The psychology and philosophy of luck

There has been a great deal of interest in the concept of luck in the recent psychological and philosophical literature. In philosophy, this interest has tended to focus not upon luck simpliciter but rather upon the role that luck plays in ethical and epistemological debates concerning (respectively) moral and epistemic luck. In psychology, in contrast, a number of studies have explicitly examined our everyday conceptions of luck and the manner in which these conceptions influence our lives. This article surveys both the recent psychological and philosophical literature on this topic and argues that (to different degrees) the work of both disciplines in this area has been hampered by a failure to be clearer about what luck involves. Accordingly, this article offers a specification of what is core to the notion of luck and highlights how this analysis can aid further research in this area by both psychologists and philosophers.     

Moral philosophy and moral psychology in Mencius

This paper defends both an interpretation of Mencius’ moral theory and that theory itself against alternative interpretive defences. I argue that the ‘virtue ethics’ reading of Mencius wrongly sees him as denying the distinction between moral philosophy and moral psychology. Virtue ethics is flawed, because it makes such a denial. But Mencius’ moral theory, in spite of Mencius’ obvious interest in moral psychology, does not have that flaw. However, I argue that Mencius is no rationalist. Instead, I show that he upholds a coherentist moral theory, in which reason and psychology both have a role. The final third of the paper compares my interpretation with the work of various important Mencius scholars. I point out that the issue of the difference between moral philosophy and moral psychology is quite important in contemporary Western moral theory.     

The formalising tendency in philosophy and experimental psychology

This paper is an exercise in the phenomenology of science. It examines the tendency to prefer formal accounts in a familiar body of experimental psychology. It will argue that, because of this tendency, psychologists of this school neglect those forms of human cognition typical of the humanities disciplines. This is not a criticism of psychology, however. Such neglect is compatible with scientific rigour, provided it does not go unnoticed. Indeed, reflection on the case in hand allows us to refine the characterisation of the formalising tendency.     

Thomas Brown on the philosophy and psychology of perception

Thomas Brown's theory of perception is set in its philosophical context, and the influence of George Berkeley, David Hume, and Thomas Reid on Brown is discussed. Destutt de Tracy, who appears to have been an unacknowledged source for Brown's ideas, is also discussed. Brown's theory of perception is elaborated, and he is categorized both as a sense-datum theorist and as a phenomenalist.     

The relationship between scientific psychology and common-sense psychology

This paper explores the relationship between common-sense psychology (CSP) and scientific psychology (SP) — which we could call the mind-mind problem. CSP has come under much attack recently, most of which is thought to be unjust or misguided. This paper's first section examines the many differences between the aims, interests, explananda, explanantia, methodology, conceptual frameworks, and relationships to the neurosciences, that divide CSP and SP. Each of the two is valid within its own territory, and there is no competition between them — primarily because CSP is not, and has no interest in being, a scientific theory. In the second section some implications are drawn. First, neither CSP nor SP has the mind-body problem in its familiar form. Second, CSP, for excellent reasons, is not equipped to handle irrational or non-rational behaviour; there are some grounds for believing that this can and should be the task of SP. Third, philosophical psychology, or armchair theories of action, perception, etc., are doomed to failure. And, fourth, the realm of the psychological is so heterogeneous that no single model for either CSP or SP is likely to succeed.     

Some unresolved issues in philosophy and psychology: their implications for therapy

This paper is divided into two interrelated sections: the first section examines the scientific status of mainstream Western psychology. It will also consider the major arguments concerning the relationship of mainstream Western psychology to philosophy—in particular to metaphysics and the philosophy of science. It will be argued that psychology has turned away from its past philosophical heritage and has thus, short-changed itself by avoiding the very issues, which form an integral part of one's subjective and existential world and of the therapeutic process. The second section argues that, to a large measure the contemporary approaches to counselling and psychotherapy have moved away from the scientific ideologies, which guide research within mainstream Western psychology. Over the last 30 years or more, counselling and psychotherapy as ‘disciplines’ have proliferated into several sub-disciplines. This has made it difficult, if not impossible, to determine their pedigree and parentage. Although a great deal of ingenuity has gone into the construction of such new therapies, very little effort has gone into testing their validity. Unless serious attempts are made to bring about a rapprochement, it is likely to lead to a state of ‘epistemological anarchy’, or, anything goes.     

Laudan's normative naturalism: a useful philosophy of science for psychology

Logical positivism, widely regarded as the received epistemology of psychology in the first half of the 20th century, was supplanted in the 1960s by various postpositivistic, relativistic philosophies of science, most notably that of Kuhn. Recently, Laudan, a major figure in the philosophy of science, developed a novel approach called normative naturalism that provides an alternative to positivism and relativism. His central thesis is that the two are not always on opposite ends of a continuum but rather have many assumptions in common. This article brings Laudan's important views to the attention of psychologists and describes some of the unique implications of these views for the conduct of research and theory in psychology. These implications, which follow from a number of closely reasoned pragmatic arguments, include more realistic and appropriate evaluation of theory and methodology than has been suggested by logical positivism or relativism.     

The philosophy of the Yijing and Jungian analytical psychology: a comparative study

The Yijing (Book of Changes) occupied a very significant position in C.G. Jung’s mind, which was closely related to Richard Wilhelm’s active recommendation and introduction of the Yijing wisdom. Inspired by the Yijing, Jung set forth the ‘principle of synchronicity’, by which scholars tend to discuss the relationship between Yijing and Jungian psychology. In fact, Jungian analytical psychology conceives in-depth onto-cosmological connotations corresponding to the philosophy of the Yijing. The terms invented or employed by Jung such as ‘archetype’, ‘Self’, ‘individuation’, ‘mandala,’ ‘anima and animus’, ‘persona and shadow’ are interrelated with the connotations of Taiji (Supreme Ultimate) (○) and liang yi (two-mode) () in the Yijing philosophy. A comparative study of the two disciplines can help us gain a more comprehensive and deeper understanding of both, and further improve the exchanges of Eastern and Western cultures.