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1.
Jeffrey C. King 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):209-242
In “Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account” (MIT Press 2001) (henceforth CD), I argued that complex demonstratives
are quantifiers. Many philosophers had held that demonstratives, both simple and complex, are referring terms. Since the publication
of CD various objections to the account of complex demonstratives I defended in it have been raised. In the present work,
I lay out these objections and respond to them.
相似文献
Jeffrey C. KingEmail: |
2.
Nathan Salmon 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):263-280
Jeffrey King’s principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded
with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory
of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails.
相似文献
Nathan SalmonEmail: |
3.
David Braun 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):243-262
I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.”
King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
相似文献
David BraunEmail: |
4.
Christian Miller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):551-561
The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival
approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
相似文献
Christian MillerEmail: |
5.
Yujin Nagasawa 《Sophia》2007,46(1):65-67
I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His
other attributes.
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Yujin NagasawaEmail: |
6.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
7.
Derek Henry Brown 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(3):377-394
I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both
stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are
not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges
from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role
this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. I argue that indirectness routinely if not typically plays a justificatory
role in such judgements, and not a semantic one, and that the same can be said of such judgements when considered within the
indirect realist framework. The denial of this, on my analysis, is essential to the criticisms of Snowdon and Smith. The discussion
is extended to include scenarios involving the sorts of misconceptions Smith employs.
相似文献
Derek Henry BrownEmail: |
8.
Andrew Mason 《Res Publica》2009,15(2):179-194
Some moral theorists defend a holistic account of practical reasons and deny that the possibility of moral thought depends
upon the existence of moral principles. This article explores the implications of this position for theorising about justice,
which has often aspired to provide us with an ordered list of principles to govern our institutions and practices.
相似文献
Andrew MasonEmail: |
9.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
相似文献
Phillip MontagueEmail: |
10.
Ásta Sveinsdóttir 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):135-148
In this article I introduce a certain kind of anti-realist account of what makes a property essential to an object and defend
it against likely objections. This account, which I call a ‘conferralist’ account, shares some of the attractive features
of other anti-realist accounts, such as conventionalism and expressivism, but I believe, not their respective drawbacks.
相似文献
ásta SveinsdóttirEmail: |
11.
Is Law’s Conventionality Consistent with Law’s Objectivity? 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Matthew H. Kramer 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):241-252
Legal positivism’s multi-faceted insistence on the separability of law and morality includes an insistence on the thoroughly
conventional status of legal norms as legal norms. Yet the positivist affirmation of the conventionality of law may initially
seem at odds with the mind-independence of the existence and contents and implications of legal norms. Mind-independence,
a central aspect of legal objectivity, has been seen by some theorists as incompatible with the mind-dependence of conventions.
Such a perception of incompatibility has led some anti-positivist theorists to reject the notion of law’s conventionality,
and has led some positivist theorists to query law’s mind-independence. What will be contended here is that both camps are
mistaken.
相似文献
Matthew H. KramerEmail: |
12.
Richard Dagger 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):259-275
This article defends the fair-play theory of legal punishment against three objections. The first, the irrelevance objection, is the long-standing complaint that fair play fails to capture what it is about crimes that makes criminals deserving of
punishment; the others are the recently raised false-equivalence and lacks-integration objections. In response, I sketch an account of fair-play theory that is grounded in a conception of the political order
as a meta-cooperative practice—a conception that falls somewhere between contractual and communitarian conceptions—and draw on this
account to show how the theory can overcome the objections.
相似文献
Richard DaggerEmail: |
13.
Victoria S. Harrison 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):97-110
Internalist pluralism is an attractive and elegant theory. However, there are two apparently powerful objections to this approach
that prevent its widespread adoption. According to the first objection, the resulting analysis of religious belief systems
is intrinsically atheistic; while according to the second objection, the analysis is unsatisfactory because it allows religious
objects simply to be defined into existence. In this article, I demonstrate that an adherent of internalist pluralism can
deflect both of these objections, and in the course of so arguing, I deploy a distinction between “conceptual-scheme targetability”
and “successful conceptual-scheme targeting”.
相似文献
Victoria S. HarrisonEmail: |
14.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |
15.
Daniel Giberman 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(2):297-311
Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity
are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose
facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these
objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies.
The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one.
相似文献
Daniel GibermanEmail: |
16.
Rolf Loeber Dustin A. Pardini Alison Hipwell Magda Stouthamer-Loeber Kate Keenan Mark A. Sembower 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2009,37(6):777-791
Relatively little is known about the factor structure of disruptive behavior among preadolescent girls. The present study
reports on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of disruptive girl behavior over four successive data waves as rated
by parents and teachers in a large, representative community sample of girls (N = 2,451). Five factors were identified from parent ratings (oppositional behavior/conduct problems, inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity,
relational aggression, and callous-unemotional behaviors), and four factors were identified derived from teacher ratings (oppositional
behavior/conduct problems/callous-unemotional behaviors, inattention, hyperactivityimpulsivity, and relational aggression).
There was a high degree of consistency of items loading on equivalent factors across parent and teacher ratings. Year-to-year
stability of factors between ages five and 12 was high for parent ratings (ICC = 0.70 to 0.88), and slightly lower for teacher
ratings (ICC = 0.56 to 0.83). These findings are discussed in terms of possible adjustment to the criteria for children's
disruptive behavior disorders found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders.
相似文献
Rolf Loeber (Corresponding author)Email: |
Dustin A. PardiniEmail: |
Alison HipwellEmail: |
Magda Stouthamer-LoeberEmail: |
Kate KeenanEmail: |
Mark A. SembowerEmail: |
17.
Philip Kitcher 《Nanoethics》2007,1(3):177-184
I argue that the title question needs to be taken seriously because there are important questions about how the scientific
agenda should be set. Natural answers to the question – declarations of the proper autonomy of science or expressions of faith
in market forces – are found inadequate. Instead, I propose a form of democracy with respect to scientific research that will
avoid the obvious dangers of a tyranny of ignorance. I conclude with some modest proposals about how the ideal of a democratic
science might be implemented and with a response to common objections.
相似文献
Philip KitcherEmail: |
18.
Jussi Haukioja 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(1):145-151
A recent strategy for defending physicalism about the mind against the zombie argument relies on the so-called conditional
analysis of phenomenal concepts. According to this analysis, what kinds of states our phenomenal concepts refer to depends
crucially on whether the actual world is merely physical or not. John Hawthorne, David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Stalnaker
have claimed, independently, that this analysis explains the conceivability of zombies in a way consistent with physicalism,
thus blocking the zombie argument. Torin Alter has recently presented three arguments against the conditional analysis strategy.
This paper defends the conditional analysis strategy against Alter’s objections.
相似文献
Jussi HaukiojaEmail: |
19.
F. Allan Hanson 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(3):415-424
Recent social theory has departed from methodological individualism’s explanation of action according to the motives and dispositions
of human individuals in favor of explanation in terms of broader agencies consisting of both human and nonhuman elements described
as cyborgs, actor-networks, extended agencies, or distributed cognition. This paper proposes that moral responsibility for
action also be vested in extended agencies. It advances a consequentialist view of responsibility that takes moral responsibility
to be a species of causal responsibility, and it answers objections that might be raised on the basis of intentions and deserts.
相似文献
F. Allan HansonEmail: |
20.
Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the (KK) principle (roughly, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson’s argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly
stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we
reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge
from prior knowledge by deduction.
相似文献
Levi Spectre (Corresponding author)Email: |