Moral Explanation and the Special Sciences

Discussion of moral explanation has reached animpasse, with proponents of contemporaryethical naturalism upholding the explanatoryintegrity of moral facts and properties, andopponents – including both anti-realists andnon-naturalistic realists – insisting thatsuch robustly explanatory pretensions as moraltheory has be explained away. I propose thatthe key to solving the problem lies in thequestion whether instances of moral propertiesare causally efficacious. It is argued that,given the truth of contemporary ethicalnaturalism, moral properties are causallyefficacious if the properties of the specialsciences are. Certain objections are rebuttedinvolving the nature of causation, on the onehand, and putative special features of themoral realm, on the other.     

In Defense of Anti‐Archimedean Moral Realism: A Response to Recent Critics

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that many putatively nonmoral metaethical theories can only be understood as being internal to the moral domain. If correct, this position, referred to as anti‐archimedeanism, has profound implications for the methodology of metaethics. This is particularly true for skeptical metaethical theories. This article defends a version of anti‐archimedeanism that is true to the spirit rather than the letter of Dworkin's original thesis from several recent objections. First, it addresses Kenneth Ehrenberg's recent attempt to demonstrate how certain metaethical theories can be understood in a morally neutral manner. It then discusses Charles Pigden's claim that Dworkin begs the question against error theorists and nihilists by assuming a conceptual space that error theorists and nihilists would reject. It concludes that the anti‐archimedean methodology originally proposed by Dworkin is defensible, and can be used to support a robust form of moral realism.     

Why history matters for moral responsibility: Evaluating history-sensitive structuralism

Is moral responsibility essentially historical, or does an agent's moral responsibility for an action depend only on their psychological structure at that time? In previous work, I have argued that the two main (non-skeptical) views on moral responsibility and agents’ histories—historicism and standard structuralism—are vulnerable to objections that are avoided by a third option, namely history-sensitive structuralism. In this paper, I develop this view in greater detail and evaluate the view by comparing it with its three dialectical rivals: skepticism about moral responsibility, historicism, and standard structuralism. Each comparison includes discussion of new work on moral responsibility and agents’ histories, and along the way I offer new arguments for preferring history-sensitive structuralism, paying special attention to the view's explanatory power.     

Forced Choices and Self-Defence

ABSTRACT This paper is a reply to three objections raised by Seumas Miller against a 'forced-choice'account of the morality of self-defence. It is argued that Miller's first objection rests on a misconception of how the forced-choice account is supposed to work; that his second objection is simply mistaken; and that his third objection overlooks how the forced-choice account explicitly accommodates the moral difference between self-defence and 'other-defence.'Finally, it is suggested that Miller's entire approach is defective in its failure to examine the principle of justice which underlies the forced-choice account, and whether it applies to standard self-defence situations.     

Corporal Punishment

This paper examines the reasons why corporal punishment in the judicial sphere has fallen into moral disfavour in recent decades. Standard objections to the practice, both practical and ethical, are considered and found to be inconclusive. It is argued that corporal punishment is not inevitably more cruel or demeaning than conventionally preferred punitive methods and that consideration should be given to its limited experimental reintroduction.     

Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Another Reply to Zimmerman

Michael Zimmerman has recently argued against the twofold Strawsonian claim that there can be no moral responsibility without a moral community and that, as a result, moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. I offered a number of objections to Zimmerman’s view, to which Zimmerman responded. In this article, I respond to Zimmerman’s responses to my criticisms.     

Aesthetic judgements and motivation

Are aesthetic judgements cognitive, belief-like states or non-cognitive, desire-like states? There have been a number of attempts in recent years to evaluate the plausibility of a non-cognitivist theory of aesthetic judgements. These attempts borrow heavily from non-cognitivism in metaethics. One argument that is used to support metaethical non-cognitivism is the argument from Motivational Judgement Internalism. It is claimed that accepting this view, together with a plausible theory of motivation, pushes us towards accepting non-cognitivism. A tempting option, then, for those wishing to defend aesthetic non-cognitivism, would be to appeal to a similar argument. However, both Caj Strandberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstong have argued that Internalism is a less plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements by raising objections against aesthetic internalism. In this paper, I will argue that both of these objections can be raised against internalism about moral judgements as well. As a result, internalism is no less plausible a claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements. I will then show how a theory of internalism about normative judgements in general is capable of avoiding both of these objections.     

Islam,the Divine Command Theory,and Religious Fundamentalism

ABSTRACT

In 1980, George F. Hourani and, more recently in 2010, Mariam al-Attar argued that Islam is not compatible with divine command theory. They rehearsed some standard objections (namely the objectivity of morality, divine goodness, moral knowledge) targeted against meta-ethical divine command theory taking the Qur’an into consideration, and argued that it should be discarded from an Islamic point of view. In addition, they criticized divine command theory since it involves obedience to God and, therefore, does not allow moral reasoning but rather is the source of religious fundamentalism and violence. Although these objections are powerful when applied to the early Ash?arite version of divine command theory, they are not powerful against recent formulations of it presented by Christian philosophers. For example, a divine command theory like that of Robert Merrihew Adams is well suited to respond to these objections. Thus, divine command theory, in its recent formulations, is a genuine option for Muslims and should be given due consideration.     

Strawson or Straw Man? More on Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community

In a recent article in this journal, I argued against the popular twofold Strawsonian claim that there can be no moral responsibility without a moral community and that, as a result, moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. Benjamin De Mesel has offered a number of objections to my argument, including in particular the objection that I mischaracterized Strawson’s view. In this article, I respond to De Mesel’s criticisms.     

Lying and deceiving--moral choice in public and private life

Suppose that there are good or morally defensible reasons for not responding truthfully to a question or request for information. Is a lie or a deception better as a means to avoid telling the truth? There are many situations in public and private life in which the answer to this question would serve as a useful moral guide, for instance, clinical situations involving dying patients, educational situations, involving young children and personal situations involving close friends. Intuitively, we feel that there is a moral asymmetry in favor of deceiving over lying. However, doubts have been cast on such intuition. The aim of this paper is to bolster this intuition. It will be argued that the claim of moral asymmetry in favor of deception can be supported on a consideration of the different degrees of expectation involved in communicative ethics. Two other objections to the claim of asymmetry will also be considered.     

Professional Codes of Practice and Ethical Conduct

ABSTRACT This essay is an attempt to examine the idea that a professional code of practice can entail ethical conduct. It is focused around two differing perspectives on ethics. It will be argued that the professions have, perhaps too hastily, adopted one theory without considering the merits, or the objections offered by the alternative account. This alternative, a 'cognitivist' theory, is sketched, and the possible advantages of such an approach are discussed. Such a perspective means adopting a radically different approach to the nature of ethics and what it is to be a moral agent, and could have interesting consequences for professional practice. Even if a cognitivist account is ultimately unconvincing, it does provide a number of worrying arguments for those professionals who believe that ethical conduct is generated by following a code of practice, and these arguments need to be addressed.     

Technology and morality: Influences on public attitudes toward biotechnology

This study uses national survey data to test effects on individuals’ objections to biotechnology applied to plants and animals. We find that females and individuals who believe in the biblical story of creation have greater intrinsic moral objections to biotechnology than males and those who do not believe the creation story. We also find that the perception of personal benefit from biotechnology significantly decreases the likelihood of moral objection to both plant and animal biotechnology, and that perception of environmental risk from biotechnology significantly increases the likelihood of moral objection to both types of biotechnology. Policy issues are discussed. He has studied biotechnology, development, social change, work and industry. He currently works in the Survey Research Division at Research Triangle Institute in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. He engages is applied studies of new technologies and public policies affecting consumers, industry, natural resources and society. He has researched moral attitude and religious affects in biotechnology acceptance, environmentalism, and in relation to numerous controversial social concerns and issues.     

The Distinctiveness of Polyamory

Polyamory is a form of consensual non‐monogamy. To render it palatable to critics, activists and theorists often accentuate its similarity to monogamy. I argue that this strategy conceals the distinctive character of polyamorous intimacy. A more discriminating account of polyamory helps me answer objections to the lifestyle whilst noting some of its unique pitfalls. I define polyamory, and explain why people pursue this lifestyle. Many think polyamory is an inferior form of intimacy; I describe four of their main objections. I explain how commitment to ‘the polyamorous possibility’ prompts one to viscerally experience personal, practical, and social constraints. Unlike monogamous dynamics, these confrontations are mediated by third parties who destabilise the familiar dynamics of coupled life. Polyamory can be emotionally challenging but, as I outline in the article, it is sustained by interpersonal emotional work that helps people feel and understand their emotions, communicate without confrontation, and contain the difficult emotions of others. This work is qualitatively and quantitatively intensified in polyamory. Finally, I rebut objections to polyamory whilst also acknowledging the ways polyamory has its own pitfalls.     

Surrogate Motherhood

ABSTRACT In the first part of this article I discuss some objections which assert that surrogacy is primarily—but not exclusively—harmful in a moral sense. After examination of mainly but not exclusively morality-dependent harms (objections from similarity with prostitution, exploitation, etc.) and after the discussion of possible non-morality-dependent harms (baby, couple, surrogate mother, agency, etc.), I argue, in the second part, that no one reason supports the possible prohibition of surrogacy. In the last part I try to show why moral reasons alone could not be sufficient to criminalize any kind of activity—including surrogacy—in a liberal order.     

Reflective equilibrium and moral objectivity

Ever since the introduction of reflective equilibrium in ethics, it has been argued that reflective equilibrium either leads to moral relativism, or that it turns out to be a form of intuitionism in disguise. Despite these criticisms, reflective equilibrium remains the most dominant method of moral justification in ethics. In this paper, I therefore critically examine the most recent attempts to defend the method of reflective equilibrium against these objections. Defenders of reflective equilibrium typically respond to the objections by saying that either reflective equilibrium can in fact safeguard moral objectivity or alternatively, even if it cannot, that there simply are no reasonable alternatives. In this paper, I take issue with both responses. First, I argue that given the non-foundationalist aspirations of reflective equilibrium, moral objectivity cannot be maintained. Second, I argue that reflective equilibrium is not the only game in town once intuitionism has been discarded. I argue that given their own normative ambitions, combined with their rejection of intuitionism, proponents of reflective equilibrium have reason to take alternative methods of moral justification, and more specifically transcendental arguments, more seriously than they have done so far. I end by sketching the outlines of what this alternative methodology might look like.     

Parenting From the Outside‐in: Reflections on Parent Training During a Potential Paradigm Shift

This article proposes that a paradigm shift that has implications for practitioners of parenting interventions is emerging. This shift represents a challenge to the dominant model of parent training. The Triple P Parenting Program is discussed as an example of parent training programme to highlight the relevant issues for practitioners, including common practitioner objections encountered in dissemination as identified, in part, by Mazzucchelli and Sanders. It is argued that apart from these objections, there are more essential concerns in relation to the adoption of parent training programmes by practitioners. Rather, the article argues that parent training is “mind‐blind” and that approaches emerging from the field of interpersonal neurobiology represent developmentally sophisticated alternatives for intervention. The Circle of Security programme is discussed as one example of this emerging paradigm shift that integrates attachment, social neuroscience, and psychodynamic theory. Contrasts are highlighted between the models, and considerations for future issues in parent intervention conclude the article.     

Creating and Redirecting Threats

In the third volume of On What Matters, Derek Parfit argued that the distinction between imposing a newly created threat on someone and making what threatens some people instead threaten someone else has no genuine moral significance. This article's central thesis is that although there is much to learn from Parfit's arguments, they are ultimately unsuccessful at establishing that the redirected versus newly created threats distinction is morally irrelevant. In particular, I show that my Causal Sequences Principle specifies this distinction in such a way that it is immune to Parfit's objections against the Redirection Principle. It follows that any moral theory that can provide a sound rationale for the Causal Sequences Principle can solve the trolley problem.