The Rāga Bhāva in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā: Rectifying an Age-Old Mistake

The last foot of the 23rd verse of the Sā?khya Kārikā (SK)—‘tāmasam asmāt viparyastam’—is in need of reinterpretation. Prevailing interpretations are generally based on the primary meaning of the verse. In that sense, it is understood as a declaration of the four tāmasika bhāva that are contrary to the sāttvika ones. Taking the primary meaning of the verse is problematic because it contradicts the gu?a-bhāva coherence required by the doctrine of satkārya. The doctrine of satkārya is one of the foundational principles of Sā?khya. The avirāga or rāga bhāva shows coherence to rajas rather than tamas. I show that the verse needs to be interpreted by taking the secondary meaning. Accordingly, avirāga or rāga is established as a bhāva of rajas rather than tamas. Further, I also show that the idea of bhāva in the Sā?khya Kārikā and the Bhagavadgītā may be closely related.     

On the nature and message of the Lotus Sūtra in the light of early Buddhism and Buddhist scholarship (towards the beginnings of Mahāyāna)

The aim of this paper is to compare the contents of the Lotus Sūtra and the style of presentation of its message with the thrust of the Buddha's teachings as they are preserved in the early Buddhist sources, particularly the Sutta Piaka of the Pāli Canon, and also in the Pāli commentarial literature. In the process it attempts to identify in the early sources the precedents of some of the bold statements in the Lotus Sūtra which appear as complete innovations, but may be elaborations of elements contained in Pāli sources in germinal form. Despite the difference in style, language and mythological imagery, the conclusion is that both the Sutta Piaka and the Lotus Sūtra express in their respective manners the true spirit of the Buddhist message. Attention is drawn also to the striking parallels between the Buddhist picture of the multiple universe and modern cosmological theories.     

The Subtlety of Subtales: Subaltern Voices of Sūkṣma Dharma in the Mahābhārata

International Journal of Hindu Studies - Many scholars have identified sūkṣma dharma (subtle dharma) as a central theme of the Mahābhārata. However, beyond recognizing it as an...     

Delivering the last blade of grass: Aspects of the bodhisattva ideal in the Mahāyāna

The ideal of the bodhisattva was crucial in the development of the Mahāyāna branch of the Buddhist tradition. It provided a meeting ground for cardinal Mahāyānist doctrines concerning prajñã (wisdom), karunā (compassion) and ?ūnvatā (voidness), as well as introducing into Buddhism more overtly religious elements which help to account for its popular appeal in those areas where the Mahāyāna took hold. The vow of the bodhisattva to forego entry into nirvāna until all beings “down to the last blade of grass” have been delivered raises several apparent contradictions and condundrums; these disappear in the light of a proper understanding of the pivotal Mahāyānist doctrine of ?ūnvatā. This paper examines the relationship of the bodhisattva ideal to the metaphysic of sunyata and discusses the place of this ideal in the spiritual economy of the Mahāyāna.     

Rādhātantram: Rādhā as Guru in the Service of the Great Goddess

International Journal of Hindu Studies - The Rādhātantram can serve as a tool with which to examine textual and doctrinal appropriations that took place between Vai??avas and...     

Is Sāṁkhya a Form of Idealism? An Exploration into Classical Sāṁkhya

Introduction

I have aims to shed light on two points in this paper. The first is to illumine that Sāṁkhya realist conception is based on false assumptions, and second is to shed light on the idealistic leanings of the system.

Text and Methods

I argue that in the light of textual evidences as well as phenomenological interpretation, Sāṁkhya metaphysics can be viewed as a form of idealism. I begin by proposing that the established realistic interpretation is based on an assumption that prakṛti and its evolutes are material and cosmic. In fact, prakṛti and its evolutes are mental categories, and the ontological dualism of puruṣa and prakṛti enunciated in the Sāṁkhya system is nothing but a form of idealism. The prakṛti and its evolutes are the principles/categories of cognition or experience. The conception that evolution is a process in prakṛti that takes place in the presence of puruṣa can also be conceived after the manner of form idealism. In fact, even the conception of puruṣa being simple and pure consciousness, together with its notion of liberation as aloneness of puruṣa and its separation from prakṛti and its activities (kaivalya), tends to advocate a form of idealism.

Conclusion

Thus, notion of evolution and liberation becomes the apparatus to interpret the Sāṁkhya as idealism.

     

Kālīghāṭ and the Fashioning of Middle-Class Modernities

International Journal of Hindu Studies - The upper middle classes have worked over the past century to transform the Hindu temple from a symbol of “backwardness” to a symbol of the...     

Vijñaptimātratā and the Abhidharma context of rarly Yogācāra

Contemporary accounts of early Mahāyāna Buddhist schools like the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra tend to portray them as generally antithetical to the Abhidharma of non‐Mahāyāna schools such as the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda. This paper attempts to locate early Yogācāra philosophical speculation firmly within the broader context of Abhidharma debates. Certain key Yogācāra concepts such as ālayavijñāna, vijñapti‐mātratā and citta‐mātra are discussed insofar as they relate to pre‐existing concepts and issues found in the Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika schools, with specific reference to the Abhidharmako?a and the corresponding bhāsya of Vasubandhu. Finally, some remarks are made about the, benefits of approaching the history of religious ideas without the benefits and distortions of hindsight, particularly as this relates to the attribution of an idealistic position to the early Yogācāra literature.     

Whitehead's doctrine of objectification and Yogācāra Buddhism's theory of the three natures

IntroductionNa¯ga¯rjuna, the most well-known Buddhist thinker after the Buddha himself, points out in his famous Mu¯lamadhyamakaka¯rika¯ that ‘The Buddha's teachings of the Dharma is based on the two truths: a truth of worldly conventions and an ultimate truth’ (XXIV:8). This doctrine of the two truths does indeed lie at the very heart of Buddhism. More particularly, the phenomenological and soteriological discourses in the Ma¯dhyamika tradition revolve around ideas concerning the two truths. Central to the doctrine is the concept that all phenomena possess dual characteristics—conventional and ultimate. The former, defined as the mode of phenomenal appearance, is the conventional truth; while the latter, defined as the ultimate mode of being, is the ultimate truth. This paper examines the ways in which these two truths are related from the Tibetan Pra¯sangika Ma¯dhyamika perspective, and argues that there are two radically distinct Tibetan ways of reading and interpreting the issues surrounding them. It does so by comparing the ccounts of Tsong khapa Blo bzang Grags pa (hereafter Tsong khapa, 1357–1423 A.D.) and Go rampa bSod nams Senge's (hereafter Go rampa 1429-1489 A.D.), and focuses on the way in which the two truths are related. It will be argued that, for Tsong khapa, the two truths constitute a ‘single ontological identity’ (ngo bo gcig) with ‘different conceptual identities’ (ldog pa tha dad), whereas for Go rampa, the truths are separate in a way that is ‘incompatible with their unity’ (gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad) or identity.     

‘Aloneness’ and the problem of realism in classical Sākhya and yoga

The concept of kaivalya (literally, ‘aloneness’) is of crucial importance to the systems of classical Indian philosophy known as Sākhya and Yoga. Indeed, kaivalya is the supreme soteriological goal to which these systems are directed. Various statements concerning this final goal appear in the classical texts—namely, the Sākhyakārikā and Yogasūtra—and yet there is no consensus within modern scholarship about how the concept is to be interpreted. More specifically, there appears to be a great deal of confusion over the implications of kaivalya for the existence of the empirical world. In this article I discuss the principal difficulties encountered by existing interpretations of kaivalya, and propose that these difficulties result from an unwarranted assumption that Sākhya and Yoga take a realist view with regard to the empirical world. I further propose that these difficulties can, in large part, be overcome when the assumption of realism is set aside.     

Sankara's doctrine of Māyā

Like all monisms Vedanta posits a distinction between the relatively and the absolutely Real, and a theory of illusion to explain their paradoxical relationship. Sankara's resolution of the problem emerges from his discourse on the nature of māyā which mediates the relationship of the world of empirical, manifold phenomena and the one Reality of Brahman. Their apparent separation is an illusory fissure deriving from ignorance and maintained by ‘superimposition’. Māyā, enigmatic from the relative viewpoint, is not inexplicable but only not self‐explanatory. Sahkara's exposition is in harmony with sapiential doctrines from other religious traditions and implies a profound spiritual therapy.     

The Problem of Indifference to Suffering in the Mahābhārata Tradition

International Journal of Hindu Studies - In the Mahābhārata, Kṛṣṇa is regularly accused of ignoring harm that befalls its various characters. In fact, the Sanskrit verb...     

Anthropocentric Obsession: The Perfuming Effects of vāsanā (Habit-energy) in ālayavijñāna in the Lan˙kāvatāra Sūtra

Many traditional Western ethical perspectives are anthropocentric or human-centred in that they assign intrinsic value to human beings alone. It is often said that anthropocentrism is responsible for the destruction of the environment. I intend to explain how Western anthropocentrism can be seen as a form of obsession deriving from the working function of vāsanā (habit-energy) in ālayavijñāna, based on the teachings in the Lan˙kāvatāra Sūtra. All of one's karmic bījas (seeds), stored in the ālayavijñāna, are preserved in a form of energy called vāsanā with the power of perfuming or causing habitual tendency in the lives of sentient beings. This perfuming of energy is known as sowing seeds of karma and seeds of language. Since beginningless time, sentient beings have created habitual energy through inappropriate dualistic discrimination. The habitual power of vāsanā is of great importance to understanding how anthropocentrism works. What we should be worried about is our habitual thinking patterns, which might be harmful to our relationship with the natural environment.     

The Presence of the Real: Jalarāmkathā and the Experience of the Transcendent

International Journal of Hindu Studies - Rarely is the presence of the Gujarati saint Jalarām Bāpā (1799–1881) felt more immediately, and indeed collectively, by his devotees...     

The development and use of the eight precepts for lay practitioners,Upāsakas and Upāsikās in Theravāda Buddhism in the West

Sometimes translating religious texts brings us up against the problem of scatological language. The author examines this problem in relation to a story of a former life of the Buddha and explores a variety of avenues for guidance on how to render gūtha ‘shit’ into English. This includes looking at Buddhist monastic law, which does not necessarily give us the guidance we might expect, and how the existing translation of this source of guidance illustrates the very problem in hand. The textual history and context of the story precludes some otherwise useful strategies for determining our translation and the best guide to the translator's hand in this instance turns out to be humour. The author makes a case that, employed judiciously, humour could become a useful hermeneutic tool for drawing meaning from religious literature. Along the way the author also reflects on the influence of the social context of the translator, including changes in British obscenity law, and on the possibility that academia is unconsciously constrained by unexamined assumptions of ‘decency’. Buddhist attitudes to language are also touched upon.