Wishful Thinking and the Unconscious: A Reply to Gouws

Abstract

This paper argues against the view that the Freudian unconscious can be understood as an extension of ordinary belief-desire psychology. The paper argues that Freud’s picture of the mind challenges the paradigm of folk psychology, as it is understood by much contemporary philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. The dynamic unconscious postulated by psychoanalysis operates according to rules and principles that are distinct in kind from those rules that organise rational and conscious thought. Psychoanalysis offers us a radical reconception of our ordinary way of thinking about our own minds.     

A collective unconscious reconsidered: Jung's archetypal imagination in the light of contemporary psychology and social science

A needed rapprochement between Jung and the contemporary human sciences may rest less on the much debated relevance of a biologistic collective unconscious than on a re-inscribing of an archetypal imagination, as the phenomenological and empirical core of Jungian psychology. The most promising approaches in this regard in terms of theory and research in psychology come from combining the cognitive psychology of metaphor and synaesthesia, individual differences in imaginative absorption and openness to numinous experience and spirituality as a form of symbolic intelligence. On the socio-cultural side, this cognitive psychology of archetypal imagination is also congruent with Lévi-Strauss on the metaphoric roots of mythological thinking, and Durkheim on a sociology of collective consciousness. This conjoined perspective, while validating the cross cultural commonality of physical metaphor intuited by Jung and Hillman on alchemy, also shows Jung's Red Book, considered as the expressive source for his more formal psychology, to be far closer in spirit to a socio-cultural collective consciousness, based on metaphoric imagination, than to a phylogenetic or evolutionary unconscious. A mutual re-inscribing of Jung into congruent areas of contemporary psychology, anthropology, sociology, and vice versa, can help to further validate Jung's key observations and is fully consistent with Jung's own early efforts at synthesis within the human sciences.     

The Unconscious Mind

ABSTRACT— The unconscious mind is still viewed by many psychological scientists as the shadow of a "real" conscious mind, though there now exists substantial evidence that the unconscious is not identifiably less flexible, complex, controlling, deliberative, or action-oriented than is its counterpart. This "conscious-centric" bias is due in part to the operational definition within cognitive psychology that equates unconscious with subliminal . We review the evidence challenging this restricted view of the unconscious emerging from contemporary social cognition research, which has traditionally defined the unconscious in terms of its unintentional nature; this research has demonstrated the existence of several independent unconscious behavioral guidance systems: perceptual, evaluative, and motivational. From this perspective, it is concluded that in both phylogeny and ontogeny, actions of an unconscious mind precede the arrival of a conscious mind—that action precedes reflection.     

Unconscious creativity: When can unconscious thought outperform conscious thought?

Recent research suggests that unconscious thought is superior to conscious thought in many cognitive domains. In this article, we show that the duration of unconscious thought has an inverted-U shaped relationship with creativity performance. Unconscious thought is, thus, unlikely to provide creative advantage over conscious thought when deliberation duration is either short or long. However, when deliberation duration is of a moderate length, the creative output of unconscious thought surpasses that of conscious thought. Furthermore, the superiority of unconscious thought pertains only to the novelty dimension of creativity, but not the appropriateness dimension. These findings not only shed light on the powers and limits of unconscious thought but also illuminate the importance of calibration in utilizing unconscious thought to boost creativity.     

脑的感知觉无意识加工及其研究进展

该文从无意识加工与认知、脑结构,神经网络的关系等三个层面,阐述了近年来认知神经科学在无意识研究方面的进展。主要就无意识与意识的相互转化、无意识加工与认知层次、脑结构之间的关联性、突触的联结方式等问题进行了讨论,并对认知神经科学如何研究无意识与意识问题提出展望,     

Fechner as a pioneering theorist of unconscious cognition

Fechner remains virtually unknown for his psychological research on the unconscious. However, he was one of the most prominent theorists of unconscious cognition of the 19th century, in the context of the rise of scientific investigations on the unconscious in German psychology. In line with the models previously developed by Leibniz and Herbart, Fechner proposes an explanative system of unconscious phenomena based on a modular conception of the mind and on the idea of a functional dissociation between representational and attentional activity. For Fechner, the unconscious is a state of consciousness resulting from the isolation of representational activity from the rest of psychical life. Unconscious mental phenomena are unattended mental states that behave autonomously while remaining able to act on consciousness. This paper aims to revisit Fechner's contribution to the history of the unconscious, but also the theoretical significance of the Fechnerian unconscious vis-à-vis current research on the cognitive unconscious.     

Zur Natur des „Sechsten Sinnes“

Unconscious interactions have been conceptualized since Sigmund Freud, especially within the framework of transference and countertransference,. Nowadays, findings in the cognitive neurosciences (cognitive psychology, neurobiology) allow for a broader view of unconscious mental processes, e.g., in terms of subliminal perception or unconscious information processing. In this paper, a model is presented for understanding countertransference processes in the context of both psychoanalysis and the cognitive neurosciences. The basic concept of this model is that, within the framework of (unconscious) transference, the patient sends complex social information which the therapist perceives both consciously and unconsciously. Further unconscious information processing leads to the known countertransference phenomena, which consist of specific emotions, body feelings, fantasies, or impulses for action, and in some respects facilitate a “sixth sense” on the part of the therapist. The various processes of unconscious information processing lead to a situation in which countertransference includes parts of both the patient and therapist. At the conclusion of the paper, current neuroscientific concepts of unconscious processes are applied to countertransference, and the unconscious nature of countertransference is discussed from this perspective.     

New approaches to understanding unconscious processes: Implicit and explicit memory systems

Abstract

Freud viewed the unconscious as being roughly equivalent to dynamically repressed wishes, needs, and motivations. Findings from developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis, and neuroscience over the past 40 years have dramatically changed our views of unconscious processes and the human mind. It is now clear that Freud's dynamic unconscious is only a minor segment of information that is processed at subsymbolic, implicit, and automatic levels. Only a fraction of this information is further processed at explicit conscious levels. Moreover, the vast majority of the information that remains nonconscious is adaptive and has major consequences for development. We examine some clinical implications of these views.     

杜威反射弧概念中的具身认知思想

伴随第二代认知科学的兴起,大量研究者开始在具身认知这一主张上达成共识,即有机体的身体运动以及与身体运动相关的特征和感觉经验（或称身体经验）在认知过程中扮演重要角色,而有机体的身体又嵌入到其所处的动态环境之中,从而形成一个不可分割的整体。杜威在《心理学中的反射弧概念》一文中的论证蕴含了上述具身认知思想的雏形,主要体现在：（1）身体运动协调构成了感觉运动回路。（2）在身体运动协调基础上形成的身体经验在感觉运动回路中具有连续性。（3）感觉运动回路中的身体运动与经验以环境为背景,最终目的是为了适应环境。未来的具身认知研究可以借鉴杜威所论证的反射弧概念,对上述三个方面作出进一步探索。     

The Influence of Joseph Sandler's Work on Contemporary Psychoanalysis

This overview stresses Joseph Sandler's integration of classical ego psychology with contemporary object relations theory. As part of this integration, Sandler clarified the origins and internal structure of the superego as a consequence and development of the representational world. The representational world, in turn, derives from the internalization of significant self- and object representations in the context of affect activation as fundamental motivational factors. Sandler described the transformation of internalized object relations into an unconscious template, expressed in repetitive behavior patterns, and the reactivation of its constituent object relations in the transference. In differentiating the present and past unconscious in the transference, Sandler described the role responsiveness of the analyst in the psychoanalytic situation as a specific countertransference reaction that facilitates the analysis of the object relationships activated in the transference. Sandler also explored the relationship between affects and drives and the neuropsychological capacities represented by affective and cognitive developments that jointly determine the structural characteristics of the mental apparatus.     

Prioritizing the Local in an Era of Globalization: A Proposal for Decentering Community Psychology

In this article, I outline a proposal for decentering the field of United States‐based community psychology. Transnational migrations, border crossings, and proliferating neoliberal trade and global media characterize the contemporary moment we live in. These movements challenge any monolithic disciplinary narrative of community psychology. Drawing from liberation psychology and women of Color feminisms, I argue that decentering the field involves engendering more reciprocal, nonhierarchical relations between the core and peripheries of knowledge production. Specifically, I consider the decentering project in two related realms—content and agents of knowledge production. The first issue concerns the kind of research and theorizing we engage in, the issues or topics we investigate, and the subject populations we work with. The second issue pertains to the agents who engage in the aforementioned processes, exercising epistemic power, that is the authority to construct what is considered legitimate and valid knowledge. I conclude with the implications of the decentering project for a multistranded community psychology that is responsive to the cartographies of contemporary struggles.     

Evolution‐revolution and the cosmos

The purpose of this paper is to sketch some remarks about the evolution of psychology within contemporary cognitive sciences and its consequences on the definition of the object of a (one) scientific psychology. Arguments are stated on empirical experience from interdisciplinary research and on experimental investigations in psycholinguistics and knowledge representation.     

Anxiety, signal anxiety, and unconscious anticipation: neuroscientific evidence for an unconscious signal function in humans

A central tenet of psychoanalysis, and arguably of any comprehensive theory of mind, is the existence of a psychological unconscious. Years of clinical investigation into the nature of unconscious processes have facilitated the development of psychoanalysis as a clinical method. Empirical investigations of unconscious mental processes, however, have lagged behind clinical inquiry. With few exceptions, attempts to understand unconscious processes using rigorous experimental controls have remained sequestered in scientific domains other than psychoanalysis, where they have proliferated recently. In view of this recent upsurge of research on unconscious processes outside of psychoanalysis, efforts to integrate such knowledge into general theories of psychopathology and clinical investigation are critical. In this paper, an interdisciplinary approach is taken to the study of one aspect of unconscious mental functioning--what Freud originally termed signal anxiety. Signal anxiety is examined using information from cognitive psychology and learning theory, psychophysiology, behavioral neuroscience, and psychoanalytic theory. Though the original concept of signal anxiety is supported by recent research, it is concluded that signal anxiety is probably best thought of not as the affect of anxiety but as a subset of unconscious mental processes that have a signal function of anticipating danger. Such unconscious anticipatory processes are a general feature of the mind that includes responses to both real and imagined (neurotic) appraisals of a situation. The neurophysiological structures and processes associated with unconscious anticipation in humans are just beginning to be understood.     

The influence of complexes on implicit learning

A century ago, Jung looked into the unconscious through complexes by using word association tests. Jung wrote, 'modern psychology with its investigation of complexes has opened up a psychic taboo area riddled with hopes and fears', and complexes remain an unexplored taboo area of research. In the present study, we have investigated the influence of complexes on unconscious cognitive processing, in particular on implicit learning. We have found that complexes shown to disturb conscious cognitive processing in fact enhanced the attention of the subjects and their performance on an implicit learning task. These results suggest that complexes are not just abstractions, but have various actual influences on both conscious and unconscious processing.     

"认知革命"与"第二代认知科学"刍议

以计算隐喻为核心假设的传统认知心理学以及联结主义心理学均不能克服离身心智（disembodied mind）的根本缺陷,当代认知心理学正面临着新的范型转换．以具身性和情境性为重要特征的第二代认知科学将日受重视,并促使认知神经科学进入新的发展阶段。作者认为在身心关系上应该坚持生理只是心理的必要条件,而非充分条件的赢场,克服生理还原论的危险;应该重新审视基于二元论的生理机制这种说法;心理学传统中的科学主义和人文主义有可能在第二代认知科学强调认知情境性的基础上达成某种融合;第一代认知科学对意识的研究是不成功的,因为对知觉、注意、记忆、思维等心理过程的研究不能代替意识的研究,同时还应避免以意识内容的研究取代心理学研究的倾向、第二代认知科学中的动力系统理论关于变量（因素）之间的偶合（coupling）关系完全不同于变差分析巾的变量之间的交互作用关系,其动力系统模式可能更有助于破解意识的产生（涌现）之谜,并引发心理学研究的方法论的变革新潮,第二代认知科学的兴起将启发人们对身心关系、生理还原论、意识研究在心理学中的地位、人工智能对心智完全模拟的可能性等重夫问题重新思考。     

The mind beyond our immediate awareness: Freudian, Jungian, and cognitive models of the unconscious

Abstract: Several branches of cognitive science now focus on the nature of the unconscious. This paper explores some of the findings and models from this research. By introducing formulations based on non‐clinical data, the cognitive scientists—in neural linguistics, computational modelling, and neuroscience—may depart from the older psychoanalytic formulations. An understanding of unconscious neural processes is nevertheless emerging showing how synapses are modified by experience and how learning, conscious and unconscious, is due to this important aspect of brain plasticity. Freud and Jung's formulations about the unconscious psyche, representing the main tenets of depth psychology, are also based on a conception of the mind as extending beyond immediate awareness. However, their models are more hypothetical in that their data, almost exclusively, come from treatments of psychotherapy patients and their verbal accounts. So how do these two conceptions of the unconscious match, where do they differ? And how does the neural understanding in the present research support theories and practices of analytic treatments?     

Reclaiming the value of assessing unconscious and subjective psychological experience

The Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual provides a model of the individual that emphasizes the prominence of unconscious subjective experience in shaping personality and psychopathology. Yet, modern psychiatry and psychology have avoided reference to and assessment of such processes. In this article, I review evidence from the cognitive neuroscience literature that supports the relationship of unconscious subjective experience to personality and behavior. Suggestions are made for how these findings should affect clinical assessment practice and how research methodology could be employed to further evaluate and enhance current assessment practice.     

Stumpf's cognitive--evaluative theory of emotion.

As a historical contribution to the current cognition-emotion debate in psychology, this article seeks (a) to bring to the readers' attention the largely ignored tradition of cognitive emotion theory within introspective psychology by reviewing what is probably the most clearly formulated cognitive emotion theory of this period, that proposed by Carl Stumpf, and (b) to point out the relevance of Stumpf's contributions to the psychology of emotions for the contemporary cognition-emotion discussion. It is suggested that Stumpf's version of a cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion deserves the serious attention of contemporary investigators and that several of his objections to noncognitive theories of emotion retain their force against modern versions of these theories.