孟子德性论的思维理路与儒家哲学认识和把握世界的基本方式

从性、天统一的德性论,到“德教”、“成德”的德性生成论,再到以德行仁的仁政学说,呈现出了孟子道德形上学的基本理路和环节。这一思维理路反映了中国哲学、尤其是儒家哲学认识和把握世界的基本方式。     

A Virtue Approach Instead of a Kantian Approach as a Solution to Major Dilemmas in Meta-ethics? A Criticism of David Carr

This contribution is a criticism of some points David Carr brings forward both in his 1991 book (Educating the Virtues) but even more so in his 1996 article in this journal (After Kohlberg: Some Implications of an Ethics of Virtue for the Theory of Moral Education and Development). With the help of a virtue approach Carr tries to solve the moral objectivism-moral relativism dilemma and the deontologism-consequentialism dilemma in ethics. I will argue that his attempt, though very interesting, suffers from some serious flaws and that, either, Carr's position is much closer to a Kantian approach than Carr thinks, or Carr's position needs a good deal of clarification.     

INTRODUCTION: VIRTUE AND VICE

Abstract: This introduction to the collection Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic addresses three main questions: (1) What is a virtue theory in ethics or epistemology? (2) What is a virtue? and (3) What is a vice? (1) It suggests that a virtue theory takes the virtues and vices of agents to be more fundamental than evaluations of acts or beliefs, and defines right acts or justified beliefs in terms of the virtues. (2) It argues that there are two important but different concepts of virtue: virtues are qualities that attain good ends, and virtues are qualities that involve good motives. (3) Accordingly, vices are qualities that either fail to attain good ends or involve bad motives. Finally, the introduction summarizes the eleven essays in the collection, which are divided into four sections: the Structure of Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology; Virtue and Context; Virtue and Emotion; and Virtues and Vices.     

A case study of ‘The Good School:’ Examples of the use of Peterson’s strengths-based approach with students

This applied case study centers on two aspects of Peterson’s research as introduced into a large K-12 school in Australia: (i) creating enabling institutions and (ii) applications of character strengths. The paper describes five character strengths initiatives. Four of the strengths initiatives have been integrated into existing school experiences such as English curriculum, school sport, student leadership, and counseling. The fifth initiative involved a brand new program which introduced a Positive Education Curriculum for years?K-10. We describe these five initiatives and then explain how students at the school may experience these in a more holistic and integrated way. We hope that this article will act as a fitting tribute to the legacy of Christopher Peterson.     

护士道德勇气研究进展

当护士拥有道德勇气时能履行对病人的道德责任等多种作用。本文对国内外护士道德勇气的研究进行梳理,列举了中西方学者对于道德勇气概念的定义,并且从质性和量性研究两方面分析护士道德勇气的研究现况,总结了人口学因素、组织伦理氛围、道德困境、道德敏感性与道德韧性等影响护士道德勇气的相关因素。本文有助于更全面的理解这一护士美德,未来可通过结合中国国情进一步探索并构建干预方案以提高护士的道德勇气,保障患者享受高质量护理。

     

亚里士多德关于以音乐教育培养少儿道德品行的思想探析

在快乐中培养少儿的道德品行是亚里士多德音乐教育思想的道德目标。在审美通感的基础上,通过道德移情进行理性灵魂的德性活动,是音乐教育培养少儿道德品行的心理机制。“执中”为善、积习成德是音乐教育培塑未来道德公民的基本途径。     

论道德理想：世俗生活中医学美德何以可能

道德理想在现代道德哲学理论建构与医学道德实践生活中占有非常重要的地位和作用。道德理想作为道德行动的卓越目标,体现为个人、社会与国家三个层次。在道德理想与道德义务的关系上存在着三种不同的观点。医学美德的实现有赖于医生的超义务行为或份外行善,道德英雄和道德圣人展现出了卓越的道德品质。道德理想虽然不像道德义务那样具有强制性,但完全缺乏任何道德理想的社会生活是不可欲的。医学美德不仅在世俗生活中是可能的,而且我们应该在医学职业中给予它应有的道德地位,它的崇高性、典范性、激励性深刻地展示了人类道德的价值和主体性尊严。

     

解析现代生育伦理问题的思维路向

人类生育选择有以“善”为核心和以“正当”为核心的两类价值定位 ,因而 ,对现代生育伦理问题的理论解释 ,不能只是其中的任何一种思维路向 ,而应当是两种思维路向的合理整合。     

Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant

Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This ‘virtue ethical’ claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good judge of moral judges; and so on. I show how this worry can be met, and trace the implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement.