Rationality in Religion

Religion can be defined narrowly as belief in anthropomorphic supernatural beings. For Levy-Bruhl this meant that prelogical ‘mystic participation’ preceded true religion. For Donald Wiebe and others it means that philosophical-scientific rationality has been struggling to replace religion since the axial age. A broader definition of religion interprets rational post-axial theology as a development within religion, not a replacement of true religion. Both definitions are legitimate. The narrow definition highlights a tendency to superstition in religion. The broader definition recognizes the possibility of an evolution of religious thought.     

Women, piety and practice: A study of women and religious practice in Malaysia

While the definition of religion in sociology has been highly contentious, we define religion in this article as simply the acts of piety that are conducted within the religious sphere. The point of this definition is to draw attention to practice and away from belief. This approach to religion appears to be especially useful in the case of contemporary Islam, where female piety has become a significant aspect of religious renewal. The idea of a religious sphere is taken from the work of Luc Boltanski and his colleagues who have coined the expression ‘the inspirational city’. Religion thus consists of acts of piety within the inspirational city, where this space is seen to be in tension with the secular city. The measurement of piety in everyday life sharply differentiates the profane world from religion. These ideas are explored in this article through qualitative data that are drawn from a small sample of pious women in contemporary Malaysia. We explore three aspects of female piety: veiling, polygamy and child-rearing. The article attempts to understand the terms in which piety is measured within the broader context of the Islamization of public life in Malaysia.     

Gendered violence and displacement of devadasis in the early twentieth-century south India

ABSTRACT

The early twentieth-century nationalist movements redefined Indian citizenship as gendered by appropriating the colonial categories religion/secular, marginalising the subaltern groups. Using Critical Religion and Cavanaugh, this article analyses the implications of these developments on devadasis, traditionally performers of music and dance, that resulted in their violent displacement to the fringes of the society. In doing so, this article shows that violence in the context of devadasi communities must be understood with a broader definition. The article will also argue that, albeit colonial categories, religion/secular categories had a different understanding among the indigenous/nationalists. In doing so, this article provides a postcolonial perspective to Critical Religion.     

Turning students into scholars: using digital methods to teach the critical study of religion

Incorporating digital tools into Religious Studies courses provides experiences and conditions that transform students into scholars. In this essay we discuss two courses we taught in conjunction with the Religious Soundmap Project of the Global Midwest, a collaborative digital humanities project that we co-directed from 2014 to 2016. Engaging students as contributors to a collaborative digital research project helped them to appreciate some of the key practical, theoretical, and ethical challenges that we face as scholars of religion. In particular, our work together brought to the fore critical questions about definition, classification, and representation. Even more, because they knew their work would be accessible to broader audiences outside the classroom, potentially including the very communities whom they were studying, students were able to perceive the stakes of these questions in ways we had not previously experienced. Incorporating digital tools enabled our students to see themselves as scholars of religion.     

Religion,Philosophy and Family Resemblances

Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances has been adopted by some writers either to explain the use of the word ‘religion’ or to advocate a use in the context of a definition. The purpose of this definition is supposedly to avoid an essentialist definition of religion such as ‘belief in God or gods’ which is seen as too parochially tied to Judaeo-Christian theistic origins of the word, while at the same time guaranteeing a distinctive role for religion as a universally applicable analytical concept. However, if an essentialist definition is not smuggled in for the purpose of maintaining a distinction between the ‘religion’ family and other neighbouring families such as ideologies, worldviews, values or symbolic systems, then the family becomes so indefinite that the word ceases to pick out any distinctive aspect of human culture. And this definitional dilemma in fact reflects the actual use of the word ‘religion’ by the scholarly community. Analysis of ‘religion’ texts shows that the word is used in such a large range of contexts that it is devoid of analytical value. Consequently, there is an obligation on the community of scholars to reconceptualize the wide and valuable range of work which is being carried out in ‘religion’ departments.     

RELIGION ON WHICH THE DEVOUT AND SKEPTIC CAN AGREE

A starting point for a constructive exchange between two groups, devout religionists and scientific skeptics, is that they can hold certain religious ideas in common. These ideas, however, must preserve the compelling nature of religious commitment without unduly compromising rational sensibilities. In the histories of both science and religion progress has been made by synthesis. The definition of religion is a key issue for the success or failure of synthesis, and I propose a new definition. Both devout religionists and scientific skeptics must make compromises if synthesis is to be successful. For the devout these compromises include waiving the prerequisite of belief in the supernatural and placing behavior above belief. For the skeptic they include abandoning explanatory exclusivity, acknowledging the authority of moral experts, and recognizing the necessity of community in achieving moral excellence. I defend each of these compromises as reasonable and tolerable costs of integration.     

Between critics and caretakers: current introductions to Islam

Among a general abundance of literature on Islam, a number of books by scholars of religion and Islamicists have now found regular use in religious-studies programs. This article examines recent introductions to Islam, written by academics, and distinguishes between introductory books in general and textbooks that share more specific features. All books undergo assessment with respect to such qualities as accessibility, structure, and content. Moreover, two broader approaches come into view: some books seek to counter “misrepresentations” of Islam by extremists and the media and try to present a more sympathetic picture of “true” Islam, while others place a stronger focus on the constructed nature of Islam and follow a more critical approach. The books reviewed thus reflect reactions to current developments and discourses as well as the plurality of academic approaches to the field. Aside from more critical assessments, this article contends that some excellent and useful works introduce newcomers not only to Islam itself, but also to the academic study of Islam and religion more generally.     

Mathematics and the definitions of religion

In 2014, I published a proposal for a definition of “religion”. My goal was to offer a definition of this contentious term that would include Buddhism, Daoism, and other non-theistic forms of life widely considered religions in the contemporary world. That proposal suggested necessary and sufficient conditions for treating a form of life as a religious one. It was critiqued as too broad, however, on the grounds that it would include the study of math as a religion. How can one include forms of life based on non-theistic realities without including math? In this paper, I show the flaw in the previous definition and the weaknesses of two attempts to evade that flaw, before recommending a shift, first, to a Wittgenstein-inspired polythetic definition of “religion” and, second, to a certain kind of polythetic definition that I call “anchored”.     

SECULARIZING DEMONS: FUNDAMENTALIST NAVIGATIONS IN RELIGION AND SECULARITY

Since the turn of the millennium, theologians and secular scholars of religion have increasingly begun exploring the relationship between transhumanism and religion. However, analyses of anti‐transhumanist apocalypticisms are still rare, and those that exist are situated mainly among broader explorations of religious and secular bioconservatism. This article addresses this lack of specificity by drawing analyses of transhumanism and religion into dialogue with explorations of contemporary demonology through a close study of the beliefs of the evangelical conspiracist Thomas Horn and the anti‐transhumanist milieu around him. Exploring the milieu's multifaceted demonology of the secular world in light of genealogies of religion and secularity, the article situates Horn's demonology as one attempt to negotiate these genealogies, using what Sean McCloud terms a “‘supernatural’ hermeneutics of suspicion” that sees spiritual forces as the structural base of reality. It argues that, while fringe, milieus like Horn's illuminate broader cultural tensions and genealogical relations surrounding the place of religion in a secular(izing) world.     

The Body in the Psychology of Religion

Hutch's position that psychology of religion has neglected the mortal body is affirmed but reinterpreted. Although it may be true that psychology has adopted as postmodern bias toward defining the human being as primarily cognitive, it is less true that the psychology of religion has been unaware of how religion emerges from the experience of living. Noting that Hutch could be understood as a modern Romantic, I reinterpret, in an alternate frame- work, his contention that reexperiencing the sexuality and mortality of the body will reinstate eros into the psychology of religion. The I story model of Donald McKay and the existential paradigm of Reinhold Niebuhr are of- fered as reconceptions of what Hutch is proposing. These theorists state Hutch's position in ways that allow for a more substantive picture of what religion is and how it emerges from the life process.     

Daniel Dubuisson,The Western Construction of Religion

In The Western Construction of Religion Daniel Dubuisson argues that the concept of ‘religion’ is too historically and culturally contingent to serve as the basis for a comparative discipline. The concept is indigenous to Western culture and is inherently theological and phenomenological. He argues for a constructionist view of the discipline and proposes the concept ‘cosmographic formations' as a replacement for ‘religion’. Religious phenomena should be taken as discursive constructions that link embodied individuals to the social, cultural and cosmic orders. The following reviews evaluate Dubuisson's arguments, relating them to broader currents in the theory of religion. Daniel Dubuisson responds to each of the reviews.     

BODY POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF BODIES: Racism and Hauerwasian Theopolitics

Today dominative power operates apart from, and exterior to, those state governmentalities that the "body politics" of Stanley Hauerwas disavows as "constantinian" entanglements such as military service, governmental office, and conspicuous expressions of civil religion. This is especially true with respect to those biopolitical modalities David Theo Goldberg names as "racelessness," by which material inequalities are racially correlated, thereby allowing whiteness to mediate life and ration death. If, as Hauerwas contends, radical ecclesiology is indeed a theopolitical alternative to the nation–state's politics of violence, then it must prove itself resistant to such racialized violence. However, inasmuch as the (largely) uncontested fact of ecclesial segregation recapitulates these broader stratifications and exclusions, the church functions as a passive civil religion and itself participates in the politics of "nonviolent violence." Thus, Hauerwas must do something that he has been reluctant to do. He must talk about race and racism more directly, specifying how his ecclesiological theopolitics resists such forms of violence; more importantly, he must demonstrate how actual ecclesial congregations instantiate such resistance. In short, to be truly nonviolent, Hauerwas's body politics must become a politics of bodies.     

The rationality of faith and the benefits of religion

Religions don’t simply make claims about the world; they also offer existential resources, resources for dealing with basic human problems, such as the need for meaning, love, identity, and personal growth. For instance, a Buddhist’s resources for addressing these existential needs are different than a Christian’s. Now, imagine someone who is agnostic but who is deciding whether to put faith in religion A or religion B. Suppose she thinks A and B are evidentially on par, but she regards A as offering much more by way of existential resources. Is it epistemically rational for her to put her faith in A rather than B on this basis? It is natural to answer No. After all, what do the existential resources of a religion have to do with its truth? However, I argue that this attitude is mistaken. My thesis is that the extent to which it is good for a certain religion to be true is relevant to the epistemic (rather than merely pragmatic) rationality of faith in that religion. This is plausible, I’ll argue, on the correct account of the nature of faith, including the ways that emotion and desire can figure into faith and contribute to its epistemic rationality.     

Popular culture fandoms,the boundaries of religious studies,and the project of the self

The starting point of this paper will be studies that view popular culture as religion. First, I examine a selection of recent works that argue certain popular culture communities—namely, music subcultures, sports, and television and celebrity fandoms—look like, act like, and indeed are religions for participants. Methodologically, the studies under examination proceed by starting with a definition of religion and then looking for parallels between the pop culture fandom and the definition. I suggest that popular culture as religion scholarship is at best creative, always problematic, and tends toward what Samuel calls ‘parallelomania’. In the second part of the paper, I use the studies under examination, as well as original research, to argue that contemporary fandoms are better understood as late modern ‘projects of the self’, affiliational choices that act to establish self-identity and community in a time period when these things are not given, but reflexively made and remade.     

The future of religion: Intersections of Rorty,Vattimo and Zabala

The following work builds and expands on a number of critical themes that were raised and discussed in a colloquy initiated by Santiago Zabala on the topic ‘the future of religion’ (which carries the title of the published version) with the American philosopher Richard Rorty and Italian political activist Gianni Vattimo. But, on top of the essay's principal aim, a re-appropriation of the critical voices of Nietzsche and Heidegger is all the more necessary to begin with: both are known to have pioneered an examination of the progress of humanity following the death of God, an expression that strikes a broader reference to religion. This essay continues from Rorty's assessment of ‘the weakening and/or death of ontology’, in the post-modern age. (Vattimo would translate this Rortyian position into a ‘philosophical slide into sociology’ or the ‘turn to social sciences,’ while Zabala would set out as far as denying the God of monotheism [and its corollary in organised faith and ecclesiastical authority] of its pre-eminent place among the highest ‘goals of knowledge’). But, notwithstanding an otherwise valid criticism of religion in the light of his deconstructive notion of Being, this essay also hopes to spell out, on the contrary even, that Rorty must have missed the point in conflating religion with ontology or, God with Being in view of which his concept of weak ontology that is derived from the death of God (hence the death of ontology) is quickly drawn. Indeed, there is still Being; though it may still resist definition, as Heidegger underscored rather sardonically in the opening pages of his celebrated work Being and Time, it is no longer the other name for God. As this essay also aims to promote, Being is an expression of the private transcendental or rather an exercise in nihilism that is at the core of religion.     

IN DEFENSE OF PUBLICS: PROJECTION,BIAS, AND CULTURAL NARRATIVES IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION DEBATES

John H. Evans's recent book Morals Not Knowledge is a timely argument to recognize broader social and cultural factors that might impact what U.S. religious publics think about the relationship between science and religion and their attitudes toward science and/or religion. While Evans's focus is primarily on what can be classed as moral issues, this response argues that there are other factors that sit within neither the older epistemic conflict model approach nor a moral conflict model approach that also merit further investigation. There is a significant need for further research that examines the social, psychological, (geo)political, and broader cultural factors shaping people's social identities in relation to science and religion debates. When undertaking such research, we need to be wary of creating a binary between scholarly and public space discourse. Social scientific research in this field should be led by public perceptions, attitudes, and views, not by concepts or frameworks that we project onto them.     

“It’s Like Playing with a Nuclear Bomb”

Abstract

Most observers of the evangelical purity culture situate it within a form of contemporary evangelicalism that prioritizes personal spiritual growth and self-fulfillment. As a result, portrayals of the movement emphasize the therapeutic individualism and optimism of new paradigm spirituality. But the new paradigm does not help us explain the language of spiritual warfare and what Jason Bivins calls a religion of fear within purity rhetoric. Evangelical purity culture is as equally informed by a religion of accommodation and new paradigm spirituality as it is by a religion of fear and the remnants of cold war fundamentalism. This discordance makes sense only when the contemporary purity culture is placed within a broader historical trajectory that marks its genesis in the fundamentalist resurgence of the 1940s, not the 1970s when new paradigm churches first emerged. By examining the seemingly discordant elements of evangelical purity culture, historians are able to recognize the theological and historical continuity between evangelicalism’s religion of fear and religion of accommodation.     

The tilted playing field: Accounting for religious tastes. a more general model for the sociology of religion

A “more general”; theory is proposed speculatively for the sociological study of religion which combines narrative theory, socialization theory, and rational choice theory. The first describes what religion is, the second how it is passed on, and the third why there is a propensity for adults to remain in the religious culture of their childhood. This theory helps to account for the remarkable durability of religion and religious affiliation and provides a broader approach to the social science study of religion. An illustration is provided of how the theory might be applied in data analysis.     

Implicit Religion: A Contemporary Theory for the Relationships between Religion,State, and Society

This article demonstrates that the term ‘implicit religion’ provides an effective way to explore some of the philosophies and ideologies common to church, state, and society and to explain the mutual influence of traditional religion, civil religion, and folk religion in the creation of a national identity. Examples of church–state interactions from three continents are provided and variations in the definition of a national church are discussed. The effect of these variations on cross-cultural studies in religion, state, and society are assessed. The article concludes by examining the potential of the construct of implicit religion for bridging the different historical and cultural understandings of religion.     

Hans Penner, Horatio and the Terminator: a review essay of Radical Interpretation in Religion

Adaptations of Donald Davidson’s meta-methodology of “radical interpretation” by Hans Penner and colleagues create more problems than they solve. Penner’s affirmation of both holistic and naturalistic approaches to the study of religion ring true. But, making the inclusion of ‘superhuman beings’—those “that do things you and I cannot do”—sufficient to the definition of religion. It is alternately counterfactual (Theravada, Chan or Zen Buddhism, Confucianism, Jainism and others), or not restrictive enough (does every such being qualify? viz. Schwarzenegger’s Terminator?), or logically ‘uninteresting’—is reference to superhuman beings alone what makes a discourse religious, or is it their being ‘worshipful’?