“Higher” and “lower”: Comparative and categorical interpretations by children

Three-, four-, and five-year-old children's categorical and comparative understanding of high and low were examined in two experiments. Categorical knowledge was assessed by presenting subjects with a single object at varying heights (from 0 to five feet above the ground), and asking if the object was high or low. Comparative understanding of the terms was assessed by showing children two objects at a time and asking which was higher or lower. We observed two patterns of performance in children's categorical treatments: younger children in particular defined disjoint categories for high and low such that they only labelled the extreme heights as high or low, and maintained that middle heights were neither high nor low. Older children defined either-or categories such that all heights were labelled either high or low. We also found that children who defined either-or categories made correct comparative judgments across the entire range of variation whereas children who defined disjoint categories could only judge which of two objects was higher if the objects were not low (at 0 and 1 feet) and which of the objects was lower if the objects were not high (at 4 and 5 feet). The results were interpreted as reflecting a lack of appreciation that the terms are interdefined as negations of each other, and were discussed in terms of the similar semantic-congruity effects found in adults.     

“Consistency” and “contradiction” in the development of gender role characteristics

There is currently an increasing amount of theoretical and empirical work arguing that stereotyped sex role behavior is maladaptive in our culture and that “androgyny” or “sex role transcendence” is a preferred mode of being. The latter, however, seems to require individual inconsistency and self-contradiction in behaviors and attitudes (since the individual is both active and passive, both independent and dependent, etc.). Theories of cognitive consistency maintain that individuals avoid self-contradiction and inconsistency, and therefore that androgyny runs counter to important motivational principles. This article examines this issue in some detail, and concludes that theories of cognitive dissonance and consistency reflect particular socio-cultural conditions rather than universal motivation principles. There is nothing inherently uncomfortable or “inconsistent” about androgyny and sex role transcendence.     

THE PROBLEM OF “GOD” IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION: LONERGAN'S “COMMON SENSE” (RELIGION) VERSUS “THEORY” (THEOLOGY)

The emphasis on God in American psychology of religion generates the problem of explaining divine‐versus‐natural causality in “spiritual experiences.” Especially “theistic psychology” champions divine involvement. However, its argument exposes a methodological error: to pit popular religious opinions against technical scientific conclusions. Countering such homogenizing “postmodern agnosticism,” Bernard Lonergan explained these two as different modes of thinking: “common sense” and “theory”—which resolves the problem: When theoretical science is matched with theoretical theology, “the God‐hypothesis” explains the existence of things whereas science explains their natures; and, barring miracles, God is irrelevant to natural science. A review of the field shows that the problem is pervasive; attention to “miracles”—popularly so‐named versus technically—focuses the claims of divine‐versus‐natural causality; and specifications of the meaning of spiritual, spirituality, science, worldview, and meaning itself (suffering that same ambiguity: personal import versus cognitive content) offer further clarity. The problem is not naturalism versus theism, but commonsensical versus theoretical thinking. This solution demands “hard” social science.     

“Patching up Virtue”

Herdt's Putting On Virtue has two chief aims. The first is to champion the virtue tradition against Christian moral quietism and modern deontological ethics. The second is to facilitate reconciliation between Augustinian and Emersonian virtue. To accomplish these tasks Herdt constructs a counter‐narrative to Schneewind's Invention of Autonomy, in which Luther's resignation and Kant's innovation are tragic consequences of “hyper‐Augustinianism”—a competitive conception of divine and human agency, which leads to excessive suspicion of acquired virtue. This review argues that Putting On Virtue succeeds in its first aim but leaves its second intriguingly uncompleted. Despite this deficiency, however, this essay also argues that Putting On Virtue makes plausible Herdt's audacious suggestion that Augustinian and Emersonian perfectionism may be reconciled by bringing acquired and infused virtue under a single term.     

“Maleness” Revisited

My response to the preceding commentaries draws on recent events such as the Thomas/Hill hearings to illustrate some of my central arguments in “Feminist Skepticism and the ‘Maleness’ of Philosophy.” I also attempt to clarify frequently misunderstood aspects of my use of gender as an analytical category, and discuss why, in my opinion, we should continue to care about the “maleness” of philosophy.     

“Equal Discipleship”

Feminist theology is known for its various critical principles and methods of biblical interpretation. In the process of doing feminist biblical interpretation, feminist theologians have started to build their theological frameworks. This article takes the feminist biblical scholar Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and her construction of the New Testament as an example. In her book Discipleship of Equals, Schüssler Fiorenza put forward the important viewpoint of “equal discipleship.” This viewpoint provides a dialogue between Schüssler Fiorenza and the theological concerns of women in China. Like Schüssler Fiorenza, Chinese theologians have also noted the testimonies of Chinese women Christians in the development of the church. These can help female Christians realize who they are and the significance of being a member of the church. Christian Chinese traditional culture still influences the understanding of women's identity. This will be a significant challenge and task in practising Chinese feminist theology.     

“Good mothering”: Maternal attitudes and mother-infant interaction

Two groups of mother-infant pairs, with infants aged 1 to 5 months, were recruited by child health nurses. One group (n = 10) of infants had rational difficulties, whereas the other group (n = 22) did not. The research team was blind to group membership. The mothers were interviewed about background variables, their cognitive-emotional orientation during pregnancy and early motherhood, their self-confidence as mothers, their satisfaction with support from their husbands, and living conditions. Mother-infant interaction was observed in à diaper change and à face-to-face situation. Comparisons between the two groups showed no differences with regard to background variables, while significant differences were obtained with regard to interview and observation data. The problem group reported less satisfaction with and focus on maternal role, less self-confidence as mothers, and less satisfaction with husband support and living conditions than the no-problem group. With regard to observation data, the no-problem group mothers and infants both showed higher levels of what was à priori regarded as desirable interactional behavior. Correlations between interview and observation data, calculated within the no-problem group, showed the same kind of connection between mothers' cognitive emotional orientation and interactional behavior as was indicated by the group comparisons.     

“I am NN”: A Reconstruction of Anscombe's “The First Person”

This paper develops a way of understanding G. E. M. Anscombe's essay “The First Person” at the heart of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that the argument through which her essay seeks to show this is itself first personal in character. Understanding Anscombe's essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be correct. But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I am this body”.     

THE “AS‐YET SITUATION” IN WINNICOTT'S “FRAGMENT OF AN ANALYSIS”: YOUR FATHER “NEVER DID YOU THE HONOR OF”… YET

The author proposes a new hypothesis in relation to Winnicott's “Fragment of an Analysis”: that as early as 1955, in the case described in this text, Winnicott is creating the paternal function in his patient's psychic functioning by implicitly linking his interpretations regarding the father to the Freudian concept of Nachträglichkeit. The author introduces an original clinical concept, the as‐yet situation, which she has observed in her own clinical work, as well as in Winnicott's analysis of the patient described in “Fragment of an Analysis” (1955).     

“Superabundant Being”: Disambiguating Rilke and Heidegger

Rilke's impact on the generation of writers reshaping philosophy and theology during the interwar years is arguably without parallel. Within this constellation, the case of Heidegger as a reader of Rilke presents unique challenges. For Rilke's poetry neither quite allows for a wholly appropriative reading such as, for better or worse, Heidegger accords Hölderlin's oeuvre; nor can Heidegger quite bring himself to subject Rilke’s poetry to critical appraisal. Instead, Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as worked out in Part I of Being and Time (1927) and in his lectures on The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics (1929) seems haunted by an intellectual and expressive debt to Rilke that he can neither acknowledge nor fully resolve. For to do so would be to confront a possibility of human finitude, so luminously traced in Rilke's Duino Elegies (1922), still defined by moments of transcendence – moments that can be captured in the fleeting plenitude of poetic intuition (Anschauung) and lyric image (Bild). Whereas von Balthasar, in volume 3 of his Apokalypse der deutschen Seele (1939), reads Rilke as fundamentally embracing Heidegger’s notion of strictly immanent and finite Dasein, I argue that the oeuvre of the later Rilke, without being reclaimed for a metaphysical, let alone religious position, nevertheless is shaped, both intellectually and expressively, by insistent, if enigmatic, moments of transcendence.     

“TRANSITIVE INFERENCE” IN MULTIPLE CONDITIONAL DISCRIMINATIONS

We used multiple conditional discriminations to study the inferential abilities of pigeons. Using a five-term stimulus series, pigeons were trained to respond differentially to four overlapping pairs of concurrently presented stimuli: A+B?, B+C?, C+D?, and D+E?, where plus and minus indicate the stimulus associated with reinforcement and extinction, respectively. Transitive inference in such situations has been defined as a preference for Stimulus B over Stimulus D in a transfer test. We measured this and other untrained preferences (A vs. C, A vs. D, B vs. E, etc.) during nonreinforced test trials. In three experiments using a novel, rapid training procedure (termed autorun), we attempted to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for transitive inference. We used two versions of autorun: response-based, in which the subject was repeatedly presented with the least well-discriminated stimulus pair; and time-based, in which the subject was repeatedly presented with the least-experienced stimulus pair. In Experiment 1, using response-based autorun, we showed that subjects learned the four stimulus pairs faster than, but at a level comparable to, a previous study on transitive inference in pigeons (Fersen, Wynne, Delius, & Staddon, 1991), but our animals failed to show transitive inference. Experiments 2 and 3 compared time- and response-based autorun. Discrimination performance was maintained, but transitive inference was observed only on the second exposure to the response-based procedure. These results show that inferential behavior in pigeons is not a reliable concomitant of good performance on a series of overlapping discriminations. The necessary and sufficient conditions for transitive inference in pigeons remain to be fully defined.     

Objective Consequentialism and the Rationales of ‘ “Ought” Implies “Can” ’

This paper argues that objective consequentialism is incompatible with the rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ – with the considerations, that is, that explain or justify this principle. Objective consequentialism is the moral doctrine that an act is right if and only if there is no alternative with a better outcome, and wrong otherwise. An act is obligatory if and only if it is wrong not to perform it. According to ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’, a person is morally obligated to φ only if the person can φ. The rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ include considerations related to intuitive plausibility, action‐guidance, blameworthiness and fairness, and the nature of practical reasons. 1     

The “Flash” System: A Field Study of Altruism1

This study evaluated the effectiveness of an experimental automated highway-help system for stranded motorists (the Flash system). Direct and indirect helping behavior rates as a function of the race and sex of supposedly stranded drivers on the Flash-equipped highway were compared to helping rates on a comparable, non-Flash-equipped highway. The results indicated that the automated system produced (a) higher overall helping rates and (b) higher helping rates for white persons, with type of help (direct or indirect) interacting with confederate sex.     

“Idiographic” vis-à-vis “idiodynamic” in the historical perspective of personality theory: Remembering Gordon Allport, 1897–1997

The centenary of Gordon W. Allport provides an occasion for reappraising his special position regarding uniqueness in personality. Allport's theory of personality, as first presented in his 1937 textbook, highlighted the idiographic in conjunction with the nomothetic approach, and the fundamental unit in his formulation was the trait. He described common and unique traits as well as the unique organization of traits. In contradistinction, the idiodynamic orientation, introduced by Saul Rosenzweig in 1951 and, in more detail in 1958, focused on events which over a lifespan constitute an idioverse—a population of phenomenological events. Allport's original emphasis on the idiographic and his later confusion concerning idiodynamics, can, in considerable measure, be understood by recognizing the role of religious spirituality in his conception of the person. That conception, which derived from an early religious indoctrination, asserted itself with renewed vigor in his later years. His scientific conception of personality thus remained unconsummated, subordinated by him to the unsolvable mysteries of ontology which properly belong, he believed, in the domain of faith. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

On Abolishing “Death”: An Etymological Note

The distinction is made between two uses of the word “death,” specifically, your death (the death of the other) and my death (the death of the self). It makes (logical, epistemological and phenomenological) sense for me to speak of your death, but not for me to speak of my death—inasmuch as, by reasonable definition, I cannot possibly ever experience my death. Dying is experienceable—although one can never be certain. The word death is a perfectly good word for the demise of the other; the word omega is suggested to allude to that non-event (the cessation of the self) now routinely spoken of as “my death,”     

“I'm an ogre so I'm very hungry!” “I'm assistant ogre”: The Social Function of Sibling Imitation in Early Childhood

Siblings' imitative behaviors were investigated in 39 middle‐class dyads during six 90‐min home sessions at both Time 1 (M age: older sibling = 4.4 years; younger sibling = 2.4 years) and Time 2 (2 years later). Although younger siblings imitated most often at T1 and T2, older siblings' imitation increased proportionally over time in comparison to younger siblings. Findings highlight the affiliative nature of imitation that occurred during reciprocal play interactions, via positive responses, and the content of the imitation. Finally, age was controlled by comparing first‐born siblings aged 4 at T1 to second‐born siblings aged 4 at T2. Findings demonstrated that sibling imitation had distinct characteristics despite the age match and partner effects. Sibling imitation is a dynamic, interactive social behavior and may be a powerful source of learning for young children.

Highlights

• The role of sibling imitation in ongoing play in early childhood is highlighted.
• Sibling imitation is a dynamic and affiliative behavior that promotes interaction during play.
• Naturalistic observations of sibling imitation document that it is a powerful source of learning for young children.