What is to be done in the history of philosophy

Because the History of Philosophy is a branch of both History and Philosophy, it faces tasks which are Historical, tasks which are Philosophical, and tasks which overlap both. As Philosophy typically flourishes by incorporating and assimilating ideas and bodies of text which have either not previously been part of its stock in trade or have been forgotten, the main task facing the History of Philosophy today is that of developing serious scholarship in areas that have been largely neglected, such as Philosophy in Arabic and Persian as well as in Sanskrit and Chinese.     

Soviet philosophy of biology today

Biology has been one of the more sensitive areas for Soviet efforts to establish the ‘scientific’ character of dialectical materialism. Since Lysenko there has been indubitable progress. Dialectification of science has come to the fore as a major question, and much of the activity has been in the line of discussing genetics and dialectics. On the other hand, the Soviets have had little success in developing a non-Lysenkoist explanation of the relationship between the organism and the environment. There have been some efforts to use structures and systems as explanatory models. The major problems that remain in Soviet biology include the meaning of materialism for living entities and the precise nature of evolution.     

Finding common ground between evolutionary biology and continental philosophy

This article identifies already existing theoretical and methodological commonalities between evolutionary biology and phenomenology, concentrating specifically on their common pursuit of origins. It identifies in passing theoretical support from evolutionary biology for present-day concerns in philosophy, singling out Sartre’s conception of fraternity as an example. It anchors its analysis of the common pursuit of origins in Husserl’s consistent recognition of the grounding significance of Nature and in his consistent recognition of animate forms of life other than human. It enumerates and exemplifies five basic errors of continental philosophers with respect to Nature, errors testifying to a philosophical fundamentalism that distorts the intricate interconnections and relationships of Nature in favor of a preferred knowledge rooted in ontological reductionism. It shows that to discover and appreciate the common ground, one must indeed study “the things themselves.”

Doing philosophy is doing its history

While Curley argues that we need to know the history of philosophy so as not to avoid important alternatives to contemporary proposals, I argue that philosophy is an essentially historical enterprise. Unlike science, philosophy cannot forget its history. Not to know the history of philosophy is not to understand why the questions we seek to answer are worth answering or asking.     

What structures could not be

James Ladyman has recently proposed a view according to which all that exists on the level of microphysics are structures “all the way down”. By means of a comparative reading of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics as proposed by Stewart Shapiro, I shall present what I believe structures could not be. I shall argue that, if Ladyman is indeed proposing something as strong as suggested here, then he is committed to solving problems that proponents of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics such as Shapiro are trying to solve. Attempting to do so, however, brings out a tacit tension in Ladyman's position. I shall argue that the upshot of this is that the ontological import that Ladyman attributes to structures is rather epistemological import properly understood.     

厘清伦理学的对象与定义

厘清伦理学的对象与定义是构建伦理学理论体系的首要问题。以往对伦理学研究对象的说法大致可以归并为德性、道德价值、道德行为、道德规范、道德语言、自由、幸福、人生问题和道德这九种。经逐一分析可知,前八种界说难以成立。第九种界说将伦理学的对象直接聚焦于道德是值得肯定的,可由此给出的伦理学定义还是不够准确与周延。虽然道德是伦理学的基本对象,但并不是伦理学的全部对象。能将伦理学全部对象一网打尽的概念只有道德问题,因而伦理学就是系统研究各种道德问题的学问。     

Doing What is Best

If doing what is best sets the right ideal of rational agency, then rational agents should do what they believe to be best. As long as we leave open the question what makes an option best, all plausible theories of rationality willfit into this framework. Consequently, rational agents will always want to do the things they believes to be best. This claim is an instance of what David Lewis calls the desire-as-belief thesis, which he has tried to refute. I reject Lewis' argument by criticizing his treatment of belief-change in respect of propositions about degrees of goodness.     

什么是东正教

一、东正教的起源和传播 　　东正教是基督教的三大派之一.由于基督教会内部争夺普世教会的最高领导权、势力范围和世俗利益以及教义上的某些分歧,于公元1054年公开分裂为西方天主教和东方正教.……     

What memory is for

Let's start from scratch in thinking about what memory is for, and consequently, how it works. Suppose that memory and conceptualization work in the service of perception and action. In this case, conceptualization is the encoding of patterns of possible physical interaction with a three-dimensional world. These patterns are constrained by the structure of the environment, the structure of our bodies, and memory. Thus, how we perceive and conceive of the environment is determined by the types of bodies we have. Such a memory would not have associations. Instead, how concepts become related (and what it means to be related) is determined by how separate patterns of actions can be combined given the constraints of our bodies. I call this combination "mesh." To avoid hallucination, conceptualization would normally be driven by the environment, and patterns of action from memory would play a supporting, but automatic, role. A significant human skill is learning to suppress the overriding contribution of the environment to conceptualization, thereby allowing memory to guide conceptualization. The effort used in suppressing input from the environment pays off by allowing prediction, recollective memory, and language comprehension. I review theoretical work in cognitive science and empirical work in memory and language comprehension that suggest that it may be possible to investigate connections between topics as disparate as infantile amnesia and mental-model theory.