共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Robert Pasnau 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):353-369
When objects are illuminated, the light they reflect does not simply bounce off their surface. Rather, that light is entirely
reabsorbed and then reemitted, as the result of a complex microphysical event near the surface of the object. If we are to
be physicalists regarding color, then we should analyze colors in terms of that event, just as we analyze heat in terms of
molecular motion, and sound in terms of vibrations. On this account, colors are not standing properties of objects, but events,
or (more cautiously) properties associated with events. Accordingly, objects in the dark are no more colored than a turned-off
stove is hot. Such an account requires rejecting some of what folk ordinarily say about color, but this is the most coherent
version of color physicalism.
相似文献
Robert PasnauEmail: |
2.
Brian P. McLaughlin 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):149-172
Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a new definition of `realization’ and used it to try to explain how mental events can be causes
within the framework of a non-reductive physicalism. I argue that it is not actually his notion of realization that is doing
the work in his account of mental causation, but rather the assumption that certain physical properties entail mental properties
that do not entail them. I also point out how his account relies on certain other controversial assumptions, including analytical
filler-functionalism for mental properties, and the assumption that causes must be proportional to their effects. I conclude
by pointing out that Shoemaker has provided no explanation of why, on his view, certain physical properties entail mental
properties.
相似文献
Brian P. McLaughlinEmail: |
3.
Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):509-529
It is a common conviction among philosophers who hold that phenomenal properties, qualia, are distinct from any cognitive,
intentional, or functional properties, that it is possible to trace the neural correlates of these properties. The main purpose
of this paper is to present a challenge to this view, and to show that if “non-cognitive” phenomenal properties exist at all,
they lie beyond the reach of neuroscience. In the final section it will be suggested that they also lie beyond the reach of
psychology, so that they may be said to lie beyond the reach of science.
相似文献
Hilla Jacobson-HorowitzEmail: |
4.
Frank Hofmann 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):173-182
Sydney Shoemaker has attempted to save mental causation by a new account of realization. As Brian McLaughlin argues convincingly,
the account has to face two major problems. First, realization does not guarantee entailment. So even if mental properties
are realized by physical properties, they need not be entailed by them. This is the first, rather general metaphysical problem.
A second problem, which relates more directly to mental causation is that Shoemaker must appeal to some kind of proportionality
as a constraint on causation in order to avoid redundant mental causation. I argue that, in addition, a “piling problem” arises,
since causal powers seem to be bestowed twice. Then, I try to sketch an alternative view of the relation between causal powers
and properties—a reductionist view—which fares better on some accounts. But it may have to face another and, perhaps, serious
problem, the “problem of the natural unity of properties”. Finally, I will pose a question about the relation between causal
powers and causation.
相似文献
Frank HofmannEmail: |
5.
Greg Janzen 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):355-366
According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's
intentional (or representational) content. In this article I attempt to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called
change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. Specifically, I argue that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it
should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist
strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores
an alternative antiintentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can
vary despite sameness of phenomenal character.
相似文献
Greg JanzenEmail: |
6.
Uriah Kriegel 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):79-95
The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we
should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of
intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is
not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
相似文献
Uriah KriegelEmail: |
7.
Jussi Haukioja 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(1):145-151
A recent strategy for defending physicalism about the mind against the zombie argument relies on the so-called conditional
analysis of phenomenal concepts. According to this analysis, what kinds of states our phenomenal concepts refer to depends
crucially on whether the actual world is merely physical or not. John Hawthorne, David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Stalnaker
have claimed, independently, that this analysis explains the conceivability of zombies in a way consistent with physicalism,
thus blocking the zombie argument. Torin Alter has recently presented three arguments against the conditional analysis strategy.
This paper defends the conditional analysis strategy against Alter’s objections.
相似文献
Jussi HaukiojaEmail: |
8.
Restating the role of phenomenal experience in the formation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion
Garry Young 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(2):177-189
In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed
to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage
account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion,
I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played by the
phenomenology underlying the disorder, both in terms of the formation and maintenance of the delusional belief. This paper
therefore proposes an interactionist two-stage model in which the phenomenal experience of the Capgras patient is examined,
emphasised, and its relation to top-down processing discussed.
相似文献
Garry YoungEmail: |
9.
Paul Coates 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(4):445-462
This paper defends a dynamic model of the way in which perception is integrated with action, a model I refer to as ‘the navigational
account’. According to this account, employing vision and other forms of distance perception, a creature acquires information
about its surroundings via the senses, information that enables it to select and navigate routes through its environment,
so as to attain objects that satisfy its needs. This form of perceptually guided activity should be distinguished from other
kinds of semi-automatic responses to visual stimuli that do not necessarily involve conscious experiences. It essentially
involves inner states, which involve both the awareness of phenomenal qualities, and also a representational component. The
navigational account is compared here with the enactive approach to perception, which opposes the view that perceptual experiences
are inner states. This paper argues that a full account of perception raises a number of different questions. One central
explanatory project concerns questions about the kinds of processes that currently enable a creature to identify and respond appropriately to distant objects: the answer, it is argued, lies in acknowledging
the role of conscious inner representations in guiding navigational behaviour through complex environments. The fact that
perception and action are interdependent does not conflict with the claim that inner representational states comprise an essential
stage in visual processing.
相似文献
Paul CoatesEmail: |
10.
11.
Previous studies have shown that a change in an existing object is not as effective in capturing attention as the appearance
of a new object. This view was recently challenged by Lu and Zhou (Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 12:567–572, 2005), who
found strong capture effects for an object changing its color. We suspected that this finding critically depends on a procedural
particularity in Lu and Zhou’s study, namely that the color of the unique item and the color of the no-unique items randomly
switched between trials. In the current study we replicate Lu and Zhou’s capture effect (Experiment 1) and show that no capture
occurs when the color-to-stimuli assignment is fixed (Experiment 2). Two further experiments suggest that the capture effect
in Experiment 1 is not because the unique item switched color (Experiment 3), but because all the no-unique items switched
color (Experiment 4). The results are discussed considering top-down modulation and inter-trial priming effects.
相似文献
Adrian von Mühlenen (Corresponding author)Email: |
Markus ConciEmail: |
12.
Jens Johansson 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):87-89
Many philosophers maintain that artworks, such as statues, are constituted by other material objects, such as lumps of marble.
I give an argument against this view, an argument which appeals to mereological simples.
相似文献
Jens JohanssonEmail: |
13.
This paper presents an new epistemicist account of vagueness, one that avoids standard arbitrariness worries by exploiting
a plenitudinous metaphysic.
相似文献
Andrew McGonigalEmail: |
14.
To build a true conscious robot requires that a robot’s “brain” be capable of supporting the phenomenal consciousness as human’s
brain enjoys. Operational Architectonics framework through exploration of the temporal structure of information flow and inter-area
interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations [by examining topographic sharp transition processes in
the scalp electroencephalogram (EEG) on the millisecond scale] reveals and describes the EEG architecture which is analogous
to the architecture of the phenomenal world. This suggests that the task of creating the “machine” consciousness would require
a machine implementation that can support the kind of hierarchical architecture found in EEG.
相似文献
Andrew A. FingelkurtsEmail: |
15.
Richard A. Lynch 《Human Studies》2008,31(2):209-221
This article brings out certain philosophical difficulties in Lacan’s account of the mirror stage, the initial moment of the
subject’s development. For Lacan, the “original organization of the forms of the ego” is “precipitated” in an infant’s self-recognition
in a mirror image; this event is explicitly prior to any social interactions. A Hegelian objection to the Lacanian account
argues that social interaction and recognition of others by infants are necessary prerequisites for infants’ capacity to recognize
themselves in a mirror image. Thus mutual recognition with another, rather than self-recognition in a mirror, is what makes
possible subsequent ego-formation and self-consciousness. This intersubjective critique suggests that many of the psychoanalytic
consequences that Lacan derives from the mirror stage (e.g., alienation, narcissism, and aggressivity) may need to be rethought.
相似文献
Richard A. LynchEmail: |
16.
Giolo Fele 《Human Studies》2008,31(3):299-322
The aim of my paper is twofold. First, I show how the notion of phenomenal field can be used to examine, describe and understand
particular collective patterns pertaining to the everyday domain of our common social experience. Secondly, I outline the
role of the notion of “phenomenal field” in ethnomethodology. I briefly discuss Gurwitsch’s notion of functional meaning. After presenting the argument, I show “the locally achieved ordinariness of a common task”, that is the lining up of the
player of the two teams in the pitch, as an embodied coherence of figural contexture in its empirical perceptual details, as Garfinkel says.
相似文献
Giolo FeleEmail: |
17.
Cornejo C 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2008,42(2):171-178
I outline in this paper a pragmatical approach to meaning. Meaning is defined as a phenomenologically experienced construal.
As such, it is a dynamic object whose first evidence comes from the first person rather than the third one. At the same time,
the approach assumes that meaning is not an individual creation, but rather an intersubjective one. Origins of meaning are
also to be founded not ‘in the head’ of a cognitive system or subject, but in the intersubjective space contingently formed
between a subject (S), an other (O) and a common object (R), which they talk about. Approaching this minimal communicative
situation therefore requires realizing that the phenomenological dimension is always implied in any intersubjective encounter.
The observed synchronized co-feeling among subjects, upon which language comprehension takes place, I call ‘co-phenomenology’.
When analyzed in this way, intersubjectivity shows at the same time its social, phenomenological and biological dimensions.
相似文献
Carlos CornejoEmail: |
18.
Alba Papa-Grimaldi 《Axiomathes》2008,18(3):339-358
Kant, in various parts of his treatment of causality, refers to determinism or the principle of sufficient reason as an inescapable
principle. In fact, in the Second Analogy we find the elements to reconstruct a purely phenomenal determinism as a logical and tautological truth. I endeavour in this
article to gather these elements into an organic theory of phenomenal causality and then show, in the third section, with
a specific argument which I call the “paradox of phenomenal observation”, that this phenomenal determinism is the only rational
approach to causality because any logico-reductivistic approach, such as the Humean one, would destroy the temporal order
and so the very possibility to talk of a causal relation. I also believe that, all things said, Kant did not achieve a much
greater comprehension of the problem than Hume did, in his theory of causality, for he did not free a phenomenal approach
from the impasse of reductivism as his reflections on “simultaneous causation” and “vanishing quantities” indeed show, and
this I will argue in Sect. 4 of this article.
相似文献
Alba Papa-GrimaldiEmail: |
19.
Bill Brewer 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):87-97
Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the object presented to the mind
in that experience. Hallucination and illusion suggest that this requires untenable mind-dependent objects. Current orthodoxy
replaces the appeal to direct objects with the claim that perceptual experience is characterized instead by its representational
content. This paper argues that the move to content is problematic, and reclaims the early modern empiricist insight as perfectly
consistent, even in cases of illusion, with the realist contention that these direct objects of perception are the persisting
mind-independent physical objects we all know and love.
相似文献
Bill BrewerEmail: |
20.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |