Intentions,Permissibility, and Choice

T. M. Scanlon has argued that the intentions with which one acts, or more specifically, one’s reasons for acting, are non-derivatively irrelevant to the moral permissibility of one’s actions. According to one of his arguments in favor of that thesis, it can be permissible to act for one reason rather than another only if one can choose to act for a reason but, since that choice is impossible since believing as will is impossible, one can be permitted to act but one cannot be permitted to act for a reason. This paper aims to show that that argument is unsound. It first argues that the assumption that choosing an action is necessary for it being an object of a moral duty or permission cannot be made consistent with Scanlon’s idea that the same does not hold for an action being an object of blame. It then argues that even if direct control over forming beliefs is impossible, it is not impossible to choose one’s reason for action and, therefore, to be permitted or forbidden to act for it.     

Proximal Intentions,Non-executed Proximal Intentions and Change of Intentions

This paper investigates the conceptual and empirical possibility of non-executed, non-conscious proximal intentions, i.e., non-conscious proximal intentions to act that do not turn into a final act, but perhaps are vetoed or overcome by an alternative action. It constructs a conceptual framework in which such cases are justifiably considered ‘proximal intentions’. This is achieved by combining Alfred Mele’s notion of non-conscious proximal intentions together with the notion of trying or striving taken from Brian O’Shaughnessy’s model of action. With this framework in hand we analyze empirical electroencephalography (EEG) findings regarding ‘change of intention’ scenarios. Prior to EEG development (and other brain imaging techniques), one would never consider non-executed, non-conscious proximal intentions a case of intention at all. However, with technological and interpretable development of EEG, a whole group of so called ‘intentions’ appears, and the main aim of the paper is to justify this expanded usage.     

目标性意图与执行性意图调节情绪反应的效果比较

目标性意图和执行性意图作为目标的不同形式,对情绪调节的影响有待探讨。本研究试图考察目标性意图和执行性意图与表达抑制相结合之后,在调节情绪反应方面的作用。实验采用主观报告和生物反馈的方法对58名大学生进行测试。结果发现：（1）执行性意图组被试在观看负性和中性图片时对自身情绪唤醒度的评价均显著低于目标性意图组,在观看负性图片时其情绪唤醒度也显著低于控制组。（2）执行性意图组被试在各项生理反应指标上均显著低于目标性意图组和控制组,主要表现为形成执行性意图的个体在皮肤电导增加量、皮温降低量和指脉增加量上均显著低于形成目标性意图或不形成任何意图的个体。上述结果表明,相较于仅仅给出情绪体验下调目标的目标性意图,与表达抑制结合在一起的执行性意图能有效下调个体的负性情绪反应。     

Military Ethical Decision Making: The Effects of Option Choice and Perspective Taking on Moral Decision-Making Processes and Intentions

We investigated the ethical decision-making processes and intentions of 151 military personnel responding to 1 of 2 ethical scenarios drawn from the deployment experiences of military commanders. For each scenario, option choice and perspective affected decision-making processes. Differences were also found between the 2 scenarios. Results add to the emerging literature concerning operational ethical conflicts and highlight the complexity and challenge that often accompanies operational ethics.     

Questionable Intentions

Philosophical Studies -     

Reconsidering Intentions

This paper argues that the principles of instrumental rationality apply primarily to extended action through time. Most philosophers assume that rational requirements and principles govern in the first instance momentary mental states, as opposed to governing extended intentional actions directly. In the case of instrumental rationality, the relevant mental states or attitudes would typically be preferences, decisions, or intentions. In fact, even those who recognize the extended nature of our agency still assume that rational requirements apply primarily to mental states at a moment in time. Such views try to do justice to the extended nature of our agency by postulating rational requirements that apply in the first instance to plans, policies, and intentions more generally. The paper focuses on the central case of requirements and reasons governing the reconsideration of intentions and argues that these requirements or reasons are either superfluous or invalid. I argue that a proper conception of instrumental reasoning that applies directly to actions turn out to have surprising consequences. In fact, this conception allows us to see that policies, projects and the like are best understood as instances of extended actions, and that the instrumental requirements that apply to projects and policies are exactly the same as the instrumental requirements that apply to ordinary extended actions. Finally, I argue that the resulting theory of instrumental rationality is a significant improvement over theories that rely on principles governing intentions.     

Attitudes, Intentions and Employment

A study of midwives' employment decisions was undertaken to identify whether and how they alter their employment plans at certain times relative to training. The research aimed to provide data which would help midwife managers to control the then widely perceived shortage of midwives, attributable partly to the non-retention of newly-qualified midwives in the maternity services. An attitude scale, devised for this study, is shown to be a valid predictor of midwifery employment.     

Referential Intentions and Communicative Luck

Brian Loar [1976] observed that communicative success with singular terms requires more than correct referent assignment. For communicative success to be achieved, the audience must assign the right referent in the right way. Loar, and others since, took this to motivate Fregean accounts of the semantics of singular terms. Ray Buchanan [2014] has recently responded, maintaining that, although Loar is correct to claim that communicative success with singular terms requires more than correct referent assignment, this is compatible with direct reference approaches, as long as one also endorses an independently motivated Gricean view of communicative intentions. This paper argues that Buchanan's Gricean view cannot account for the full range of Loar cases. In doing so, it aims to explicate the structure of Loar's cases and thus to clarify the conditions that a theory must meet in order to adequately meet his challenge.     

Utterance Interpretation and Actual Intentions

Axiomathes - In this paper I argue, from the consideration of what I hope is the complete variety of a hearer’s approaches to a speaker’s utterance, that (1) the speaker’s...