Remembering pride and shame: Self-enhancement and the phenomenology of autobiographical memory

People's self-images are grounded in autobiographical memories and, in particular, in the phenomenological experience associated with remembering. The desire to increase or maintain the positivity of the self-image (i.e., the self-enhancement motive) might thus play an important role in shaping memory phenomenology. This study examined this hypothesis by asking participants to recall positive and negative events that involve self-evaluations (i.e., pride and shame) and positive and negative events that involve evaluations about others (i.e., admiration and contempt); various phenomenological characteristics (e.g., sensory details, feeling of re-experiencing) were assessed using rating scales. The results show a positivity bias (i.e., subjectively remembering positive events with more details than negative events) for events that involve self-evaluations but not for events that involve evaluations of others. In addition, this bias was stronger for people high in self-esteem. It is concluded that biases affecting the phenomenology of autobiographical memory are part of the arsenal of psychological mechanisms people use to maintain a positive self-image.     

Facets of personality and the phenomenology of autobiographical memory

The relationship between individual differences in autobiographical memory and personality was examined by having 118 undergraduates complete the NEO Personality Inventory after rating 15 word‐cued autobiographical memories on 20 scales. The Openness to Feelings facet (O3) correlated with measures of belief in the accuracy of memories, recollection, sensory imagery and emotion. Four other facets had correlations with belief (A3—Altruism, E1—Warmth, E4—Activity, E6—Positive Emotions). These facets also deal with emotional components of personality. In multiple regressions, measures of belief and measures of recollection were predicted by different variables, and for measures of belief, the O3 facet increased the variance accounted for beyond that of just the cognitive variables. Our results are consistent with and extend studies of the effects of depression and emotional suppression on autobiographical memory. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Age,memory type,and the phenomenology of autobiographical memory: Findings from an Italian sample

The present research explored differences in phenomenology between two types of memories, a general self-defining memory and an earliest childhood memory. A sample of 76 Italian participants were selected and categorised into two age groups: 20–30 years and 31–40 years. The Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ) was administered, taking note of latency and duration times of the narratives. Consistent with the literature, the self-defining memory differed significantly from the earliest childhood memory in terms of phenomenology, with the recency of the memory associated with more intense phenomenological experience. The self-defining memory took longer to retrieve and narrate than the earliest childhood memory. Meaningful differences also emerged between the two age groups: Participants in their 30s rated their self-defining memory as more vivid, coherent, and accessible than participants in their 20s. According to latency findings, these differences suggest an expanded period of identity consolidation for younger adults. Further applications of the MEQ should be carried out to replicate these results with other samples of young adults.     

Measuring the phenomenology of autobiographical memory: A short form of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire

The Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ) is a theoretically driven and empirically validated 63-item self-report scale designed to measure 10 phenomenological qualities of autobiographical memories: Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, Time Perspective, Sensory Details, Visual Perspective, Emotional Intensity, Sharing, Distancing and Valence. To develop a short form of the MEQ to use when time is limited, participants from two samples (N = 719; N = 352) retrieved autobiographical memories, rated the phenomenological experience of each memory and completed several scales measuring psychological distress. For each MEQ dimension, the number of items was reduced by one-half based on item content and item-total correlations. Each short-form scale had acceptable internal consistency (median alpha = .79), and, similar to the long-form version of the scales, the new short scales correlated with psychological distress in theoretically meaningful ways. The new short form of the MEQ has similar psychometric proprieties as the original long form and can be used when time is limited.     

Age differences in autobiographical memory across the adult lifespan: older adults report stronger phenomenology

As an individual’s life story evolves across adulthood, the subjective experience (phenomenology) of autobiographical memory likely changes. In addition to age at retrieval, both the recency of the memory and the age when a memory is formed may be particularly important to its phenomenology. The present work examines the effect of three temporal factors on phenomenology ratings: (a) age of the participant, (b) age at the event reported in the memory, and (c) memory age (recency). A large sample of Americans (N?=?1120), stratified by chronological age, recalled and rated two meaningful memories, a Turning Point and an Early Childhood Memory. Ratings of phenomenology (e.g., vividness of turning points) were higher among older adults compared to younger adults. Memories of events from the reminiscence bump were more positive in valence than events from other time periods but did not differ on other phenomenological dimensions; recent memories had stronger phenomenology than remote memories. In contrast to phenomenology, narrative content was generally unrelated to participant age, age at the event, or memory age. Overall, the findings indicate age-related differences in how meaningful memories are re-experienced.     

Determinants of pride and shame: outcome, expected success and attribution

In two experiments we investigated the relationship between subjective probability of success and pride and shame. According to Atkinson (1957), pride (the incentive of success) is an inverse linear function of the probability of success, shame (the incentive of failure) being a negative linear function. Attribution theory predicts an inverse U-shaped relationship between subjective probability of success and pride and shame. The results presented here are at variance with both theories: Pride and shame do not vary with subjective probability of success. However, pride and shame are systematically correlated with internal attributions of action outcome.     

Shaping our personal past: Assessing the phenomenology of autobiographical memory and its association with object and spatial imagery

A new instrument has been developed that allows a comprehensive assessment of the relevant dimensions of the phenomenology of autobiographical memories (Assessment of the Phenomenology of Autobiographical Memory, APAM), and their association with visual object and spatial imagery has been examined. An initial version of APAM consisting of 30 items (the first 28 measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale) was developed and administered to a sample of 138 undergraduates. To test whether each item consistently measured the same dimension across different memories, all questions were rated for 12 cues. Results showed that 25 Likert-type items possessed adequate levels of internal consistency and unidimensionality across cues. We also found that higher levels of visual object imagery were associated with more sensory details and recollective qualities of memory, and with stronger experience of sensory and emotional reliving. The theoretical and practical usefulness of APAM as well as the relevance of visual object imagery in the phenomenology of autobiographical memory are discussed.     

Assessing autobiographical memory: the web-based autobiographical Implicit Association Test

By assessing the association strength with TRUE and FALSE, the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) [Sartori, G., Agosta, S., Zogmaister, C., Ferrara, S. D., &; Castiello, U. (2008). How to accurately detect autobiographical events. Psychological Science, 19, 772–780. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02156.x] aims to determine which of two contrasting statements is true. To efficiently run well-powered aIAT experiments, we propose a web-based aIAT (web-aIAT). Experiment 1 (n?=?522) is a web-based replication study of the first published aIAT study [Sartori, G., Agosta, S., Zogmaister, C., Ferrara, S. D., &; Castiello, U. (2008). How to accurately detect autobiographical events. Psychological Science, 19, 772–780. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02156.x; Experiment 1]. We conclude that the replication was successful as the web-based aIAT could accurately detect which of two playing cards participants chose (AUC?=?.88; Hit rate?=?81%). In Experiment 2 (n?=?424), we investigated whether the use of affirmative versus negative sentences may partly explain the variability in aIAT accuracy findings. The aIAT could detect the chosen card when using affirmative (AUC?=?.90; Hit rate?=?81%), but not when using negative sentences (AUC?=?.60; Hit rate?=?53%). The web-based aIAT seems to be a valuable tool to facilitate aIAT research and may help to further identify moderators of the test’s accuracy.     

Narcissism,self-esteem,and the phenomenology of autobiographical memories

Across two studies, we investigated the influence of narcissism and self-esteem along with gender on phenomenological ratings across the four subscales of the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ; impact, recollection, rehearsal, and belief). Memory cues varied in valence (positive vs. negative) and agency (agentic vs. communal). In Study 2, we used different memory cues reflecting these four Valence by Agency conditions and additionally investigated retrieval times for the autobiographical memories (AMs). Results were consistent with the agency model of narcissism [Campbell, W. K., Brunell, A. B., & Finkel, E. J. (2006). Narcissism, interpersonal self-regulation, and romantic relationships: An agency model approach. In E. J. Finkel & K. D. Vohs (Eds.), Self and relationships: Connecting intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. New York, NY: Guilford], which characterises narcissists as being more concerned with agentic (self-focused) rather than communal (other-focused) positive self-relevant information. Narcissism predicted greater phenomenology across the four subscales for the positive-agentic memories (Study 1: clever; Study 2: attractive, talented) as well as faster memory retrieval times. Narcissism also predicted greater recollection and faster retrieval times for the negative-communal AMs (Study 1: rude; Study 2: annoying, dishonest). In contrast, self-esteem predicted greater phenomenology and faster retrieval times for the positive-communal AMs (Study 1: cooperative; Study 2: romantic, sympathetic). In both studies, results of LIWC analyses further differentiated between narcissism and self-esteem in the content (word usage) of the AMs.     

Remembering the impressions of others as our own: how post‐experience decisions can distort autobiographical memory

The aim of this research was to investigate conditions under which memory for previous impressions and evaluations can be distorted by post‐experience information. Two experiments tested a two‐step model for autobiographical memory distortion. In the first step, the impressions overheard from another person after evaluating an experience were incorporated into experience related decisions. In the second step, the distorted decisions were used in the retrieval of the initial evaluation. The results of Experiment 1 results reveal that post‐experience comments heard before, but not after, the decisions result in memory distortion. The results of Experiment 2 results replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and eliminate possible alternative explanations. The results are discussed in the context of the Source Monitoring Framework. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Status signals: Adaptive benefits of displaying and observing the nonverbal expressions of pride and shame

A growing body of research suggests that pride and shame are associated with distinct, cross-culturally recognised nonverbal expressions, which are spontaneously displayed in situations of success and failure, respectively. Here, we review these findings, then offer a theoretical account of the adaptive benefits of these displays. We argue that both pride and shame expressions function as social signals that benefit both observers and expressers. Specifically, pride displays function to signal high status, which benefits displayers by according them deference from others, and benefits observers by affording them valuable information about social-learning opportunities. Shame displays function to appease others after a social transgression, which benefits displayers by allowing them to avoid punishment and negative appraisals, and observers by easing their identification of committed group members and followers.     

Status signals: adaptive benefits of displaying and observing the nonverbal expressions of pride and shame

A growing body of research suggests that pride and shame are associated with distinct, cross-culturally recognised nonverbal expressions, which are spontaneously displayed in situations of success and failure, respectively. Here, we review these findings, then offer a theoretical account of the adaptive benefits of these displays. We argue that both pride and shame expressions function as social signals that benefit both observers and expressers. Specifically, pride displays function to signal high status, which benefits displayers by according them deference from others, and benefits observers by affording them valuable information about social-learning opportunities. Shame displays function to appease others after a social transgression, which benefits displayers by allowing them to avoid punishment and negative appraisals, and observers by easing their identification of committed group members and followers.     

Tracking the trajectory of shame, guilt, and pride across the life span

The authors examined age differences in shame, guilt, and 2 forms of pride (authentic and hubristic) from age 13 years to age 89 years, using cross-sectional data from 2,611 individuals. Shame decreased from adolescence into middle adulthood, reaching a nadir around age 50 years, and then increased in old age. Guilt increased from adolescence into old age, reaching a plateau at about age 70 years. Authentic pride increased from adolescence into old age, whereas hubristic pride decreased from adolescence into middle adulthood, reaching a minimum around age 65 years, and then increased in old age. On average, women reported experiencing more shame and guilt; Blacks reported experiencing less shame and Asians more hubristic pride than other ethnicities. Across the life span, shame and hubristic pride tended to be negatively related to psychological well-being, and shame-free guilt and authentic pride showed positive relations with well-being. Overall, the findings support the maturity principle of personality development and suggest that as people age they become more prone to experiencing psychologically adaptive self-conscious emotions, such as guilt and authentic pride, and less prone to experiencing psychologically maladaptive ones, such as shame and hubristic pride.     

Two neglected moral emotions in university settings: some data on pride and shame

Pride and shame, two moral emotions partially neglected by the literature, can also be categorised as achievement emotions, because of their salience within everyday school and academic life. Our aims were to explore whether they are organised in a setting-specific manner and whether they differ in two settings, learning exam-relevant material and taking exams. Five hundred and forty university students evaluated pride and shame related to the two settings. A confirmatory multitrait-multimethod analysis (MTMM) indicated higher salience of type of emotion rather than type of setting; however, the structure of pride and shame was best explained when also type of setting was accounted for. A repeated-measure analysis of variance revealed higher levels of the positive emotion compared to the negative emotion, with the latter higher for the evaluative setting. Findings are discussed in light of their theoretical and applied relevance.     

Place and the self: An autobiographical memory synthesis

In this article, I argue that the relationship between place and self can be accounted for by recent theoretical work on autobiographical memory. The link between place and self is conceptualized as a transitory mental representation that emerges as a “place of mine” (personal autobiographical experience) from a “place” (declarative knowledge). The function of “place of mine” is to guide personal memory and self-knowing consciousness of periods of our lives. I combine inquiries of memory, self, and place in a triadic relationship, a synthesis, suggesting a conceptual model for the phenomenon of place-related self as a sub-system of the self. This is formed by a causal progression from a physical place across time via emotional and cognitive bonds, components of the autobiographical information grounding the self, apportioned across declarative memory. Finally, using the methods of factor analysis and structural equation modeling, I show that the proposed model accounts for previous and new data on place-related identity.     

Rumination and overgeneral autobiographical memory

Two studies investigated the effects of rumination on the retrieval of autobiographical memories in high-depressed and low-depressed individuals. Experiment 1 administered either a rumination or distraction task prior to a cued autobiographical memory task. High-depressed participants recalled more overgeneral memories following rumination relative to distraction, whereas experimental inductions did not influence low-depressed participants. Experiment 2 administered either a positive or negative rumination task prior to a cued autobiographical memory task. Negatively valenced rumination led high-depressed participants to recall more overgeneral memories than positively valenced rumination; this effect was not observed in low-depressed participants. These findings accord with the proposal that rumination is a mediating mechanism in the retrieval of overgeneral memories, and extends this proposal by indicating that negatively valenced ruminative content is particularly instrumental in inducing overgeneral retrieval.     

Ruminative self-focus and autobiographical memory

Many studies have shown a positive relationship between elevated dispositional self-focus and emotional disorder. Trapnell and Campbell (1999) proposed that this relationship was only true for ruminative forms of self-focus, reflective self-focus being associated with psychological health. The present study aimed: (1) to examine the replicability of Trapnell and Campbell's (1999) questionnaire-based differentiation of reflective and ruminative dispositional self-focus; (2) to see whether reflection and rumination could also be differentiated using measures of autobiographical memory; (3) to see whether such memory measures could elucidate mechanisms underlying different forms of dispositional self-focus. 130 volunteers retrieved autobiographical memories to neutral cue words and completed questionnaires. Questionnaires differentiated reflection and rumination: reflection correlated with openness to experience, whereas rumination correlated with neuroticism, replicating previous findings that it is specifically ruminative self-focus that is maladaptive. Memory measures also differentiated reflection and rumination: reflection was unrelated to the affective qualities of memories, whereas rumination correlated with measures of the happiness, unhappiness and at-oneness of memories. Dispositional ruminative self-focus, like neuroticism, was specifically related to increased accessibility of memories of events where individuals felt “not at all at-one with things”. This style of memory access could underpin dispositional ruminative self-focus, which is closely linked to neuroticism.     

Phenomenology of autobiographical memories: the memory experiences questionnaire

The phenomenology of autobiographical memories varies on a number of dimensions: some memories are vivid and others dim; some are emotionally intense and others lack emotional content. The present research sought to develop a psychometrically-sound scale to assess the entire range of dimensions on which autobiographical memories differ. We reviewed the literature on memory experiences and identified 10 relevant dimensions: Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, Time Perspective, Sensory Details, Visual Perspective, Emotional Intensity, Sharing, Distancing, and Valence. We constructed a comprehensive item pool to assess these dimensions and, using data from several large samples (Ns=941; 510; 212), we showed that: (a) all 10 scales had adequate reliability (median alpha=.87; range=.72 to .97), (b) the 10-factor structure provided a good fit to the data, and (c) gender, personality, and memory recency had theoretically meaningful relations with the 10 scales. For example, gender and ethnicity differences in phenomenology were mediated by memory content, and early and recent memories had distinct phenomenologies. The discussion focuses on the theoretical and practical utility of the 10 scales.