The relationship of personality to punctuality for a variety of types of appointment

The punctuality with which undergraduate students kept four distinct types of appointment was observed without their knowledge. Ss were asked to record, confidentially, the importance with which they regarded each appointment, using a 7-point scale. A frequency distribution of the proportion of appointments kept punctually approximated to a normal distribution (rather than the bimodal distribution predicted by ‘common sense’). Both punctuality and importance-rating were strongly affected by appointment type. Ss' scores on the P scale of the EPQ were inversely related to the importance they attributed to appointments, but showed little relationship to punctuality. Their scores on the E scale, on the other hand, were inversely related to punctuality for most types of appointment, but were not related to the importance attributed to appointments. Ss' N scores were positively related to punctuality for those appointments that were generally regarded as ‘extremely important’. A small interaction effect between gender of the Ss and type of appointment may have been due to the gender of the majority of the experimenters' collaborators. A principal-components analysis revealed a primary factor on which punctuality, importance-rating, E score and P score all load highly, i.e. a ‘concern for appointments’ factor.     

Reliability of a scale measuring disposition towards hallucination: a brief report

Two forms of the Launey-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS) measuring disposition toward hallucination were given to 150 male undergraduate students. Scores on both forms were approximately normally distributed and a high test-retest reliability was observed. All the items except one on each scale were judged by at least some Ss as applying to themselves. The percentage of Ss scoring pathological items as certainly applying to themselves was consistent with previous research that suggests that a surprisingly large percentage of people experience hallucinations at some time in their lives.     

Responding time: A response equivalent to inspection time

A response equivalent to ‘inspection time’ (IT) was developed using a reaction time task in which Ss were required to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to whichever one of two lights appeared on each of a number of trials. The appearance of the lights was followed on all trials by a backward mask. IT was estimated for each S as the shortest duration between the onsets of the light and the backward mask at which the S could respond accurately on virtually every trial. An estimate of ‘responding time’ was then made by setting the duration between the stimulus onset and the mask to each S's individual IT and gradually reducing the time between trials so that Ss had less and less time in which to respond correctly. Responding time was taken to be the shortest such interval at which the S could respond accurately on virtually every trial. This measure was found to be reliable although quantitatively different estimates were obtained using two different methods of presenting the stimulus trials. Responding time was longer for a group of lower-intelligence Ss than for a group of higher-intelligence Ss and the measure was also found to correlate with measured intelligence in the former group. However, it did not itself correlate significantly with IT suggesting that responding time and IT may be measuring different underlying processes.     

Inspection time and IQ: Evidence for a mental speed—ability association

Two studies have tested a theory that individual differences in mental speed constitute an important component of differences in general intelligence by examining patterns of correlation between ‘inspection time’ (IT) and various ability measures assumed to reflect different kinds of speed. The first study was set within the framework of Cattell's theory about the structure of abilities. Results from 30 adult Ss whose IQs (Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices, RAPM) were in the average to above-average range suggested that IT is associated with a broad general ability variable and not with the primary abilities ‘perceptual speed’ or ‘speed of closure’. However, IT was significantly correlated with only a subgroup of those primary abilities that were significantly intercorrelated, and the outcome did not further elucidate the nature of speed as discussed within Cattell's formulation. The second study tested a relationship between IT and a measure of general ‘intellectual speed’, previously described as the major determinant of intellectual differences in a situation where two other critical variables, ‘accuracy’ and ‘continuance’ can exert no influence. It was measured for more than 40 adult Ss, whose IQs (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Revised) ranged from 81 to 138, and compared with times to produce the correct solution to individual items from the RPM. IT, IQ and solution times were all significantly intercorrelated but, nonetheless, IT and solution times appeared to be substantially reflecting different processes. It is concluded that IT can account for more than the 10% of variance in IQ commonly found to be shared with simple information-processing tasks. The present result of approx. 17% shared variance is probably an underestimate, given the restricted IQ samples used and certain procedural shortcomings. The nature of speed reflected by IT has not been determined and current measurement procedures may be confounded by internal noise.     

Effects of repeated exposure to sexually violent or nonviolent stimuli on sexual arousal to rape and nonrape depictions

The major purpose of this investigation was to examine the effects of repeated exposure to sexually violent stimuli (SVS) in relatively ‘naturalistic settings’ on sexual arousal to rape and nonrape stimuli. Repeated exposure effects using nonviolent erotica were also examined. Sixty-nine male Ss participated in the study. A preexposure session was conducted in which Ss were exposed to written and pictorial depictions of rape and mutually-consenting intercourse. Based on Ss' penile tumescence to these depictions, they were classified as either Force-oriented, Nonforce-oriented or Unclassifiable. Subsequently, Ss were randomly assigned to sexually violent (SVS), sexually nonviolent (SNVS) or control conditions within each force-orientation group. Those assigned to the SVS condition were then exposed to 10 SVS including feature-length films and written and pictorial depictions over a period of 4 weeks. Ss in the SNVS condition were exposed to 10 similar media presentations depicting sexually nonviolent activities only. Ss in the control condition were not exposed to any stimuli during this 4-week period. Soon after completion of the exposure phase, Ss returned for a postexposure laboratory session in which they were presented with four depictions that were similar in theme to those in the preexposure session. Penile tumescence scores and self-reports of sexual arousal were obtained. Results revealed that, for Force-oriented Ss, those exposed to either SVS or SNVS were less aroused to the rape depictions in the postexposure session than those in the control condition. A similar pattern occurred with the nonrape depictions for these Ss, though it was considerably less pronounced. No evidence of a similar ‘satiation’ pattern was obtained for either Nonforce-oriented or Unclassifiable Ss, with these Ss showing no significant differences among the three exposure conditions. The findings are discussed in the context of cognitions, personality differences, conditioning processes, stimulus parameters and response habituation theories. Social and clinical implications are also discussed.     

Inspection time and the mental age deviation hypothesis

The ‘g’-loading of the inspection time (IT) measure was tested by applying Spitz's mental age (MA) deviation model to a sample of non-retarded adolescents and children. An MA 8 and MA 11 group, each composed of below-average, average and above-average intelligence Ss, were compared on an IT task in which latency of responses was also recorded. Results showed that IT related to MA but not to IQ. By contrast, the latency of responding in the IT differentiated Ss by IQ, but not MA, with above-average IQ Ss exhibiting longer response latencies. It was concluded that response latency exhibited a higher ‘g’-loading than did IT.     

How personality relates to intelligence test performance: Implications for a theory of intelligence,ageing research and personality assessment

Previously reported findings indicate that variation of EEG evoked potential parameters is strongly related to both personality and intelligence differences (Robinson, 1982a, b). These data and the associated theory imply that personality should relate to intelligence test performance. Results are described in this report which indicate that subtest profiles obtained with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) differ significantly for Ss scoring highest and lowest on the Extraversion (E) scale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ); introverts tend to do better on the ‘Verbal’ subtests while extraverts tend to do better on the ‘Performance’ measures. Ss with middling scores on the E scale of the EPQ can also be distinguished in terms of specific WAIS profiles. In this case the results define two contrasting groups. Young male Ss with middling E scores tend to have high Psychoticism (P) and low Lie (L) scores on the EPQ as well as having distinctive WAIS profiles characterized by higher scores on subtests normally associated with a ‘Memory’ or ‘Attention-Concentration’ factor. Higher scores were also obtained by this subgroup on the Picture Arrangement and Block Design subtests which were previously shown to load a P + /L ? factor. The converse is true for older female Ss who also have middling E scores. As well as demonstrating a systematic relationship between personality and intelligence test performance these data provide some further support for a model of brain-behaviour relationships proposed by Robinson. Within this theoretical framework a neurophysiologically meaningful explanation can be provided for the three major factors that reliably emerge in factor-analytic studies of the WAIS. From an applied viewpoint, the data indicate that personality differences can be assessed from performance on tests such as the WAIS. On this issue the results are discussed with particular reference to Gittinger's Personality Assessment System. Implications for ageing research are also discussed.     

Perception,illusion, and hallucination

Patrick Suppes' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed's metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms ‘perception’ and ‘truth’ are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion.     

What does the Beck depression inventory measure in students?

This study was carried out to investigate Gotlib's claim that the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) is more a measure of general psychopathology than a specific measure of depression when applied to psychiatrically normal students. Varimax factor analysis of the items of the BDI yielded seven factors for a sample of students (N = 160) and six factors for a sample of psychiatric patients (N = 65). A factor clearly interpretable as ‘somatic disturbance’ emerged in both the patient and student samples. Reasonable comparability was found on two further factors interpreted as ‘feelings of hopelessness’ and ‘feelings of unworthiness’ in the student sample, and ‘depressed mood’ and ‘depressive self-blame’ in the patient sample. A factor labelled ‘lack of vital energy’ found in the patient data appeared split among three factors in the student data. All BDI factors in the student sample correlated significantly with a measure of general psychopathology (N scale). Four factors correlated significantly with the number of recent negative life events for whose occurrence participants perceived responsibility. For all four factors the component of factor scores orthogonal to neuroticism was significantly correlated with the life-event measure. It is concluded the BDI has a factor structure in students which is reasonably comparable, though not identical, to that in depressed patients. It is also concluded that although BDI factors do, to some extent, measure general psychopathology they also measure specific aspects of depression independent of general psychopathology.     

Personality and performance on a missing-letter measure of perceptual defence

Fifty-two Ss were required to make complete words from 20 neutral and 20 unpleasant ‘target’ words whose alternate letters had been removed. The four personality scales from the EPQ and the Psychoticism scale from the unpublished PEN inventory were employed as independent variables in repeated-measures analyses of variance in which the dependent variable was the number of neutral or bad target words produced in the missing-letter task. A significant two-way interaction was obtained between PEN Psychoticism and performance on the task, such that Ss scoring low on the personality scale hit significantly more neutral targets than Ss scoring high on the scale. These results did not support previous studies on the relationship between personality and perceptual defence and were interpreted within the framework provided by Mednick, whereby schizophrenia is characterized by a flattening of associative hierarchies.     

Semantic relationism, belief reports and contradiction

In his book Semantic Relationism, Kit Fine propounds an original and sophisticated semantic theory called ‘semantic relationism’ or ‘relational semantics’, whose peculiarity is the enrichment of Kaplan’s, Salmon’s and Soames’ Russellian semantics (more specifically, the semantic content of simple sentences and the truth-conditions of belief reports) with coordination, “the very strongest relation of synonymy or being semantically the same”. In this paper, my goal is to shed light on an undesirable result of semantic relationism: a report like “Tom believes that Cicero is bald and Tom does not believe that Tully is bald” is correct according to Fine’s provided truth-conditions of belief reports, but its semantic content is (very likely) a contradiction. As I will argue in the paper, even the resort to the notion of token proposition, introduced in Fine’s recent article “Comments on Scott Soames’ ‘Coordination Problems’”, does not suffice to convincingly eliminate the contradiction; moreover, it raises new difficulties.     

Interrogative suggestibility,delayed memory and self-concept

This study investigates the relationship between interrogative suggestibility as measured by the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS) and variables related to memory recall and self-esteem. There were 30 Ss, tested twice 1 week apart. After completing the GSS they were required to fill in a number of Semantic Differential scales relating to the concepts: Myself as I am generally, Myself during the experiment and The experimenter. Ss were generally more suggestible during the second interview when their memory about the context of the interrogation context had deteriorated. The exception was that negative feedback appeared to have most effect on suggestibility and self-esteem the first time it was applied. Self-esteem related to ‘competence’ and ‘potency’ correlated significantly with suggestibility, especially during the first interrogative session. Perceptions of the experimenter were generally not found to be significantly related to suggestibility.     

A preliminary investigation of cognitive and relaxation treatment of panic disorder: effects on intense anxiety vs 'background' anxiety

In this study, three adult males complaining of Panic Disorders were treated with cognitive therapy followed by relaxation training combined with cognitive therapy in a multiple-baseline across Ss design. All Ss demonstrated a decrease in the number and duration of episodes of heightened or intense anxiety, which was maintained at 3-month follow-up. Daily time-sampled ratings of ‘background’ anxiety, not necessarily associated with periods of intense anxiety, showed a substantial decrease for S2, which was maintained at 3-month follow-up. However, S 1 and S 3 evidenced an increase in background anxiety during the combined treatment phase in contrast to the effects of treatment on periods of ‘intense’ anxiety. These results suggest that psychological treatments for patients classified as suffering from Panic Disorder are effective and lend some support to the differentiation of panic from ‘general’ anxiety. Recent observations of relaxation-induced anxiety were also replicated in this clinical setting. These data also illustrate the advantages and difficulties of self-monitoring anxiety over a period of time.     

Sensation seeking,decision making styles,and preference for individual responsibility

Two scales were designed to measure respectively how people report they make plans and decisions; the Active/Decisive (AD) scale, and the degree to which they prefer environments that offer some type of personal initiative, personal freedom, and/or personal control; the Individual Responsibility (IR) scale. The results indicate that people can be differentiated in terms of being active/decisive and, to some degree, in terms of preferring environments that offer greater or lesser amounts of individual responsibility. Factor analysis of the AD scale indicated there are four distinct factors that correspond to four of the attributes that Peters and Waterman (1982) suggest characterize the planning and decision making styles of the executives of some of the top companies in the U.S. The AD scale was found to correlate 0.42 (P < 0.01) with Zuckerman's Sensation Seeking scale (SSSV) while the IR scale was found to correlate 0.24 (P < 0.01) with the SSSV scale. It is suggested that the trait of sensation seeking ‘prepares’ individuals to develop the active/decisive planning and decision making style as well as influences them to endorse the concept of ‘individual responsibility’.     

Attribution of blame for criminal acts and its relationship with personality

This paper examines the relationship between some personality variables and attribution of blame by offenders for their criminal activity. A specially-designed ‘Blame Attribution Inventory’ was constructed and administered to 224 Ss who had committed ‘serious’ criminal acts. Factor analysis of the items revealed 3 independent factors: (1) ‘External’ Attribution (i.e. blaming the crime on social circumstances, victims, society); (2) ‘Mental-Element’ Attribution (i.e. blaming responsibility for the crime on mental illness, poor self-control, distorted perception); (3) ‘Guilt-Feeling’ Attribution (i.e. feelings of remorse, regrets, need for punishment). The inventory was administered to 40 offender patients who had completed the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ), the Gough Socialization Scale (GSS) and the Beck Depression Inventory. External Attribution had significant correlation with the EPQ P scale, Mental-Element Attribution correlated significantly with the EPQ L scale and the GSS. Guilt-Feeling Attribution was associated with depression and neuroticism.     

Hallucinating real things

No particular dagger was the object of Macbeth’s hallucination of a dagger. In contrast, when he hallucinated his former comrade Banquo, Banquo himself was the object of the hallucination. Although philosophers have had much to say about the nature and philosophical import of hallucinations (e.g. Macpherson and Platchias, Hallucination, 2013) and object-involving attitudes (e.g. Jeshion, New essays on singular thought, 2010), their intersection has largely been neglected. Yet, object-involving hallucinations raise interesting questions about memory, perception, and the ways in which we have knowledge of the world around us. In this paper, I offer an account of object-involving hallucinations. Specifically, I argue that they are an unusual species of perceptual remembering.     

The world,the flesh and the argument from design

In the the passage just quoted from theDialogues concerning Natural Religion, David Hume developed a thought-experiment that contravened his better-known views about “chance” expressed in hisTreatise and firstEnquiry. For among other consequences of the ‘eternal-recurrence’ hypothesis Philo proposes in this passage, it may turn out that what the vulgar call cause is nothing but a secret and concealed chance. (In this sentence, I have simply reversed “cause” and “chance” in a well-known passage fromHume's Treatise, p. 130). In the first eight sections of this essay, I develop one topological and model-theoretic analogue of Hume's thought-experiment, in which ‘most’ (‘A-generic’) modelsM of a ‘scientific’ theoryU are both ‘eternally recurrent’ and topologically random (in a sense which will be made precise), even though they are ‘inductively’ defined, via a step-by-step (‘empirical’?) procedure that Hume might have been inclined to endorse. The last aspect of this model-theoretic thought-experiment also serves to distinguish it from simpler measure-theoretic prototypes that are known to follow from Kolmogorov's Zero-One Law (cf. the Introduction, 5.2, 6.1 and 6.7 below). In the last three sections, I will argue more informally

1. that the metamathematical thought-experiments just mentioned do have a genuine metaphysical relevance, and that this relevance is predominantly skeptical in its implications;
2. that such ‘nonstandard’ instances of semantic underdetermination and ‘pathology’ seem to be the metatheoretic rule rather than the exception; and therefore,
3. that metamathematical and metatheoretic ‘malign-genius’ arguments are quite coherent, contrary (e.g.) to assertions such as that of Putnam (1980), pp. 7–8.

In the essay's conclusion, finally, I assimilate (2) and (3) to the familiar datum that ‘simplicity’, rather than ‘pathology’, has more often than not turned out to be an anomalous ‘special case’ in the historical development of scientific and mathematical ontology.     

Intelligence and inspection time: Do high-IQ subjects use cognitive strategies?

It has been suggested that ‘inspection time’ (IT) can be aided by specific strategies, and that high-IQ Ss would therefore be advantaged on this task. However consideration of previously published findings from university students suggest that such strategies cannot currently be taught with any degree of success, and that strategy use may disrupt rather than explain the IT-IQ relationship. Correlations between IT and IQ for high-IQ Ss not using strategies are consistent with previously observed data, perhaps from -0.3 to -0.6. Despite considerable variation in the IT technique used, similar results are being obtained by different researchers. It is not possible to prove that no strategies at all have been used by Ss, but re-interpretation of current evidence suggests that this source of bias is overstressed. By applying Baron's formal criteria for identifying strategies, it becomes possible to test whether strategies have been used or not. Failing a clear statement of what counts as evidence of strategy use, particular strategies must be examined for their impact on IT when Ss have been fully trained in their use.     

Common sense and Berkeley's perception by suggestion

Abstract

Significant attention has been paid to Berkeley's account of perception; however, the interpretations of Berkeley's account of perception by suggestion are either incomplete or mistaken. In this paper I begin by examining a common interpretation of suggestion, the ‘Propositional Account’. I argue that the Propositional Account is inadequate and defend an alternative, non‐propositional, account. I then address George Pitcher's objection that Berkeley's view of sense perception forces him to adopt a ‘non‐conciliatory’ attitude towards common sense. I argue that Pitcher's charge is no longer plausible once we recognize that Berkeley endorses the non‐propositional sense of mediate perception. I close by urging that the non‐propositional interpretation of Berkeley's account of mediate perception affords a greater appreciation of Berkeley's attempt to bring a philosophical account of sense perception in line with some key principles of common sense. While Berkeley's account of perception and physical objects permits physical objects to be immediately perceived by some of the senses, they are, most often, mediately perceived. But for Berkeley this is not a challenge to common sense since common sense requires only that we perceive objects by our senses and that they are, more or less, as we perceive them. Mediate perception by suggestion is, for Berkeley, as genuine a form of perception as immediate perception, and both are compatible with Berkeley's understanding of the demands of common sense.     

Engagement and suffering in responsible caregiving: On overcoming maleficience in health care

The thesis of this article is that engagement and suffering are essential aspects of responsible caregiving. The sense of medical responsibility engendered by engaged caregiving is referred to herein as ‘clinical phronesis,’ i.e. practical wisdom in health care, or, simply, practical health care wisdom. The idea of clinical phronesis calls to mind a relational or communicative sense of medical responsibility which can best be understood as a kind of ‘virtue ethics,’ yet one that is informed by the exigencies of moral discourse and dialogue, as well as by the technical rigors of formal reasoning. The ideal of clinical phronesis is not (necessarily) contrary to the more common understandings of medical responsibility as either beneficence or patient autonomy — except, of course, when these notions are taken in their “disengaged” form (reflecting the malaise of “modern medicine”). Clinical phronesis, which gives rise to a deeper, broader, and richer, yet also to a more complex, sense than these other notions connote, holds the promise both of expanding, correcting, and perhaps completing what it currently means to be a fully responsible health care provider. In engaged caregiving, providers appropriately suffer with the patient, that is, they suffer the exigencies of the patient's affliction (though not his or her actual loss) by consenting to its inescapability. In disengaged caregiving — that ruse Katz has described as the ‘silent world of doctor and patient’ — provides may deny or refuse any ‘given’ connection with the patient, especially the inevitability of the patient's affliction and suffering (and, by parody of reasoning, the inevitability of their own. When, however, responsibility is construed qualitatively as an evaluative feature of medical rationality, rather than quantitatively as a form of ‘calculative reasoning’ only, responsibility can be viewed more broadly as not only a matter of science and will, but of language and communication as well — in particular, as the task of responsibly narrating and interpreting the patient's story of illness. In summary, the question is not whether phronesis can ‘save the life of medical ethics’ — only responsible humans can do that! Instead, the question should be whether phronesis, as an ethical requirement of health care delivery, can ‘prevent the death of medical ethics.’