Influencing Risk Preference in Decision Making: The Effects of Framing and Salience

Prospect theory predicts that people tend to prefer the sure option when choosing between two alternative courses of action framed in terms of gains and prefer the risky option when choosing between two alternatives framed as losses. Related research investigated the impact of emphasizing the probability of the positive outcome of a risky option versus emphasizing the probability of the negative outcome on preference. Most of these studies on the effects of "outcome salience" related their findings to prospect theory′s framing effect. It will be argued that most of these studies inaccurately applied prospect theory to explain the obtained effects and that these might be better understood in terms of salience. In four experiments we test the predictions that (1) choosing between two options in a gain problem will lead to decreased risk preference as compared to loss problems and (2) emphasizing the probability of positive outcomes of a risky option leads to increased preference for this option compared to emphasizing the probability of negative outcomes. Results confirm the impact of both prospect framing and outcome salience and indicate that these effects should be understood in terms of distinct, independent processes.     

When mixed options are preferred in multiple‐trial decisions

We report three studies showing that in prospective multiple‐trial decisions people often select a mix of sure and risky options over pure bundles of either option. Such a preference is not ‘rational’ because a mixed option cannot be the EV‐maximizing choice. Experiment 1 confirmed a mixed‐option preference for gains but not for losses. Showing a graph of the multiple‐trial outcome distribution reduced but did not eliminate this effect, suggesting that it is not due purely to a failure to aggregate correctly over the multiple trials. Experiment 2 replicated the mixed option preference using a wider range of problems. Experiment 3 compared choices in the trinary choice conditions used in Experiments 1 and 2 with binary choices between pairs of the multiple‐trial sure, mixed, and risky options. In the binary choice condition the mixed option was no longer the modal choice, suggesting that the strong mixed option preference found in the trinary choice conditions is mainly due to a compromise effect. However, the binary choice probabilities did show violations of strong stochastic transitivity in a pattern that suggested a slight bias toward the mixed option. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

心理距离对跨期选择和风险选择的影响

通过考察时间距离、社会距离和概率距离对跨期选择和风险选择的影响, 探究跨期选择和风险选择心理过程的相似性, 并检验不同心理距离影响决策的相似性。结果发现, 无论是时间距离(实验1)、社会距离(实验2)、还是概率距离(实验3), 心理距离越远, 被试在跨期选择中越倾向于延迟选项, 在风险选择中越倾向于风险选项。研究认为, 在跨期选择和风险选择中, 选项的表征结构和选项整体评价时不同选项特征的相对权重具有相似性。随着心理距离增加, 与高识解相联系的金额特征的相对权重增加, 与低识解相联系的时间和概率特征的相对权重降低, 这使得被试更倾向于选择金额较大的延迟和风险选项。同时, 研究发现三类心理距离对两类决策有相似影响, 进一步验证了不同心理距离的本质相似性。     

Effects of problem frame and gender on principals’ decision making

Research indicates people’s decisions can sometimes be influenced by seemingly trivial differences in the framing (i.e., wording) of alternative options. The tendency to prefer risk averse options when framed positively and risky options when framed negatively is known as the framing effect. The current study examined the susceptibility of school principals to the framing effect. Additionally, analytical and intuitive decision styles, the degree to which one’s typical goal is to maximize (rather than satisfice), gender, and years of experience as a principal were measured to assess whether they are predictive of principals’ choices, and to test whether they moderate the effects of framing on choice. Seventy-one principals completed six decision problems (framed either positively or negatively) and instruments assessing decision style, typical decision goal, gender, and experience. Analyses demonstrated that principals are influenced by framing. Although the positively and negatively framed versions of the decision problems were objectively identical, negative framing resulted in more risky choices. Additionally, regardless of frame, men made more risky choices than women. There was no evidence that experience, decision style, or the degree to which one’s typical decision goal was to maximize, decreased framing effects. Several potential debiasing strategies are described, and limitations are noted.     

Order effects in sequentially judged options due to the direction of comparison

Many real-world judgment tasks present options in sequence. Typically, these judgments are made step-by-step, immediately after considering each option, or end-of-sequence, after all have been seen. We report similar order effects in both procedures, due to direction of comparison. It appears that judges form an impression of each new option by comparing it to those that preceded it. Using that option’s features as a “checklist,” more weight is given to unique ones than to ones shared with previous options. This unidirectional comparison process produces increasing ratings in options with unique positive features, and decreasing ratings when options have unique negative features. By manipulating the barriers to making multiple comparisons, we show that the direction-of-comparison effect is not limited to judgment tasks with sequential presentation. Even simultaneously presented options may show order effects, if they are judged one at a time—in sequence. Possible explanations and implications are discussed.     

Risking Everything in Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder: An Analogue Decision-Making Study

An experiment examined decision-making processes among nonclinical participants with low or high levels of OCD symptomatology (N?=?303). To better simulate the decision environments that are most likely to be problematic for clients with OCD, we employed decision tasks that incorporated “black swan” options that have a very low probability but involve substantial loss. When faced with a choice between a safer option that involved no risk of loss or a riskier alternative with a very low probability of substantial loss, most participants chose the safer option regardless of OCD symptom level. However, when faced with choices between options that had similar expected values to the previous choices, but where each option had some low risk of a substantial loss, there was a significant shift towards riskier decisions. These effects were stronger when the task involved a contamination based, health-relevant decision task as compared to one with financial outcomes. The results suggest that both low and high symptom OC participants approach decisions involving risk-free options and decisions involving risky alternatives in qualitatively different ways. There was some evidence that measures of impulsivity were better predictors of the shift to risky decision making than OCD symptomatology.

     

DECISION AFFECT THEORY:

Abstract— How do people feel about the outcomes of risky options? Results from two experiments demonstrate that the emotional reaction to a monetary outcome is nor a simple function of the utility of that outcome Emotional responses also depend on probabilities and unobtained outcomes Unexpected outcomes have greater emotional impact than expected outcomes Furthermore any given outcome is lets pleasant if an unobtained outcome is better We propose an account of emotional experiences associated with outcomes of decisions called decision affect theory. It incorporates utilities expectations and counterfactual companions into hedonic responses. Finally, we show that choices between risky options can be described as the maximization of expected emotional experiences as predicted by decision affect theory That is people choose the risky option for which they expect to feel better on average.     

Spontaneous versus Controlled Influences of Stimulus-Based Affect on Choice Behavior

This article identifies two routes through which affect and cognitions arising from a stimulus can influence choices: a “lower order” route, where choices are influenced through automatic affective processes, and a “higher order” route, where choices are influenced through more controlled affective or consequence-related cognitive processes. Across three experiments the extent of deliberation, mental preoccupation, and the nature of exposure to the stimuli were manipulated to identify conditions under which lower order affect, higher order affect, or higher order cognitions impact choices. Respondents chose between two alternatives: one that was associated with more intense positive affect but less favorable cognitions (e.g., chocolate cake), and one that was associated with less intense positive affect but more favorable cognitions (e.g., fruit salad). Findings suggest that when the individual makes the decision quickly and is mentally preoccupied while making the decision, choices are driven by lower order affect. When the individual deliberates on the decision without being mentally preoccupied and the affect-laden option is in full view while the decision is being deliberated upon, choices are driven by higher order affect. In both cases, the affect-laden option (e.g. chocolate cake) is selected. In all other situations, choices are driven by higher order consequence-related cognitions and the alternative that is superior on the cognitive dimension (e.g. fruit salad) is selected. It is suggested that the effects of affective reactions on choice occur through the activation of appetitive (i.e., gratification-seeking) goals.     

Ignore risk; Maximize expected moral value

Many philosophers assume that, when making moral decisions under uncertainty, we should choose the option that has the greatest expected moral value, regardless of how risky it is. But their arguments for maximizing expected moral value do not support it over rival, risk-averse approaches. In this paper, I present a novel argument for maximizing expected value: when we think about larger series of decisions that each decision is a part of, all but the most risk-averse agents would prefer that we consistently choose the option with the highest expected value. To the extent that what we choose on a given occasion should be guided by the entire series of choices we prefer, then on each occasion, we should choose the option with the highest expected moral value.     

得失不对称：跨期选择中自我-他人决策差异

采用跨期选择任务范式,考察得失情境下自我–他人决策差异。结果发现：（1）为自己决策比为他人决策更偏好于选择即刻选项;（2）损失情境比获益情境下更偏好于选择即刻选项;（3）获益情境下为自己决策与为他人决策在选择即刻选项上不存在显著差异,而损失情境下为自己决策比为他人决策更偏好于选择即刻选项,表明得失情境下自我–他人决策差异存在不对称性。     

Common and distinct factors in decision making under ambiguity and risk: A psychometric study of individual differences

The relation between decision making under ambiguity and risky decision making was examined. In Studies 1 and 2, choices under ambiguity were measured for a large sample receiving an Ellsberg-type Ambiguity-Probability Tradeoff Task. Participants with extreme scores were recruited for Part 2 of each study which consisted of a risky decision making task (Study 1) or a series of decisions under ambiguity in “real life” scenarios (Study 2). Despite a time gap of up to 2 months, individual differences in scores on Part 1 predicted scores on Part 2. In Study 3 participants received in a single session several risky decision making tasks, several measures of decision making under ambiguity, and several personality scales related to uncertainty and decision making style. Taken together, the findings support the existence of a stable dispositional trait to reduce uncertainty in decision making but also task-specific differences related to gains and losses.     

Choice,Rating, and Ranking: Framing Effects with Different Response Modes

In a typical risky choice framing task, people have to choose among two options, which are either positively or negatively framed. Choices in the two framing conditions are then compared. However, different preferences between the conditions can be due to changes in the evaluation of the single constituent options or due to specific processes triggered by the choice task. In order to clarify the source of the framing effect, we investigate the effect with different response modes: choice, rating, and ranking. The rating and ranking findings indicate that what is commonly called a risky choice framing effect is actually a framing effect that changes the evaluation of only the riskless option, although there is little or no effect on the risky option. According to these findings, risky choice framing might be construed as a process of attribute framing, which is independent of risk preference in choice contexts. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Better Safe than Sorry: Risking Irresponsibility by Seeking Uncertainty

Research findings differ as to whether choosing a risky option is an efficient strategy for decision makers seeking to avoid responsibility for potential failures. A risky choice may leave the final outcome to chance factors, but the decision maker can still be held responsible for choosing risk. Further, it is unclear whether a risky choice is a responsible choice. The present article investigates the putative relationship between risk‐taking and responsibility by drawing a distinction between being responsible for the outcome (R1) versus acting responsibly (R2). Four experiments were performed, in which participants were presented with scenarios describing decision makers facing a choice between a risky (uncertain) option and a riskless (certain) option, framed in terms of losses or equivalent gains. The results showed that decision makers who chose the risky alternative were judged to have acted in a less responsible manner (R2), while still being held equally responsible for the outcome (R1), unless they were ignorant of the risks involved. Choosing risk did not absolve decision makers from blame, despite being less causal and less in control than those who chose the riskless option. Risky decision makers were also judged to be more personally involved. The dissociation between R1 and R2 ratings confirms earlier findings and serves to clarify an alleged relationship between risky choices and responsibility aversion. Framing effects for own choices were found in both scenarios. In contrast, responsibility ratings were only slightly affected by frame. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consequences of Regret Aversion: Effects of Expected Feedback on Risky Decision Making

Previous research has considered the question of how anticipated regret affects risky decision making. Several studies have shown that anticipated regret forces participants towards the safe option, showing risk-aversion. We argue that these results are due to the previous confounding of the riskiness of the options with the feedback received. Our design unconfounds these factors, and we predict that participants will always tend to makeregret-minimizingchoices (rather than risk-minimizing choices). We present three experiments using a “choices between equally valued alternatives” paradigm. In these experiments we manipulate whether the risky or safe gamble is the regret-minimizing choice by manipulating which gamble(s) will be resolved. As predicted, participants tend to choose the regret-minimizing gamble in both gains and losses and in both relatively high risk and relatively low risk pairs of gambles. We consider the implications of these results for the role of regret in choice behavior.     

因果与权重：决策的眼动模型

结合眼动注视的漂移扩散模型可很好描述个体的决策行为,但尚存在两个问题未得到解决：注视与决策的因果关系以及决策过程中累积证据的权重问题。本研究采用基于注视的操纵范式考察了基于价值的决策中注视与决策的关系,发现操纵被试对选项的注视时间可影响其选择,注视操纵主要影响决策后期时程,且模型参数估计结果更支持近因模型。研究结果支持了漂移扩散模型的近因假设,为今后的模型发展指明了新方向。     

Risk-sensitive choice in humans as a function of an earnings budget

Risky choice in 3 adult humans was investigated across procedural manipulations designed to model energy-budget manipulations conducted with nonhumans. Subjects were presented with repeated choices between a fixed and a variable number of points. An energy budget was simulated by use of an earnings budget, defined as the number of points needed within a block of trials for points to be exchanged for money. During positive earnings-budget conditions, exclusive preference for the fixed option met the earnings requirement. During negative earnings-budget conditions, exclusive preference for the certain option did not meet the earnings requirement, but choice for the variable option met the requirement probabilistically. Choice was generally risk averse (the fixed option was preferred) when the earnings budget was positive and risk prone (the variable option was preferred) when the earnings budget was negative. Furthermore, choice was most risk prone during negative earnings-budget conditions in which the earnings requirement was most stringent. Local choice patterns were also frequently consistent with the predictions of a dynamic optimization model, indicating that choice was simultaneously sensitive to short-term choice contingencies, current point earnings, and the earnings requirement. Overall, these results show that the patterns of risky choice generated by energy-budget variables can also be produced by choice contingencies that do not involve immediate survival, and that risky choice in humans may be similar to that shown in nonhumans when choice is studied under analogous experimental conditions.     

Human risky choice in a repeated-gambles procedure: an up-linkage replication of Lakshminarayanan, Chen and Santos (2011)

Lakshminarayanan et al. (J Exp Soc Psychol 47: 689–693, 2011) showed that when choice is between variable (risky) and fixed (safe) food amounts with the same expected values, capuchins prefer the safe alternative if choice is framed as a gain, but the risky alternative if it is framed as a loss. These results seem similar to those seen in human prospect-theory tests in choice between variable and fixed gains or losses. Based on this similarity, they interpreted their results as identifying a between-species commonality in cognitive function. In this report, we repeat their experiment with humans as subjects (an up-linkage replication). Whether choices were rewarded with candy or nickels, choice approximated indifference whether framed as gains or losses. Our data mirror those of others who found that when humans make risky choices within a repeated-trials procedure without verbal instruction about outcome likelihoods, preference biases seen in one-shot, language-guided, prospect-theory tests such as Tversky and Kahneman’s (Science 211:453–458, 1981) reflection effect may not appear. The disparity between our findings and those of Lakshminarayanan et al. suggests their study does not evidence a cognitive process shared by humans and capuchins.