, the picture requires not only Realism about tensed facts, but also Neutrality, i.e. the tensed facts not being ‘oriented towards’ one privileged time. However unlike Fine, and unlike others who advance McTaggartian arguments, I take McTaggart's paradox to indicate neither the need for a more dynamic theory of passage nor that time does not pass. A more dynamic theory is not to be had: Fine's ‘non‐standard realism’ amounts to no more than a conceptual gesture. But instead of concluding that time does not pass, we should conclude that theories of passage cannot deliver the dynamicity of our intuitive picture. For this reason, a B‐theoretic account of passage that simply identifies passage with the succession of times is a serious contender.     

On field's argument for substantivalism

In this article I subject to criticism Field's argument, according to which field theory takes space‐time to be à substance since it ascribes field properties to space‐time points. There is petitio principii error made in this reasoning because Field does not give any justification for his controversial assumption that fields are properties of space‐time points. What is more, I suggest, Field's interpretation of field theory is incompatible with the way this theory is understood and utilized by its users, namely scientists. My criticism is based on the assumption that one cannot propose an ontology of a given scientific theory, at the same time imposing on it an interpretation which clashes with the interpretation current among its users. I also suggest that in order to establish the ontology of a scientific theory one should also take into account the way it has been constructed. According to this criterion, field theory does indeed take space‐time to be a substance.     

The time course of consolidation in visual working memory

How long does it take to form a durable representation in visual working memory? Several theorists have proposed that this consolidation process is very slow. Here, we measured the time course of consolidation. Observers performed a change-detection task for colored squares, and shortly after the presentation of the first array, pattern masks were presented at the locations of each of the colored squares to disrupt representations that had not yet been consolidated. Performance on the memory task was impaired when the delay between the colored squares and the masks was short, and this effect became larger when the number of colored squares was increased. The rate of consolidation was approximately 50 ms per item, which is considerably faster than previous proposals.     

Perceptual consciousness plays no epistemic role

It is often assumed that perceptual experience provides evidence about the external world. But much perception can occur unconsciously, as in cases of masked priming or blindsight. Does unconscious perception provide evidence as well? Many theorists maintain that it cannot, holding that perceptual experience provides evidence in virtue of its conscious character. Against such views, I challenge here both the necessity and, perhaps more controversially, the sufficiency of consciousness for perception to provide evidence about the external world. In addition to motivating and defending the idea that unconscious perception can and does often provide evidence, I observe that whether or not perceptual phenomenology is relevant to the evidentiary status of perception depends on the nature of consciousness. And I argue that a well‐supported theory of consciousness—higher‐order thought theory—invites a striking conclusion: that perceptual phenomenology is not on its own sufficient to provide for evidence of the external world.     

Can Implicit Theory Influence Construal Level?

Beliefs about stability and change are captured by individuals’ implicit theories. Incremental‐theorists believe that human traits and world‐dispositions are malleable and can change through effort, whereas entity‐theorists believe that human traits and world‐dispositions are fixed. In this research we find that the implicit theory an individual holds influences an important aspect of the cognitive process, namely, the level of construal at which information is processed. In three studies we demonstrate that, compared to entity‐theorists, incremental‐theorists adopt a more abstract level of information construal, and the increased cognitive flexibility afforded by an incremental‐theory mindset explains this effect.     

The Experience of the Passage of Time

This paper explains the phenomena that compose the experience of the passage of time and argues that this experience represents the temporal direction of causal processes. The experience of the passage of time comprises several more specific experiences, namely: (1) the experience of continuously advancing to later times; (2) the observation of continuous change, both in the things around us and in ourselves; (3) the feeling of a lack of control over (1) and (2); and (4) the experience of a number of phenomena that we describe as animated, dynamic, or flowing. The experience of passage is a causal process whose function is to promote survival and reproductive success by representing the temporal direction of causal processes (including itself). It does this primarily via the specious present, wherein later content is presented as more vivid than earlier content. The experience of passage is veridical and is compatible with either the B‐theory or the A‐theoretic views of time.     

Error Theory and the Concept of Morality

Error theories about morality often take as their starting point the supposed queerness of morality, and those resisting these arguments often try to argue by analogy that morality is no more queer than other unproblematic subject matters. Here, error theory (as exemplified primarily by the work of Richard Joyce) is resisted first by arguing that it assumes a common, modern, and peculiarly social conception of morality. Then error theorists point out that the social nature of morality requires one to act against one's self‐interest while insisting on the categorical, inescapable, or overriding status of moral considerations: they argue that morality requires magic, then (rightly) claim that there is no such thing as magic. An alternate eudaimonist conception of morality is introduced which itself has an older provenance than the social point of view, dating to the ancient Greeks. Eudaimonism answers to the normative requirements of morality, yet does not require magic. Thus, the initial motivation for error theory is removed.     

Getting Expression‐Based Semantics Right: Its Proper Objects of Evaluation and Limits

Often those attempting to resolve the answering machine paradox appeal to Kaplan's claim that the objects of semantic evaluation are expression‐types evaluated with respect to indices, instead of utterances, as part of their solution. This article argues that Dylan Dodd and Paula Sweeney exemplify the kind of mistakes theorists make in applying such expression‐based semantic theories in that (1) they conflate what is asserted with semantic content, and (2) they take their approach to utterance interpretation as having semantic significance. In light of these mistakes, we learn two things. First, we learn how expression‐based semantic theorists can avoid making these kinds of mistakes. Second, we learn how the limits of expression‐based semantics can contribute to what we should expect a semantic theory to explain regarding how semantics fits into a more general theory of linguistic communication and linguistic understanding.     

Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists

Many metaphysicians tell us that our world is one in which persisting objects are four‐dimensionally extended in time, and persist by being partially present at each moment at which they exist. Many normative theorists tell us that at least some of our core normative practices are justified only if the relation that holds between a person at one time, and that person at another time, is the relation of strict identity. If these metaphysicians are right about the nature of our world, and these normative theorists are right about what justifies our normative practices, then we should be error theorists about the justification of at least some of our core normative practices and in turn, arguably we should eliminate those practices for which justification is lacking. This paper offers a way of resolving the tension between these two views that does not lead into the grips of error theory. It is a way that is amenable to “exceptionists” about persons: those who think there is something special about persons and the first‐person perspective; that personhood cannot be explained naturalistically, and the first‐person perspective is naturalistically irreducible. The conclusion is thus a conditional: given that one is an exceptionist, an attractive way to resolve this tension is to embrace the view that persons are sui generis ontological kinds.     

Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability

This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. ‘Low‐level theorists’ argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low‐level properties (textures, shapes, colors), ‘high‐level theorists’ argue that we have perceptual experiences of high‐level properties (functional properties, causal relations, etc.), while ‘disunified view theorists’ argue that perceptual seemings can present high‐level properties. The paper explores how cognitive states can penetrate perceptual experience and provides an interpretation of cognitive penetration that offers some support for the high‐level view.     

Defending the Objective List Theory of Well‐Being

The objective list theory of well‐being holds that a plurality of basic objective goods directly benefit people. These can include goods such as loving relationships, meaningful knowledge, autonomy, achievement, and pleasure. The objective list theory is pluralistic (it does not identify an underlying feature shared by these goods) and objective (the basic goods benefit people independently of their reactive attitudes toward them). In this paper, I discuss the structure of this theory and show how it is supported by people's considered judgments. I then respond to three objections. First, I argue that there is no conceptual reason to favor a monistic theory of well‐being over a pluralistic one (such as the objective list theory). Second, I argue that states of affairs can benefit people even though they hold no positive reactive attitudes toward them. And, third, I argue that objective list theorists can identify a fairly‐determinate list of basic goods.     

"Leaky" Rationality: How Research on Behavioral Decision Making Challenges Normative Standards of Rationality

ABSTRACT— For more than 30 years, decision-making research has documented that people often violate various principles of rationality, some of which are so fundamental that theorists of rationality rarely bother to state them. We take these characteristics of decision making as a given but argue that it is problematic to conclude that they typically represent departures from rationality. The very psychological processes that lead to "irrational" decisions (e.g., framing, mental accounting) continue to exert their influence when one experiences the results of the decisions. That is, psychological processes that affect decisions may be said also to "leak" into one's experience. The implication is that formal principles of rationality do not provide a good enough normative standard against which to assess decision making. Instead, what is needed is a substantive theory of rationality—one that takes subjective experience seriously, considers both direct and indirect consequences of particular decisions, considers how particular decisions fit into life as a whole, and considers the effects of decisions on others. Formal principles may play a role as approximations of the substantive theory that can be used by theorists and decision makers in cases in which the formal principles can capture most of the relevant considerations and leakage into experience is negligible.     

The cresting wave: a new moving spotlight theory

One argument for the moving spotlight theory is that it better explains our temporal phenomenology than does any static theory. In this paper it is argued that insofar as moving spotlight theorists take this to be a sound argument they ought embrace a new version of the moving spotlight theory according to which the moving spotlight is a cresting wave of causal efficacy. Hence a range of fundamental properties are temporary because presentness synchronically changesthe fundamental properties that are instantiated in the present moment, and our experiences of presentness co-varies with presentness, allowing us to phenomenologically detect presentness.     

Extensional Superposition and Its Relation to Compositionality in Language and Thought

Semantic composition in language must be closely related to semantic composition in thought. But the way the two processes are explained differs considerably. Focusing primarily on propositional content, language theorists generally take semantic composition to be a truth-conditional process. Focusing more on extensional content, cognitive theorists take it to be a form of concept combination. But though deep, this disconnect is not irreconcilable. Both areas of theory assume that extensional (i.e., denotational) meanings must play a role. As this article demonstrates, they also have the potential to fulfill a mediative function. What is shown is that extensional meanings are themselves inherently compositional. On this basis, it becomes possible to model semantic composition without assuming the existence of any specifically linguistic/conceptual apparatus. Examples are presented to demonstrate this direct style of modeling. Abstract connections between composition in thought and language can then be made, raising the prospect of a more unified, theoretical account of semantic composition.     

Consumers' attributions and brand evaluations in product‐harm crises: The role of implicit theories of personality

This study aims to examine the moderating role of implicit theories of personality in the relationship between corporate recovery strategy (i.e., support versus stonewalling) and consumers' attributions (and brand evaluations). It is suggested that consumers' implicit theories about the fixedness/malleability of personality can affect consumers' attributions and brand evaluations during a product‐harm crisis. In addition, corporate image (i.e., strong versus weak) can moderate the influence of the role of implicit theories of personality. Two experiments were conducted to examine the proposed hypotheses. Results of Experiment 1 show that consumers who endorse entity theory (i.e., entity theorists) are likely to attribute crisis as more internal, stable, and controllable, particularly when they do not have any prior knowledge about the firm. The entity theorists would have more negative brand evaluations than incremental theorists (who endorse incremental theory), when “support” strategy was used by the firm. Results of Experiment 2 show that entity theorists are prone to have more external (internal) and unstable (stable) attributions toward a firm with a strong (weak) corporate image. Furthermore, entity theorists would provide more positive brand evaluations than incremental theorists when “stonewalling” strategy was used by a firm with strong corporate image, but not when “support” strategy was used by a firm with weak corporate image. Managerial implications are provided to managers with regard to product‐harm crisis and recovery strategies. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Keeping it Real: Intentional Inexistents,Fineness‐of‐Grain,and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher‐Order Representational Theories

According to the standard argument from targetless higher‐order representations, the possibility of such representations presents a dilemma for higher‐order theorists. In this article I argue that there are two theoretically well‐motivated replies to the standard argument. Consequently, the standard argument against higher‐order theories fails. I then go on to argue that while certain versions of higher‐order theory can adequately respond to the standard argument, they both, nevertheless, fail to explain the fineness‐of‐grain that phenomenally conscious experience appears to have.     

A geometric principle of indifference

That one's degrees of belief at any one time obey the axioms of probability theory is widely regarded as a necessary condition for static rationality. Many theorists hold that it is also a sufficient condition, but according to critics this yields too subjective an account of static rationality. However, there are currently no good proposals as to how to obtain a tenable stronger probabilistic theory of static rationality. In particular, the idea that one might achieve the desired strengthening by adding some symmetry principle to the probability axioms has appeared hard to maintain. Starting from an idea of Carnap and drawing on relatively recent work in cognitive science, this paper argues that conceptual spaces provide the tools to devise an objective probabilistic account of static rationality. Specifically, we propose a principle that derives prior degrees of belief from the geometrical structure of concepts.     

The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts

The A‐theory and the B‐theory advance competing claims about how time is grounded. The A‐theory says that A‐facts are more fundamental in grounding time than are B‐facts, and the B‐theory says the reverse. We argue that whichever theory is true of the actual world is also true of all possible worlds containing time. We do this by arguing that time is uniquely groundable: however time is actually grounded, it is necessarily grounded in that way. It follows that if either the A‐theory or the B‐theory is actually false, then it is necessarily false.