What Sort of Collective Afterlife Matters and How

In Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler argues that the assumption of a “collective afterlife” (i.e., the assumption that the human race and humanity lives on after our own individual deaths) plays an essential role in us valuing much of what we do. If a collective afterlife did not exist, our value structures would be radically different according to Scheffler. We would cease to value much of what we do. In Part I of the paper, I argue that there is something to Scheffler’s afterlife conjecture, but that Scheffler has misplaced the mattering of a collective afterlife. Its significance lies not in the realm of axiology but more importantly in coming to terms with the fact of death and in viewing our lives as having meaning. In Part II of the paper, I outline three views on the sort of collective afterlife that matters and argue in favor of the view that it must involve creatures that recognize our existence, reasons, values, and contributions (“The Recognition Thesis”) and the view that it must involve creatures that value similar things to us (“The Valuers Like Us Thesis”)—but argue against the view that it necessarily be a human collective afterlife (“The Human Form Thesis”).     

Geographies of Meaningful Living

Because it is significantly unclear what ‘meaningful’ does or should pick out when applied to a life, any account of meaningful living will be constructive and not merely clarificatory. Where in our conceptual geography is ‘meaningful’ best located? What conceptual work do we want the concept to do? What I call agent‐independent and agent‐independent‐plus conceptions of meaningfulness locate ‘meaningful’ within the conceptual geography of agent‐independent evaluative standards and assign ‘meaningful’ the work of commending lives. I argue that the not wholly welcome implications of these more dominant approaches to meaningfulness make it plausible to locate ‘meaningful’ on an alternative conceptual geography — that of agents as end‐setters and of agent‐dependent value assessments — and to assign it the work of picking out lives whose time‐expenditures are intelligible to the agent. I respond to the challenge confronting any subjectivist conception of meaningfulness that it is overly permissive.     

DOWNSHIFTING AND MEANING IN LIFE

So‐called downshifters seek more meaningful lives by decreasing the amount of time they devote to work, leaving more time for the valuable goods of friendship, family and personal development. But though these are indeed meaning‐conferring activities, they do not have the right structure to count as superlatively meaningful. Only in work – of a certain kind – can superlative meaning be found. It is by active engagements in projects, which are activities of the right structure, dedicated to the achievement of goods beyond ourselves, that we make our lives superlatively meaningful.     

Reasons for Randomness: A Solution to the Axiological Problem for Theists

Abstract

In this paper we bring to light several ways randomness—i.e., undetermined and unintended events—may contribute to our understanding of God's providence and personality. We begin by making clearer a certain problem that randomness has been thought to pose to theism. We then discuss recent criticisms of certain contemporary solutions to this problem that emphasize the value of an autonomous creation. From there, we propose a fresh way of understanding the value of a semi-autonomous creation that does not succumb to these recent critiques. Our end goal is to explore new reasons God might have to value randomness. In particular, we highlight two plausible, interrelated candidate values: (1) There are certain aesthetic properties that a partially random, self-forming creation enjoys; and (2) Such a creation grants God and creatures certain pleasures, such as wonder, anticipation, curiosity, surprise, and appreciation. In articulating our version of the autonomy defense, we position it within two opposing accounts of divine providence, specifically open theism and simple foreknowledge.     

Further Life Experiences Informing the Death and Adjustment Hypotheses

The meaning of life is never straight to us humans. At different turns of life, we perceive different meanings that are offered to us by our own lives. Near one’s death, professional disaster, enmity, family suffering, and fears for life all have their own dimensions. Nevertheless, when summing up, they seem to revolve around the same central themes again and again. In this article, we tried to offer the insights that we found from some very significant and traumatic events of our own lives through the spectacles of our theory—“Death and Adjustment Hypotheses.” Our life is always important; so is our peace and safety. But when we lose our values, we lose everything. It is often that we try to live through our offspring; however, it is our morality and humane values that can ultimately save them from the traumas of life and see them meaningfully through life and death as transcendental beings.     

Intuitive Dualism and Afterlife Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Study

It is widely held that intuitive dualism—an implicit default mode of thought that takes minds to be separable from bodies and capable of independent existence—is a human universal. Among the findings taken to support universal intuitive dualism is a pattern of evidence in which “psychological” traits (knowledge, desires) are judged more likely to continue after death than bodily or “biological” traits (perceptual, physiological, and bodily states). Here, we present cross-cultural evidence from six study populations, including non-Western societies with diverse belief systems, that shows that while this pattern exists, the overall pattern of responses nonetheless does not support intuitive dualism in afterlife beliefs. Most responses of most participants across all cultures tested were not dualist. While our sample is in no way intended to capture the full range of human societies and afterlife beliefs, it captures a far broader range of cultures than in any prior study, and thus puts the case for afterlife beliefs as evidence for universal intuitive dualism to a strong test. Based on these findings, we suggest that while dualist thinking is a possible mode of thought enabled by evolved human psychology, such thinking does not constitute a default mode of thought. Rather, our data support what we will call intuitive materialism—the view that the underlying intuitive systems for reasoning about minds and death produce as a default judgment that mental states cease to exist with bodily death.     

Optimistic Naturalism: Scientific Advancement and the Meaning of Life

Naturalist theories of the meaning of life are sometimes criticised for not setting the bar high enough for what counts as a meaningful life. Tolstoy’s version of this criticism is that Naturalist theories do not describe really meaningful lives because they do not require that we connect our finite lives with the infinite. Another criticism of Naturalist theories is that they cannot adequately resolve the Absurd—the vast difference between how meaningful our actions and lives appear from subjective and objective viewpoints. This article proposes a novel view, Optimistic Naturalism, in order to refute these criticisms. Optimistic Naturalism is the view that scientific and technological advancement might allow us to lead Truly Meaningful lives in a purely physical universe by enabling our actions, which we find meaningful partly because they might have particular infinite consequences, to actually have infinite consequences for life. The central tenets of Optimistic Naturalism are Infinite Consequence and Scientific Optimism. By explaining how the correct connection of the subjective and objective meaning of actions can result in True Meaning, Infinite Consequence provides a theoretical blueprint for resolving the Absurd. Scientific Optimism provides reason to think that it is possible to follow that blueprint in a purely physical universe. Therefore, when taken together, these two principles provide relatively plausible reasons to think that at least one kind of Naturalist theory can connect the finite with the infinite in a meaningful way and resolve the Absurd.     

Meaning in the lives of humans and other animals

This paper argues that contemporary philosophical literature on meaning in life has important implications for the debate about our obligations to non-human animals. If animal lives can be meaningful, then practices including factory farming and animal research might be morally worse than ethicists have thought. We argue for two theses about meaning in life: (1) that the best account of meaningful lives must take intentional action to be necessary for meaning—an individual’s life has meaning if and only if the individual acts intentionally in ways that contribute to finally valuable states of affairs; and (2) that this first thesis does not entail that only human lives are meaningful. Because non-human animals can be intentional agents of a certain sort, our account yields the verdict that many animals’ lives can be meaningful. We conclude by considering the moral implications of these theses for common practices involving animals.     

“They hate me now but where was everyone when I needed them?”: Mass incarceration,projective identification,and social work praxis

Mass incarceration has been thoroughly explored as a racial, social, and economic project. A psychoanalytic lens makes visible another dimension: the ways in which the dehumanization and criminalization of certain members of society forces them to function as repositories for the unbearable aspects of our otherwise shared humanity. In this article, I take a psychodynamic social work perspective and explore how the creation and maintenance of traumatogenic conditions, and the criminalization of the adaptations that people make to them, enables the logic of mass incarceration by taking a problem in the environment—one that implicates the collective—and relocates it inside the individual—as a person to be punished. Applying the concept of projective identification to these social-level dynamics, I argue that mass incarceration serves an important psychological function for society related to anxieties about racial and economic inequality and, as such, we continue to invest in mass incarceration despite its failure. I discuss its implications for social work praxis, emphasizing the need for both meaningful thought and effective action. I take an interdisciplinary approach and rely on psychoanalysis, sociology, criminology, and critical race studies in the hope of making clear the pernicious hold that mass incarceration has on the United States, and the work we must do as a collective to wrest ourselves from it.     

CREATED FOR EVERLASTING LIFE: CAN THEISTIC EVOLUTION PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE CHRISTIAN ACCOUNT OF HUMAN NATURE?

Christians who affirm standard science and the biblical doctrine of creation often endorse theistic evolution as the best approach to human origins. But theistic evolution is ambiguous. Some versions are naturalistic (NTE)—God created humans entirely by evolution—and some are supernaturalistic (STE)—God supernaturally augmented evolution. This article claims that NTE is inadequate as an account of human origins because its theological naturalism and emergent physicalist ontology of the soul or person conflict with the Christian doctrine that God created humans for everlasting life. Both the traditional Christian account of the afterlife and its modern Christian alternatives involve God's supernatural action and a separation (dualism) of person and body at death. STE can combine with several philosophical accounts of the body‐soul relation to provide an adequate Christian account of original human nature.     

On Becoming Creatures: Being Called to Presence in a Distracted World

In the biblical creation story human beings are depicted as beings ejected from the true home given to them in creation and entrapped in the dynamics of their flight from God. Franz Rosenzweig suggested that modern life is best understood as a type of chronic living death characterized by an animate but nevertheless sterile experience of loss. Following Eric Santner's presentation of this theme in Rosenzweig, this article will explore what it might mean to recover a sense of the goodness of place and particularity. I will examine Santner's suggestion that to become present to ‘place’ is to have undergone the ‘undeadening’ intervention of another person, who offers us an exit route in the midst of the tangle of our lived lives. I will then show how the main lines of his analysis both parallel and offer ways to sharpen important aspects of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's account in Creation and Fall of the dynamics of the Fall and the healing of creatures. Human beings are depicted by Bonhoeffer as in need of being transformed into creatures, a theological insight resting on a complex account of creation, and which I will suggest, in conclusion, is a particularly important theme of a Christian gospel that can speak to a world saturated by the desire to be elsewhere.     

Christ’s Love amid Pandemic

In 2022, the 11th Assembly of the World Council of Churches is to take place in Karlsruhe, Germany, at a time when nations are searching for the strength to rise out of the ashes of COVID-19. The assembly theme, “Christ’s love moves the world to reconciliation and unity,” reflects God’s vision for creation. The focus on Christ’s love and its inherent power to move the world to reconciliation and solidarity is necessary, as the assembly will gather amid perplexity, anxiety, and fundamental existential, structural, and societal questions. These questions are related to humanity’s place in creation: how we inhabit the earth and make sense of our own lives and the lives of other creatures and how we seek to develop collective human conscience to live justly and peacefully together in God’s world.     

Women's Lives/Feminist Knowledge: Feminist Standpoint as Ideology Critique

Feminist standpoint theory posits feminism as a way of conceptualizing from the vantage point of women's lives. However, in current work on feminist standpoint the material links between lives and knowledges are often not explained. This essay argues that the radical marxist tradition standpoint theory draws on—specifically theories of ideology post-Althusser—offers a systemic mode of reading that can redress this problem and provide the resources to elaborate further feminism's oppositional practice and collective subject.     

The three eras of cosmic evolution

The time‐honored concept of change seems capable of accounting for the appearance of matter from the primal energy of the Universe, and in turn for the emergence of life from that matter. As sentient beings, we, perhaps along with other advanced life forms in the cosmos, have become the collective consciousness of the Universe. Our raison d'etre is our ability to appreciate the cosmos—to wonder, to introspect, to abstract, to explain—for technological intelligence is a preeminently evolved agent of the Universe.     

Morality,Inescapable Rational Authority,and a God's Wishes

It is a supposed conceptual truth about moral norms that we have reason to comply with them even if we desire not to. This combination of rational authority and inescapability is thought to be incompatible with instrumentalism about practical reason. This essay argues that there are ways in which norms with inescapable rational authority can exist alongside instrumentalism about practical reason. One way involves positing an afterlife and a powerful supernatural agency—so, a kind of god—who has total control over our welfare in that afterlife. I go on to argue that the attitudes of this god would also provide something answering to our impressions of moral desert.     

Mathematics and Theology: A Stroll through the Garden of Mathaphors

Mathematics has long been considered the language of science and has even been acknowledged as the universal language of the future. Yet mathematics also plays a less-recognized religious role in that metaphors drawn from mathematics (mathaphors) can influence our spiritual perspectives by helping us to entertain new religious ideas and to challenge old ones. Mathaphors are therefore useful tools in matheology (the study of mathematics and theology). This essay explores ten ways in which contemporary mathaphors affect our spiritual lives. Specifically, mathaphors are: changing our metaphors for God; challenging our human role in the universe; helping us accept ambiguity; revamping our understanding of the one and the many; revising our thoughts about free will and determinism; moving us toward pluralistic, multi-world views; pushing the envelope on what consciousness is; altering our expectations for afterlife; offering the hope of a more compassionate future; encouraging faith perspectives that are always incomplete and in process.     

Mutual mother–offspring vocal recognition in an ungulate hider species (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Capra hircus</Emphasis>)

Parent–offspring recognition can be essential for offspring survival and important to avoid misdirected parental care when progeny mingle in large social groups. In ungulates, offspring antipredator strategies (hiding vs. following) result in differences in mother–offspring interactions, and thus different selection pressures acting on the recognition process during the first weeks of life. Hider offspring are isolated and relatively stationary and silent to avoid detection by predators, whereas follower offspring are mobile and rapidly mix in large social groups. For these reasons, hiders have been suggested to show low offspring call individuality leading to unidirectional recognition of mothers by offspring and followers high offspring call individuality and mutual recognition. We hypothesised that similar differences would exist in hider species between the hiding phase (i.e. unidirectional recognition) and the phase when offspring join social groups (i.e. mutual recognition). We tested these predictions with goats (Capra hircus), a hider species characterised by strong mother–offspring attachment. We compared the individuality of kid and mother calls, and the vocal recognition ability, during the early phase of life when kids are usually hidden and later when kids have typically joined social groups. Contrary to our predictions, we found that both kids and mothers had individualised contact calls and that mutual recognition existed even during the hiding phase. The large differences in the duration of the hiding phase and in the rate of mother–offspring interactions (possibly partially driven by domestication in some species) probably cause variations among hider species in the mother–offspring recognition process.     

Inheriting the Shadow: Unlived Lives,Unshed Tears

The determination and courage of those whose lives were destroyed by terror, whether the Holocaust or extermination, to move forward in a new life modeled for us, the children, an unspoken mandate to live in the present and to bury the shadows of the past. It has left many of us to face the challenge of finding our center, the anchoring of our being in our lives: personally, professionally, collectively, and culturally. The next generation is not able to mourn lives lost, and being in the present without a past, without links to ethnic cultures or heritage, isolates individuals and affects the collective—indeed, there is no collective except in the communal silences. This article explores the impact of dismembered personal and collective bonds and the need to re-member, resulting in relationships that can move into the future, into the center.     

Meaning without fulfilment

Some philosophers argue that a necessary component of a meaningful life is positive affect. The implication of this type of view is that a meaningful life necessarily feels good. I respond primarily to Susan Wolf's version of this type of view; for Wolf, meaningful lives are necessarily fulfilling lives. In contrast to Wolf, I argue that people do sometimes find parts of their lives to be meaningful when the feeling of fulfilment is absent. I propose an alternative subjective condition that does not involve positive affect. I argue that meaningful parts of our lives obtain their value through their relationship to our practical identities.     

A new member of the family? The continuum of being,artificial intelligence,and the image of God

Abstract

Are the scientific and religious definitions of life irreconcilable or do they overlap in significant areas? What is life? Religion seems to imply that there is a qualitative distinction between human beings and the rest of creation; however, there is a strong tradition in Christianity and in Eastern thought that suggests that the natural world also has a relationship with God. Human dominion over other parts of creation exists, but does not obviate this connection, nor give humans a circle unto themselves. The concept of humans being created in the image of God can be used to explain why we might believe humans are in a circle unto themselves, yet we can expand this concept to include artificially intelligent computers, a new potential member of the cognitive family. Our quest for artificial intelligence tells us both what we value in our humanity, and how we might extend that valuation to the rest of creation.