Portrayal of the Other in Palestinian and Israeli Schoolbooks: A Comparative Study

The present study examined how Israelis and Palestinians present their narratives related to their conflict in school textbooks used by the state educational system and the ultraorthodox community in Israel and by all Palestinian schools in Palestinian National Territories. The focus was on how each side portrays the Other and their own group. The content analysis was based on a developed conceptual framework and standardized and manualized rating criteria with quantitative and qualitative aspects. The results showed in general that (1) dehumanizing and demonizing characterizations of the Other are rare in both Israeli and Palestinian books; (2) both Israeli and Palestinian books present unilateral national narratives that portray the Other as enemy, chronicle negative actions by the Other directed at the self‐community, and portray the self‐community in positive terms with actions aimed at self‐protection and goals of peace; (3), there is lack of information about the religions, culture, economic and daily activities of the Other, or even of the existence of the Other on maps; (4) the negative bias in portrayal of the Other, the positive bias in portrayal of the self, and the absence of images and information about the Other are all statistically significantly more pronounced in Israeli Ultra‐Orthodox and Palestinian books than in Israeli state books.     

SELF‐KNOWLEDGE AND MORAL STUPIDITY

Most commonplace moral failure is not conditioned by evil intentions or the conscious desire to harm or humiliate others. It is more banal and ubiquitous – a form of moral stupidity that gives rise to rationalization, self‐deception, failures of due moral consideration, and the evasion of responsibility. A kind of crude, perception‐distorting self‐absorption, moral stupidity is the cause of many moral missteps; moral development demands the development of self‐knowledge as a way out of moral stupidity. Only once aware of the presence or absence of particular desires and beliefs can an agent have authority over them or exercise responsibility for their absence. But what is the connection between self‐knowledge and moral development? I argue that accounts (such as Kant's and Richard Moran's) which construe instances of self‐knowledge as like the verdicts of a judge cannot explain its potential role in moral development, and claim that it must be conceived of in a way that makes possible a process of self‐refinement and self‐regulation. Making use of Buddhist moral psychology, I argue that when self‐knowledge plays a role in moral development, it includes a quality of attention to one's experience best modeled as the work of the craftsperson, not as judge.     

Care Ethics and Obligations to Future Generations

A dominant area of inquiry within intergenerational ethics concerns how goods (and bads) ought to be justly distributed between noncontemporaries. Contractualist theories of justice that have broached these discussions have often centered on the concepts of mutual advantage and (indirect) reciprocal cooperation between rational, self‐interested beings. However, another prominent reason that many in the present feel that they have obligations toward future generations is not due to self‐interested reciprocity, but simply because they care about what happens to them. Care ethics promises to be conceptually well‐suited for articulating this latter reason: given that future generations are in a perpetual condition of dependency on present‐day people's actions, this is precisely the kind of relational structure that care theorists should be interested in morally evaluating. Unfortunately, the care literature has been largely silent on intergenerational ethics. This article aims to advance this literature, offering the blueprints of what a care ethic concerning future generations—a “future care ethic”—should look like. The resultant ethic defends a sufficientarian theory of obligation: people in the present ought to ensure the conditions needed to encourage and sustain a world that enables good caring relations to flourish.     

A Phenomenology of Depth

In this paper, I re-vision the depth metaphor in a more contemporary epistemological frame. Rather than using depth as a “vertical” metaphor referring to the hidden, remote, or regressed, I use depth as a “horizonal” metaphor referring to the dimensionality of experience, to the ways in which all experience is structured in a figure–ground relationship. A foreground is always contextualized in relation to its background, and the series of relationships of form to field, self to world, subject to other constitute the ways in which meaning is formed, unformed, and transformed in a movement that characterizes how experience becomes what it is. The analyst’s role in deepening involves attending to the immediacy of the immersive perceptive moment, where embodied feeling-states might emerge from an unspecified ground, where the gap between what forms and its context becomes the crucible for new meaning. This entails receptivity to absence as much as presence, to the ways in which formation is always a play between what becomes and what it is not yet there.     

The lost cause of mourning

This paper examines the evolution of Jacques Lacan’s concept of mourning from his treatment of Hamlet in Seminar 6, “Desire and Its Interpretation,” to its transformation in the tenth Seminar on “Anxiety.” It is a transformation that occurs in tandem with Lacan’s reconception of anxiety as lack of the lack and his reshaped conception of the objet a as object/cause of desire. The key point is the way that Lacan’s renovated conception upends the common sense notion of mourning, that which assumes that suffering the death of a loved one means accommodating oneself to an absence where there was previously a presence. On the contrary, says Lacan, part of what is most deeply to be mourned is the lack in the Other around which the love relation was constructed. The paper concludes by asking to what extent Lacan’s account of mourning should be distinguished from those of both Hegel and Freud.     

Buddhist Fictionalism

Questions regarding what exists are central to various forms of Buddhist philosophy, as they are to many traditions of philosophy. Interestingly, there is perhaps a clearer consensus in Buddhist thought regarding what does not exist than there may be regarding precisely what does exist, at least insofar as the doctrine of anātman (no self, absence of self) is taken to be a fundamental Buddhist doctrine. It may be noted that many forms of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy in particular are considered to offer a quite austere ontology—a rather ‘empty’ account of what exists. Continuing in this vein of ontological austerity, here I will attempt to lay out a relatively novel approach to Buddhist ontology, viz. Buddhist fictionalism.     

Innen, Außen, Zwischen

The so-called “intersubjective turn” (or “relational turn”) in psychoanalysis is closely associated with the work of Winnicott. It was him who added a new dimension to the psychoanalytic theories of a separate inner world, a dimension focussing on the mediating processes between the separate spheres of psychic and external reality: a space between subject and object, drive and civilisation, Ego and reality — the “potential space” that unconsciously connects our self to the Other as well as to a shared physical and social world we live in. Winnicotts paradoxical notions of the self are traced in this paper and unwrapped from their often enigmatic, developmentally and epistemologically confusing veils: the infant who does not exist without a holding mother; who is not aware of his/her being held because of its evidence, and only has an experience when falling; who him-/herself creates that reality which is already there; who must destroy the object in order to use it; who can only be alone when another person is present. The author, starting from apparently narcissistic phenomena of the media society, rehabilitates the term of “in-between” in contemporary psychoanalytic discussion which for a long time was considered as suspect, as being part of a “non-psychoanalytic” superficial social psychology (as the intersubjective, the interpersonal or the interactive). Under the strong influence of Winnicott, and overarching the different schools, contemporary psychoanalysis is focussing on intersubjectivity and relationality. The paper is an appeal for reformulating classical intrapsychic concepts — including the theory of the unconscious—in intersubjective terms, thus unfolding a relational approach inherent in Freud’s metapsychology.     

Do Demanding Conditions Help or Hurt Self‐Regulation?

Although everyday life is often demanding, it remains unclear how demanding conditions impact self‐regulation. Some theories suggest that demanding conditions impair self‐regulation, by undermining autonomy, interfering with skilled performance and working memory, and depleting energy resources. Other theories, however, suggest that demanding conditions improve self‐regulation by mobilizing super‐ordinate control processes. The present article integrates both kinds of theories by proposing that the self‐regulatory impact of demanding conditions depends on how people adapt to such conditions. When people are action‐oriented, demanding conditions may lead to improved self‐regulation. When people are state‐oriented, demanding conditions may lead to impaired self‐regulation. Consistent with this idea, action versus state orientation strongly moderates the influence of demands on self‐regulatory performance. The impact of demanding conditions on self‐regulation is thus not fixed, but modifiable by psychological processes.     

‘With healing in her wings…’: Integration and repair in a self-destructive adolescent

This paper describes certain Jungian concepts related to integration and repair. Fundamental to this is Jung's concept of the self, which Fordham has made the basis of his model of development. To Jung's notion of the self as an integrator and organizer of experience, Fordham has added the idea that the self divides up, or deintegrates. Three corollaries of Fordham's model, pertaining to whole and part objects and the depressive position, are amplified through infant studies.

Clinical material from the treatment of a pigeon-phobic adolescent is presented, which attempts to demonstrate that a significant part of what the phobia represented was an infantile state of projective and introjective identification with an anxious mother. Treatment facilitated actions of the self that contributed to the integration of the experiences represented by the pigeons, so that what had been split off became a deintegrate capable of being reintegrated.

The focus of this paper is on the developmental as well as the pathological. Both are conceived in relation to the treatment.     

Autobiographical reflections on what it means to experience disruption

Accepting disruption as an inevitable occurrence in life, five nurse-teacher-researchers explore their experience with being disruptive/being disrupted. Reflection on the all-encompassing embodied experience of disruption takes us through a process of exploration and meaning-making. We pause to show what it is like to be in-between the known and unknown in creating a life in academia through stories. Plotlines such as being in-between family and work; transplanted outsider seeking a sense of belonging; going into the chaos while feeling invisible; and self-induced disruption in response to loss illuminate our reflection. The metaphor of the breathturn allows us to reconstruct our experience and to discern possibilities beyond the usual negative connotations.     

In-between Believing

For any proposition p , it may sometimes occur that a person is not quite accurately describable as believing that p , nor quite accurately describable as failing to believe that p . I describe such a person as in an 'in-between state of belief'. I argue for the prevalence of in-between states of believing, and assert the need for an account of belief that allows us intelligibly to talk about in-between believing. I suggest that Bayesian and representationalist approaches are inadequate to the task, and that a Rylean dispositional account of belief might do the trick.     

Institute reports

Abstract

The “Other” refers to that which is “absolutely other,” which, according to certain postmodern thinkers, signifies the radical difference and autonomy of our fellow humans. To approach the patient as the Other, then, is to accept him or her as someone who is ultimately inaccessible to my grasp, concealed from my truth, and withdrawn from my presence. Ethics of the Other poses manifold challenges to conventional patient care: a) it exposes the inherent violence against the Other, as is manifest in the pervasive rejection of absence/concealment, in psychiatric care; b) it demands consideration of alternative perspectives on absence/concealment; c) it demands a new paradigm of healing, a paradigm which focuses on care instead of cure, and which measures excellence in clinical practice in terms of humility and sensibility, instead of power and mastery.     

State Authenticity in Everyday Life

We examined the components and situational correlates of state authenticity to clarify the construct's meaning and improve understanding of authenticity's attainment. In Study 1, we used the day reconstruction method (participants assessed real‐life episodes from ‘yesterday’) and in Study 2 a smartphone app (participants assessed real‐life moments taking place ‘just now’) to obtain situation‐level ratings of participants' sense of living authentically, self‐alienation, acceptance of external influence, mood, anxiety, energy, ideal‐self overlap, self‐consciousness, self‐esteem, flow, needs satisfaction, and motivation to be ‘real’. Both studies demonstrated that state authentic living does not require rejecting external influence and, further, accepting external influence is not necessarily associated with state self‐alienation. In fact, situational acceptance of external influence was more often related to an increased, rather than decreased, sense of authenticity. Both studies also found state authentic living to be associated with greater, and state self‐alienation with lesser: positive mood, energy, relaxation, ideal‐self overlap, self‐esteem, flow, and motivation for realness. Study 2 further revealed that situations prioritizing satisfaction of meaning/purpose in life were associated with increased authentic living and situations prioritizing pleasure/interest satisfaction were associated with decreased self‐alienation. State authenticity is best characterized by two related yet independent components: authentic living and (absence of) self‐alienation. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Hineni and Transference: The Remembering and Forgetting of the Other

Emmanuel Levinas proposed a philosophical critique that worked to unsettle and decenter generalizing, totalizing, and thematizing attempts to define the self. However, on the other hand, Levinas provides the space for the formation of a configuration of the self that has been conditioned by ethical relation and even points to some of the ingredients for (or shape of) such a self. Throughout Levinas’ work, the concept of hineni (“Here I am”) is used to illustrate the moral event that best characterizes the “psyche.” In the following paper, we consider how to apply the notion of hineni to modern psychological constructs of the human self. In the first section, we flesh out the characteristics of a self lived as hineni. We argue that such a self is “shaped” or oriented morally toward the outside and is radically exposed to the Other (not merely a bearer of moral consciousness or moral attributes). It is a remembering of the preoriginal and primordial ethical relation. In the second section, we use the psychoanalytic concept of transference to illustrate how the moral shape of the self can be forgotten, and how the self enters a state of “mineness” wherein the Other is reduced to one’s own history (Levinas 1990). In this state of forgetfulness, we argue that a “concreteness of egoism” (Levinas 1969) is maintained and a self lived toward the outside remains untenable. Transference, we argue, is an impoverished relation and a forgetting of and violence to the Other. Its proper use, however, in the therapeutic alliance allows for the possibility of a remembering of the Other and a calling beyond oneself.

Mending the Broken Frame: Self-Narration in a Constructionist Framework

The communal construction of mental illness makes recovery a daunting challenge since society largely perceives the psychiatrically ill as ??deficient??. Not only does one have to deal with the illness itself, one additionally has to deal with the perpetual stigma associated with the labeling, increasing the personal consequences of these illnesses. In my own journey through mental illness, I have repeatedly tried to construct for myself those structures which would help me become stable and empower me from within rather than rob me of my sense of self. This paper is a small expression of that narrative.     

Cultural influences on artistic creativity and its evaluation

Two studies were designed to compare (a) the rated creativity of artworks created by American and Chinese college students, and (b) the criteria used by American and Chinese judges to evaluate these artworks. The study demonstrated that the two groups of students differed in their artistic creativity. American participants produced more creative and aesthetically pleasing artworks than did their Chinese counterparts, and this difference in performance was recognized by both American and Chinese judges. The difference between the use of criteria by American and Chinese judges was small, and consisted mainly of the American judges' use of stricter standards in evaluating overall creativity. Moreover, in general, there was a greater consensus among Chinese judges regarding what constitutes creativity than among American judges. The study also revealed, but preliminarily, that the artistic creativity of Chinese students was more likely to be reduced as a function of restrictive task constraints or of the absence of explicit instructions to be creative. The results of this study seem to support the hypothesis that an independent self‐oriented culture is more encouraging of the development of artistic creativity than is an interdependent self‐oriented culture. Other possible explanations, such as differences in people's attitudes toward and motivation for engaging in art activities, or socioeconomic factors might also account for differences in people's artistic creativity.     

The road to the unconscious self not taken: Discrepancies between self‐ and observer‐inferences about implicit dispositions from nonverbal behavioural cues

To what extent can individuals gain insight into their own or another person's implicit dispositions' We investigated whether self‐perceivers versus neutral observers can detect implicit dispositions from nonverbal behavioural cues contained in video feedback (cue validity) and whether these cues are in turn used as a valid basis for explicit dispositional inferences (cue utilization). Across three studies in the domains of extraversion and anxiety we consistently obtained reliable cue validity and cue utilization for neutral observers but not for self‐perceivers. An additional measure of state inferences in Study 3 showed that one reason for the lack of mediation in self‐perceivers is their reluctance to use their state inferences as a basis for more general trait inferences. We conclude that people have a ‘blind spot’ with respect to the nonverbal behavioural manifestations of their unconscious selves, even though neutral observers may readily detect and utilize this information for dispositional inferences. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The face of the state on the U.S.-Mexico border

In recent years, feminist geopolitics and the turns toward emotional and affective geography have resulted in new perspectives on theories of power, embodiment and subjectivity. Other recent trends have considered non-human objects as important for state theory, insofar as state practice often relies upon the force of objects in everyday life. This article works to bring together object-oriented and emotional geographies for a new perspective on the state. It does so by drawing on another theoretical tradition that has been less familiar for political geography: psychoanalytic theory. Findings from ethnographic research with residents living near the U.S.-Mexico border in Arizona help illuminate the presence and spectral circulation of what we call the “face of the state” as a psycho-emotional entity in everyday life for these residents. Surveillance objects enter the psyche through the face of the state, insofar as they are imagined and felt as a visual and embodied experience. The force of the object, then, extends beyond its own materiality and into the psycho-social dimensions of life through which state power operates, thereby empowering the border to gaze at the subject population in powerful new ways.