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1.
On Sinnott-Armstrong’s Case Against Moral Intuitionism 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jonathan Smith 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2010,13(1):75-88
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued against moral intuitionism, according to which some of our moral beliefs are justified
without needing to be inferred from any other beliefs. He claims that any prima facie justification some non-inferred moral
beliefs might have enjoyed is removed because many of our moral beliefs are formed in circumstances where either (1) we are
partial, (2) others disagree with us and there is no reason to prefer our moral judgement to theirs, (3) we are emotional
in a way that clouds our judgement, (4) the circumstances are conducive to illusion, or (5) the source of our moral beliefs
is unreliable or disreputable. I take issue with the elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument that centre on (1) to (3) and
(5), concluding that his case against moral intuitionism is unpersuasive. 相似文献
2.
Philosophia - After summarizing the content of Philip Rossi’s book, The Ethical Commonwealth in History: Peace-Making as the Moral Vocation of Humanity, I pose two main questions. First, does... 相似文献
3.
Imtiaz Moosa 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):159-182
In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical
claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing
how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent
conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not.
My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.
相似文献
Imtiaz MoosaEmail: |
4.
Philosophia - Many philosophers have argued that moral disagreement raises metaphysical and/or epistemological challenges for moral realism. In this paper, I consider whether widespread moral... 相似文献
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Matthew H. Kramer 《The Journal of Ethics》2017,21(2):185-212
This paper seeks to clarify and defend the proposition that moral realism is best elaborated as a moral doctrine. I begin by upholding Ronald Dworkin’s anti-Archimedean critique of the error theory against some strictures by Michael Smith, and I then briefly suggest how a proponent of moral realism as a moral doctrine would respond to Smith’s defense of the Archimedeanism of expressivism. Thereafter, this paper moves to its chief endeavor. By differentiating clearly between expressivism and quasi-realism (or moral realism as a moral doctrine), the paper highlights both their distinctness and their compatibility. In so doing, it underscores the affinities between Blackburnian quasi-realism and moral realism as a moral doctrine. Finally, this paper contends—in line with my earlier work on these matters—that moral realism as a moral doctrine points to the need for some reorienting of meta-ethical enquiries rather than for the abandoning of them. 相似文献
7.
Philosophia - The social nature of human beings and individualistic characterizing destiny of individuals is contradictory and call for philosophical interrogation. Segun Ogungbemi has... 相似文献
8.
Stephen Palmquist 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):17-28
Although Kant is often interpreted as an Enlightenment Deist, Kant scholars are increasingly recognizing aspects of his philosophy that are more amenable to theism. If Kant regarded himself as a theist, what kind of theist was he? The theological approach that best fits Kant’s model of God is panentheism, whereby God is viewed as a living being pervading the entire natural world, present ‘in’ every part of nature, yet going beyond the physical world. The purpose of Kant’s restrictions on our knowledge of God is not to cast doubt on God’s existence, but to preserve a mystery in God’s reality so that God is always more than the world as we experience it. The same God who is theoretically unknowable is also an aspect of the moral substratum of the physical world. Kant’s moral Trinity (God as righteous Lawgiver, benevolent Ruler, and just Judge) permeates everything, as the ultimate unifier of reason and nature. This Paper was delivered during the 2007 APA Pacific Mini-Conference on Models of God, together with papers published in Philosophia 35:3–4. 相似文献
9.
Patricia Sheridan 《Sophia》2007,46(3):263-275
Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact,
Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration
and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate
what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, I hope to bring
to light an otherwise unexpected continuity between moral sense theory and the moral rationalism to which it is usually opposed,
and, in so doing, draw attention to the anti-sceptical realism that lies at the heart of both accounts.
相似文献
Patricia SheridanEmail: |
10.
Mark Hanin 《Res Publica》2012,18(4):283-301
To enhance the plausibility of naturalistic moral realism, David Copp develops an argument from epistemic defeaters aiming to show that strongly a priori synthetic moral truths do not exist. In making a case for the non-naturalistic position, I locate Copp??s account within the wider literature on peer disagreement; I identify key points of divergence between Copp??s doctrine and conciliatorist doctrines; I introduce the notion of ??minimal moral competence??; I contend that some plausible benchmarks for minimal moral competence are grounded in substantive moral considerations; and I discuss two forms of spinelessness that Copp??s moral naturalism could result in. 相似文献
11.
Extending prior research on the characteristics potentially associated with adolescents’ tendencies to be a moral rebel, the present study found that adolescents themselves, their peers, and their teachers agreed on adolescents’ tendencies to (a) possess a moral identity, (b) possess moral courage characteristics, and (c) be a moral rebel. Although moral identity (when considered independently and in combination with the moral courage characteristics) did not consistently predict the tendency to be a moral rebel, all indices of the adolescents’ moral courage characteristics positively predicted the tendency to be a moral rebel. 相似文献
12.
Science and Engineering Ethics - This paper critically assesses John Danaher’s ‘ethical behaviourism’, a theory on how the moral status of robots should be determined. The basic... 相似文献
13.
Joel Thomas Tierno 《Sophia》2008,47(2):223-230
In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning
the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately
explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques,
is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free
will is compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive.
相似文献
Joel Thomas TiernoEmail: |
14.
Philosophia - One version of Pascal’s Wager says we should commit to, or cultivate belief in, whatever religion we think is most likely to bring us eternal joy. I pose a reductio for this... 相似文献
15.
Sven Ove Hansson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2014,17(4):643-651
When presented with a situation involving an agent’s choice between alternative actions, a moral oracle says what the agent is allowed to do. The oracle bases her advice on some moral theory, but the nature of that theory is not known by us. The moral oracle’s test consists in determining whether a series of questions to the oracle can be so constructed that her answers will reveal which of two given types of theories she adheres to. The test can be applied to moral theories in order to determine if they differ in their recommendations for action. Based on this test, a terminology is developed to specify different forms and degrees of distinguishability between moral theories, or types of theories, in terms of their recommendations for action. In conclusion, the test is applied to consequentialism and utilitarianism. 相似文献
16.
Matheson Russell 《Husserl Studies》2011,27(1):41-62
Over four decades, Habermas has put to paper many critical remarks on Husserl’s work as occasion has demanded. These scattered
critical engagements nonetheless do add up to a coherent (if contestable) position regarding the project of transcendental
phenomenology. This essay provides a comprehensive reconstruction of the arguments Habermas makes and offers a critical assessment
of them. With an eye in particular to the theme of intersubjectivity (a theme of fundamental interest to both thinkers), it
is argued that Habermas’s arguments do indeed show up deficiencies in Husserlian phenomenology and yet that they do not succeed
in proving that we must abandon the methods and tasks of phenomenological research. On the contrary, it is argued that phenomenological
methods may well be needed in order to investigate certain philosophical questions that Habermas’s theory of communication
has thus far only partially addressed. 相似文献
17.
Thomas Nawrath 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(4):365-377
Following Kant, it is clear that, but probably not completely how we are morally obligated. I will point out that there are three possible ways to struggle for an understanding of how we can be obligated as rational beings and also as ordinary human beings. There is (a) the argument from rational feeling (‘Achtung’), (b) the argument from language, and finally (c) the argument from systematization. Reading the later passages of the ‘Critique of pure Reason’ and following its instructions, we will understand why education has to be founded by the same kind of argumentation as the natural sciences. The systematical analysis of Kant’s analogy between the physical body and the moral obligation will explain the suspected gap between our just rational and our whole selves. The most important part of the demanded bridge will be Kant’s Moral Laboratory. 相似文献
18.
Bj?rn Thomassen 《Philosophia》2012,40(2):237-252
This article argues that we must abandon the still predominant view of modernity as based upon a separation between the secular
and the religious - a “separation” which is allegedly now brought into question again in “postsecularity”. It is more meaningful
to start from the premise that religion and politics have always co-existed in various fields of tension and will continue
to do so. The question then concerns the natures and modalities of this tension, and how one can articulate a publically grounded
reason with reference to it. It will first be argued that this question cannot be articulated, let alone fully answered, from
the position developed by John Rawls. A different approach will then be developed, building on the writings of Eric Voegelin.
This involves a much more serious engagement with the classical tradition in thought and philosophy than found in Rawls. It
also implies much more than a “pragmatic” recognition of religion as a possible source for overlapping consensus, since for
Voegelin a true, balanced rationality can only depart from an experientially grounded encounter with the transcendent. 相似文献
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Thomas Douglas 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2014,17(2):325-334
Kelly Sorensen defends a model of the relationship between effort and moral worth in which the effort exerted in performing a morally desirable action contributes positively to the action’s moral worth, but the effort required to perform the action detracts from its moral worth. I argue that Sorensen’s model, though on the right track, is mistaken in three ways. First, it fails to capture the relevance of counterfactual effort to moral worth. Second, it wrongly implies that exerting unnecessary effort confers moral worth on an action. Third, it fails to adequately distinguish between cases in which effort is required because of defects of moral character and those in which effort is required because of barriers external to moral character, such as social pressures or non-moral cognitive deficits. I suggest three amendments to Sorensen’s model that correct these three defects. 相似文献