“Intrinsically” or just “Instrumentally” Valuable? On Structural Types of Values of Scientific Knowledge

Debates about scientific (though rarely about otherforms of) knowledge, research policies or academic trainingoften involve a controversy about whether scientificknowledge possesses just “instrumental” value or also “intrinsic” value. Questioning this common simpleopposition, I scrutinize the issues involved in terms of agreater variety of structural types of values attributableto (scientific) knowledge. (Intermittently, I address thepuzzling habit of attributing “intrinsic” value to quitedifferent things, e.g. also to nature, in environmentalethics.) After some remarks on relevant broader philosophicaldebates about scientific knowledge, I pave a path throughthe (terminological) thicket of structural types of values. Our initial simple opposition is shown to conflate thedistinctions intrinsic/extrinsic and instrumental (or justuseful)/final. Next, I consider the value(s) of knowledgeand knowing in general and their possible value components(like the values of truth and justifiedness). After havingdiscussed the types of value of everyday knowledge,especially its functional and constitutive value (notionsintroduced earlier), I argue that these can or should alsobe attributed to scientific knowledge, thus departing fromboth objectivist and sociological views of science. One could say that I offer a certain defense of theintrinsic value of scientific knowing (and the inherentvalue of scientific knowledge) and some importantdifferentiations of its “instrumental values”. I alsocaution (in relation with my puzzle) against drawing hastymoral conclusions. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

ONE ENCHANTED BEING: NEUROEXISTENTIALISM AND MEANING

The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World is my attempt to explain whether and how existential meaning is possible in a material world, and how such meaning is best conceived naturalistically. Neuroexistentialism conceives of our predicament in accordance with Darwin plus neuroscience. The prospects for our kind of being-in-the-world are limited by our natures as smart but fully embodied short-lived animals. Many find this picture disenchanting, even depressing. I respond to four criticisms of my relentless upbeat naturalism: that naturalism can make no room for norms, for values; that I overvalue truth at the expense of happiness; that I underestimate the extent to which supernaturalism has made peace with naturalism; and that I can give no account for why humans as finite animals should want to overcome our given natures and seek impersonal, self-transcendent value.     

Retrospective reflexivity: The residual and subliminal repercussions of researching war

Stories of the war have been a known part of my story as granddaughter of Polish post-war migrants. Yet venturing into these stories as researcher has been troubling; I found their closeness and their raw emotion difficult to process. Significant sections of my interview schedules entailed participants recounting their own, their parents' or their grandparents' stories of war and migration, with traumatic episodes frequently intersecting into their stories. As a researcher, these traumatic narratives have had a residual quality, lasting in my subconscious long after the interviews themselves and doctorate for which they were conducted had finished.In this paper, I focus on experiences of, and reactions to listening to, analysing and writing about these traumatic cultural memories. Collins (1998: 3.35) has observed that ‘the emotions experienced, whether by the interviewer or interviewee, are as real, as important and as interesting as any other product of the interview’; my powerfully felt experiences with traumatic content have validated this sentiment. With a retrospective reflexivity I now realise that these cultural memories were not the only ‘product’ of my research, but that how they were narrated and how I dealt with them were also a significant part of the research process, and indeed stories in themselves. Here I attempt to retell how these stories impacted me as the researcher; how in the case of particularly harrowing stories, I also needed time to absorb the narratives, to comprehend the participant's experiences and their ability to narrate such stories, and to recover from the experience of listening to such accounts.     

Free Choice

In everyday language, the central question raised by “free choice” is not causation but whether I do what I want. We can, however, grant that our wants are caused. We commonly fail to appreciate this because there is no consciousness of these causal processes. Nevertheless a question about the causation of my want may on occasion become relevant to the freedom of my choice. Thus one may ask if my want is caused by my knowledge and values, or by causes alien to these. This is not a question about the truth, or implications, of the theory of universal determinism.     

Free Choice

In everyday language, the central question raised by “free choice” is not causation but whether I do what I want. We can, however, grant that our wants are caused. We commonly fail to appreciate this because there is no consciousness of these causal processes. Nevertheless a question about the causation of my want may on occasion become relevant to the freedom of my choice. Thus one may ask if my want is caused by my knowledge and values, or by causes alien to these. This is not a question about the truth, or implications, of the theory of universal determinism.     

Responsible Psychopaths Revisited

This paper updates, modifies, and extends an account of psychopaths’ responsibility and blameworthiness that depends on behavioral control rather than moral knowledge. Philosophers mainly focus on whether psychopaths can be said to grasp moral rules (or reasons, or demands) as such, whereas it seems to be important to their blameworthiness that typical psychopaths are hampered by impulsivity and other barriers to exercising self-control. I begin by discussing an atypical case, for contrast, of a young man who was diagnosed as a psychopath at one point but who lacks the element of impulsivity. He exhibits the usual deficits of empathy and related moral emotions, but by now he has developed effective alternative means of conforming to moral rules, essentially on the basis of self-interest. I think it does seem reasonable to hold him morally responsible if he should violate a rule, despite his refusal to acknowledge any specifically moral reasons. I then turn to more typical cases, arguing that blameworthiness is mitigated by the difficulty of learning alternative means of self-control. In a departure from my earlier work, I do not take responsibility to have degrees. But since both blameworthiness and freedom to do otherwise have degrees that depend on the same factors, I go on to explain how it can be reasonable to blame a typical psychopath for an act he may not have been free to avoid. More generally, my suggestion is that notions commonly conflated in philosophers’ treatments of responsibility should be prized apart.     

Response to ‘Somatic Intentionality Bifurcated: A Sellarisan Response to Sachs’s Merleau-Pontyan Account of Intentionality’

ABSTRACT

This article advances a new analysis of stupidity as a distinctive form of cognitive failing. Section 1 outlines some problems in explicating this notion and suggests some desiderata. Section 2 sketches an existing model of stupidity, found in Kant and Flaubert, which serves as a foil for my own view. In Section 3, I introduce my theory: I analyse stupidity as form of conceptual self-hampering, characterised by a specific aetiology and with a range of deleterious effects. In Section 4, I show how this proposal meets the desiderata and I clarify how it diverges from existing accounts. My position is close to a ‘public health approach’, in contrast to the virtue/vice framework employed by Engel or Mulligan.     

Living and Loving Cybernetics

How we learn to interpret our experiences influences the sorts of experiences we seek. In other words, habits of mind become habits of action. Cybernetics, as a way of thinking, changes how we act. My testimony demonstrates that the appeal of cybernetics remains strong today, for those who are lucky enough to stumble across its beauty, as I was. Cybernetics contributed to the theoretical foundation and conceptualization of my dissertation, and it positively influences my teaching, whether I am teaching cybernetics explicitly or not. While I am fortunate to be able to integrate cybernetics in my work, what delights me most is living it in my every day.     

Reply to Commentaries

Each discussant approached my paper on embedded levels of illusion from a different perspective, representing schools as diverse as those derived from Jung and Bion. It is interesting that, although my paper was not primarily about dreams or how to interpret them, but rather about the way in which multiple levels of illusion may open a potential space in treatment, each discussant centered his comments around a dream that I had reported in one of my cases. In this reply, I compare the discussants' approaches to the dream with mine. I also wonder whether the dream itself represents an embedded level of illusion within my paper. If so, it may function as a transitional space in which we may entertain different viewpoints around not only the nature of dream work, but also around questions including the nature of the mind and the therapeutic process.     

Equality as Comparative Fairness

The goal of this article is modest. It is simply to help illuminate the nature of egalitarianism. More particularly, I aim to show what certain egalitarians are committed to, and to suggest that equality, as these egalitarians understand it, is an important normative ideal that cannot simply be ignored in moral deliberations. In doing this, I distinguish between equality as universality, equality as impartiality, and equality as comparability, and also between instrumental and non‐instrumental egalitarianism. I then characterise the version of egalitarianism with which I am concerned, which I call equality as comparative fairness. I discuss the relations between equality, fairness, luck, and responsibility, and defend egalitarianism against rival views that focus on subsistence, sufficiency, or compassion. I also defend egalitarianism against the Levelling Down and Raising Up Objections, and present several key examples to illustrate egalitarianism's distinct appeal, in contrast to prioritarianism's. I conclude by considering two common questions about my view: first, whether my ultimate concern is really with comparative fairness, rather than equality, so that my view is not, in fact, a substantive, non‐instrumental version of egalitarianism, and second, whether my view ultimately reduces to a theory about desert.     

Happiness theories of the good life

The paper starts with a presentation of the pure happiness theory, i.e. the idea that the quality of a person’s life is dependent on one thing only, viz. how happy that person is. To find out whether this type of theory is plausible or not, I examine the standard arguments for and against this theory, including Nozick’s experience machine argument. I then investigate how the theory can be modified in order to avoid the most serious objections. I first examine different types of epistemic modifications of the theory (e.g. the idea that a person’s happiness is more valuable for her if it is based on a correct perception of her own life), and then turn to a number of modifications which all make the value of a person’s happiness depend on whether the evaluative standard on which her happiness is based satisfies certain requirements. In connection with this, I present and defend my own modified version of the happiness theory.     

How do my students think about ME as an English-language teacher?

The concepts of student-centered classrooms, empowering students with communicative competences to be able to voice their ideas in the surrounding community, powerless and marginalized strata, are conspicuous and prevalent in recent research articles. Teachers are well-acquainted with pertinent underpinnings and theories of teaching methodologies; and some research is also conducted to see how those learned theories in pre-service and in-service programs are implemented in their real-life classrooms. But, the teachers’ reflection on implementation of their teaching practices in classrooms is still a venue which needs further investigation within an international scope. Here, my own teaching practice within a period of two semesters is reflected through the 61 male and female students’ sharp and meticulous eyes, which is reflected in their written responses to the posed question at the end of their final exams, and some of my notes from their comments in each of their classes. The Constant Comparative method was then used to unearth students’ comments and feedback on both my personality as an English-language teacher, and my teaching practice respectively.     

In sickness and in health: An exploration of some of the unconscious processes involved in the decision by family caregivers to place a family member with dementia in residential care

This paper explores the feelings, conscious and unconscious, evoked by the difficult decision to place a family member with dementia into residential care. In an exploratory study I interviewed five people who had made this decision with a view to exploring some of the unconscious processes involved in their decision-making. The interviews were interpreted paying attention to my understanding of the transference and my countertransference feelings and as triangulated by a psychodynamic supervision group.

Intimate contact with ageing and death evokes fears about mortality and activates primitive anxieties. The progress of dementia may amplify primitive or psychotic states of functioning, particularly those involving evacuatory projection, and family carers may resort to splitting off unbearable feelings of anxiety which such projections can evoke and may contribute to their decision to look for residential care.

Once placed in residential care different dynamics evolve and further difficult questions arise: how often to visit; whether and when to dispose of the person's possessions and ultimately how to grieve. The focus of this paper is, as far as it is possible, on the partner without dementia as an individual and the impact of their relative's dementia on their lives.     

The Groundedness Approach to Class Theory

Abstract

Kripke showed how to restrict Tarski’s schema to grounded sentences. I examine the prospects for an analogous approach to the paradoxes of naive class comprehension. I present new methods to obtain theories of grounded classes and test them against antecedently motivated desiderata. My findings cast doubt on whether a theory of grounded classes can accommodate both the extensionality of classes and allow for class definition in terms of identity.     

Sinnott–Armstrong's Moral Scepticism

Walter Sinnott–Armstrong's recent defence of moral scepticism raises the debate to a new level, but I argue that it is unsatisfactory because of problems with its assumption of global scepticism, with its use of the Sceptical Hypothesis Argument, and with its use of the idea of contrast classes and the correlative distinction between 'everyday' justification and 'philosophical' justification. I draw on Chisholm's treatment of the Problem of the Criterion to show that my claim that I know that, e.g., baby–torture is wrong, is no more question–begging than Sinnott–Armstrong's denial that I know this.     

Reflexivity in Counterspaces Fieldwork

Reflexivity is an important tool for navigating ethically important moments in fieldwork. It may be particularly useful in situations where the researcher has the potential to undermine the conduct of the study and/or the well‐being‐enhancing role of counterspaces. In this article, I explore my use of reflexivity to traverse ethically important moments I encountered while investigating a counterspace for African‐American youth who had been incarcerated. The ethical challenge concerned whether and how to continue this study in light of realizing that I held implicit biases toward the research participants. I describe my process for arriving at a decision and propose key considerations for the use of reflexivity in supporting ethical fieldwork within counterspaces.     

PROBLEMS FOR SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG'S MORAL CONTRASTIVISM

In his recent book Moral Skepticisms Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues in great detail for contrastivism with respect to justified moral belief and moral knowledge. I raise three questions concerning this view. First, how would Sinnott-Armstrong account for constraints on admissible contrast classes? Secondly, how would he deal with notorious problems concerning relevant reference classes? Finally, how can he account for basic features of moral agency? It turns out that the last problem is the most serious one for his account.     

Collapsing Space: Reply to Gentile and Grill

This article is in response to Katie Gentile’s and Hillary Grill’s discussions of my paper “Childless.” Picking up on themes both authors articulate in their commentaries, I advocate for the expansion of space in which a woman can reflect on and locate her voice, desire, and choice in regard to motherhood, childlessness, and reproduction. Incorporating research and anecdotal evidence, I describe how, regardless of whether or not a woman has children, this space can collapse under the weight of personal, historical, and societal pressures.     

Cultural diversity in nanotechnology ethics

Along with the rapid worldwide advance of nanotechnology, debates on associated ethical issues have spread from local to international levels. However unlike science and engineering issues, international perceptions of ethical issues are very diverse. This paper provides an analysis of how sociocultural factors such as language, cultural heritage, economics and politics can affect how people perceive ethical issues of nanotechnology. By attempting to clarify the significance of sociocultural issues in ethical considerations my aim is to support the ongoing international dialogue on nanotechnology. At the same time I pose the general question of ethical relativism in engineering ethics, that is to say whether or not different ethical views are irreconcilable on a fundamental level.     

“A Lingering Whiff of Descartes in the Air”: From Theoretical Ideas to the Messiness of Clinical Participation: Commentary on Paper by the Boston Change Process Study Group

From a perspective in recognition of my unconscious attachment to their theoretical conceptualizations as well as intrinsic blind spots to both their and my conceptualizing, I offer a consideration of the clinical assistance and difficulty created by the Boston Change Process Study Group's formulation of the reflective, the implicit and the disjunction between the two as an “intention unfolding process.” I first consider how their conceptualizations can either clarify or obscure organizing experience for the analyst trying to make sense of what is going on between her and her analysand. Then I consider how these ideas might guide or mislead the analyst's active participation in the micromoment process flow of clinical interaction. The impact of dissociation is recognized as constitutive of a messiness and uncertainty that accompanies, and often can undermine, the adoption of any theoretical “idea,” including these, for clinical organizing and intervening activity.