Disagreement and Dispute

In this paper, I will trace a distinction between two different ways of thinking about doxastic conflicts. The first way emphasises what is going on at the level of semantics, when two subjects disagree by uttering certain sentences or accepting certain contents. The second way emphasises some aspects that are epistemic in kind, which concern what subjects are rationally required to do whenever they disagree with someone. The semantics-oriented and epistemically-oriented notions will serve for the purpose of assessing some aspects of the debate that revolves around the notions of disagreement on matters of inclination. These aspects include: (i) the idea that disagreements in areas of inclination are somehow defective (Egan 2010); (ii) the idea that Relativism makes disagreement epistemically insignificant (Carter 2013); (iii) the idea that there can be faultless disagreements in which faultlessness is epistemic in kind (Schafer 2011).     

Possible disagreements and defeat

Conciliatory views about disagreement with one’s epistemic peers lead to a somewhat troubling skeptical conclusion: that often, when we know others disagree, we ought to be (perhaps much) less sure of our beliefs than we typically are. One might attempt to extend this skeptical conclusion by arguing that disagreement with merely possible epistemic agents should be epistemically significant to the same degree as disagreement with actual agents, and that, since for any belief we have, it is possible that someone should disagree in the appropriate way, we ought to be much less sure of all of our beliefs than we typically are. In this paper, I identify what I take to be the main motivation for thinking that actual disagreement is epistemically significant and argue that it does not also motivate the epistemic significance of merely possible disagreement.     

Disagreement,Credences, and Outright Belief

This paper addresses a largely neglected question in ongoing debates over disagreement: what is the relation, if any, between disagreements involving credences (call them credal disagreements) and disagreements involving outright beliefs (call them full disagreements)? The first part of the paper offers some desiderata for an adequate account of credal and full disagreement. The second part of the paper argues that both phenomena can be subsumed under a schematic definition which goes as follows: A and B disagree if and only if the accuracy conditions of A's doxastic attitude are such that, if they were fulfilled, this would ipso facto make B's doxastic attitude inaccurate, or vice‐versa.     

Adolescents' perception of bullying: who is the victim? Who is the bully? What can be done to stop bullying?

The main aim of this study was to describe adolescents' perceptions and experiences of bullying: their thoughts about why children and adolescents are bullied, their ideas about why some bully others, and what they believe is important in order to stop bullying. The adolescents were asked about experiences throughout their school years. The study group was comprised of 119 high school students, with a mean age of 17.1 (SD = 1.2). Of the adolescents who reported, 39% indicated that they had been bullied at some time during their school years and 28% said that they had bullied others; 13% reported being both victims and bullies. The ages during which most students had been bullied at school were between 7 and 9 years. Bullies reported that most of the bullying took place when they were 10 to 12 years old. The most common reason as to why individuals are bullied was that they have a different appearance. The participants believe that those who bully suffer from low self-esteem. The most common response to the question "What do you think makes bullying stop?" was that the bully matures. The next most frequent response was that the victim stood up for himself/herself. Those who were not involved in bullying during their school years had a much stronger belief that victims can stand up for themselves than did the victims themselves.     

I am a better driver than you think: examining self‐enhancement for driving ability

We examined whether people recognized that others might disagree with their high self‐assessments of driving ability, and, if so, why. Participants in four experiments expressed a belief that others would assess them as worse drivers than they assessed themselves. This difference appears to be caused by participants' use of their own, idiosyncratic definition of driving ability. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants reported that others would supply similar assessments of their ability when the skill was less ambiguous. Results of Experiment 4 indicate that participants recognize that there may be more than one way to view driving performance. Participants appear aware that others likely disagree with their self‐assessment of driving ability due to differences in how others define driving ability.     

Why do People Disagree? Explaining and Endorsing the Possibility of Partiality in Judgments

The current study examines developing changes in children's intuitions about why disagreements about decisions might occur, focusing on what children understand about partiality and how it may vary depending on the context. Eighty children ages 6 to 13 years old and 20 adults were presented with stories in which there was a disagreement with the judge about who the winner of a contest should be. Participants were asked to generate their own explanations for why the disagreement may have occurred and to evaluate the plausibility of different explanations provided by the experimenter. Even 6-year-olds generated and endorsed partiality as a possible explanation for disagreement, although they did so at a lower rate than older children. A richer understanding of how context influences both the reasons for disagreement and the likelihood of partiality seems to develop over childhood.     

Perception, Content and Rationality

Anil Gupta's Empiricism and Experience is a stylish and stimulating contribution to our subject. My expectation is that those who disagree with some of its central theses will, like me, learn greatly from thinking through where and why they part company with Gupta's lucidly presented position. For the purposes of a Symposium, I select three points of disagreement. Each point in one way or another concerns the epistemic role of the content of experience.     

Belief in Pseudoscience,Cognitive Style and Science Literacy

Most studies of superstitious belief have focused on paranormal phenomena, but this study extended existing findings to non‐paranormal pseudoscience by exploring links between belief and dual‐process thought (cognitive ability and intuitive‐analytical thinking styles). In the present study, Japanese participants (N = 264; 188 women, 76 men; mean age = 25.0; range = 18–81) completed questionnaires on cognitive style and ability and level of beliefs and science literacy. Results showed that belief in paranormal and non‐paranormal pseudoscience correlated positively; after controlling for demographic variables, level of science literacy and cognitive ability, both analytic and intuitive cognitive styles positively predicted paranormal belief. Belief in non‐paranormal pseudoscience associated positively with analytic, but not intuitive style. These results follow the dual‐process view of belief perseverance; however, analytic style affected beliefs oppositely from previous studies. This discrepancy might emerge from Western and Eastern cultural differences in reasoning. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relationship of interparental conflict and global marital adjustment to aggression,anxiety, and immaturity in aggressive and nonclinic children

Although there is agreement that marital problems are associated either directly or indirectly with particular child behavior problems, there is disagreement about the types of marital conflict associated with these problems and the differential effects on boys and girls in clinic and nonclinic samples. We examined the relationships among mothers' ratings of marital adjustment, parenting disagreements, and three child problem factors (aggression, anxiety, and immaturity) after the child's age and family socioeconomic status were controlled. These relationships were compared with samples of boys and girls (3 to 8 years of age) from clinic and nonclinic populations, revealing that parenting disagreement predicted aggression in all groups and that both marital adjustment and parenting disagreement predicted anxiety in boys. Neither marital variable predicted immaturity. Possible reasons for the results (including methodological limitations of the present data) are discussed.Thanks to Merryl Reville and Kath Faulkner, Monica Smith and Dr. Bill Bor of Queensland Division of Child Guidance, and Pat Roberts of the Lady Gowrie Child Centre for their help with subject recruitment. Part of this study was supported by a Social Science Research Grant from the University of Queensland.     

Gender and height: Developmental patterns in knowledge and use of an accurate stereotype

The belief that men are taller than women is an accurate gender stereotype that is presumably learned through everyday encounters with men and women. It is unlike most gender beliefs that are difficult to quantify and verify, and that may be learned through means other than direct experience. This research makes use of several advantages available when studying an accurate stereotype (e.g., the ability to know the “truth” about judged targets). Subjects from five different age/grade levels (kindergarten, third grade, seventh grade, tenth grade, and college, N=491, 92.26% Caucasian, 7.54% Arabic, 0.2% African American) made judgments of “who is taller” among photographed male—female pairs that had actually been matched in height. Judgments were made of kindergarten, seventh grade, and college photo pairs. In a developmental context, height judgments are particularly interesting because the gender difference in height changes at different ages—specifically, girls are taller than boys around seventh grade. The data indicated that subjects were sensitive to the changing height stereotype—i.e., they judged adult males taller than adult females, but seventh grade females taller than seventh-grade males. However this was most strikingly true among subjects directly faced with this reality in their peer context—seventh graders—and among college students. Height judgments were also sensitive to an ingroup (gender) bias. The data are discussed in reference to the broader literature on stereotyping and base rate influences on judgment.     

Meta‐Analyses of the Relationship of Creative Achievement to Both IQ and Divergent Thinking Test Scores

There is disagreement among researchers about whether IQ tests or divergent thinking (DT) tests are better predictors of creative achievement. Resolving this dispute is complicated by the fact that some research has shown a relationship between IQ and DT test scores (e.g., Runco & Albert, 1986; Wallach, 1970). The present study conducted meta‐analyses of the relationships between creative achievement and both IQ and DT test scores. The analyses included 17 studies (with 5,544 participants) that established the correlation coefficients between IQ and creative achievement and 27 studies (with 47,197 participants) that established the correlation coefficients between DT test scores and creative achievement. Marginal, but statistically significant, Fisher's Z‐transformed correlation coefficients were revealed. The analysis found a significantly higher relationship between DT test scores and creative achievement (r = .216) than between IQ test scores and creative achievement (r = .167). The differences in the correlation coefficients were explained by differences in DT tests, creative achievement types, predicted time periods, and creativity subscales. The significant independent moderator effect for different DT tests indicates that the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT) predict creative achievement better than any other DT test included in this study. Among the creative achievement types, music is predicted the best by IQ and all others are predicted best by DT tests. Among the time periods evaluated, the relationship between DT test scores and creative achievement had the highest correlation at the period of 11–15 years.     

工作记忆成分的年龄相关差异对算术策略运用的预测效应

采用选择/无选范式,借助工作记忆成套测验,在两位数乘法估算问题中探讨了工作记忆系统各成分对不同年龄段个体算术策略运用的预测效应。结果显示:(1)工作记忆的不同成分与年龄之间存在明显的相关。表现为,除视空模板成分外,其他各成分得分随着年龄增长而呈现上升趋势;(2)估算策略运用中,年龄与策略选择显著相关,表现为随着年龄增长,策略选择表现明显提高;(3)估算策略运用中,不同年龄个体的工作记忆不同成分和策略选择表现出不同的联系,中央执行均显示出显著的预测效应,语音环路和视空模板的预测效应均不显著。不同年龄个体的工作记忆不同成分对策略执行的预测效应均不显著。上述发现对于深刻理解工作记忆系统在算术认知策略运用中的作用机制具有重要理论含义。     

Intellectual humility and openness to the opposing view

Strong disagreements have stymied today’s political discourse. We investigate intellectual humility – recognizing the limits of one’s knowledge and appreciating others’ intellectual strengths – as one factor that can make disagreements more constructive. In Studies 1 and 2, participants with higher intellectual humility were more open to learning about the opposition’s views during imagined disagreements. In Study 3, those with higher intellectual humility exposed themselves to a greater proportion of opposing political perspectives. In Study 4, making salient a growth mindset of intelligence boosted intellectual humility, and, in turn, openness to opposing views. Results suggest that intellectual humility is associated with openness during disagreement, and that a growth mindset of intelligence may increase intellectual humility. Implications for current political polarization are discussed.     

Choosing Work Group Members: Balancing Similarity, Competence, and Familiarity

This study explores one of the contributors to group composition—the basis on which people choose others with whom they want to work. We use a combined model to explore individual attributes, relational attributes, and previous structural ties as determinants of work partner choice. Four years of data from participants in 33 small project groups were collected, some of which reflects individual participant characteristics and some of which is social network data measuring the previous relationship between two participants. Our results suggest that when selecting future group members people are biased toward others of the same race, others who have a reputation for being competent and hard working, and others with whom they have developed strong working relationships in the past. These results suggest that people strive for predictability when choosing future work group members.     

Developmental change on a five-term transitive inference

Three experiments are reported which utilize the five-term transitive inference task developed by P. E. Bryant and T. Trabasso (Nature (London) 1971, 232, 456–458). In Experiment I, preschool children (mean age = 4 years 8 months) required fewer trials to learn the premises and showed a higher proportion of correct responses on the inferences when the presentation order was serial (i.e., AB, BC, CD, DE) throughout training as compared to when a nonserial presentation order (i.e., BC, DE, AB, CD) was used. In Experiments II and III, preschool (mean age = 4 years 7 months), second grade (mean age = 7 years 8 months), fourth grade (mean age = 9 years 9 months), and college students (mean age = 18 years 11 months) were administered the nonserial presentation version of the five-term transitive inference. An ontogenetic decrease in trials to learn the premises and corresponding increase in proportion correct on both premises and inferences was observed. A developmental model specifying changes at two stages of constructing an internal linear order is proposed to explain the results.     

Deep Disagreement,the Dark Enlightenment,and the Rhetoric of the Red Pill

Deep disagreements are disagreements wherein the dialectical conditions for fruitful argumentative exchange do not obtain. One view from within these disagreements is that the other side has been duped or is so deeply ignorant of and complacent with some illusion, there is no hope for exchange. The Dark Enlightenment's critique of liberal democracy and progressive politics (which gave rise to the alt‐right movement) proceeds on this premise, calling their critical philosophy ‘the red pill’ and terming the opposition's program ‘the Cathedral’. Despite the depth of their disagreement with progressives, there is evidence for an optimistic program of critical dialogue in this instance of deep disagreement.     

Cognitive predictors of symptom return following depression treatment

This study tested whether poor cognitive change during depression treatment predicted time to return of depressive symptoms. Depressed participants (N = 121) completed assessments of dysfunctional attitudes and extreme thinking (i.e., number of totally agree and totally disagree responses) during hospitalization and again after 6 months of outpatient treatment. Participants then completed monthly depression assessments for 1 year. Survival analyses for time to symptom recurrence during follow-up were conducted among participants who reported 50% improvement in their depressive symptoms and were at least partially asymptomatic at the end of treatment (n = 53). Poor change in dysfunctional attitudes and poor change in extreme thinking both predicted shorter time to return of depressive symptoms.     

SES differences in young children’s metacognition in the context of mathematical problem solving

This investigation examines socioeconomic (SES) differences in young children’s development of key aspects of metacognition and related language. The participants were 102 children ranging in age from 4 years 0 months to 5 years 11 months in five daycare centers located in New York City. Metacognitive abilities and language were observed as children engaged in an individually administered clinical interview concerning mathematical problem solving. The results indicate that the ability to describe thinking and explain ideas is stronger in the upper-SES group than the middle- or lower-SES groups. The findings also indicate that all the SES groups, and children of both ages, show little awareness of mistakes and adaptability without adult assistance. The capacity to express thinking was found to increase with age during early childhood. The results suggest that young children begin to employ rudimentary forms of metacognition before the onset of formal schooling. Implications for education are discussed.