Forecasting Elections from Voters' Perceptions of Candidates' Ability to Handle Issues

When deciding for whom to vote, voters should select the candidate they expect to best handle issues, all other things equal. A simple heuristic predicted that the candidate who is rated more favorably on a larger number of issues would win the popular vote. This was correct for nine out of ten U.S. presidential elections from 1972 to 2008. We then used simple linear regression to relate the incumbent's relative issue ratings to the actual two‐party popular vote shares. The resulting model yielded out‐of‐sample forecasts that were competitive with those from the Iowa Electronic Markets and established quantitative models. The issue‐index model has implications for political decision makers, as it can help to track campaigns and to decide which issues to focus on. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Presidential Debate Watching,Issue Knowledge,Character Evaluation,and Vote Choice

This study employs NES (National Election Survey) data from several presidential elections to investigate the effects of presidential debate watching on voters' issue knowledge, character evaluation, and vote choice. Debates can instill issue knowledge; however, voters are less likely to learn about incumbent presidents seeking re‐election after a four‐year term in office than about other candidates. Debates are also capable of changing voters' impressions of the candidates' character. Finally, at times debates help viewers make a vote choice; they are more likely to strengthen existing preferences (increasing confidence in their vote choice) than alter vote preferences.     

Ballot Photographs as Cues in Low‐Information Elections

In low‐information elections, voters are often faced with the task of choosing from a list of unknown candidates. By examining a set of low‐information elections where candidate photographs were displayed on the ballot, we test how first impressions of candidates can influence election outcomes. We find that attractive candidates are more likely to be attributed the qualities associated with successful politicians and these trait inferences, based on facial appearances, influence the outcomes of elections. We also find that these trait inferences are based on physical characteristics of the candidates, such as age, race and ethnicity, evident from a photograph. Therefore, first impressions can be important determinants of election outcomes, especially in low‐information elections.     

Implicit Candidate‐Trait Associations in Political Campaigns

While the study of political attitudes has incorporated implicit processes in its theoretical models, the predominant approach to candidate‐trait perception focuses exclusively on explicit processes. Our novel, dual‐process approach to candidate perception sees voters as holding both conscious, explicit impressions of candidate traits and automatic, implicit candidate‐trait associations that cannot be measured using traditional self‐report techniques. We examine implicit candidate‐trait associations for the first time using data from a three‐wave online panel conducted in the last month of the 2012 U.S. presidential election. First, we demonstrate that implicit candidate‐trait associations exist. Second, we show that implicit associations of warmth and competence with the candidates predict explicit candidate evaluations, economic evaluations, and vote choice, above and beyond conventional political science controls and explicit trait perceptions. Finally, we find that these effects are strongest among nonpartisans and partisans with conflicted feelings about their party's nominee. We suggest future directions for implicit political cognition research, including trait perception.     

The Wished‐For Always Wins Until the Winner Was Inevitable All Along: Motivated Reasoning and Belief Bias Regulate Emotion During Elections

How do biases affect political information processing? A variant of the Wason selection task, which tests for confirmation bias, was used to characterize how the dynamics of the recent U.S. presidential election affected how people reasoned about political information. Participants were asked to evaluate pundit‐style conditional claims like “The incumbent always wins in a year when unemployment drops” either immediately before or immediately after the 2012 presidential election. A three‐way interaction between ideology, predicted winner (whether the proposition predicted that Obama or Romney would win), and the time of test indicated complex effects of bias on reasoning. Before the election, there was partial evidence of motivated reasoning—liberals performed especially well at looking for falsifying information when the pundit's claim predicted Romney would win. After the election, once the outcome was known, there was evidence of a belief bias—people sought to falsify claims that were inconsistent with the real‐world outcome rather than their ideology. These results suggest that people seek to implicitly regulate emotion when reasoning about political predictions. Before elections, people like to think their preferred candidate will win. After elections, people like to think the winner was inevitable all along.     

“To hope was to expect”: The impact of perspective taking and forecast type on wishful thinking

When forecasting future outcomes, people tend to believe that the outcomes they want to happen are also likely to happen. Despite numerous attempts, few systematic factors have been identified that consistently and robustly reduce wishful thinking (WT) effects. Using elections and sporting event outcomes as contexts, three experiments examined whether taking the perspective of a political rival or opposing fan reduced WT effects. We also examined whether making deliberative (vs. intuitive-based) forecasts was associated with lower WT effects. Online adult samples of U.S. citizens from Mechanical Turk and U.S. college students provided their preferences and forecasts for the U.S. presidential election (Experiments 1 and 2) and a sports competition outcome (Experiment 3). Critically, some participants received perspective taking prompts immediately before providing forecasts. First, results revealed reductions in WT effects when participants engaged in perspective taking. Interestingly, this effect only emerged when intuitive-based forecasts were made first (Experiment 3). Second, intuitive-based forecasts revealed stronger evidence of WT effects. Finally, we found that perspective taking and forming forecasts deliberately promoted a shift in focus away from preferences and toward a consideration of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the entities (i.e., candidates and teams). Theoretical implications for understanding WT effects and applied implications for developing interventions are discussed.     

God and Country: The Partisan Psychology of the Presidency,Religion, and Nation

Overt love of God and country have seemingly been prerequisites to be president in the United States in recent decades, if not always. Indeed, the 2008 presidential race was replete with campaign messages showcasing such perspectives—that Barack Obama and John McCain were religiously faithful and deeply patriotic. Scholarship demonstrates the potential political power of explicit appeals to America and Christianity; however, little research has examined (a) citizens' perceptions of candidates' ties to faith and nation and (b) how these impressions may be related to electoral attitudes and intended vote. We address this gap, measuring both explicit and implicit indicators of the Christian‐ness and American‐ness of Obama and McCain. We expected and found that both explicit and—in a final‐entry regression position—implicit perceptions of these traits related to voters' overall candidate attitudes and intended vote choice and that they were connected significantly more strongly for our sample of self‐described Republicans than Democrats. Results illuminate these partisan differences and raise questions about their implications for U.S. presidential politics in years to come.     

Republican Voters Prefer Candidates Who Have Conservative‐Looking Faces: New Evidence From Exit Polls

Research shows people share common political facial stereotypes: They associate faces with political ideologies. Moreover, given that many voters rely on party affiliation, political ideology, and appearances to select political candidates, we might expect that political facial stereotypes would sway voting preferences and, by extension, the share of votes going to each candidate in an election. And yet few studies have examined whether having a stereotypically conservative‐looking (or liberal‐looking) face predicts a candidate's vote shares. Using data from U.S. election exit polls, we show that the Republican voters within each state are more likely to vote for a candidate (even a Democrat) the more that person has a stereotypically Republican‐looking face. By contrast, the voting choices of the Democratic voters within each state are unrelated to political facial stereotypes. Moreover, we show that the relationship between political facial stereotypes and voting does not depend on state‐level ideology: Republican voters in both right‐leaning (“red”) and left‐leaning (“blue”) states are more likely to vote for candidates with conservative‐looking faces. These results have several important practical and theoretical implications concerning the nature and impact of political facial stereotypes, which we discuss.     

Candidate Vulnerability and Exposure to Counterattitudinal Information: Evidence From Two U.S. Presidential Elections

Politically motivated selective exposure has traditionally been understood through the lens of long‐standing attitudes and beliefs, but the role of environment in shaping information exposure practices merits further consideration. Citizens might respond to the political environment in their information‐seeking behavior for numerous reasons. Citizens who believe their position is politically vulnerable have specific cognitive and affective needs that may make them uniquely attuned to counterattitudinal information. In the context of a presidential election, this means that as the defeat of a supported candidate appears more likely, attention to counterattitudinal content will increase. Data collected in the 2008 and 2012 U.S. Presidential elections support this prediction, although this relationship was observed primarily among supporters of the Republican candidate in both elections.     

Candidate Voice Pitch Influences Election Outcomes

A growing literature in psychology shows that human voice pitch—perceived “highness” or “lowness” as determined by the physiology of the throat—influences how speakers are perceived. This leads to the prediction that candidate voice pitch influences voters. Here this question is addressed with two studies. The first is an experiment conducted with a large national sample of U.S. adults. The results show that men and women prefer to vote for male and female candidates with lower pitched voices. The second study examines the outcomes of the 2012 U.S. House elections. When facing male opponents, candidates with lower voices won a larger vote share. However, when facing female opponents, candidates with higher voices were more successful and particularly so in the case of male candidates. In synthesizing research on the human voice and voter behavior and triangulating evidence from a controlled experiment and a large observational study of actual elections, this article illustrates that candidate voice pitch influences election outcomes.     

Overestimating Reported Prejudice Causes Democrats to Believe Disadvantaged Groups Are Less Electable

Four studies show that Democrats overestimate the explicit prejudice reported by the American electorate, leading them to perceive presidential candidates from disadvantaged groups as less electable. Study 1 (MTurk; n = 728) found that Democrats overestimated the percentage of Americans who say they would not vote for presidential candidates from disadvantaged groups. Study 2 (MTurk; n = 597) replicated this finding and demonstrated that Democrats who perceive high levels of explicit prejudice toward a group also believe presidential candidates from that group are less electable. Moreover, Democrats who more frequently interacted with Republicans were more accurate in estimating the amount of explicit prejudice reported by Republicans, Democrats, and Americans in general. Studies 3A (Prolific; n = 930) and 3B (YouGov; n = 747) found that presenting information about true levels of reported prejudice made Democrats believe generic presidential candidates from disadvantaged groups would be more electable. We did not find evidence that information about true levels of reported prejudice affected Democrats' beliefs about the electability of specific candidates in the 2020 Democratic Primary or their support for these candidates.     

Simple method for predicting American presidential greatness from victory margin in popular vote (1824-1996)

The author tested the simple method (SM) for predicting presidential greatness from the winner's victory margin in the popular vote and A. M. Schlesinger Jr.'s (1986) cycles of American political history with the expert sample presidential rankings of W. J. Ridings Jr. and S. B. McIver (1997). The SM, which involves only simple calculations on minimal data available shortly after an election, predicts greatness ratings that are above average for winners with high victory margins in years of public purpose and for winners with low victory margins in years of private interest. Also, the SM predicts ratings that are below average for winners with low victory margins in public purpose years and for winners with high victory margins in private interest years. Based on the data for 42 elections from 1824 to 1996, the SM success rate was 81.0% for all elections, 85.2% for the 27 1st-term elections, 86.2% for elections after 1880, and 94.4% for 1st-term elections after 1880. Chi-square analyses showed all percentages significant at the .001 level.     

Need for Cognition and Conscientiousness as Predictors of Political Interest and Voting Strategy1

Participants (N = 251) used an Internet‐based information board to learn about fictional U.S. presidential candidates in a voting simulation task. Need for cognition and conscientiousness interacted to predict political interest. Participants high in need for cognition and participants high in conscientiousness, regardless of the magnitude of the other construct, exhibited high political interest. Participants low in need for cognition and conscientiousness exhibited low political interest. Additionally, participants high in need for cognition or low in conscientiousness preferred an issue‐based voting strategy, whereas those low in need for cognition or high in conscientiousness preferred a candidate‐based voting strategy. These findings have important implications for how political information should be disseminated to voters through Internet means, such as political websites.     

Divergence over conformity: Change in immigration attitudes after the electoral success of an anti‐immigration populist party in the Finnish 2015 parliamentary elections

The populist, anti‐immigration‐oriented Finns Party was considered the winner of the Finnish 2015 parliamentary elections. In a representative sample of young adults (N = 606), a longitudinal pre‐ post‐election design revealed that attitudes towards immigration became more favourable among those disappointed by the outcome and those who did not vote for the Finns Party. Among the latter, both supporting the green‐red rival parties and disliking the Finns Party independently predicted increased support for migration. Other attitudes did not change. The results highlight the importance of social processes and identity concerns, particularly self‐categorization, as drivers of attitude change. While previous work has focused on conformity dynamics, our results suggest that diverging from an unwanted identity may be associated with attitude change.     

Emotions,Public Opinion,and U.S. Presidential Approval Rates: A 5‐Year Analysis of Online Political Discussions

This article examines how emotional reactions to political events shape public opinion. We analyze political discussions in which people voluntarily engage online to approximate the public agenda: Online discussions offer a natural approach to the salience of political issues and the means to analyze emotional reactions as political events take place in real time. We measure shifts in emotions of the public over a period that includes 2 U.S. presidential elections, the 9/11 attacks, and the start of military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our findings show that emotional reactions to political events help explain approval rates for the same period, which casts novel light on the mechanisms that mediate the association between agenda setting and political evaluations.     

The curious,context‐dependent case of anger: Explaining voting intentions in three different national elections

Collective action is typically studied in social protest contexts and predicted by different motivations (i.e., ingroup identification and efficacy beliefs, and outgroup‐directed anger). Assuming that voting to some extent reflects a form of collective action, we tested whether these three different motivations predicted voting in Dutch, Israeli, and Italian national election contexts. Based on previous meta‐analyses on voting and collective action, we hypothesized that identification with and efficacy beliefs regarding this party would motivate voting across the different elections (i.e., context‐independent effects). As for anger, we predicted more context‐dependent effects, depending on whether the anger is targeting the previous government or at the political system at large. Results were largely in line with predictions, showing the relatively context‐independent motivational power of party identification and efficacy beliefs, and clearly context‐dependent effects for anger. Specifically, we found little support for a similar motivational power of anger targeting previous government policies, but anger targeting politics in general demotivated Dutch and Israeli participants to vote (interpreted as an expression of political cynicism), while curiously motivating Italian participants to vote (interpreted as a desire for system change from “old” to “new” politics). We discuss these findings in the context of voting in national elections, and recommend further integration of the voting and social protest literatures.     

Politicians' estimated height as an indicator of their popularity

Previous research has found that an electoral candidates' eight is correlated with their image. Many studies have found that height is a great asset for a candidate as height correlates with electoral outcome. In this research the previously obtained results were partially confirmed—in the first study the supporters of a given candidate estimated him as taller than his opponents (confirmed by six out of 10 candidates). The second study, conducted during the presidential elections in Poland, showed that electorate‐perceived height of candidates for the Presidency changed after the first phase of elections (confirmed by three from six main candidates). These changes in electoral‐perceived height depended more upon their electoral support than attitudes toward them. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does Complex or Simple Rhetoric Win Elections? An Integrative Complexity Analysis of U.S. Presidential Campaigns

Research suggests that the integrative complexity of political rhetoric tends to drop during election season, but little research to date directly addresses if this drop in complexity serves to increase or decrease electoral success. The two present studies help fill this gap. Study 1 demonstrates that, during the Democratic Party primary debates in 2003–2004, the eventual winners of the party nomination showed a steeper drop in integrative complexity as the election season progressed than nonwinning candidates. Study 2 presents laboratory evidence from the most recent presidential campaign demonstrating that, while the complexity of Obama's rhetoric had little impact on college students' subsequent intentions to vote for him, the complexity of McCain's rhetoric was significantly positively correlated with their likelihood of voting for him. Taken together, this research is inconsistent with an unqualified simple is effective view of the complexity‐success relationship. Rather, it is more consistent with a compensatory view: Effective use of complexity (or simplicity) may compensate for perceived weaknesses. Thus, appropriately timed shifts in complexity levels, and/or violations of negative expectations relevant to complexity, may be an effective means of winning elections. Surprisingly, mere simplicity as such seems largely ineffective.     

A short note on the maximal point‐biserial correlation under non‐normality

The aim of this paper is to derive the maximal point‐biserial correlation under non‐normality. Several widely used non‐normal distributions are considered, namely the uniform distribution, t‐distribution, exponential distribution, and a mixture of two normal distributions. Results show that the maximal point‐biserial correlation, depending on the non‐normal continuous variable underlying the binary manifest variable, may not be a function of p (the probability that the dichotomous variable takes the value 1), can be symmetric or non‐symmetric around p = .5, and may still lie in the range from ?1.0 to 1.0. Therefore researchers should exercise caution when they interpret their sample point‐biserial correlation coefficients based on popular beliefs that the maximal point‐biserial correlation is always smaller than 1, and that the size of the correlation is always further restricted as p deviates from .5.     

Attractiveness and Facial Competence Bias Face‐Based Inferences of Candidate Ideology

Can voters infer candidates' political orientations from their faces? We report evidence that observers make systematic judgment errors, ascribing their own political views to attractive or competent‐looking candidates. Subjects judged headshot images of student candidates running in university elections (Experiment 1), as well as professional politicians from state election races in Germany (Experiment 2), according to whether the person(s) displayed held ideologically leftist or rightist views. While prediction accuracy was above chance level in both experiments, candidate attractiveness (Experiment 1) and perceived competence (Experiment 2) increased a subject's likelihood of attributing her political views to a candidate. These findings suggest that the value of face‐based inferences in choosing the candidate who best represents one's views is more limited than previously assumed. They also suggest that good looks may help extremist candidates in presenting themselves as more moderate.