The functional independence of trait self-knowledge: Commentary on Sakaki (2007)

In a recent paper, Sakaki (2007) proposed that Klein and Loftus's conclusion that semantic and episodic trait self-knowledge are functionally independent (e.g., Klein, Babey, & Sherman, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993a; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992b) was based on questionable assumptions and not supported by the available evidence. In this paper we show that Sakaki (2007) has misinterpreted our position on the independence of self-knowledge, omitted mention of large portions of the relevant research at odds with her contention, and conducted her studies with procedures we explicitly warned against due to interpretive ambiguities associated with their use.     

TESTING A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE

Abstract— A priming procedure (e g, Klein, Loftus Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992) was used to lest a hierarchical model of self-knowledge. According lo this model, people simultaneously hold multiple representations of themselves that differ bath in their context specificity and in the type of knowledge of which they consist Specifically, context-independent self-knowledge is assumed to be represented abstractly without reference to any particular behaviors, whereas the representation of context-dependent self-knowledge includes knowledge of one's behavior in specific situations. Our results support a hierarchical model. Subjects accessed abstract knowledge when describing their context-independent personality characteristics, but accessed behavioral episodes when describing themselves in a specific context Possible implications of this research are discussed, as a the relation of a hierarchical model of self-knowledge to a mixed model of self-knowledge (e g, Klein & Loftus, 1993b).     

Semantic self-knowledge and episodic self-knowledge: independent or interrelated representations?

In this study of the structure of self-knowledge, we examined priming effects for the recall of personal episodes in order to investigate whether abstract trait knowledge and personal episodes are independent mental representations. We found that accessing similar abstract representations of traits facilitated a faster recall of related personal episodes than did accessing irrelevant abstract representations of traits (Experiments 1 and 2), reading a nonword prime (Experiments 2 and 3), accessing knowledge of one's mother (Experiment 3), or accessing semantic knowledge (Experiment 3). Contrary to previous findings, which indicated that abstract trait knowledge is represented independently of related personal episodes (e.g., Klein & Loftus, 1993; Tulving, 1993), our results suggest that abstract trait knowledge is associated with personal episodes, and therefore that semantic self-knowledge is associated with episodic self-knowledge in long-term self-knowledge.     

Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?

In previous work I argued that skepticism about the compatibility ofanti-individualism with self-knowledge is incoherent. Anthony Brueckner isnot convinced by my argument, for reasons he has recently explained inprint. One premise in Brueckner's reasoning is that a person'sself-knowledge is confined to what she can derive solely from herfirst-person experiences of using her sentences. I argue that Brueckner'sacceptance of this premise undermines another part of his reasoning – hisattempt to justify his claims about what thoughts our sincere utterances ofcertain sentences would express in various possible worlds. I describe aweird possible world in which a person who uses Brueckner's reasoning endsup with false beliefs about what thoughts her sincere utterances of certainsentences would express in various possible worlds. I recommend that wereject Brueckner's problematic conception of self-knowledge, and adopt onethat better fits the way we actually ascribe self-knowledge.     

Melanie Klein’s letters addressed to Marcelle Spira (1955–1960)1

Between 1955 and 1960, Melanie Klein wrote some 45 hitherto unpublished letters to Marcelle Spira, the Swiss psychoanalyst living at that time in Geneva. In 2006, after Spira’s death, these letters were deposited with the Raymond de Saussure Psychoanalysis Centre in Geneva. They are the only known letters that Klein addressed to her psychoanalyst colleagues. Several topics are mentioned in them: (1) the meetings between the two women in Geneva and London; (2) Spira’s contribution to Boulanger’s translation into French of The Psychoanalysis of Children, which Klein herself carefully revised; (3) the papers that Klein was at that time working on, including Envy and Gratitude; (4) Spira’s own work; (5) the difficulties that Spira, a Kleinian psychoanalyst who trained in Buenos Aires, was encountering in her attempt to be admitted to the Swiss Psychoanalytical Society; and (6) a few items of personal and family news. In addition to the invaluable historical information that these letters provide, they offer us a very moving epistolary self‐portrait of Melanie Klein, enabling us to discover her personality in the final years of her life – she died in September 1960, just two months after writing her last letter to Spira.     

Perceptual interference at encoding enhances item-specific encoding and disrupts relational encoding: Evidence from multiple recall tests

Interfering with perception during encoding can enhance later memory, a phenomenon known as the perceptual interference effect. This effect is investigated in the context of the item-specific-relational framework (e.g., Hunt & McDaniel, 1993), which suggests that the perceptual interference enhances item-specific encoding and impedes relational encoding. Two experiments performed with multiple recall tests support this view. Prior research indicates that item-specific processing increases item gains across tests, whereas relational processing protects against item losses (e.g., Burns, 1993; Klein, Loftus, Kihlstrom, & Aseron, 1989). Consistent with the item-specific-relational framework, perceptual interference produced significant increases in both item gains and losses relative to a control condition.     

Revisiting confidence intervals for repeated measures designs

Loftus and Masson (1994) proposed a method for computing confidence intervals (CIs) in repeated measures (RM) designs and later proposed that RM CIs for factorial designs should be based on number of observations rather than number of participants (Masson & Loftus, 2003). However, determining the correct number of observations for a particular effect can be complicated, given that its value depends on the relation between the effect and the overall design. To address this, we recently defined a general number-of-observations principle, explained why it obtains, and provided step-by-step instructions for constructing CIs for various effect types (Jarmasz & Hollands, 2009). In this note, we provide a brief summary of our approach.     

Self-deception and self-knowledge

The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self-deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein the subject violates this epistemic obligation. I argue that construing this type of self-deception as a failure of self-knowledge explains two important aspects of it: The tension that we observe between the subject’s speech and her actions, and our inclination to hold the subject responsible for her condition. I compare this proposal with two other approaches to self-deception in the literature; intentionalism and motivationalism. Intentionalism explains the two aspects of self-deception but it runs into the so-called ‘paradoxes’ of self-deception. Motivationalism avoids those paradoxes but it cannot explain the two aspects of self-deception.     

Win some, lose some: Hypermnesia for actions reflects increased item-specific processing

Memory for simple action phrases (e.g., “Break a match”) improves when subjects perform the actions at study. The relative contribution of item-specific and relational processing to this enactment effect has been an issue of considerable debate. It was addressed in the present study by examining hypermnesia in a multiple-test free recall paradigm, -based on the assumptions that itemspecific processing increases the probability of intertest gains and relational processing protects against intertest forgetting (e.g., Burns, 1993; Klein, Loftus, Kihlstrom, & Aseron, 1989). It was found that the enactment condition produced both significantly more gains and more losses than did the nonenactment condition, resulting in a net gain (hypermnesia) for the enactment condition. The results suggest that enactment promotes item-specific processing at the expense of relational processing.     

Editing misleading information from memory: Evidence for the coexistence of original and postevent information

When misleading postevent information biases one’s memory for an event, what is the fate of the original, accurate information? One possibility is that the new information and the original information coexist in memory, but that the former is simply more accessible. A second hypothesis suggests that the new information replaces the old, and memory is irreversibly altered. Using various retrieval techniques, Loftus and her associates (Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982; Loftus, 1979a, 1979b) have failed repeatedly in attempts to recover original memories after postevent biasing, a finding that supports the alteration hypothesis. In the present study, postevent biasing was demonstrated in two experiments. In each experiment, some subjects were given a warning that the postevent information had included a few inaccurate details. These subjects were able to edit out the inaccurate details and to recover the original facts when the warning came as much as 45 rain after they had read the misleading information, a result that argues for the coexistence of memories. Successful recovery of the original memories was apparently due to the clarity of the warning and to an improved technique for assessing the retrieval of original memories.     

Associative strength level and retrieval inhibition in semantic memory

In a series of investigations, E. F. Loftus (1973; G. R. Loftus & E. F. Loftus, 1974; E. F. Loftus, Senders, & Turkletaub, 1974) discovered that the latency of item retrieval from a semantic category was reduced if it immediately followed an earlier retrieval from the same category, a phenomenon attributed to spreading activation. Subsequently, Brown (1981) discovered an increase in latency across extended retrievals from a single semantic category. The present investigation followed up this finding by comparing exemplars that varied in strength of association to the category name. The probability of obtaining inhibition (longer latencies and increased errors) was inversely related to the associative strength of the exemplars. The results suggest that low-strength category associates build up inhibition more rapidly because they accrue situational strength relatively more rapidly than high-strength associates.     

The Psychic Life of Fragments: Splitting from Ferenczi to Klein*

The present paper starts from the reflection that there is a curious “phenomenological gap” in psychoanalysis when it comes to processes of splitting and to describing the “life” of psychic fragments resulting from processes of splitting. In simpler terms, we are often in a position to lack a precise understanding of what is being split and how the splitting occurs. I argue that although Melanie Klein’s work is often engaged when talking of splitting (particularly through discussions on identification, projection and projective identification), there are some important phenomenological opacities in her construction. I show that by orchestrating a dialogue between Melanie Klein and Sándor Ferenczi, we arrive at a fuller and more substantive conception of psychic splitting and of the psychic life of fragments which are the result of splitting. This is even more meaningful because there are some unacknowledged genealogical connections between Ferenczian concepts and Kleinian concepts, which I here explore. While with Klein we remain in the domain of “good” and “bad” objects—polarised objects which are constantly split and projected—with Ferenczi we are able to also give an account of complicated forms of imitation producing psychic fragments and with a “dark” side of identification, which he calls “identification with the aggressor”. While attempting to take steps toward imagining a dialogue between Klein and Ferenczi, I note a certain silent “Ferenczian turn” in a late text by Melanie Klein, “On the Development of Mental Functioning”, written in 1958. In particular, I reflect on her reference to some “terrifying figures” of the psyche, which cannot be accounted for simply as the persecutory parts of the super-ego but are instead more adequately read as more enigmatic and more primitive psychic fragments, resulting from processes of splitting.     

The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge

In this paper I argue, first, that the most influential (and perhaps only acceptable) account of the epistemology of self-knowledge, developed and defended at great length in Wright (1989b) and (1989c) (among other places), leaves unanswered a question about the psychology of self-knowledge; second, that without an answer to this question about the psychology of self-knowledge, the epistemic account cannot be considered acceptable; and third, that neither Wright's own answer, nor an interpretation-based answer (based on a proposal from Jacobsen (1997)), will suffice as an acceptable answer to the psychological question. My general ambition is thus to establish that more work is needed if we are to have a full account of self-knowledge in both its epistemological and psychological aspects. I conclude by suggesting how my thesis bears on those who aim to provide an empirical account of the cognition involved in self-knowledge. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A generalized linear factor model approach to the hierarchical framework for responses and response times

We show how the hierarchical model for responses and response times as developed by van der Linden (2007), Fox, Klein Entink, and van der Linden (2007), Klein Entink, Fox, and van der Linden (2009), and Glas and van der Linden (2010) can be simplified to a generalized linear factor model with only the mild restriction that there is no hierarchical model at the item side. This result is valuable as it enables all well‐developed modelling tools and extensions that come with these methods. We show that the restriction we impose on the hierarchical model does not influence parameter recovery under realistic circumstances. In addition, we present two illustrative real data analyses to demonstrate the practical benefits of our approach.     

The ego according to Klein: return to Freud and beyond

This paper explores fundamental dimensions of Melanie Klein's concept of the ego through a detailed study of the writings of Klein and her early colleagues (Paula Heimann, Susan Isaacs and Joan Riviere). The study examines three central issues: (a) the basic theoretical framework for Klein's conceptualization of the ego, and specifically how her conceptualization builds on Freud's structural and dual instinct models; (b) the processes involved in the development of the ego and its capacities (including the development from id to ego and from ego to superego); and (c) the view of the ego as an object of phantasy. Through this examination, the study demonstrates that Klein's conceptualization of the ego is firmly grounded both in Freud's formulations about the ego and in his theoretical and metapsychological approach to thinking about the ego. This counters the prevalent view that Klein was only focused on clinical understandings, unconcerned with theory and fuzzy in her abstract thinking. More specifically, it counters the view that Klein did not really have a concept of the ego in any well-structured sense of the term (Britton, 2003; Hinshelwood, 1994; Segal, 2001). The study considers the sources of these misconceived views. Finally, it argues that discarding such views allows us to appreciate better the richness of Klein's thinking, her theoretical affinities to Freud, and the role of theory in the development and justification of psychoanalysis.     

Adrian Stokes and the portrait of Melanie Klein

This paper focuses on the offer by the art writer Adrian Stokes to commission and pay for a portrait of the psychoanalyst Melanie Klein by the artist William Coldstream. It details some of the precursors of this offer in Stokes's preceding involvement first with Klein and then with Coldstream; her response to this offer; and its outcome and aftermath in Stokes's subsequent writing about Klein and Coldstream.     

Melanie Klein and Envy: A Static Totalitarian Script or a Sample of our Protean Theories? Commentary on Paper by Joye Weisel-Barth

I agree with Joye Weisel-Barth's main point. But I regret her impression that Klein “monopolized” envy. In the world of ideas, a concept cannot be appropriated as if it has been bought. We acknowledge the originator, but the concept belongs to our collective heritage. It is open at all hours and there is no entry fee. Quite apart from this, Klein's concept is not simple. I have discussed elsewhere the conflicting currents in her paper on envy and questioned traditional views. But even for Klein herself, envy is never isolated. It is always in a dynamic conflict with love. To my mind, Klein's envy was loaded with a further responsibility: to remind us of the worst in our nature. If we accept the full humanity of our patients, we must remain receptive to their cruelty as well as their love. In my own thinking, envy has a subtle relationship with admiration and is ever shifting on a spectrum, from a point of positive emulation to a point of destructive attack. Lastly, I enjoyed Joye's clinical work. But I expressed deep concern about the paedophilic activities disclosed by the patient.     

Erna and Melanie Klein

Erna was one of the child patients treated by Melanie Klein in Berlin, employing her recently discovered play technique. Since Erna died in Chile, the authors considered the IPA Congress in Santiago an opportunity to present a paper as a homage both to Erna and, especially, to Klein. She learned much from that very disturbed child, which she later used to sustain the ongoing development of her theories. The paper explores biographic data relevant to understanding both the case and the theories. It analyses the case material to follow Klein in the discovery and the handling of the child's transference and the harsh expressions of hate, jealousy and envy, which are brought in, with sad consequences, by strong persecutory feelings. Klein's comparison of this case with that of Freud's Wolf-man is also considered, mostly to show that the similarities were less than originally claimed, and that Klein, perhaps, was introducing a theoretic shift which led her technique to gradually change from ' Nachträglichkeit ' to the 'signification-resignification' pair, akin to Strachey's concept of the mutative interpretation. Lastly, the comprehension of Erna's strong psychotic traits and the links with later developments of the theory on psychosis are studied.     

Buy three but get only two: The smallest effect in a 2 × 2 ANOVA is always uninterpretable

Loftus (Memory & Cognition 6:312–319, 1978) distinguished between interpretable and uninterpretable interactions. Uninterpretable interactions are ambiguous, because they may be due to two additive main effects (no interaction) and a nonlinear relationship between the (latent) outcome variable and its indicator. Interpretable interactions can only be due to the presence of a true interactive effect in the outcome variable, regardless of the relationship that it establishes with its indicator. In the present article, we first show that same problem can arise when an unmeasured mediator has a nonlinear effect on the measured outcome variable. Then we integrate Loftus’s arguments with a seemingly contradictory approach to interactions suggested by Rosnow and Rosenthal (Psychological Bulletin 105:143–146, 1989). We show that entire data patterns, not just interaction effects alone, produce interpretable or noninterpretable interactions. Next, we show that the same problem of interpretability can apply to main effects. Lastly, we give concrete advice on what researchers can do to generate data patterns that provide unambiguous evidence for hypothesized interactions.     

Moral Self-Knowledge in Kantian Ethics

Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics.