What is to be done in the history of philosophy

Because the History of Philosophy is a branch of both History and Philosophy, it faces tasks which are Historical, tasks which are Philosophical, and tasks which overlap both. As Philosophy typically flourishes by incorporating and assimilating ideas and bodies of text which have either not previously been part of its stock in trade or have been forgotten, the main task facing the History of Philosophy today is that of developing serious scholarship in areas that have been largely neglected, such as Philosophy in Arabic and Persian as well as in Sanskrit and Chinese.     

Soviet philosophy of biology today

Biology has been one of the more sensitive areas for Soviet efforts to establish the ‘scientific’ character of dialectical materialism. Since Lysenko there has been indubitable progress. Dialectification of science has come to the fore as a major question, and much of the activity has been in the line of discussing genetics and dialectics. On the other hand, the Soviets have had little success in developing a non-Lysenkoist explanation of the relationship between the organism and the environment. There have been some efforts to use structures and systems as explanatory models. The major problems that remain in Soviet biology include the meaning of materialism for living entities and the precise nature of evolution.     

Finding common ground between evolutionary biology and continental philosophy

This article identifies already existing theoretical and methodological commonalities between evolutionary biology and phenomenology, concentrating specifically on their common pursuit of origins. It identifies in passing theoretical support from evolutionary biology for present-day concerns in philosophy, singling out Sartre’s conception of fraternity as an example. It anchors its analysis of the common pursuit of origins in Husserl’s consistent recognition of the grounding significance of Nature and in his consistent recognition of animate forms of life other than human. It enumerates and exemplifies five basic errors of continental philosophers with respect to Nature, errors testifying to a philosophical fundamentalism that distorts the intricate interconnections and relationships of Nature in favor of a preferred knowledge rooted in ontological reductionism. It shows that to discover and appreciate the common ground, one must indeed study “the things themselves.”

Doing philosophy is doing its history

While Curley argues that we need to know the history of philosophy so as not to avoid important alternatives to contemporary proposals, I argue that philosophy is an essentially historical enterprise. Unlike science, philosophy cannot forget its history. Not to know the history of philosophy is not to understand why the questions we seek to answer are worth answering or asking.     

什么是幸福

"幸福"是一种生活状态,一种人们对生活经验的主观感受,当然也是一种生活价值的评价.人们对幸福的感受与人们时幸福的追求和心理欲望是相辅相成的.从社会或人际的角度看,幸福是一种可以观察、可以评价的生活状态.创造幸福的过程是痛苦的,但同时享受创造过程本身就是一种幸福体验,要学会创造幸福,学会享受幸福,这种享受不是独享而需要分享.分享有两个好处,就个人来说,与人分享不仅更安全,也更有幸福感.就社会的角度来说,幸福的分享程度越广泛,说明这个社会越公平,秩序越好.国家和社会的发展目标要与公民的幸福目的一致.     

What structures could not be

James Ladyman has recently proposed a view according to which all that exists on the level of microphysics are structures “all the way down”. By means of a comparative reading of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics as proposed by Stewart Shapiro, I shall present what I believe structures could not be. I shall argue that, if Ladyman is indeed proposing something as strong as suggested here, then he is committed to solving problems that proponents of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics such as Shapiro are trying to solve. Attempting to do so, however, brings out a tacit tension in Ladyman's position. I shall argue that the upshot of this is that the ontological import that Ladyman attributes to structures is rather epistemological import properly understood.     

厘清伦理学的对象与定义

厘清伦理学的对象与定义是构建伦理学理论体系的首要问题。以往对伦理学研究对象的说法大致可以归并为德性、道德价值、道德行为、道德规范、道德语言、自由、幸福、人生问题和道德这九种。经逐一分析可知,前八种界说难以成立。第九种界说将伦理学的对象直接聚焦于道德是值得肯定的,可由此给出的伦理学定义还是不够准确与周延。虽然道德是伦理学的基本对象,但并不是伦理学的全部对象。能将伦理学全部对象一网打尽的概念只有道德问题,因而伦理学就是系统研究各种道德问题的学问。     

Doing What is Best

If doing what is best sets the right ideal of rational agency, then rational agents should do what they believe to be best. As long as we leave open the question what makes an option best, all plausible theories of rationality willfit into this framework. Consequently, rational agents will always want to do the things they believes to be best. This claim is an instance of what David Lewis calls the desire-as-belief thesis, which he has tried to refute. I reject Lewis' argument by criticizing his treatment of belief-change in respect of propositions about degrees of goodness.