Why there are no good arguments for any interesting version of determinism

This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from this quarter—to doubt that we are libertarian free. In particular, the paper responds to various arguments for neural and psychological determinism, arguments based on the work of people like Honderich, Tegmark, Libet, Velmans, Wegner, and Festinger.     

The Individuality of Species: Some Reflections on the Debate

The thesis that species are individuals, and not classes as the traditional view had it, has been influential in the last 25 years. In this paper David Hull's arguments for the thesis are surveyed, as well as some counterarguments presented by Philip Kitcher. It is claimed that though species can be conceptualized as individuals, we are not compelled to view them in that way. The importance of the issue seems to have been somewhat exaggerated. However, it might happen that empirical findings concerning species selection would strengthen the case for the thesis, thereby rendering it straightforwardly empirical. The applicability of teleological explanation is suggested as a criterion for biological individuality. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Presentism and the Notion of Existence

The aim of this paper is to make presentism a dynamic view of reality by basing it on a notion of dynamic existence, that is, on a notion of existence which has a dynamic character. The paper shows that both of the notions of existence which are used in metaphysical theories of time (in presentism and eternalism) have a static character and, while such a notion is useful for eternalists, it is useless for presentists if they want to make their view able to remain in agreement with our everyday experience and self-consistent. It is demonstrated that both empirical and theoretical arguments indicate that the presentist should replace the notion of this static existence with the notion of a dynamic existence and that this maneuver allows the presentist to treat his/her existential thesis as equivalent to the thesis that time flows. Not only does this strategy allow us to express presentism in a simple, homogenous way which remains in agreement with our experience, but also permits us to solve some of the difficult problems which presentism faces, such as, for example, the objection of triviality and the question about the rate of time passage. Moreover, such an approach to presentism allows us to solve fundamental metaphysical problems concerning time such as the problem of the openness of the future and the fixity of the past, direction of causation, and relations between presentism and persistence through time by endurance.     

Measuring memory for source: Some theoretical assumptions and technical limitations

Henkel and Franklin (1998) present a series of well-designed experiments in support of the conclusion that memory for the source of an item is affected by the similarity between the item and other information in memory. Their principle analyses use an empirical measure of source memory that is a variant of a measure evaluated by Murnane and Bayen (1996). We point out an important assumption that underlies the use of this measure and question additional arguments and analyses that Henkel and Franklin offer in support of their conclusions. The problems discussed illustrate the need for careful consideration of the technical characteristics of measures and the theoretical assumptions on which measures rest when one is conducting research on source memory.     

Scepticism: Epistemic and Ontological

It is widely thought that sceptical arguments, if correct, would show that everyday empirical knowledge-claims are false. Against this, I argue that the very generality of traditional sceptical arguments means that there is no direct incompatibility between everyday empirical claims and sceptical scenarios. Scepticism calls into doubt, not ordinary empirical beliefs, but philosophical attempts to give a deep ontological explanation of such beliefs. G. E. Moore's attempt to refute scepticism (and idealism) was unsuccessful, because it failed to recognise that philosophical scepticism operates on a different level from that on which we make – or doubt – particular empirical claims. And, as I argue with specific reference to work by Nozick and Fogelin, Moore's basic confusion is still widely shared in contemporary discussions of scepticism.     

CYBORG: MYTH OR REALITY?

Abstract. The idea of cyborg often is taken as a token for the distinction between human and machine having become irrelevant. In this essay I argue against that view. I critically analyze empirical arguments, theoretical reflections, and ultimate convictions that are supposed to support the idea. I show that empirical arguments at this time rather point in a different direction and that theoretical views behind it are at least questionable. I also show that the ultimate convictions presupposed deny basic tenets of traditional Christianity, while their claim to be based on science confuses scientific results with their interpretation on the basis of a naturalistic world‐view.     

Socrates and Superiority

I propose an alternative interpretation of the Crito. The arguments that are typically taken to be Socrates' primary arguments against escape are actually supplementary arguments that rely on what I call the Superiority Thesis, the thesis that the state and its citizens are members of a moral hierarchy where those below are tied by bonds of obligation to those above. I provide evidence that Socrates holds this thesis, demonstrate how it resolves a number of apparent difficulties, and show why my interpretation is preferable to competing interpretations.     

Further reflections on the nature of intuition‐analysis and the construct validity of the Cognitive Style Index

Theoretical and empirical arguments that support the construct validity of the Allinson‐Hayes Cognitive Style Index are reviewed in the light of Hodgkinson and Sadler‐Smith's (2003) assertion that Allinson and Hayes (1996) incorrectly specified the nature of the Cognitive Style Index (CSI) as a measure of intuition‐analysis predicated on a unitarist conception of the construct. It is concluded that Hodgkinson and Sadler‐Smith fail to offer a robust challenge to either the theoretical or empirical arguments supporting the construct validity of the Cognitive Style Index.     

What is it to be aware of your awareness of red? A review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given

In this review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given we focus on the central thesis in the book: the awareness of awareness thesis. On that thesis, a state of awareness constitutively involves an awareness of itself. In Section 2, we discuss what the awareness of awareness thesis amounts to, how it contrasts with the transparency of experience, and how it might be motivated. In Section 3, we discuss one of Montague’s two theoretical arguments for the awareness of awareness thesis. A view that accepts the awareness of awareness thesis, Montague argues, is to be preferred over competing views because it outperforms them in accounting for the property attributions one makes in perceptual experience. We suggest that it is not clear that this argument for the awareness of awareness thesis is successful. Finally, in Section 4 we consider the relation between Montague’s view of color experience and what she calls Strawson’s datum, arguing that Montague may not be able to explain this datum as straightforwardly as she supposes. This, we suggest, threatens Montague’s second theoretical argument for the awareness of awareness thesis.     

THE EXTENDED MIND

The extended mind is the thesis that some mental—typically cognitive—processes are partly composed of operations performed by cognizing organisms on the world around them. The operations in question are ones of manipulation, transformation, or exploitation of environmental structures. And the structures in question are ones that carry information pertinent to the success or efficacy of the cognitive process in question. This essay examines the thesis of the extended mind and evaluates the arguments for and against it.     

Aristotle and the tradition of rhetorical argumentation

The first part of this paper contends that argumentation is central and essential to Aristotle's Rhetoric, and recounts a number of arguments in support of that view, particularly the recognition that deliberative rhetoric or the rhetoric of counsel is the primary concern of Aristotle's work. The second part of the paper reviews the work that follows in this present volume to show that the other writers' views fit in perfectly with this thesis.     

Autonomy,Gendered Subordination and Transcultural Dialogue

This paper is a theoretical and empirical investigation into whether persons in subordinate social contexts possess agency and if they do, how do we recognise and recover their agency given the oppressive conditions of their lives. It aims to achieve this through forging closer links between the philosophical arguments and the ethnographic evidence of women's agency. Through such an exercise, this paper hopes to bridge the existing gap between feminist theoretical interventions and feminist politics as well as to increase ‘sociological awareness’ within feminist philosophical arguments. In order to think about women's agency in oppressive social contexts, the paper evaluates the suitability of existing theoretical frameworks for examining, describing and capturing the autonomy of persons and concludes that a new and a more complex thinking is required to facilitate thinking about human agency within oppressive transcultural contexts. The social context of subordination, the exhibition of agency within and oppressive context and the application of the new theoretical framework is illustrated in an extensive empirical study of the contact with modernity and its accompanying ideas of autonomy and individual rights of rural women belonging to two districts in Rajasthan, North western India.     

Statistics between inductive logic and empirical science

Inductive logic generalizes the idea of logical entailment and provides standards for the evaluation of non-conclusive arguments. A main application of inductive logic is the generalization of observational data to theoretical models. In the empirical sciences, the mathematical theory of statistics addresses the same problem. This paper argues that there is no separable purely logical aspect of statistical inference in a variety of complex problems. Instead, statistical practice is often motivated by decision-theoretic considerations and resembles empirical science.     

TARGET ARTICLE: On Parametric Continuities in the World of Binary Either Ors

This article presents conceptual arguments and empirical evidence consistent with a unified conception of human judgment. It identifies several continuous parameters which intersections at specific values determine the judgmental impact of the information given. The unimodel serves as an overarching framework subsuming a plethora of theoretical notions and empirical findings related to binary distinctions between associative versus rule based, automatic versus deliberative, intuitive versus rational, heuristic versus systematic, and central versus peripheral modes of judgment. This perspective simplifies the depiction of human judgment processes and highlights its critical determinants.     

Challenging epistemicide through transformation and Africanisation of the philosophy curriculum in Africa

The position that I defend in this article is that the transformation and Africanisation of the philosophy curriculum in universities in Africa is necessary in order to reverse epistemicide. It is necessary because the present philosophy curriculum in universities in Africa is predominantly Eurocentric in its content. As a result, it curiously excludes the philosophy of the indigenous people of Africa. This status quo calls for a fundamental change of the philosophy curriculum. In advancing the thesis of this article, I seek to critique recent arguments on the transformation and Africanisation of the philosophy curriculum. I note that much of the literature in defence of transformation and Africanisation of the philosophy curriculum contains principally theoretical arguments. I attempt to go further than this and discuss some normative suggestions that can be implemented in order to put this noble idea into practice. I argue that the theoretical call for the Africanisation of the philosophy curriculum on its own is not enough if it is not simultaneously accompanied by clear policies on how that can be put into practice.     

Thinking Woman-to-Woman Rape: A Critique of Marcus’s “Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention”

This article uses the empirical fact of woman-to-woman rape as a lens to critique Sharon Marcus’s “Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention.” To the extent that any theory forecloses this fact, we can assume it is erroneous. While Marcus’s work is promising in its intention to deconstruct binary views of gender, it largely reiterates the very dualism it seeks to destabilize. I explore two different deconstructive arguments that can be drawn from the piece, each of which has been adopted by some thinkers. The first forecloses woman-to-woman rape while the second makes theoretical room for it. The second argument has the potential to deconstruct the first. Following the logic of Judith Butler’s thoughts on gender transgression, I suggest a synthesis of these two arguments. Finally, I explore ways the self-defense strategies Marcus promotes can be made to accommodate survivors of gender transgressive assaults.     

Multiple Realization,Computation and the Taxonomy of Psychological States

The paper criticizes standard functionalist arguments for multiple realization. It focuses on arguments in which psychological states are conceived as computational, which is precisely where the multiple realization doctrine has seemed the strongest. It is argued that a type-type identity thesis between computational states and physical states is no less plausible than a multiple realization thesis. The paper also presents, more tentatively, positive arguments for a picture of local reduction.     

Content externalism and phenomenal character: a new worry about privileged access

Some philosophers argue that the thesis of content externalism, according to which the contents of a subject’s thoughts are in part individuated by environmental factors, threatens the standard idea that a subject can know the contents of her thoughts without empirical investigation. It is typically assumed, however, that this thesis does not threaten another common idea about privileged access: that a subject can know the phenomenal character of her experience–its “what it’s like” aspect–without empirical investigation. That is, even if content externalism is true and does imply that a subject cannot know without empirical investigation the contents of some of her thoughts (e.g., her thoughts about water), surely she can know without empirical investigation what it’s like for her to be having whatever experience she is having. I argue that if content externalism threatens privileged access to content (I do not discuss whether it does), then it also threatens privileged access to phenomenal character. My argument does not involve claiming that phenomenal character is itself externally individuated. Rather, it depends on two other claims: (1) that introspective access to phenomenal character is conceptual; and (2) that standard arguments for content externalism suggest that some phenomenal concepts are externally individuated.     

The MCMI provides a good assessment of DSM-III disorders: the MCMI-II will prove even better

Although the arguments that Widiger, Williams, Spitzer and Frances muster in their appraisal of MCMI-DSM-III relationships appear compelling, the study employed to furnish empirical support for their thesis may be seriously flawed and the item content approach they propose as a validation model is judged logically and psychometrically deficient. A rejoinder with supportive data are presented to demonstrate both the substantive parallels and the clinical concordance that exist between MCMI and DSM-III criteria. On the basis of theory development and ongoing research, a new MCMI-II assessment instrument will be forthcoming. A brief summary of this updated inventory's rationale and empirical grounding is provided.