Moral Evil,Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy

Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in ‘On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create finite beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts. However, the work of Carl Christian Eberhard Schmid showed Kant that given his own beliefs about freedom and the nature of responsibility one could not account for moral evil in this way without tacitly denying that human beings were responsible for their actions. This result is significant not only because it explains an otherwise puzzling shift in Kant's philosophy of religion, but also because it shows that the theodicy essay provides powerful evidence that Kant's thinking about moral evil and freedom underwent fundamental shifts between early works such as the Groundwork and later works like the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason.     

Why Conclusions Should Remain Single

This paper argues that logical inferentialists should reject multiple-conclusion logics. Logical inferentialism is the position that the meanings of the logical constants are determined by the rules of inference they obey. As such, logical inferentialism requires a proof-theoretic framework within which to operate. However, in order to fulfil its semantic duties, a deductive system has to be suitably connected to our inferential practices. I argue that, contrary to an established tradition, multiple-conclusion systems are ill-suited for this purpose because they fail to provide a ‘natural’ representation of our ordinary modes of inference. Moreover, the two most plausible attempts at bringing multiple conclusions into line with our ordinary forms of reasoning, the disjunctive reading and the bilateralist denial interpretation, are unacceptable by inferentialist standards.     

Why Enactivists Should Care about Wittgenstein

Philosophia - There is now an established literature on the link between later Wittgenstein and enactivist approaches in cognitive science. However, is this link not just a matter for card carrying...     

Why Liberal Neutralists Should Accept Educational Neutrality

Educational neutrality states that decisions about school curricula and instruction should be made independently of particular comprehensive doctrines. Many political philosophers of education reject this view in favor of some non-neutral alternative. Contrary to what one might expect, some prominent liberal neutralists have also rejected this view in parts of their work. This paper has two purposes. The first part of the paper concerns the relationship between liberal neutrality and educational neutrality. I examine arguments by Rawls and Nagel and argue that some of the same arguments they use to justify liberal neutrality also justify educational neutrality; thus, if we accept these arguments for liberal neutrality, we should also accept educational neutrality. The second part of the paper defends educational neutrality against objections that it is impossible and objections that it is undesirable.     

Employee Happiness: Why We Should Care

Albert Schweitzer once stated that “success is not the key to happiness, happiness is the key to success.” Despite this widespread belief, employee happiness is often perceived by organizations as an insubstantial topic, irrelevant to bottom-line outcomes. Equally as problematic, past investigations have primarily utilized other positive emotion variables as a proxy for happiness, thus convoluting the relationships between happiness and work outcomes. As such, taking a scientist-practitioner approach, the present study sought to address the need to: (a) directly measure employees’ happiness, (b) link employee happiness to outcomes of organizational interest, and (c) assess the impact that organizational psychosocial factors have in decreasing employee happiness levels. Therefore, by measuring employee happiness, job demands, and organizational outcomes through a two-wave full panel design, the present study provided evidence for employee happiness’s ability to significantly mediate the relationship between job demands and organizational outcomes. Explicitly, a high level of job demands decreased employee happiness, which subsequently decreased employees’ organizational commitment, task performance, and contextual performance, while increasing turnover intentions and counterproductive work behaviors. These results carry significant theoretical and practical implications. Future QOL (Quality of Life) and organizational research would benefit from building on the present findings and establishing a nomological net of employee happiness. Additionally, practitioners have the opportunity to utilize this evidence to demonstrate the impact that employee happiness has on organizationally-relevant outcomes and the role that organizations can have in fostering employee happiness.

     

Why Egalitarians Should Not Care About Equality

Can outcome equality (say, in welfare) ever be unjust? Despite the extensive inquiry into the nature of luck egalitarianism in recent years, this question is curiously under-explored. Leading luck egalitarians pay little attention to the issue of unjust equalities, and when they do, they appear not to speak in one voice. To facilitate the inquiry into the potential injustice of equalities, the paper introduces two rival interpretations of egalitarianism: the responsibility view, which may condemn equalities as unjust (when they reflect unequal levels of personal responsibility); and, the non-responsibility view, which does not. It then teases out the implications of these two views, in the hope of establishing that the latter is at least as plausible as the former. The paper thus establishes that the egalitarian ideal can be plausibly formulated in a way that condemns only (certain) inequalities but never equalities, and that this formulation is both coherent and attractive.     

Why We Earthlings Should Colonize Mars!

Mars can and should be settled with Earth émigrés. For our generation and many that will follow, Mars is the New World. Exploration, settlement, and colonization are inherent in the human spirit. We earthlings must reject misleading prophesies such as the Malthusian fear that we are running out of resources on our planet. Resources abound off-Earth in space. Humanity's potential for growth is unlimited. Failure to terraform and colonize Mars would constitute a failure to live up to our human nature, and a betrayal of our responsibility as members of the community of life itself.     

德教概念的儒学意蕴

德教是由上个世纪的中叶,从中国东南沿海传至东南亚,在东南亚华人中广为流传的一种新兴的民间宗教。它已接近成型,有自己的教主、神灵系统、教义、经典;有自己独特的宗教仪式、祈祷方式、通过扶鸾沟通神人;有固定的宗教活动场所、德教会的组织和称之为德生的宗教信徒。应该说现代宗教学所界定宗教的基本要素,德教或多或     

Neonatal Euthanasia Is Unsupportable: The Groningen Protocol Should Be Abandoned

The growing support for voluntary active euthanasia (VAE) is evident in the recently approved Dutch Law on Termination of Life on Request. Indeed, the debate over legalized VAE has increased in European countries, the United States, and many other nations over the last several years. The proponents of VAE argue that when a patient judges that the burdens of living outweigh the benefits, euthanasia can be justified. If some adults suffer to such an extent that VAE is justified, then one may conclude that some children suffer to this extent as well. In an attempt to alleviate the suffering of extremely ill neonates, the University Medical Center Groningen developed a protocol for neonatal euthanasia. In this article, I first present the ethical justifications for VAE and discuss how these arguments relate to euthanizing ill neonates. I then argue that, even if one accepts the justification for VAE in adults, neonatal euthanasia cannot be supported, primarily because physicians and parents can never accurately assess the suffering of children. I argue that without the testament of the patient herself as to the nature and magnitude of her suffering, physicians can never accurately weigh the benefits and burdens of a child’s life, and therefore any such system would condemn to death some children whose suffering is not unbearable. I conclude that because the primary duty of physicians is to never harm their patients, neonatal euthanasia cannot be supported.     

Why Science cannot be Value-Free

Against the ideal of value-free science I argue that science is not––and cannot be––value-free and that relevant values are both cognitive and moral. I develop an argument by indicating various aspects of the value-ladenness of science. The recognition of the value-ladenness of science requires rethinking our understanding of the rationality and responsibility of science. Its rationality cannot be seen as merely instrumental––as it was seen by the ideal of value-free science––for this would result in limiting the autonomy of science and reducing scientists to “minds to hire”. The scientific rationality must be seen as practical rationality which takes into account the full horizon of values. The scientific responsibility must also be broaden in scope and type. On this basis I draw three practical conclusions concerning the organization of research and training of young scientists, appealing to Plato’s claim that those most capable of healing are also those most capable of harming.     

Why purists should be infallibilists

Philosophical Studies - Two of the most orthodox ideas in epistemology are fallibilism and purism. According to the fallibilist, one can know that a particular claim is true even though one’s...