Reply to Commentaries by Dodi Goldman and Avgi Saketopoulou

In this newly fashioned dialogue that allows us three respondents to continue our first-round discussions, I treasure the opportunity of learning more about Farhi's and Milner's works through the lenses of Dodi Goldman and Avgi Saketopoulou. Both respondents bring additional important historical information to this virtual roundtable, giving me another chance of re-reading Farhi's text through these new perspectives. I think that Goldman's information about Milner's interest in the natural science contributes a great deal to my understanding of her amazing capacity to tolerate her patient's changing psychotic states. I also learn a lot from Saketopoulou's sensitive discussion of the patient's last phone call to Milner shortly before her death in which the patient informs Milner that she had failed her in similar ways as Winnicott had failed Milner. I suggest a slightly different reading of the word failure and propose that the patient's utterance was a sign of a renewed strength rather than a statement of utter disappointment. A discussion of the place of phantasy in the intra-uterine life of a baby is also included in my response.     

Reply to Reviews by Slavin,Stein, and Stern

Major points of three reviews—by Malcolm Owen Slavin, Ruth Stein, and Donnel Stern—are highlighted and further elaborated, particularly the broad existential foundations of dialectical constructivism, the importance of dialectical thinking, and the centrality of the struggle with epistemological and moral uncertainty in this perspective. Several counterpoints are formulated—for example, the seemingly paradoxical commitment to a definitive theory of the process, the place of objective facts and universal principles in experience that is fundamentally ambiguous, and the pragmatic necessity for commitment to particular understandings and courses of action in the light of the passage of time and of mortality. Some clinical examples are presented to illustrate the dialectic of ritual and spontaneity as reflected in the tailoring of the frame to suit particular analytic relationships. Precursors of dialectical constructivism in the author's early work are identified.     

Counting by Identity: A Reply to Liebesman

David Liebesman (AJP, 2015) argues that we never count by identity. He generalizes from an argument that we don't do so with sentences indicating fractions, or with measurement sentences on their supposed count readings. In response, I argue that measurement sentences aren't covered by the thesis that we count by identity, in part because they don't have count readings. Then I use the data to which Liebesman appeals, in his argument that we don't count by identity using measurement sentences, in order to rebut his argument that we don't count by identity using sentences indicating fractions.     

Reply to Commentary by Daniel N. Stern

I respond to Stern's largely affirming discussion by fleshing out a few points, for example, improvisation is more than just being spontaneous, it is ensemble work that plays off and with patterns emergent in the personalities of both parties. These patterns illuminate something about the unconscious of each from which blossom things heretofore unimagined or unarticulated. Several principles are then emphasized: First, improvisational moments arise when the “characters” in the moment draw from something real within themselves along with who they are inducing one another to become. Second, the cultivation of play in improvisation lends itself to putting to rest the myth of the perfectly analyzed analyst as not only impossible but as being both unnecessary and undesirable—a seminal point to the entire relational canon. Third, improvisation is a means for putting live flesh on the sterile bones of a host of theories now informing the contemporary psychoanalytic perspective such as chaos and complexity theory, along with dynamic systems theory. I also note that improvisational moments exhibit an emerging sense of vitality and a deepened sense of connection between the partners. Their work obtains a greater sense of focus, though not a deliberate focus as that their relational unconsciouses are “directing” them. Improvisational work feels liberating, playful, as well as affirming and recognizing what what each is bringing to their coauthorship. By contrast, when the improvisation fails, it devolves into negative thirdness or one-upsmanship, the qualities of which reflect deadness, avoidance, confusion, constriction of play, and a misrecognition of one another that devolves into a mutual sense of defeat. Responding to Stern's question about posi-traums, I affirm there is a phenomenon in which an entrenched emotional conviction of a patient's can be dramatically altered. This happens when something positive occurs that cannot be assimilated within the patient's intransigently negative belief system such that she must accommodate a new organizing principle, that is, a new emotional conviction to make sense of it. I concede, however, that it may be too soon to tell how much such phenomena penetrate the more physiologically encoded elements of trauma.