THE MACHINE IN THE GHOST: TRANSHUMANISM AND THE ONTOLOGY OF INFORMATION

An ontology of information belies our common intuitions about reality today and animates and governs both explicit scholarly study in philosophy and the sciences as well as the ideologies that are growing out of them. Transhumanism is one such technoscientific ideology that holds to a very specific ontology of information which need not be the only one on offer. This article argues that the transhumanist ontology of information exhibits gnostic and docetic religious overtones in it and that it devalues physical existence. At the same time, despite claiming a rejection of supernature, hypothetical transhumanist practices (such as mind-uploading) posit the infosphere as a kind of supernatural realm that is often set in opposition to the natural world. This article presents a critique of transhumanist conceptions of information and offers an alternative ontology of information that more adequately accounts for the distinction between the natural and supernatural as well as the integrity of the physical world.     

The Shifting Border Between Perception and Cognition

The distinction between perception and cognition has always had a firm footing in both cognitive science and folk psychology. However, there is little agreement as to how the distinction should be drawn. In fact, a number of theorists have recently argued that, given the ubiquity of top‐down influences (at all levels of the processing hierarchy), we should jettison the distinction altogether. I reject this approach, and defend a pluralist account of the distinction. At the heart of my account is the claim that each legitimate way of marking a border between perception and cognition deploys a notion I call ‘stimulus‐control.’ Thus, rather than being a grab bag of unrelated kinds, the various categories of the perceptual are unified into a superordinate natural kind (mutatis mutandis for the complimentary categories of the cognitive).     

Variation in the anthropomorphization of supernatural beings and its implications for cognitive theories of religion

The cognitive study of religion has been highly influenced by P. Boyer's (2001, 2003) claim that supernatural beings are conceptualized as persons with counterintuitive properties. The present study tests the generality of this claim by exploring how different supernatural beings are conceptualized by the same individual and how different individuals conceptualize the same supernatural beings. In Experiment 1, college undergraduates decided whether three types of human properties (psychological, biological, physical) could or could not be attributed to two types of supernatural beings (religious, fictional). On average, participants attributed more human properties to fictional beings, like fairies and vampires, than to religious beings, like God and Satan, and they attributed more psychological properties than nonpsychological properties to both. In Experiment 2, 5-year-old children and their parents made both open-ended and closed-ended property attributions. Although both groups of participants attributed a majority of human properties to the fictional beings, children attributed a majority of human properties to the religious beings as well. Taken together, these findings suggest that anthropomorphic theories of supernatural-being concepts, though fully predictive of children's concepts, are only partially predictive of adults' concepts.     

Foxhole atheism,revisited: The effects of mortality salience on explicit and implicit religious belief

Although fear of death features prominently in many historical and contemporary theories as a major motivational factor in religious belief, the empirical evidence available is ambivalent, and limited, we argue, by imprecise measures of belief and insufficient attention to the distinction between implicit and explicit aspects of cognition. The present research used both explicit (questionnaire) and implicit (single-target implicit association test; property verification) measurement techniques to examine how thoughts of death influence, specifically, belief in religious supernatural agents. When primed with death, participants explicitly defended their own religious worldview, such that self-described Christians were more confident that supernatural religious entities exist, while non-religious participants were more confident that they do not. However, when belief was measured implicitly, death priming increased all participants' beliefs in religious supernatural entities, regardless of their prior religious commitments. The results are interpreted in terms of a dual-process model of religious cognition, which can be used to resolve conflicting prior data, as well as to help explain the perplexing durability of religious belief.     

CYBORG: MYTH OR REALITY?

Abstract. The idea of cyborg often is taken as a token for the distinction between human and machine having become irrelevant. In this essay I argue against that view. I critically analyze empirical arguments, theoretical reflections, and ultimate convictions that are supposed to support the idea. I show that empirical arguments at this time rather point in a different direction and that theoretical views behind it are at least questionable. I also show that the ultimate convictions presupposed deny basic tenets of traditional Christianity, while their claim to be based on science confuses scientific results with their interpretation on the basis of a naturalistic world‐view.     

Acting with Feeling from Duty

A central claim in Kantian ethics is that an agent is properly morally motivated just in case she acts from duty alone. Bernard Williams, Michael Stocker, and Justin Oakley claim that certain emotionally infused actions, such as lending a compassionate helping hand, can only be done from compassion and not from duty. I argue that these critics have overlooked a distinction between an action's manner, how an action is done, and its motive, the agent's reason for acting. Through a range of examples I demonstrate how an emotion can determine an action's manner without also serving as the motive. Thus, it is possible for an agent to act compassionately from duty alone. This distinction between the manner and the motive of an action not only restores a central claim in Kantian ethics but it also allows for an expanded role of emotions in moral action.     

SPINOZA AND PROCESS ONTOLOGY

In this paper, I put forward some remarks supporting a reading of Spinoza's metaphysics in terms of process ontology, that is, the notion that processes or activities, rather than things, are the most basic entities. I suggest that this reading, while not the only possible one, offers advantages over the traditional substance‐properties interpretation. While this claim may sound implausible vis‐à‐vis Spinoza's language of ‘substance’ and ‘attributes’, I show that process ontology illuminates important features of Spinoza's thought and can facilitate solutions to some interpretive problems.     

The pursuit of the natural

In recent years, it has become common to defend science against charges of bias against the supernatural by explaining that science must remain methodologically natural but does not assume metaphysical naturalism. While such a response is correct, some details about the distinction between methodological naturalism and ontological or metaphysical naturalism have been lacking, as has a clear understanding of the distinction between the methodological restriction of science to natural explanations and naturalistic claims about the scope of those methods. We still require an account of the natural that explains well why science is restricted to giving naturalistic methods, and why the pursuit of natural explanations is not tantamount to the assumption that only natural causes exist. I suggest that the distinguishing characteristics of the natural are not metaphysical at all but broadly epistemological, concerning goals of intersubjectivity and predictability. I argue that by focusing on naturalistic goals we can better explain why the pursuit of natural explanations need not presume any purely natural metaphysics. But I also suggest that the adoption of natural methods is not entirely metaphysically neutral, as it is associated with values that may be more closely associated with some metaphysical views than others.     

Teleology and the intentions of supernatural agents

Teleological beliefs about the natural world often exist implicitly, and there is a positive relationship between teleological endorsement and belief in supernatural agents. In the current study, participants judged a series of scientifically unwarranted teleological explanations of biological organisms and natural non-living objects, under speeded or un-speeded instructions. After controlling for belief in the existence of supernatural agents, rates of implicit (speeded) and explicit (un-speeded) teleological endorsement were moderated by the belief that supernatural agents intentionally interact with the world. Amongst non-religious individuals, rates of implicit endorsement were significantly higher than explicit endorsement, whereas for highly religious individuals the difference was non-significant. This interaction was driven predominantly by explanations of natural non-living objects. These results are consistent with an intention-based theory of teleology, and help to reconcile the finding of a positive relationship between teleological endorsement and belief in supernatural agents, with the those of an enduring teleological bias.     

The touch of King Midas: Collingwood on why actions are not events

It is the ambition of natural science to provide complete explanations of reality. Collingwood argues that science can only explain events, not actions. The latter is the distinctive subject matter of history and can be described as actions only if they are explained historically. This paper explains Collingwood’s claim that the distinctive subject matter of history is actions and why the attempt to capture this subject matter through the method of science inevitably ends in failure because science explains events, not actions. It argues that Collingwood’s defence of the methodological autonomy of history vis-à-vis natural science is not based on a commitment to human exceptionalism, i.e. the exclusion of human beings and their doings from the rest of nature, but on the view that explanations which appeal to norms are different in kind from explanations which appeal to empirical regularities. Given the close relationship between the method and the subject matter of a form of inquiry, actions elude any attempt to explain them through the scientific method because the application of this method entails that what is thus explained is not an action but an event.     

DESIRE AND THE ORIGINS OF CULTURE: LONERGAN AND GIRARD IN CONVERSATION

This paper explores differing accounts of the nature of desire, found in the works of Bernard Lonergan and René Girard, and their implications for our understanding of the origins or socio‐cultural order. Using Lonergan's distinction between natural and elicited desires it argues that Girard's account of desire as mimetic may account for elicited desire, but may not account for natural desire, in Lonergan's account, as desire for meaning, truth and goodness. It then considers the implications for this distinction in our understanding of our socio‐cultural origins.     

THE QUESTION OF NATURE AND GRACE IN KARL BARTH: HUMANITY AS CREATURE AND AS COVENANT‐PARTNER1

This article describes and responds to criticisms of Karl Barth recently offered by John R. Betz and John Milbank concerning this set of issues in Barth's theology: nature and grace, analogy, and a natural desire for the supernatural. It attempts to defuse these complaints by giving attention to Barth's twofold determination of humanity as both creature and covenant‐partner. Within this material, it is argued, Barth employs doctrines such as election, Christology and analogy in order to orient nature towards grace in such a way that something like a natural desire for the supernatural is present in his theology.     

The Blind Men and the Elephant: Selective Examination of the Public-Private Literature Gives Rise to a Faulty Perception

ABSTRACT Wicklund and Gollwitzer make two claims that the distinction between public and private self-awareness/self-consciousness is “Aristotelian,” and that the distinction is fallacious For the distinction to be Aristotelian, as Wicklund and Gollwitzer use that term, requires that the distinction not be embedded in a “process” model of behavior Thus, the first claim is easily shown to be false The second claim rests on a variety of empirical and theoretical issues An examination of these issues reveals (a) that Wicklund and Gollwitzer's alternative interpretations for public self-attention effects are themselves Aristotelian—involving labels but no processes, (b) that their citation of literature relevant to their case is highly selective and misleading, and (c) that their abolition of the public-private distinction would leave an embarrassing contradiction among self-awareness effects, which Wicklund and Gollwitzer apparently are unable to address The vast preponderance of evidence thus supports the utility and the importance of the public-private self-focus distinction     

CHARLES LYELL,UNIFORMITARIANISM, AND INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES

I examine the development of Charles Lyell's principle of uniformity and its influence on the development of modern geology and biology and argue that distinguishing between philosophical starting points and empirical findings is essential for clarity in the discussion between science and religion. First, I explore Lyell's arguments against catastrophism and how these were both empirically and religiously motivated. I then consider how David Hume's empiricism, theory of causation, and rejection of miracles influenced Lyell. Using these insights, Lyell formulated his principle of uniformity, which he believed was based on current empirical findings, and rejected explanatory hypotheses that used the biblical Flood or other catastrophist accounts as violations of uniform causation and introductions of theological concepts into empirical science. I next examine the influence of Lyell's principle on Charles Darwin. Although Lyell opposed Darwinism for most of his life, Darwin relied heavily on Lyell, as is evidenced by references throughout The Origin of Species. I contend that the most important aspect of Lyell's principle for Darwin is that it makes natural evil (the struggle for survival) a process that has always been occurring rather than something introduced after the Fall as recorded in Genesis. Finally, I discuss the role that uniformity plays for Lyell, Darwin, and modern science as an interpretive principle rather than as an inference from empirical data, and I conclude by noting that keeping the distinction in mind between interpretive principles and empirical findings will help clarify debates between science and religion.     

Dimensions of Social Dominance Orientation: The Roles of Legitimizing Myths and National Identification

Using a representative sample of Dutch natives, the current study examined the distinction between two dimensions of social dominance orientation [SDO‐Dominance (SDO‐D) and SDO‐Egalitarianism (SDO‐E)] and their relation with prejudice towards immigrant groups. Results showed that an empirical distinction between the two dimensions could be made. Furthermore, the relation between SDO and prejudice was fully mediated by hierarchy‐enhancing (ethnic citizenship, assimilation) and hierarchy‐attenuating myths (civic citizenship, multiculturalism), but in different ways for both SDO dimensions. Moreover, there were distinct paths between the SDO dimensions and ethnic prejudice for higher and lower identifiers. For higher identifiers, the relation between SDO‐D and prejudice was fully mediated by the endorsement of hierarchy‐enhancing myths. For lower identifiers, there was an association between SDO‐E and prejudice that was predominantly mediated by the endorsement of hierarchy‐attenuating myths. Copyright © 2014 European Association of Personality Psychology     

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REDUCTIVE AND NONREDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM

Abtract: This article argues that the debate between reductive and nonreductive physicalists is best characterized as a disagreement about which properties are natural. Among other things, natural properties are those that characterize the world completely. All physicalists accept the “completeness of physics,” but this claim contains a subtle ambiguity, which results in two conceptions of natural properties. Reductive physicalists should assert, while nonreductive physicalists should deny, that a single set of low‐level physical properties is natural in both of these senses. This way of drawing the distinction succeeds where previous approaches have failed and illuminates why the debate about reductionism is important.     

What Does God Know? Supernatural Agents’ Access to Socially Strategic and Non‐Strategic Information

Current evolutionary and cognitive theories of religion posit that supernatural agent concepts emerge from cognitive systems such as theory of mind and social cognition. Some argue that these concepts evolved to maintain social order by minimizing antisocial behavior. If these theories are correct, then people should process information about supernatural agents' socially strategic knowledge more quickly than non-strategic knowledge. Furthermore, agents' knowledge of immoral and uncooperative social behaviors should be especially accessible to people. To examine these hypotheses, we measured response-times to questions about the knowledge attributed to four different agents--God, Santa Claus, a fictional surveillance government, and omniscient but non-interfering aliens--that vary in their omniscience, moral concern, ability to punish, and how supernatural they are. As anticipated, participants respond more quickly to questions about agents' socially strategic knowledge than non-strategic knowledge, but only when agents are able to punish.     

Can We Be Self‐Deceived about What We Believe? Self‐Knowledge,Self‐Deception,and Rational Agency

Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first‐order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self‐knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self‐knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes one's belief that p and so self‐knowledge involves a constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs. If this is true, it is hard to see how those second‐order beliefs could ever be false. I develop two counter‐examples which show that despite the constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs in standard cases of self‐knowledge, it is possible to be mistaken, and even self‐deceived, about the content of one's own beliefs. These counter‐examples do not show that the rational agency model is mistaken—rather, they show that the possibility of estrangement from one's own mental life means that, even within the rational agency model, it is possible to have false second‐order beliefs about the content of one's first‐order beliefs. The authority of self‐knowledge does not entail that to believe that one believes that p suffices to make it the case that one believes that p.     

A Challenge to the Integrity of Creation: An African Woman's Perspective

Is JPIC a compelling process calling churches and Christians to commitment and involvement within the life of the world? Or, as some critics claim, is JPIC a rather a handy but not too practical theoretical construct within which to house the various environment and development commitments of the ecumenical movement? These are ongoing and helpful questions which are not new to the JPIC process. They are important, and necessary to keep in the forefront of debate and discussions in churches, for they point to a central truth — that JPIC is effective only to the extent that it makes a difference in the lives of people. The wealth of theological reflection and socio-political assessment of the JPIC process, as evidenced by the articles of this issue of The Ecumenical Review, are meaningful precisely in relation to their capacity to form and inform the understandings and actions of churches and Christians in the world. For in the last analysis, JPIC can only be measured in terms of human life, and of flesh and blood. Therefore, it seems worthwhile, and perhaps necessary, within a journal of theological reflection which has as its focus the JPIC process, to include a testimony to JPIC as it is lived out at the grassroots level. We know that women bear a disproportionate impact of the effects of poverty and unjust economic systems. Women too experience a disproportionate impact of the effects of racism. As bearers of life into the world, and as the primary nurturers of future generations, women claim a special place in relation to the environment. It is appropriate, therefore, that Cecilia Asogwa inserts into these JPIC reflections a personal account of a community of rural women in Africa who begin to work together in an economic self-help group, and in so doing discover themselves involved as active participants and leaders in their community. For these women, JPIC has meant personal and community empowerment which they have experienced as part of the healing of creation.