Schelling on understanding organisms

In this paper, I attempt to reconstruct Schelling’s theory of organism, primarily as it is elaborated in the First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature and the Introduction to the Outline. First, I discuss the challenge that the properties of organisms presented to the dominant scientific viewpoint by the end of the eighteenth century. I present different responses to this challenge, including reductive materialism, metaphysical and heuristic vitalism, and the Kantian response, and I situate Schelling’s account of organism with respect to these responses. I argue that while Schelling agrees with vitalism in that he wants to preserve the specificity of organic phenomena, he rejects principles such as vital forces or the formative drive postulated by vitalism, even for purely heuristic purposes. I argue that Schelling understands organisms fundamentally in terms of the coordinated functioning of their organs. I further clarify Schelling’s account of problematic organic phenomena by focusing on his treatment of the relation between organic activity and organic receptivity. For Schelling, organic activity and organic receptivity mutually condition each other. I provide a detailed account of how this is supposed to work.     

Is Synthesis of World Religions Possible?

Introduction

All major religions appear to follow a pattern of social contract with an additional feature of ‘termination of the contract’ and its ‘aftermath’, for the soul. This way, religion is known as ‘dissolution mechanism’ (DM). It contains both social and metaphysical terms, where the former is subsidiary to the latter. The metaphysical term is represented by the mokṣa. A given DM not only explicates the state of soul after the termination of contract, but also it endeavours to point out the nature of the ultimate reality it conceives.

Method

DM provides a geometrical/mathematical picture of the universe to locate the ultimate reality and the individual souls in it; three views of the universe—destruction, creation and sustenance—are obtained for three basic religions or thoughts. Buddhist ‘Nothingness’ forms the psychological background for these views of universe. Architectural designs of worship places, yantras or manḍalas, etc., show both the nature of universe and the location of the ultimate in it. Understanding these figures is the key method to be employed for arriving at synthesis.

Conclusion

Synthesis consists in noting the identical common metaphysical generic essence as running through all the religions, and identifying the unique specific root-essence on such a generic essence. Specific root-essence of a given DM consists in the way the unification of cognitions of the universe is carried out. When the unification of all the specific root-essences on the generic essence is carried out with a further psychological background of Buddhism, we get a specimen of metaphysical synthesis of world religions. Thus, synthesis is a distinct and sure possibility.

     

"我思":从笛卡儿到萨特

Cogito, as the first principle of Descartes’ metaphysical system, initiated the modern philosophy of consciousness, becoming both the source and subject of modern Western philosophical discourse. The philosophies of Maine de Biran, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others developed by answering the following questions? Is consciousness substantial or not? Does consciousness require the guarantee of a transcendental subject? Is Cogito epistemological or ontological? Am I a being-for-myself or a being-for-others? Outlining the developmental history of the idea of Cogito from Descartes to Sartre is important for totally comprehending the evolution and development of Western philosophy.     

Reply to Dews,and a plea for Schelling

The discussion is a response to Dews on the question of how Schelling's Freiheitsschrift should be interpreted. It falls into two halves, the first defending my interpretation, and the second expanding on the case that Dews makes for the unavoidability of metaphysics in the theory of human freedom, with which I am in full agreement. The main criticism that Dews makes of my reading is that the argument I attribute to Schelling concerning the metaphysical significance of evil rests on Kantian assumptions regarding the existence of pure practical reason, which Schelling rejects. I argue that, though certainly matters are more complicated than my earlier discussion made them seem, Schelling remains sufficiently close to Kant for the argument I attribute to avoid inconsistency. In the second half I raise what I claim to be a neglected but important question: Why is the legacy of classical German philosophy not regarded as significant for contemporary discussion of human freedom? My answer in brief is that the concept of freedom has undergone a profound contraction. In this context I also try to define more precisely what is distinctive of Schelling's view of human freedom.     

The metaphysics of human freedom: from Kant’s transcendental idealism to Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift

Schelling’s 1809 Freiheitsschrift (Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom), perhaps his most widely read work, presents considerable difficulties of understanding. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of the work in relation to Kant. My focus is on the relation in each case of their theory of human freedom to their general metaphysics, a relation which both regard as essential. The argument of the paper is in sum that Schelling may be viewed as addressing and resolving a problem which faces Kant’s theory of freedom and transcendental idealism, deriving from the challenge posed by Spinozism. One major innovation in Schelling’s theory of human freedom is his claim that it presupposes the reality of evil. I argue that Schelling’s thesis concerning evil also provides a key to the new and highly original metaphysics of the Freiheitsschrift. The relation of Schelling’s theory of freedom to his general metaphysics is therefore complex, for it goes in two directions: the metaphysics are not simply presupposed by the theory of freedom but are also in part derived from it. These new metaphysics also, I argue, allow Schelling to resolve a problem which his own earlier Spinozistic system had left unresolved.     

Hegel and the history of idealism

ABSTRACT

This article attempts to expose an unwarranted narrowness in the study of idealism in nineteenth century philosophy, and to show that the field of idealism is much wider than usually assumed. This narrowness stems from the influence of Hegel’s history of philosophy, which saw the idealist tradition as beginning in Kant, passing through Fichte and Schelling, and then culminating in his own system. This conception of history has been disseminated by Hegel’s followers and still prevails today. I argue that this conception is too narrow for several reasons. First, it ignores the romantic idealists (Hölderlin, Novalis, Schlegel); second, it excludes the opposing tradition of idealism of Herbart, Fries and Beneke, which affirmed (against Schelling and Hegel) transcendental idealism, an empiricist epistemology, the existence of the thing-in-itself and the value of the Kantian dualisms; and, third, it neglects the history of idealism after Hegel later in the nineteenth century, more specifically, the idealism of Trendelenburg, Lotze and Hartmann.     

Dialectics and the Transcendence of Dialectics: Adorno's Relation to Schelling

The influence of the thought of the great German Idealist philosopher G.W.F Hegel on the thought of Theodor Adorno, the leading thinker of the first generation of the Frankfurt School, is unmistakeable, and has been the subject of much commentary. Much less discussed, however, is the influence of Hegel's prominent contemporary, F.W.J. Schelling. This article investigates the influence of Schelling on Adorno, and the sometimes striking parallels between fundamental motifs in the work of both thinkers. It argues that Adorno's critique of Hegelian (and indeed of his own, negative) dialectics, his conception of the relation between nature and spirit, and his philosophy of history (amongst other aspects of this thought) owe a considerable debt to Schelling. Furthermore, when adequately explicated, Schelling's position on a range of problems which confronted German Idealist philosophy often prove intrinsically preferable to those of Hegel.     

A Complex Legacy: Louis Bouyer and the Metaphysics of the Reformation

Based on a discussion of Louis Bouyer's thesis about the metaphysics of the Reformation in The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism, this essay considers the methodological and hermeneutical issues involved in enquiring into the metaphysical commitments of Reformation theology. A case study of the theology of the Reformer Peter Martyr Vermigli is employed for the argument that Reformation metaphysics was a hybrid of elements pertaining both to a nominalist and a participatory ontology. This argument is then taken further by a reflection on the history of reception of the metaphysical complexity which is at the heart of the Reformation legacy.     

Jung's Red Book and its relation to aspects of German idealism

The late nineteenth century saw a renaissance of interest in the thought of the German Romantic philosopher, F.W.J. Schelling. This paper takes Jung's engagement with Schelling and his awareness of Schellingian ideas and interests (notably, the mysterious Kabeiroi worshipped at Samothrace) as its starting-point. It goes on to argue that a key set of problematics in German Idealism - the relation between freedom and necessity, between science and art, and ultimately between realism and idealism - offers a useful conceptual framework within which to approach Jung's Red Book. For the problem of the ideal is central to this work, which can be read as a journey from eternal ideals to the ideal of eternity. (Although the term 'idealism' has at least four distinct meanings, their distinct senses can be related in different ways to Jung's thinking.) The eloquent embrace of idealism by F.T. Vischer in a novel, Auch Einer, for which Jung had the highest praise, reminds us of the persistence of this tradition, which is still contested and debated in the present day.     

Schelling’s substantive reinterpretation of the transcendental turn: beyond method

ABSTRACT

Several factors, including but not limited to his investments in Naturphilosophie and Spinoza, make it hard to determine the extent to which Schelling remains on track with Kant’s transcendental project. My aim here is to isolate Schelling’s conception of transcendental method in the first decade of his philosophical development, a topic that has received little direct and extended discussion. Schelling’s 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism stands out as of particular importance, but no single text can be regarded as Schelling’s definitive statement of his views on the question of method in his early period, necessitating a diachronic approach. I argue that, though in important respects Schelling’s concerns diverge from those of Kant and Fichte, Schelling should not be regarded as abandoning the transcendental framework, and is best understood as attempting to work out what is involved at the original point of adoption of the transcendental standpoint. This entails, I argue, exchanging transcendental philosophy’s claim to a distinctive method for a substantive interpretation of the transcendental turn.     

La Liberté Dans la Perception Chez Husserl et Fichte<Superscript>1</Superscript>

In spite of their opposite methods, Fichte's deductive process and Husserl's reduction cope with the same challenge: they aim to explain how the sensible world is dependent on reflixivity. As perception is generally linked with natural existence, and pure passivity, the deepest significance of transcendental thought in those philosophies consists in equalizing phenomenon and reflexion. In the heart of bodily life, some spiritual theme has to be found. Fichte defines action as the quantification of freedom, and freedom is effectively achieved in the sensible world. Human perception reveals freedom altogether in corporal movements as in the surrounding world (Umwelt). The Fichtean theory of acknowledgment assumes this goal. In the same way, Husserl's reduction explains how significance proceeds from the body (Leib). The Husserlian analysis of kinesthesis and the radical experience of the hand touching the other hand both introduce to the status of pre-reflection. However the complete resolution of the question is given by Fichte: Intelligibility may exist in the sensible world as the metaphysical concept of phenomenon (Erscheinung) in the last Fichtean philosophy expresses the idea of the Absolute pervading the sensible.

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La Liberté Dans la Perception Chez Husserl et Fichte¹

     

The Action of God in the World—A Synthesis of Process Thought in Science and Theology

A foundational belief of monotheistic religions is that God acts in the world. In this paper, the case is made that divine action has its origins in the molecular world. Within a metaphysical framework of process thought, a hypothesis is constructed in which God's action in the world, God's ‘initial aim’ for all actualities, is divine motivation of chemical becoming.     

Theory construction and existential description in Schelling’s treatise on freedom

Despite considerable recent attention, important features of Schelling’s famous work, the 1809 treatise On the Essence of Human Freedom, remain under-explored. One of these is the methodological dualism which Schelling advocates at the very start of the text. Schelling aims to weld together into a coherent position a first-person phenomenology of freedom and an explanation achieved by locating freedom within a conceptual system articulating the basic structure of the world. Most interpretations of the Freiheitsschrift, however, concentrate on only one of these approaches, thus foreshortening their understanding of Schelling’s enterprise. The article explores this tendency towards one-sidedness by considering two sophisticated recent interpretations of the work, taking opposite tacks. One, by Markus Gabriel, focuses on the distinctive, self-reflexive metaphysics which Schelling proposes, while the other, by Sebastian Gardner, claims that Schelling’s ontology is extrapolated entirely from his account of our moral consciousness, a procedure pioneered by Kant. The article argues that neither of these interpretations can do full justice to Schelling’s project. Furthermore, although the Freiheitsschrift is not entirely successful, and hence points towards later developments in Schelling’s thinking, its treatment of freedom is superior to the ‘soft naturalism’ pioneered by Peter Strawson, and currently influential across various philosophical traditions.     

A Common Earth Religion: World Religions from an Ecological Perspective

On the basis of a critical analysis of the place of world religions in an era of globalization, and drawing on the Gaia hypothesis of James Lovelock, this paper argues for the need for a shift in perspective from a world economy to an earth economy, and for world religions to become earth religions. Here the anthropocentrism of the modern world is overcome and humanity is viewed as an integrated element in planet earth as a whole. This view implies that the world religions need to give back to the earth the virtues they have projected onto the world beyond, and abandon their denial of life and their capacity for violence. In secular terms, this means that world religions need to engage with the ecological perspective and start by applying it to themselves. For if the earth can no longer support life, that means the end of the human world, and the end of world religions.     

Critiquing Borders: Teaching About Religions in a Postcolonial World

Abstract. In a postcolonial environment, our students will encounter multiple representations and diverse followers of various religions outside the classroom. Students need to think critically about the representations of all religions and recognize the humanity of all people. Too often, students leave courses discussing one or more world religions with an idealized view of other religions that draws strict boundaries around the components of each religion. Bringing postcolonial thought into introductory and survey courses highlights the diversity within each lived religion and encourages students to critique those strict borders and all representation of religions. Based on continuing experiments with critical theory in undergraduate classes, the six strategies presented here use the diversity of lived religions to promote critical analysis of representations of religions. These strategies move beyond the rejection of common representations by introducing set theory as an alternative framework that students can use to theorize about the complexity within religions.     

Psychological individuation and spiritual enlightenment: some comparisons and points of contact

In his writings on individuation Jung often references Eastern religions and philosophies such as Buddhism, Taoism, and Hinduism. This essay discusses differences and similarities between analytical psychology's concept of individuation, especially in its advanced stages, and enlightenment as expressed in such texts as Zen (Chan) Buddhism's Ten Ox‐Herding Pictures. I advance the argument that important common features can be found while cultural differences must also be respected. There is here a convergence between West and East that can foster dialogue and mutuality.     

In defense of naturalism

History and the modern sciences are characterized by what is sometimes called a “methodological naturalism” that disregards talk of divine agency. Some religious thinkers argue that this reflects a dogmatic materialism: a non-negotiable and a priori commitment to a materialist metaphysics. In response to this charge, I make a sharp distinction between procedural requirements and metaphysical commitments. The procedural requirement of history and the sciences—that proposed explanations appeal to publicly-accessible bodies of evidence—is non-negotiable, but has no metaphysical implications. The metaphysical commitment is naturalistic, but is both a posteriori and provisional, arising from the fact that for more than 400 years no proposed theistic explanation has been shown capable of meeting the procedural requirement. I argue that there is nothing to prevent religious thinkers from seeking to overturn this metaphysically naturalistic stance. But in order to do so they would need to show that their proposed theistic explanations are the best available explanations of a range of phenomena. Until this has been done, the metaphysical naturalism of history and the sciences remains defensible.     

Islamic Daciva and Christian mission: Positive and negative models of interaction between Muslims and Christians

The history of relations between the Muslim and Christian worlds has been predominantly one of discord and confrontation. There have been instances of mutual acceptance and amicable co‐existence, but the influence of these has been lost under the cumulative, negative impressions gained from conflict. Of the positive and negative models of interaction between Muslims and Christians, it is the latter that have been most influential. This is especially to be seen in the matter of Islamic da^cwa and Christian mission which have become identified as part of the battle between the two religions, whether a theological contest over ‘truth’ or a political weapon of colonial rule. This paper looks at the political and historical contexts of the theological debate between Islam and Christianity and seeks to discover whether this is inherently negative or whether there is the possibility of a positive interaction between followers of the two religions.     

A sorrowful farewell to a Utopia

Born 1931, professor of the history of philosophy at the University of ódz. Specialist in German philosophy, with numerous publications on Schelling, Hegel, and Marx and their influence on political and social theories.     

Schelling on freedom,evil and imputation: A puzzle

This paper is focused on F. W. J. Schelling's view of freedom during the period of the Freiheitsschrift (1809) and related works. It is argued that the standard way this has been understood may be too simplistic. On this standard interpretation of his view, evil is made a matter of free choice by the agent, but where the choice does not concern individual actions, but the choice of the agent's essence in an atemporal act. As a result of this choice, it is argued, Schelling can then make evil imputable. By contrast, I argue that for Schelling freedom does not involve choice, but necessity, but in a way that is still internal to the agent and hence non-coercive, and thus in a way that remains free and makes evil imputable. How Schelling comes to have this view is considered, and some responses are given to ways it might be challenged both interpretatively and philosophically.