Recent Defenders of Eliade: A Critical Evaluation

Several defenders of Mircea Eliade have written books maintaining that Eliade's personal life and literary and scholarly contributions are all of one piece; that one cannot understand his scholarship without understanding his personal life, fears, ambitions, religious and other commitments. Reviewed and critically evaluated are Mac Linscott Ricketts's interpretation that the essence of Eliade's scholarship can be seen in his early Romanian experiences and writings; Carl Olson's interpretation that Eliade's scholarship is essentially theological and philosophical; and David Cave's interpretation that Eliade's scholarship is essentially based on his spiritual vision of a new humanism. Interpretations of Eliade's historical consciousness and his Christianity are criticized. Next, using these three defenders and several critics, the recent controversy about Eliade's politics and the political nature of his scholarship is considered. Finally, questions are raised as to whether Eliade's defenders have blurred or collapsed certain legitimate scholarly distinctions, thus rendering his scholarship even more vulnerable to attack.     

JAPANESE AMERICAN WARTIME EXPERIENCE,TAMOTSU SHIBUTANI AND METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATION, 1942–1978

A case study of how wartime internment reverberated in the life and work of Japanese American intellectuals, this essay discusses the career and interests of Tamotsu Shibutani, a sociologist who began his training as part of Dorothy Swaine Thomas’ Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study (JERS). Though recent scholarship has noted some of the ethical problems that attended the use of Japanese American participant observers during the war, this essay concentrates instead on how interned intellectuals responded to their double role of both researcher (and intellectual) and object of study. I argue that in the case of Shibutani, his circumstances and identity shaped his scholarship, both as an academic endeavor and a political project. By tracking Shibutani's postwar scholarly activities, I show that his wartime experiences—as an internee, military officer, and participant‐observer—reverberated in his sociological publications long after the war's end.     

Four Pedagogical Mistakes: A Mea Culpa

Abstract. The theological pedagogies which dominate degree‐granting schools originated in the courses of study and graduate programs of the teachers. These pedagogies foster a deep rift between theology as an academic or scholarly discipline (science?) and the situations and interests of students. Students are taught to imitate what scholars do: interpreting texts, making formal arguments, and writing essays. Accordingly, theology recedes from the present and future of students including future clergy, having little to do with their religious life or career. By defining theology as scholarship, academic pedagogy obscures its primary meaning, the critical and creative thinking of the situations of life and world under the perspective of the Gospel. If theology's primary meaning is scholarly knowledge and its preoccupation with text interpretation and doctrinal exposition, the result will be to ignore religion's actual practices, especially its idolatrous tendency to literalize its own language and absolutize its institutional mediations. A pedagogy that reflects theology's primary meaning will focus on contemplation, reflection, and thinking and thus order methods, texts, and doctrines to that.     

Two Jungs. Apropos a paper by Mark Saban

Jung's idea of the ‘personal equation’ amounts to the reflection that theoretical differences between the psychologies that people teach are rooted in their personalities, in other words, that they are due to the psychology each one ‘has’. This concept also applies to different interpretations of Jung's work. The serious difficulties that Mark Saban has with my psychology are a case in point. Recourse to the concept of the personal equation reveals that Saban has his Jung and I have mine. With his insistence on his Talmudic methodological principle of dream interpretation, that ‘the dream is its own interpretation’, according to Saban Jung means nothing but a rejection of Freudian free association. My Jung goes far beyond that. Jung understands this methodological principle above all in terms of what he calls ‘circumambulation’. The main part of this paper is devoted to an elucidation of what circumambulation involves as a mode of dream interpretation. The paper concludes with the distinction Jung himself introduced between two types of reading of his work, either as ‘paper’ and ‘dead nostrums’ or as ‘fire and wind’, and pleads for a reconstruction of Jung's psychology as a whole in terms of his most advanced, deepest insights, instead of a dogmatic reading mainly based on the early Jung, a reading for which his later revolutionary insights are at best negligible embellishments.     

Descartes and the Dissolution of Life

I argue that Descartes is not a reductionist about life, but dissolves or eliminates the category entirely. This is surprising both because he repeatedly refers to the life of humans, animals, and plants and because he appears to rely on the category of life to construct his physiology and medicine. Various attempts have been made in the scholarship to attribute a principled concept of life to Descartes. Most recently, Detlefsen (2016) has argued that Descartes “is a reductionist with respect to explanation of life phenomena but not an eliminativist with respect to life itself” (143). I show that all these attempts either result in arbitrariness or force Descartes's wider philosophical project into incoherence. I argue that Descartes's ontological commitments make a principled concept of life impossible, that he does not need such a concept, and that his project ends up more coherent without one.     

EBERHARD BETHGE: INTERPRETER EXTRAORDINAIRE OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER

Bethge was Dietrich Bonhoeffer's closest friend and confidant during the last ten years of Bonhoeffer's life. Bonhoeffer held him in high esteem, and he regarded no one better able to understand and clarify his thought. Anticipating his own death, Bonhoeffer designated Bethge to care for his legacy and write his biography, responsibilities Bethge later fulfilled with remarkable dedication and erudition. In the process he produced a significant number of interpretative essays, becoming internationally respected for his historical and theological scholarship, as well as his own engagement with church and social issues. Without Bethge, Bonhoeffer's legacy would not have become as well or as widely known as it did, or interpreted in the way that it has.     

From the body: an exchange on scholarship and advocacy

Abstract

In this article, the authors draw from their own experiences working among religious congregations that minister to unauthorized immigrants in the new destinations in the U.S. to reflect on the relationship between scholarship and advocacy. They argue that because of the scholar's embodied condition, his/her location in networks of relations characterized by power differentials, scholarship will always involve a measure of advocacy, invariably containing judgments not only about what counts as legitimate and authoritative methods, arguments, and data for the religious-studies scholarly ‘community,’ but also about the place of the scholar and her/his scholarly community in the larger society. However, as their own experiences show, not all forms of advocacy are equal – they vary in their level of publicness, as well as the intensity and type of the engagement – and these various modalities carry potential payoffs and pitfalls. Thus, rather than trying to draw fixed, sharp, and ultimately untenable boundaries between scholarship and advocacy, the task is to develop a reflexive, pragmatic, and experimental attitude that can allow for these two dimensions of praxis to benefit from each other, animated by a critical approach and an emancipatory interest focused on the intractable problems and defining dilemmas of our age.     

Profiling Derald Wing Sue: Blazing the Trail for the Multicultural Journey and Social Justice in Counseling

This article reviews contributions of Derald Wing Sue to the counseling profession through his scholarship, teaching, leadership, and innovation in articulating multicultural issues in counseling. The article profiles Sue's multicultural journey by blending summaries from his writings, comments from professional colleagues, and information from a personal interview. The profile provides a snapshot of Sue's pioneering contributions to building the multicultural counseling movement while giving an overview of personal and professional benchmarks within his career.     

Interpretations of Freud's Jewishness, 1924–1974

During the first fifty years of historical and biographical commentary on Freud and the origins of psychoanalysis there were there periods of interpretation of Freud's Jewishness. During the first period, extending from the mid-1920s until the 1950, it was widely assumed, following the works of Wittels, that Freud was essentially Viennese, that his Jewishness was at most incidental. During the second period, extending until the late 1960s, Freud was believed by some, following Bakan, to be essentially Jewish, and to have concealed that important aspect of his life intentionally. During the most recent period, and especially in the early 1970s, psychoanalysis was interpreted as a compromise wrought by Freud to meet the conflicting demands of secular German and scientific modernity and Jewish and othe traditions.     

Wittgenstein on the grounds of religious faith: A Kantian proposal

This paper argues that there is an important continuity between Wittgenstein's early remarks on religion and his later treatment of the theme as it appears in his lectures in the 1930s and in his personal diary notes at that time. This continuity pertains to 3 features. First, the early and later Wittgenstein share a critical stance on methodological naturalism, that is, the view that the method of philosophy is relevantly similar to that of the natural sciences. Importantly, religion figures as one of Wittgenstein's examples of the limits of the factual language of natural sciences. Second, both the early and the later Wittgenstein connect religion to the problem of seeing one's life as meaningful while denying the possibility of establishing any objectively understood meaning of life. Third, both evoke the idea of different types of judgments, the conditions of which are independent of each other. Although religious faith is not grounded in factual knowledge and cannot be justified by appeal to empirical evidence or conceptual argumentation, it is not groundless either. Rather, in accordance with Kant who claims that faith may have a nontheoretical justification, Wittgenstein shows that religious faith may result from a personal experience of one's life as a meaningful whole.     

Noumenalism and Einstein's argument for the existence of God

Einstein argued in his latter years that the intelligibility of the world was in the nature of a miracle, and that in no way could one have expected a priori such a high degree of order; this is why he rejected the atheist, positivist standpoint, and believed in a Spinozist God. Einstein's argument, however, is essentially a form of the ‘argument from design’ for a personal God based on the existence of beautiful, mathematically simple laws of nature; that physical order is a unique, improbable alternative compared to the infinite number of chaotic universes that might have existed. Einstein, in his early manhood, was a Humean, but in later years, as he moved toward Spinoza, from phenomenalism to noumenalism, he clearly rejected Hume's restriction of probable inferences to observed sequences. Darwin's arguments against biological design did not apply to Einstein's argument, because the laws of physics are not the outcome of any cumulative struggle for existence and natural selection. Perhaps the beautiful simplicity of basic physical laws helps account for the fact that relatively more physicists than biologists or psychologists hold to a theistic standpoint. Einstein's finite universe would have seriously weakened the argument that life, though infinitely improbable, would have been realized in an infinite world. But in any case, Einstein would have regarded ‘emergence’ theories of life as irrational. In accordance with the principle of identity of Emile Meyerson, the epistemologist whom he most respected, it would have followed that the occurrence of consciousness and intelligence was grounded in a God with those attributes, and that theism was consequently the basis for scientific knowledge.     

Playing the Odds: A New Response to Lucretius's Symmetry Argument

Abstract: Most commentators have assumed that Lucretius's symmetry argument against the fear of death is flawed. There remains, however, dispute as to what the flaw is. After establishing what I understand the target of Lucretius's argument to be (a desire for a longer life as such), I argue for a novel interpretation of what the flaw is, namely, that extending one's life into the time before one was actually born would be an uncertain bet for one who wanted to extend his life, whereas extending one's life beyond the time one actually dies is a sure bet. This account of what the flaw is has the particular merit of relying only on simple concepts used in everyday reasoning and thus can explain why Lucretius's argument gains no traction even in the absence of sophisticated philosophical analysis.     

Khandwalla's protocol analysis

E. H. Gombrich (1909–2001) was almost certainly the most broadly known art historian of the 20th century, and his scholarly work has influenced researchers in many domains. Among psychologists, Gombrich's impact has been greatest in the area of visual perception, largely through the ideas articulated in his book Art and Illusion (1960). His influence on creativity research has been far less profound, although his writings include numerous (although often indirect) discussions of fundamental aspects of creative processes. This cognitive–historical case study investigation aimed to understand how Gombrich achieved a rich, and sometimes prescient, understanding of creativity without emphasizing it as an explicit focus of his scholarship. I argue that Gombrich's cognitive style and multidisciplinary forays led him to emphasize and integrate a particular set of principles that are often underemphasized in contemporary creativity research. Gombrich's foci, on understanding individual creators, continuity with tradition, expert knowledge, feedback, evaluation, and learning, are highly relevant to the study of creativity and represent a stimulating challenge to investigators.     

Hume's Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of Mind1

The article presents a new interpretation of Hume's treatment of personal identity, and his later rejection of it in the “Appendix” to the Treatise. Hume's project, on this interpretation, is to explain beliefs about persons that arise primarily within philosophical projects, not in everyday life. the belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the “vulgar” who rarely turn their minds on themselves so as to think of their perceptions. the author suggests that it is this philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems that Hume finally acknowledges in the “Appendix.” He is unable to explain why we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizing are themselves part of our minds. This suggestion is then tested against seven criteria that any interpretation of the “Appendix” must meet.     

Jakob Wilhelm Hauer's New Religion and National Socialism

Jakob Wilhelm Hauer (1881–1962) was a missionary to India and later both a professor of religious studies at Tübingen and a founder of a new religion, called the German Faith Movement (Deutsche Glaubensbewegung, DGB). According to Hauer, his movement was the essence of National Socialism. Because some contemporary scholars try to distance Hauer's scholarship and the DGB from National Socialism, this paper reviews existing literature about the Hauer phenomenon. It does so in light of the authors' research in the Federal Archives of Koblenz and Berlin and the German Literature Archive in Marbach. Hauer's personal development and determination to further Nazism are traced. Together, the literature review and Hauer's view of religion show that his religious thought and his Nazi politics are inseparable.     

Heidegger’s Concept of Truth Reconsidered in Light of Tugendhat’s Critique

Ernst Tugendhat’s critique of Martin Heidegger’s conception of truth is an ongoing topic in Heideggerian scholarship. In this paper, I contribute to the ongoing exchange between defenders of Heidegger and those who are in agreement with Tugendhat. Specifically, I contend that Tugendhat’s criticisms fail to situate Heidegger’s account of truth within his broader phenomenological–hermeneutic project. In the end, Tugendhat’s critique is grounded upon philosophical assumptions that Heidegger is bringing under question by rethinking the concept of truth. I suggest that thinking through Tugendhat’s critique and attempting to formulate an adequate Heideggerian response gives us a richer understanding of both Heidegger’s account of truth and his general philosophical project.     

FORWARD,TO THE EAST: NAPTHALI HERZ IMBER'S PERCEPTION OF KABBALAH

Naphtali Herz Imber is famous as the author of the Jewish national anthem, “Hatikvah” (“The Hope”). He is also quite well known for his non-conformism, vagabond lifestyle, and excessive drinking. However, his interest in the occult and Kabbalah are much less known. Imber wrote several articles on Jewish mysticism, translated some kabbalistic texts, and published the first journal on Kabbalah—Uriel: A Monthly Magazine Devoted to Cabbalistic Science (of which only one issue appeared). Although much scholarly literature has been devoted to Imber and his famous poem, his interest in the occult and Jewish mysticism has not been investigated. This article will discuss Imber's encounter with late-nineteenth-century esotericism, specifically the doctrines of Laurence and Alice Oliphant and the Theosophical Society. It presents Imber's notions concerning Jewish mysticism and examines the impact that the Theosophical Society and the Oliphants' principles had on his perception of Kabbalah. Finally, it discusses the connection between Imber's Zionism and his interest in Kabbalah and shows that his perception of Jewish mysticism, which was greatly influenced by Western esoteric ideas, was shaped in the framework of fin de siècle Orientalism and Jewish nationalism. Imber's positive evaluation of Jewish mysticism and its nationalistic interpretation anticipates the position of later Zionist scholars of Jewish mysticism, whose vision of Kabbalah and Hasidism largely shaped the way Jewish mysticism is perceived and studied today.     

Problems with paccekabuddhas—decoding early Buddhism

Steven Collins's review (Religion 2:3 (July 1992), pp. 271–8) of my publication Ascetic Figures before and in Early Buddhism: the Emergence of Gautama as the Buddha, Berlin, New York, Mouton de Gruyter 1990) warrants an extended response for a variety of reasons. In a circumstance where a four‐thousand word review has not one positive thing to say about a book, then the principle of natural justice particularly cries out for the author's right of reply. If Collins's review should have the effect of putting off prospective readers of my book then my reply is designed to recuperate their interest. Notwithstanding, it does not take an adept in the art of hermeneutic suspicion to realize the review actually tells us much more about the reviewer than the book. I cannot think that frenzied expressions like ‘academic hooligan’, ‘hearer‐bashing’, ‘fantasy’, ‘biting the hand that feeds you, with a vengeance’ could so easily have poured forth from the pen of normally so gracious a reviewer, had this particular book not hit an emotive nerve—if nothing else!—and sent Collins into an unparalleled fit of moral panic. Indeed, I shall be so bold as to suggest that Collins's reaction to the book has less to do with questions of its scholarly credibility (though his academic posturing would have us believe otherwise): ‘the thesis is presented as historical scholarship, and so it must be judged on academic grounds’ (p. 274) than with Collins's own narrow, pedantic conception, or preconception, of Buddhist Studies. This means my rejoinder to Collins's review inevitably draws me into a discussion of broader methodological questions of general interest to the wider academic community as well as particular issues pertaining to Buddhist scholarship.